Master Negotiator: The Role of James A. Baker, III at the End of the Cold War. Diana Villiers Negroponte. Bloomington, IN: Archway Publishing, 2020.
Unlike The Man Who Ran Washington: The Life and Times of James A. Baker III from Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Diana Villiers Negroponte’s Master Negotiator: The Role of James A. Baker, III at the End of the Cold War focuses on James Baker’s time as secretary of state rather than his entire career in Washington. By focusing on this phase of Baker’s career, Negroponte still presents a thorough and rigorous analysis.
The title of Negroponte’s book nicely sums up her work. Her first four segments explore questions and themes related to James Baker’s overall time as secretary of state. She explores the real goal for the foreign policy review initiated by the National Security Council and how it affected all aspects of President George H.W. Bush’s administration; the challenges of German reunification and Germany’s admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the response of the United States to the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre; and the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Negroponte focuses her three remaining themes on issues about the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Europe. She analyzes the challenges and issues the Baltics, Yugoslavia, and Ukraine presented; the Bush administration’s reaction to the failed coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev; and the tense negotiations with the Soviet Union, and later Russia, over American loans and credits.
Throughout the book, Negroponte depicts Baker as a secretary of state who negotiated strong and impressive deals with a variety of nations regarding security, loans, and other issues of international and national security. Through the title and her methodology, the author tries to show Baker as a master negotiator. One of the best examples is through his support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Yet, Baker was not able to successfully negotiate a settlement of issues related to Israel and Palestine, to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia into ethnic warfare, or to avoid problems concerning Iraq after the Gulf War or those connected to the Tiananmen Square massacre. For some incidents, like Tiananmen Square, Baker deferred to President Bush to address the crisis. For the others mentioned, Baker made attempts, but crises in these regions continued for years or even decades afterward. The author attempts to show that Baker did all in his power to resolve or prevent these crises; his inability to solve them, however, undermines the depiction of him as a master negotiator.
President George H. W. Bush with James Baker in 1990 (George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum/Wikimedia)
The narrative that Negroponte depicts of Baker’s time as secretary of state resembles not so much a master negotiator, but rather a master crisis manager. The author depicts the numerous challenges Baker and the United States faced between 1989 and August 1992 when Baker left the State Department to become Chief of Staff to George H.W. Bush. The Gulf War, Tiananmen Square, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism in Europe, the Middle East peace process, and the ethnic fighting that erupted in Yugoslavia were just some of the challenges that Baker faced. With these, and other challenges, the author presents Baker as a capable and able secretary of state. Yet, the limitations Baker sometimes faced in trying to get parties to negotiate—in Yugoslavia and in the Middle East, for example—are expertly described by the author and illustrate how it was sometimes not possible for Baker to juggle and balance the interests of the parties involved to achieve a negotiated settlement. Negroponte, rather than depicting a master negotiator, presents an able member of Bush’s administration working to implement his policies, but facing limits, even at the height of America’s power and prestige at the end of the Cold War and America’s victory in the first Gulf War.
Negroponte conducted significant research in writing this book, with ample sources cited that include interviews, newspapers, books, articles, and other sources. The book would be a stronger asset for researchers, however, if it included an index. The organization of the book via seven main themes works to focus the reader on some key issues Baker faced as secretary of state. The drawback to this thematic approach, however, is that the chronology of events sometimes gets lost. Baker faced multiple challenges at the same time. A thematic approach, rather than a chronological one, does not illustrate just how many international issues Baker managed concurrently. If such a chronological approach had been offered, readers would have a better appreciation for the complex issues and negotiations that Baker had to manage.
The style and focus of this book make it a good source for readers wanting an introduction to either the foreign policy of the Bush administration or events leading to the end of the Cold War. Stylistically, the book flows in a more journalistic fashion than scholarly. This is not to say the work is not rigorous in its sources. It is, but it does not read like a typical scholarly work of history. Negroponte’s narration of events is suitable for this work that is covering several major events over four years. If, however, readers want more in-depth analysis or detail on a particular event, like Yugoslavia, they should consult other sources. Even so, the amount of information provided by the author is enough to whet readers’ appetites for more.
By focusing this book on Baker’s work as secretary of state, the reader gets an in-depth and intense study of one of Baker’s most public works in government service. The author does provide some interesting personal vignettes, especially between Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze, and how Baker organized the State Department when he became secretary. The focus of this work, however, is his public, foreign policy contributions. This is not a book that focuses on Baker’s private life or life before or after becoming secretary of state. This is not meant as a criticism, but if a reader wishes a more fully biographical study on James Baker, they should consult other sources. This study is a solid work into the accomplishments and events faced by secretary of state James Baker during a complicated and tumultuous time in history.
Javan David Frazier is Professor of History at Middle Georgia State University-Cochran Campus. Dr. Frazier’s academic interests are in the Cold War and particularly U.S.-South African nuclear relations. He has written several reviews for H-War and this is his first for The Strategy Bridge.
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Header Image: Secretary of State James A. Baker at the United Nations, 1990. (Chester Higgins Jr./The New York Times)
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