Alysha Taylor and Jeff Turner
Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our sixth annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present an essay selected for Honorable Mention from Alysha Taylor and Jeff Turner, recent graduates from The Eisenhower School of National Security and Resources Strategy.
“No institution will remain successful without adapting to its constantly changing environment. Our armed forces must adapt to changing threats, evolving technology, reconfigured organizational structures, and new strategies and structures.”
—Base Realignment and Closure Commission, 2005[1]
The need for U.S. armed forces to adapt to changing threats is intensifying as near-peer competitors begin to outpace U.S. military advantages.[2] However, competing interests within the military-industrial-congressional complex (MICC) constrain and undermine the services’ efforts to make real change. While this is not a new phenomenon, finding a path to break the current deadlock is becoming more urgent. The status quo leaves little room to improve the capabilities the American warfighter relies upon to protect U.S. national security.
Exploring how previous Congresses resolved similar tensions at a different inflection point is instructive. For example, the creation of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission broke through the parochial concerns of individual members of Congress to allow for the thoughtful consideration of the services’ domestic footprint as the force downsized.[3] The process closed or realigned obsolete or under-utilized bases, allowing the associated human and financial resources to shift to more productive endeavors.
While today’s challenges are different, the parochial political concerns that forced American taxpayers to support obsolete bases for over a decade are comparable to the concerns inhibiting the Department of Defense from sunsetting dated systems and platforms. Driven by an interest in keeping jobs in their districts, Congress sometimes funds outdated programs. At the same time, older equipment has higher sustainment costs, limiting the Department's ability to invest in new capabilities that will be instrumental in maintaining America's strategic and technological advantages in the era of great power competition.
A new paradigm is imperative to maintain the United States’ technological superiority, but it cannot happen unless the Department can shed obsolete capabilities. We propose a board of experts to thoughtfully decide which systems no longer support mission objectives after exploring a few illustrative examples.
The Size of the Problem
According to Citizens Against Government Waste, over the last ten years, members of Congress have added $4.8 billion to the defense budget in areas not requested by the administration and increased presidential budget requests by over $43.8 billion in that same period.[4] Two programs that have benefitted from parochial earmarks despite best military advice are the Army's M1 Abrams tank and the Air Force's A-10 Warthog.[5]
Equipment
M1 Abrams (U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center)
In 2012, Gen. Ray Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, testified that the minimum sustain rate for the Abrams tanks was 70 per year and that with roughly 9,000 tanks between the Army and Marines, the Army did not have an immediate need for more tanks.[6] Despite this advice and the Army's intent to develop equipment for urban warfare, Congress added $183 million for Abrams tanks to the fiscal year 2013 appropriations.[7] In December 2014, congress added $120 million more for Abrams tank upgrades.[8] Support continued regularly through fiscal year 2021 when Senator Tim Ryan (D-OH) secured an additional $65M for Abrams M1 program upgrades in his state's General Dynamics factory.[9]
This direction from Congress pushed the Army to undertake a modernization plan for the M1 called the System Enhancement Package (SEP) v3, which increased the electrical power margin, added a Vehicle Health Management System, integrated new counter-improvised explosive device protection, and improved fuel efficiency, among other additions. However, these enhancements do not scale down the M1to solve reported maneuverability problems associated with urban warfare.[10] Furthermore, the SEP v3 model is too heavy to be transported by current recovery vehicles, equipment transporters, or to cross tactical bridges.[11] Interviews with armor crews in Iraq confirmed the M1 was too heavy for many bridges and too large to traverse as much as 1/3 of the urban area of operations in Iraq.[12]
Despite these persistent shortcomings and operational gaps, between 2015 and 2020, the Army spent over $13.3 billion on more than 1,700 M1 SEP v3 upgrade packages.[13] A new M1 Abrams costs the Army around $8 million compared with $7.8 million per upgrade, making the upgrades for an inadequate solution nearly as expensive as the original tank.
Missions
A U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II over the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, June 29, 2020. (SSgt Justin Parsons/U.S. AF Photo)
Debates across the services over capabilities, budgets, and "roles and missions" have also contributed to a fiscal tug-a-war. One example is the A-10 Warthog, which the Air Force developed in the 1970s to execute the Close Air Support (CAS) mission and keep the associated funding rather than let the Army improve helicopters for CAS.[14] Highly specialized to meet the CAS mission, the A-10 excels at low speed, low altitude, and high maneuverability flight.[15] However, the slow, detectable A-10 proved easy to shoot down with shoulder-launched missile systems during the Iraq War – a significant liability when providing air coverage to ground troops.[16]
In contrast, the Air Force’s F-35A provides multi-mission support and better competes with countries, like China, that have advanced anti-aircraft capabilities.[17] Sunsetting the forty-five-year-old A-10s could provide approximately $4.2 billion in operations and maintenance savings over five years, freeing up funding to support F-35s.[18] However, some in Congress preferred to keep the A-10s, fearing the loss of bases that maintain those planes and the corresponding economic support to the surrounding communities.[19] In the meantime, the Army spent billions in taxpayer money to develop the Apache helicopter to meet the CAS mission.[20] The parochial economic interests underlying these earmarks are largely analogous to those in play as the forces downsized and suddenly had dozens of obsolete bases.
Depoliticizing Base Closures
In the late 1980s, Representative Richard Armey (R-TX), a former economics chair at West Texas State University, introduced legislation to reduce the politicization of military base closures. In introducing the bill, Rep. Armey asserted, “We must eliminate obsolete military bases which serve no purpose except to advance the parochial interests of individual Members of Congress. We must eliminate pork barrel bases.”[21] Congress had effectively blocked the administration's prerogative to manage domestic bases through the 1977 O'Neill-Cohen amendment, which Rep. Armey characterized as requiring "DOD to carry out complex and time-consuming environmental impact statements (EIS) before a base can be shut down."[22] Any EIS was subject to judicial challenge, allowing interested parties to entangle a proposed base closing in unending legal proceedings. However, Congress' adoption of the O'Neill-Cohen amendment was not without provocation. Previous administrations had used the threat of a base closure to intimidate members of Congress on key votes. This approach led members to view new base closing proposals as political retaliation.[23] Between 1977 and 1987, DoD could not close a single major base, after unilaterally closing around 500 bases in the early 1970s.[24]
Out of concern for the growing federal budget deficit, Rep. Armey wanted to break the stalemate. He created a process to depoliticize base closures so that members of Congress would agree to waive the EIS and other requirements. The ultimate result, embodied in the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, promised up to $5 billion in annual budget savings.[25] Considered a success, the process, with modifications, underlaid successive rounds in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005.[26]
Starting in 1988, Congress delegated validation of the DoD's base-closing proposals to an independent commission to achieve a balance of interests. Commission members were appointed by the president in consultation with Congressional leadership and confirmed by the Senate. These experts, usually with relevant military or public service backgrounds, had the wherewithal to consult with a wide variety of stakeholders across all the relevant bases as part of their deliberations.[27]
Initially, the Secretary of Defense developed the criteria to evaluate the bases with public input until congress codified it in 2004.[28] That codification prioritized the consideration of military value followed by potential cost savings, the economic impact on nearby communities, the ability of the receiving community to support the additional forces, missions and personnel, and the environmental impact and remediation costs.[29] In addition, the Secretary had to certify that based on a force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory, a need existed for further closures or realignments, which would result in annual net savings for each of the military departments.[30]
Once the Secretary completed his certification and evaluation, the list of bases would be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to Congressional defense committees and the BRAC Commission by May 16.[31] The Commission had until September 8 to conduct required public hearings, undertake site visits, and transmit its recommendations to the president. The constrained scope of inquiry and public process helped eliminate the risk of political motivations underlying the Secretary's recommendations. Subject to certain constraints, the Commission could add bases or remove bases and recommend realignments to consolidate capability locations and support. Once the president received the Commission's recommendations, he had 45 days to accept or reject the Commission's list in its entirety.[32] Once accepted, "BRAC implementation begins by default unless congress rejects the implementation in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution."[33] The Supreme Court’s ruling Dalton v. Spector, 511 US 462, held that a president’s actions were not reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act because the president is not an “agency.” This effectively eliminated the risk of endless litigation.
The BRAC process worked because it brought in experts who could take the time to learn the issues, consult with the communities, and make informed decisions that considered the full range of stakeholders. It also worked because it shifted power from individual members of Congress focused on parochial concerns to majority votes that could consider the needs of the nation as a whole.
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (Chief Photographer's Mate Johnny Bivera/U.S. Navy Photo/Wikimedia)
A Commission for Program Reviews
Congress should authorize a similar process to facilitate the sunsetting of obsolete programs through a new Joint Program Review and Modernization Board (JPRMB). This should include adjustments to the military value criteria used under BRAC to make it relevant to systems and platforms rather than bases. The Secretary would then consider those criteria in conjunction with a long-term force-structure plan to determine which programs should sunset or be realigned. That analysis would become part of the public record to be considered by the JPRMB, which would be comprised of independent experts, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Those experts would substantiate the Secretary's recommendations and expand the scope of inquiry to consider economic impacts. The final recommendations would be submitted to a president constrained to accepting or rejecting the whole set of recommendations, with automatic implementation unless the House of Representatives and the Senate jointly disapprove.
Congress should consider a few additional deviations from the BRAC model relating to the frequency of reviews, the appointee process, the applicable criteria, the scope and authority of the JPRMB, and the future use of the savings.
Under the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510), Congress authorized three rounds of the base closure determinations in quick succession (1991, 1993, and 1995). That frequency may have contributed to the intensity of the public debate and left little time for states to implement mitigation measures before a new round started. Extending the time between rounds to every six years could achieve the desired goal while allowing impacted companies and communities more time to adjust. This could reduce opposition to platform sunset proposals at the start of new rounds.
One of the many things that has changed in the last thirty years is the time to confirm political appointees, having nearly doubled from an average of 62 days under President G.H.W Bush to 115 days under President Trump.[34] To ensure that the JPRMB has enough time to properly consult with the stakeholders and deliberate within the non-election year, Congress should devise a mechanism to expedite the consent process. For example, Congress should replicate the original nomination deadline (e.g., the first day of the congressional session), incorporate a reasonable time limit for Senate action, and create an automatic alternative if confirmation exceeds the time limit. This alternative might substitute the highest-ranking career military officers and senior executives working in specified agencies for unconfirmed nominees.[35] The substitutes may need to be dedicated full-time to their Board role to ensure that the review process and impacted stakeholders receive adequate attention. Implementing this automatic option would limit the ability of an individual senator to block the JPRMB’s establishment and subsequent review.
Three other adjustments relate to the applicable criteria. The first would expand the relevant stakeholders. Sunsetting a program, as opposed to a base, would impact the firm producing or sustaining the capability or platform and its subcontractors, in addition to the communities hosting the production and providing workers. To ensure that the Board considers the full range of perspectives, Congress could require that it assess the firm, its employees and subcontractors, and the firm’s position in the overall industrial base. Additionally, Congress should require consideration of the full capability or platform costs, from acquisition to operation and sustainment, both during and beyond the expected lifecycle, to decommissioning. This analysis would provide a more fulsome understanding of potential savings and account for the tendency of the military to keep equipment well beyond the intended end of life. Lastly, the JPRMB should consider the desired alternative's technological readiness—essentially, is the alternative under consideration revolution or evolution? Capabilities that will be replaced by revolutionary alternatives may need a longer transition period to allow new technologies the time to be adequately proven and tested.
Akin to the idea of base realignment, the JPRMB should have the authority to realign specific missions across services. For example, rather than the Army and Air Force both spending billions of dollars developing competing CAS programs or distracting active service members with debates over parochial service interests, the JPRMB could conduct a thoughtful and deliberate assessment of the options across all services and all military accounts before recommending a particular course of action. Shifting this responsibility from the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense to the Board experts helps to mitigate the competing interests, short tenures, and everyday duty demands that inhibit current military leaders from giving those program decisions the analysis they deserve.
The final adjustment to consider relates to the savings. While some funding would be needed temporarily to help impacted firms and communities transition away from the sunsetting program, the rest could be maintained in Budget Function 050: The National Defense. Keeping the authorized spending-level stable in the same budget function, even as obsolete programs are ended, will ensure that the money remains available for other defense spending, rather than be reallocated to any of the other 19 budget functions covered in Congress’ budget resolution.[36] This allocation model would limit potential reallocation of congressional spending authority, while providing impacted communities with funding to capitalize or incentivize new local businesses for job replacement, and allowing the military to pursue advanced capabilities and platforms. As congress considers the transition funds, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program could offer a helpful supplement to community-based economic development grants.[37] Congress may also want to legislate other constraints on transition support to ensure that a president could not selectively offset the economic impact of a discontinued or realigned capability.[38] A fair allocation would be necessary to avoid parochial politicization of the process.
Conclusion
After five rounds of closing and realigning over 100 obsolete bases, DoD estimated the Department saved $12 billion annually.[39] At the same time, CRS reported that the base closures and realignments generally did not have dire community effects, particularly when there was timely economic redevelopment.[40] As proposed, the JPRMB should have similar outcomes. However, unlike BRAC, the ultimate goal of this board should not be limited to deficit reduction but rather whether taxpayer money is used in the manner that best achieves U.S. national security through a better equipped and structured force.
The U.S. defense budget is larger than the defense spending of the following eleven countries combined, partly due to the maintenance of aging platforms.[41] At the same time, other countries are winning the race to new capabilities. An expert joint program review and modernization board can help America realign its priorities and regain its technological advantage.
Alysha Taylor has served as the Senior Advisor to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Services. Alysha has held several trade policy positions in the Department’s International Trade Administration, including advising senior officials and coordinating the Department’s engagement in free trade agreement negotiations. Before her time at Commerce, she worked at a law firm, in non-profits, and had internships with the U.S. Senate and World Trade Organization. Alysha earned a LL.M. from Georgetown University, a J.D. from George Mason University, and a B.A. from the American University of Paris. She is a 2022 graduate of The Eisenhower School.
Jeff Turner works for the Army G-6 overseeing the Army’s global IT infrastructure modernization of data and voice networks and supporting equipment. Previously he served as Nuclear Field Machinist Mate aboard the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) from 1992-1995. After leaving the Navy, he managed IT infrastructure at several start-ups in Sacramento and San Francisco where he ensured IT continuity across a range of environments in the medical, financial, and software development sectors. In 2002, he became an IT Specialist for the Department of the Army. He graduated from University of Maryland in 2005 with a BA in English, and he is a 2022 graduate of The Eisenhower School.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of National Defense University, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: An aerial view of the Pentagon, 11 May 2021. ()SSgt Brittany A. Chase/DoD Photo)
Notes:
[1] Anthony J. Principi et al., “2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report,” September 8, 2005.
[2] “Hypersonic Weapons Development in China, Russia and the United States: Implications for American Security Policy,” AUSA, March 23, 2022, https://www.ausa.org/publications/hypersonic-weapons-development-china-russia-and-united-states-implications-american.
[3] David E Lockwood and George Siehl, “Military Base Closures: A Historical Review from 1988 to 1995,” Congressional Research Service, October 18, 2004, 20.
[4] A“Earmark Database,” Citizens Against Government Waste, accessed April 14, 2022, https://www.cagw.org/reporting/earmarks from 2012-2021.
[5] Matthew Cox, “Pentagon Tells Congress to Stop Buying Equipment It Doesn’t Need,” Military.com, October 31, 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/01/28/pentagon-tells-congress-to-stop-buying-equipment-it-doesnt-need.html.
[6] “Army Fiscal Year 2013 Budget | C-SPAN.Org,” § Committee on Armed Services (2002), https://www.c-span.org/video/?304483-1/army-fiscal-year-2013-budget; Army Fiscal Year 2013 Budget | C-SPAN.org.
[7] Cox, “Stop.”
[8] Cox.
[9] “Congressman Ryan Secures $65 Million for Abrams Tank Modernization,” Representative Tim Ryan, accessed April 13, 2022, http://timryan.house.gov/media/press-releases/congressman-ryan-secures-65-million-abrams-tank-modernization.
[10] Jeremy M Zollin, “MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Joint Planning Studies,” n.d., 157.
[11] Jen Judson, “Creeping Weight of Abrams Tank Concerns Pentagon’s Chief Weapons Tester,” Defense News, January 26, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/01/26/creeping-weight-of-abrams-tank-concerns-pentagons-chief-weapons-tester/; Dave Majumdar, “Inside the US Army’s Lethal New M1A2 SEP v3 Abrams Main Battle Tank,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, June 2, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/inside-the-us-armys-lethal-new-m1a2-sep-v3-abrams-main-16445; “Abrams Main Battle Tank,” Military, March 29, 2022, https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/abrams-main-battle-tank/.
[12] Zollin, “MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Joint Planning Studies.”
[13] “Justification Book,” n.d., 261.
[14] Joint Publication 3-09.3; Zach Beauchamp, “This Airplane Is Hammering ISIS. So Why Is the Air Force Trying to Kill It? - Vox,” Vox, January 26, 2015, https://www.vox.com/2015/1/26/7871943/a-10-warthog; It is worth noting that the Air Force was more interested in the long range bomber and air-to-air combat missions, and only developed the A-10 to prevent the Army from developing the Cobra, the predecessor to the Apache, and taking over the CAS mission. Arden B. Dahl, “The Warthog. The Best Deal the Air Force Never Wanted:” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1, 2003), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA442118.
[15] “A-10C Thunderbolt II,” Air Force, accessed April 19, 2022, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104490/a-10c-thunderbolt-ii/.
[16] Beauchamp, “Beauchamp, ‘Hammering ISIS’”; Sebastien Roblin, “Can the A-10 Warthog Defeat Its Toughest Enemy?,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, August 19, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-the-10-warthog-defeat-its-toughest-enemy-17413.
[17] David Roza, “Senate to Air Force: You’re Gonna Keep Your A-10 Warthogs and You’re Gonna like It,” Task & Purpose (blog), July 29, 2021, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-a-10-warthog-funding/.
[18] “Soldiers Fight to Save the A-10 Warthog,” Bloomberg.Com, May 16, 2014, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-15/soldiers-fight-to-save-a-10-warthog-jet.
[19] Roza, “Senate to Air Force.”
[20] Oriana Pawlyk, “Congress Rebuffs Air Force’s Plan to Retire Older Aircraft, Putting A-10 Move on Hold,” Military.com, July 28, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/07/28/congress-rebuffs-air-forces-plan-retire-older-aircraft-putting-10-move-hold.html; “50 A-10 Facts: Interesting Features of the Warthog,” Military Machine, August 12, 2020, https://militarymachine.com/a-10-warthog/.
[21] Richard Armey, “Politics of the Pork Barrel” (House Floor Statement, Washington, D.C., April 13, 1988), 134 Cong Rec H 1615.
[22] “Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978,” Pub. L. No. 95–82, § 612, 10 USC §2687 (1977). Sec. 612; Christopher T Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress,” n.d., 45.; Armey, “Pork Barrel.”
[23] Closing Military Bases | Interview with Rep. Richard Armey (R-Texas) (C-SPAN, 1988), https://www.c-span.org/video/?2488-1/closing-military-bases; Lockwood and Siehl, “97-305 F.”
[24] “Economic Policy 1987: Bases: A History of Protection by the System,” in CQ Almanac 1987, vol. 43, CQ Almanac Online Edition (Washington, D.C., United States: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 441, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal87-1144056. Prior to 1977, the management of which bases to close or add was largely an executive branch decision. After the imposition of the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act requirements to military bases through the O’Neill-Cohen amendment, Defense Secretary Frank C Carlucci noted that the new requirements would tie a base closing up in “knots forever by endless procedures and litigation and political pressure to the point where the Defense Department finally throws up its hands and says ‘We just cannot do this.’” (as quoted in the above document)
[25] P.L. 100-526. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIV of PL 101-510) created three additional commissions to operate in 1991, 1993 and 1995; Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress,” 4; Armey, “Pork Barrel.” Remarks made by Rep. Upton. In April 2022, the amount would be between $6.075 billion and $12.2 billion. Calculated at OfficialData.Org on April 13, 2022.
[26] Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990), and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, (P.L. 107-107; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510) .
[27] “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC),” April 30, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190430171317/https://www.brac.gov/.
[28] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (As amended through FY 05 Authorization Act) §2903(a), accessed at https://web.archive.org/web/20190524115712/https://www.brac.gov/docs/BRAC05Legislation.pdf on April 14, 2022; “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,” Pub. L. No. 108–375 (2004) §2913.
[29] The military value criteria included four distinct components (FY2005 NDAA, §2913):
The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
[30] “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (PL 101-510 Section 2901 et Seq.) as Amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, (PL 107-107 Section 3001 et Seq.) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, (PL 108-375 Section 2913 et Seq.),” United States § (2019). §2912(b).
[31] Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (PL 101-510 section 2901 et seq.) as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, (PL 107-107 section 3001 et seq.) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, (PL 108-375 section 2913 et seq.). §2914
[32] Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress.”
[33] Mann, 2.
[34] “Senate Confirmation Process Slows to a Crawl” (Partnership for Public Service: Center for Presidential Transition, January 20, 2020), https://presidentialtransition.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2020/01/Senate-Confirmations-Issue-Brief.pdf.
[35] See e.g., “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020: Export-Import Bank Extension,” Pub. L. No. 116–94, § 409, 12 US § 635a(c)(6)(B) (2019); Agencies that should be consider include the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury as well as the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Small Business Administration. Each of those agencies would have valuable perspectives to add to the process.
[36] “Budget Functions,” House Budget Committee Democrats, March 31, 2016, https://budget.house.gov/budgets/budget-functions.
[37] “Law | U.S. Department of Labor,” accessed May 25, 2022, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/tradeact/laws.
[38] “Officials Should Resign Over Base Closing, House Leader Says,” accessed April 12, 2022, https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/1998/05/05/officials-should-resign-over-base-closing-house-leader-says/62282581007/.
[39] Mann, “Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress,” 10.
[40] Tadlock Cowan, “Military Base Closures: Socioeconomic Impacts,” RS22147, n.d., 9.
[41] “U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other Countries,” accessed April 20, 2022, https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison.