Colin P. Mahle and Amanda B. Cronkhite
All Americans—be they beach-going Floridians, skiing Coloradans, or ranch-owning Texans—are citizens of an Arctic nation. But how many realize that? A lack of national Arctic identity has contributed to a minimalist approach to policy in the Arctic region, leaving the U.S. strategically vulnerable. With Russia’s Northern Sea Route and Canada’s Northwest Passage both likely open year-round by the early 2030s, Arctic policy indecision is a huge blind spot in great power competition. Although Arctic awareness is slowly increasing as a topic in American policy circles, twenty-first century U.S. Arctic Policy has remained minimally resourced and underprioritized. If policymakers fail to address these strategic shortfalls, the U.S. risks Arctic irrelevance by 2030.[1]
Background
The changing Arctic environmental, economic, and diplomatic conditions have increased the analysis of U.S. national security and Arctic policy. Research of note includes Stephen Haycox’ exhaustive study of U.S. Arctic policy, which affirmed the United States’ propensity to focus on scientific research and be historically slow to develop Arctic policy objectives.[2] Others, such as David Auerswald, focused on contemporary U.S. Arctic policy shortfalls such as how the lack of a current national Arctic strategy is a critical national security omission that inhibits cross-governmental synchronization.[3] Highlighting the foreign policy implications of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan examined how the Arctic Council’s decision to pause its working groups has provided Russia a strategic opportunity to strengthen evolving Arctic partnerships with China, India, and the United Arab Emirates.[4] In terms of strategic capabilities, Jeremy Greenwood contends that an aging U.S. icebreaker fleet combined with acquisition delays presents a critical shortfall that is impeding U.S. Arctic maritime presence.[5]
The U.S. has officially been an Arctic nation since it acquired Alaska in 1867.[6] But the Arctic has always been geographically and psychologically far away. The most direct ground route from the Alaskan capital in Juneau to Washington, DC, is over 3,700 miles, and goes through much of Canada.[7] One of the southernmost of the Alaskan islands—Prince of Wales Island—is nearly 700 miles straight line distance from Seattle.[8] The Department of Defense and other agencies draw a distinction between CONUS (continental United States) and OCONUS (outside of the continental U.S.), effectively othering Alaska, Hawaii and other U.S. lands to secondary status.
The large geographic distance between CONUS and Alaska discourages types of social interactions between Alaskans and other Americans that typically occur along state borders. Alaskan citizens and indigenous groups maintain a proud heritage of arctic identity, but this regional sentiment has proven unable to populate national arctic awareness.[9] A lack of awareness means national Arctic legislation consistently fights an uphill battle, as it is exceedingly easy for executive and legislative branch policymakers to misclassify national Arctic policy issues as internal Alaskan state concerns.
U.S. Arctic policy is not nonexistent, but rather outdated and neglected. The modern roots of national Arctic awareness start in the Cold War, with the admission of Alaska to the Union in 1959.[10] The catalyst that facilitated the development of initial Arctic policy was discovery of significant oil reserves in Prudhoe Bay in 1968.[11] This discovery enabled an Arctic policy framework under Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton, but did not adequately prioritize policy objectives and failed to spark a comprehensive approach toward U.S. Arctic policy in the twenty-first century.[12] As two Air Force professors recently pointed out, “while U.S. leaders have had spurts of polar interest throughout the years, with occasional demonstrations of presence and power projection, polar apathy has been the norm.”[13]
Why should this matter to the citizens of an Arctic nation? Due to sea-ice reduction and corresponding economic growth, within a decade the Arctic is likely to rival any theater for global economic and political significance.[14] It would be imprudent and irresponsible for the U.S. to remain indifferent and cede this strategically critical region through policy inaction or indecision.
Yet ceding the region is exactly what we seem to be doing. Other nations are observing U.S. Arctic policy shortfalls and eagerly advancing their Arctic objectives. The Obama administration published the National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013, but it has not been updated since.[15] This lack of strategic direction leaves national Arctic policy objectives ambiguous for policymakers and our Arctic allies. Although recent departmental strategies—including the 2019 Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security’s 2021 Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security—have strengthened departmental actions, national level synchronization remains unrealized.[16]
In contrast, Canada appointed their first Circumpolar Ambassador in 1994, was instrumental to the Arctic Council creation in 1996, and has had a formal Arctic strategy since 2009.[17] In 2019 Canada published its Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, developed through collaboration with provincial and indigenous leadership, outlining its national objectives through 2030.[18] Similarly, Russia has been engaged in Arctic territorial disputes with Norway since the mid-1970s, and published their first Arctic strategy in 2001.[19] Their current strategy projects national interests through 2035, and highlights concern over future Arctic conflict.[20] China, a self-proclaimed near-Arctic nation, published their Arctic policy in 2018 , outlining their desired influence along Arctic shipping routes.[21] Other Arctic Council observer states, such as India and the United Kingdom, have a growing Arctic awareness, both publishing Arctic strategies in March 2022.[22]
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been in force since 1994. Although ratified by 167 other nations, the U.S. has failed to do so. Multiple administrations, including those of Presidents George H. Bush and Barack Obama, favored UNCLOS ratification, with the latest push in May 2021 citing global implications and freedom of navigation as primary concerns.[23] Since UNCLOS covers global territorial claims, including the Arctic, not being a party to it silences the U.S. voice as Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route and Canada and Denmark over the North Pole.[24] In the 21st Century, ratification of UNCLOS and Arctic relevance are closely linked.
Beyond treaties though, as the saying goes, show me your budget and I’ll show you your values. By that standard, the US does not signal that the Arctic is a priority. The U.S. is the only member not to have Ambassador-level representation on the Arctic Council. The Department of State has a Coordinator for the region, but that office consists of just four people and does not represent the U.S. at the Arctic Council.[25] Increased diplomatic representation is even more critical with Russian aggression in Ukraine causing the Arctic Council to pause its working groups, a decision that may result in the revision of its 1996 guiding documents. The potential of Finland and Sweden joining NATO could further complicate Arctic Council diplomacy, with all members but Russia having NATO membership if successful.[26] Appointing an ambassador to the Arctic Council and elevating the Arctic coordinator position to an Assistant Secretary of State for Arctic Affairs would ensure that US interests are adequately represented in decision-making forums and revised Arctic Council documents.[27] In other words, it would signal that the country values the Arctic much more than current diplomacy does.
The Biden administration signaled an increased Arctic focus in September 2021 by reactivating the Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC).[28] This is an important milestone for Alaska residents and Indigenous groups as it will assist in coordinating infrastructure projects for remote and underdeveloped communities.[29] However, the AESC agenda appears largely focused on domestic environmental and renewable energy concerns, failing to address Arctic foreign policy gaps and increased competition in the Arctic.[30]
The Military in the Arctic
A paratrooper assigned to the 4th Infantry Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, jumps over Malemute Drop Zone, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, in 2018. (SrA Curt Beach/USAF Photo)
The Department of Defense recently signaled its Arctic awareness with the standup the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies and the reflagging of the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska.[31] Although a positive step for Arctic awareness, these defense-focused actions could be seen as a provocative use of hard power absent parallel diplomatic support at national security forums and the Arctic Council.[32] Furthermore, it seems premature to increase Arctic military spending and posture without guiding policy documents, such as the National Security Strategy and National Arctic Strategy, to articulate desired Arctic policy objectives.[33]
How does technology factor into Arctic awareness and competition? The American way of war includes technology to gain an edge, yet our drones do not work in the cold, the Army is at the prototype stage with a cold weather all-terrain vehicle (CATV), and the U.S. has only two icebreakers, one in service since 1976.[34] The U.S. fleet is dwarfed by Russia’s 55 icebreakers, some of which are nuclear-powered, the only nation able to make this claim.[35] This has rendered the U.S. Coast Guard incapable of achieving more than a nominal Arctic presence. And icebreakers do more than just break ice. They provide critical domain awareness, search and rescue capabilities, and support scientific exploration. Although Congress has approved the acquisition of three new vessels, significant delays will restrict US operational reach in the Arctic until at least 2026, and potentially later.[36]
Further limiting Arctic awareness is the Commandant of the Coast Guard only being a de facto member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without the ability to vote.[37] As the lead federal agency for Arctic maritime security, the Coast Guard is uniquely postured at the crossroads of national security and international cooperation.[38] Elevating the Coast Guard to a full voting member would increase Arctic policy focus and support national security perspectives that are currently underrepresented.
Recommendations to Prevent Arctic Irrelevance
The U.S. is woefully behind in terms of Arctic-capable technology and diplomatic representation. Both are essential to achieve Arctic presence and influence, and neither can be created overnight. Even if Washington were to begin prioritizing and resourcing the region immediately, the U.S. would remain years behind in terms of production costs and time, in contrast to many nations who have been proactively investing in the region for decades.
Given the identified policy shortfalls, what can be done to increase awareness and prevent U.S. Arctic irrelevance? To signal to both Arctic allies and competitors that the Arctic matters to the U.S. and assume a position commensurate with our status as an Arctic nation, there are multiple actions that should be taken immediately:
Update the National Strategy for the Arctic Region through 2030
Ratify UNCLOS
Make the representative to the Arctic Council an ambassadorial-level post and appoint an ambassador
Make the Commandant of the Coast Guard a full voting member on the Joint Chiefs
Those relatively simple actions―three out of four of which can be done by the Executive alone and none of which require significant fiscal resourcing―would increase Arctic awareness and influence in U.S. policy.
A combination of climate change and European security concerns are impacting Arctic sea routes, economic frameworks, and diplomatic relations across the Arctic region.[39] It is possible and potentially plausible that the next major security threat could be in the Arctic region. Yet the U.S. does not possess the requisite tools or Arctic awareness and thus is unprepared for foreign policy actions and potential conflict. And, if actions speak louder than words, we risk letting ourselves become irrelevant all too soon.
Colin P. Mahle is a U.S. Army officer on the faculty at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in Fort Leavenworth, KS. He is a graduate of the Advanced Strategic Leaders Studies Program (ASLSP) and holds a master’s degree in military history from the Army Command and General Staff College.
Amanda B. Cronkhite is an Assistant Professor at SAMS. She holds a Ph.D. in political science and previously worked for the State Department as a Foreign Service Officer.
The views expressed are the authors’ alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: The Kapitan Dranitsyn, 2020 (NOAA)
Notes:
[1] James Stavridis, Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2017): 259-260.
[2] Stephen Haycox, “Arctic Policy of the United States: An Historical Survey,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds. Ken S. Coates and Carin Holroyd, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 245-248.
[3] David Auerswald, “A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, May 27, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/a-u-s-security-strategy-for-the-arctic/.
[4] Elizabeth Buchanan, “The Ukraine War: Arctic Council Steps into Unchartered Territory,” Arctic Circle, March 15, 2022, https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/arctic-council-steps-into-unchartered-territory.
[5] Jeremy Greenwood, “Without Icebreakers, Arctic Infrastructure Won’t Matter,” The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, April 12, 2022, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/without-icebreakers-arctic-infrastructure-wont-matter/.
[6] Annika E. Nilsson, “The United States and the Making of an Arctic Nation,” Polar Record 54, no. 2 (March 2018): 95-97.
[7] “Distance from Washington, DC to Juneau, AK,” Travel Math, accessed December 29, 2021, https://www.travelmath.com/distance/from/Washington,+DC/to/Juneau,+AK.
[8] “Distance from Hydaburg, Prince of Wales Island, Alaska to Seattle, Washington,” Travel Math, accessed March 8, 2022, https://www.travelmath.com/from/Hydaburg,+AK/to/Seattle,+WA.
[9] “Who We Are,” Alaska Federation of Natives, last modified 2021, https://www.nativefederation.org/about-afn/.
[10] Dwight D Eisenhower, Proclamation 3269. “Admission of the State Alaska into the Union,” Eisenhower Presidential Library, DDE's Records as President, Official File, Box 630, OF-147-D Alaska, (January 3, 1959), https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/alaska-statehood.
[11] Nilsson, “The United States and the Making of an Arctic Nation,” 97-98.
[12] Office of the President of the United States, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) 144, United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group, December 22, 1971, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/national-security-decision-memoranda-nsdm; Office of the President of the United States, Presidential Decision Directive 26 (PDD/NSC-26), US Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions, June 9, 1994, https://clinton.presidential libraries.us/items/show/48946.
[13] Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek, "The Polar Trap: China, Russia, and American Power in the Arctic and Antarctica," Journal of Indi-Pacific Affairs 4, no. 7 (October 2021): 36-66, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2820739/the-polar-trap-china-russia-and-american-power-in-the-arctic-and-antarctica/.
[14] Mead Treadwell and Taylor Drew Holshouser, “Small Steps in the Arctic, Giant Leaps for U.S. Arctic Policy: Three Recommendations for Expanding U.S. Presence in the Region,” Proceedings: The Coast Guard Journal of Security and Safety at Sea 78, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 66. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Featured-Content/Proceedings-Magazine/Proceedings-Archives-Delete/Proceedings-Archives/.
[15] Barack Obama, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region” (Washington, DC: The White House, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.
[16] US Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, January 2021), https://www.dhs.gov /sites/default/files/publications/21_0217_plcy_dhs-arctic-strategy.pdf
[17] Bernard Funston, “Time-Witness Reports: I Was Dealing with the Nuts and Bolts,” Arctic Council, October 27, 2021, https://arctic-council.org/news/time-witness-reports-i-was-dealing-with-the-nuts-and-bolts/.
[18] Government of Canada, Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, Government of Canada, last modified November 18, 2019, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587.
[19] Geir Hønneland, Russia and the Arctic: Environment, Identity and Foreign Policy (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016), 156.
[20] Pär Gustafsson, “Russia’s Ambitions in the Arctic Towards 2035” (Swedish Defence Research Agency, October 2021), 4-5, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%207624.
[21] People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy (Beijing, The State Council, January 26, 2018), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.
[22] Anurag Bisen, “India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development,” ASEEMA, March 18, 2022, https://aseemamag.com/indias-arctic-policy-building-a-partnership-for-sustainable-development/; Andrew Chuter, “New Strategy Sharpens UK Military Focus on the Arctic,” Defense News, March 29, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/03/29/new-strategy-sharpens-uk-military-focus-on-the-arctic/.
[23] “Senators Hirono, Murkowski, Kaine Introduce Resolution Calling on the Senate to Ratify UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” The Official U.S. Senate Website of Mazie K. Hirono, last modified May 18, 2021, https://www.hirono.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-hirono-murkowski-kaine-introduce-resolution-calling-on-the-senate-to-ratify-un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea.
[24] Gabriella Gricius, “Geopolitical Implications of New Arctic Shipping Lanes,” The Arctic Institute (March 18, 2021), https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/geopolitical-implications-arctic-shipping-lanes/; “Canada makes competing claim to North Pole against Russia, Denmark," CBC News, May 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/north-pole-canada-russia-denmark-1.5151432.
[25] James P. DeHart, “A Balanced Approach to the Arctic,” The Foreign Service Journal 98, no. 4 (May 2021): 31.
[26] Joshua Berlinger, “What you need to know about Finland, Sweden, and NATO,” CNN, May 14, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/14/europe/sweden-finland-nato-next-steps-intl/index.html.
[27] Lisa Murkowski, “Murkowski, King Introduce Bill to Strengthen Diplomacy in the Arctic,” News/Press Releases, Office of Senator Lisa Murkowski, last modified October 7, 2021, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/press/release/murkowski-king-introduce-bill-to-strengthen-diplomacy-in-the-arctic.
[28] “Biden-Harris Administration brings Arctic Policy to the forefront with Reactivated Steering Committee and New Slate of Research Commissioners,” News/Press Releases, The White House, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/09/24/biden-harris-administration-brings-arctic-policy-to-the-forefront-with-reactivated-steering-committee-new-slate-of-research-commissioners/.
[29] Lisa Murkowski, “U.S. Engagement in the Arctic, Present and Future,” The Wilson Quarterly (Winter 2022), https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-new-north/us-engagement-in-the-arctic,-present-and-future.
[30] “Summary of Principals Meeting, Arctic Executive Steering Committee, December 2, 2021,” News/Press Releases, The White House, accessed 15 May, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/12-2021-Summary-of-December-21-AESC-meeting.pdf.
[31] “Army to reestablish 11th Airborne Division, America’s Third, in Alaska,” News/Press Releases, Office of Senator Daniel Sullivan, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/army-to-reestablish-11th-airborne-division-americas-third-in-alaska.
[32] Randy Kee, “Securing the Northern Flank: Reflections toward Establishing the DoD’s Newest Regional Center: The Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 4, no. 7, Arctic Strategy Special Issue (October 25, 2021), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Editions/.
[33] Auerswald, “A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic.”
[34] Tucker Chase and Matthew Hanes, "Three’s a race for arctic-capable drones going on, and the United States is losing," Modern War Institute, January 19, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/theres-a-race-for-arctic-capable-drones-going-on-and-the-united-states-is-losing/; Andrew Eversden, “BAE, Oshkosh cold weather vehicle prototypes survive Army’s Alaskan tests,” Breaking Defense, January 26, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/bae-oshkosh-cold-weather-vehicle-prototypes-survive-armys-alaskan-tests/; Melody Schreiber, “Delivery of the U.S. Coast Guard’s New Icebreaker is Delayed, even as the Agency as Sharpens Its Arctic Focus,” Arctic Today, December 1, 2021, https://www.arctictoday.com/delivery-of-the-u-s-coast-guards-new-icebreaker-is-delayed-even-as-the-agency-as-sharpens-its-arctic-focus/.
[35] US Department of Homeland Security, USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy Report: Major Icebreakers of the World 2020, (Washington, DC: 2020), https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907 ; Thomas Nilsen, “Full Speed Ahead for Russia’s New Fleet of Giant Icebreakers,” ArcticToday, November 30, 2021, https://www.arctictoday.com/full-speed-ahead-for-russias-new-fleet-of-giant-icebreakers/.
[36] Greenwood, “Without Icebreakers, Arctic Infrastructure Won’t Matter.”
[37] “Crist, Palazzo Introduce Bill to Promote Coast Guard Commandant to Joint Chiefs,” News, Office of Representative Charlie Crist, last modified March 23, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://crist.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2297.
[38] US Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, (Washington, DC: January 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0217_plcy_dhs-arctic-strategy.pdf.
[39] Isabelle-Jani-Friend, “Greenland's ice is melting from the bottom up -- and far faster than previously thought, study shows,” CNN, February 22, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/22/world/greenland-ice-melting-sea-level-rise-climate-intl-scli-scn/index.html; Nicholas LePan, “The final frontier: how Arctic ice melting is opening up trade opportunities,” World Economic Forum, February 13, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/ice-melting-arctic-transport-route-industry/; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, Laura B. Comay, John Frittelli, Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Jane A. Leggett, Jonathan L. Ramseur, Pervaze A. Sheikh, and Brandon S. Tracy, R41153 (2022), 60-77.