J.B. Vowell and Craig Evans
The United States cannot compete effectively or prevail in conflict if its approach to leading the free world through current global challenges is self-centered. Hans Morgenthau described self-centered leadership as strategic narcissism: “the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans.” In his 2018 book, Battlegrounds, former National Security Advisor and retired Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster describes multiple examples where strategic narcissism contributed false assumptions about other countries, which errantly drove U.S. policy in the post-Cold War era—most acutely regarding U.S. policy toward China.[1] McMaster responds to that history by calling for strategic leaders and practitioners to embrace strategic empathy, defined as "the skill of understanding what drives and constrains one's adversary."[2]
McMaster’s strategic empathy concept prescribes looking at issues from the perspective of others—specifically adversaries.
McMaster’s strategic empathy concept prescribes looking at issues from the perspective of others—specifically adversaries. However, it is equally applicable to allies and partners as a window into better understanding the emotions, ideologies, and aspirations that motivate their behavior. The theory predicts, as strategic empathy increases, that strategic narcissism decreases, resulting in better policies and strategies for competing and prevailing in conflict. McMaster’s theory, however, begs the question; How do strategic leaders operate with strategic empathy?
To operationalize the concept of strategic empathy, this article argues that strategic leaders must appreciate three critical factors: geography, history, and domestic politics. These three factors are the pillars of the framework employed by U.S. Army Japan, a theater-strategic headquarters in the Indo-Pacific theater. First, U.S. Army Japan embraced strategic empathy by reorienting the map to gain appreciation for how U.S. adversaries and its anchoring ally, Japan, perceive the region. Second, through professional development sessions, leaders in U.S. Army Japan have also invested in examining the historical perspectives of regional actors to contextualize contemporary actions and policies. The command’s leadership then applies that framing to sufficiently understand Japanese domestic political events, such as elections and strategic document formulation. These activities enable the command to operate with the kind of strategic empathy to think, act, and operate differently in an operational environment that demands greater agility and innovation to address regional challenges.[3]
Pay Attention to Geography
Journalist Robert Kaplan argues that the "only thing enduring is a people's position on the map [and] the map, while not determinative, is the beginning of discerning historical logic about what might come next.".[4] U.S. Army Japan reoriented the map to see geography through the lens of regional actors to help illuminate many regional security challenges in Northeast Asia. Three countries are particularly useful as examples: Japan, Russia, and China.
First Island Chain Perspective. (US Army Japan)
U.S. and Japanese military leaders often remark that the fault line of the international order runs through Japan.[5] From Japan’s northernmost tip to the southernmost island, it has territorial disputes with three authoritarian, nuclear powers—each with distinct regional ambitions that collide with Japan’s security interests.
Reorienting the map also helps apply strategic empathy by focusing U.S. leaders on China’s geographic perception of being surrounded by U.S. partner democracies such as the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines that constrain China’s regional and global ambitions.
Russia is similarly influenced by the chokepoint between Petropavlovsk and the Northern Territories to transform the geography with modernized anti-access and area denial capabilities, such as the Bastion. The Russian fleet relies on navigation routes from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Northern Pacific Ocean that are potentially at risk if not defended. The influence of geography on Russian policy is readily apparent when viewing the map from an orientation centered on Russia’s geographic context.[6]
Reorienting the map also helps apply strategic empathy by focusing U.S. leaders on China’s geographic perception of being surrounded by U.S. partner democracies such as the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines that constrain China’s regional and global ambitions. U.S. leaders can better appreciate China’s express belief that it is the object of a U.S.-led regional containment strategy.[7] Beijing’s attempts to create and enforce new geographic facts by designating a 10-dash-line, the construction and militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea, and its pressure campaign against Taiwan are all efforts to alter conditions in a security environment in furtherance of its interests. Leaders gain empathetic perspectives of the region by studying the geography.
Remember the Importance of History
“History is who we are and why we are the way we are,” according to the late historian and Pulitzer Prize winner, David McCullough.[8] U.S. Army Japan has used various methods to gain increased understanding of historical perspectives of regional actors and how their interactions over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries have directly shaped present-day national security policies and actions. The command has institutionalized historical understanding through both cyclical and occasional venues, such as leader professional development program, expert roundtables, staff rides, and the commander’s update briefs.
A command-wide professional development session used Rush Doshi’s, The Long Game, and included a candid, structured dialogue led by the commanding general on how China’s goals for Great Rejuvenation are directly linked to its historical self-perception as a regional and global leader. An essential insight from that discussion was that the Chinese Communist Party views 1839 to 1949, known in China as the “Century of Humiliation,” as historically anomalous and that the CCP is determined to establish China in what it views as China’s natural and rightful place as the leader of the international order.[9]
A recent Analyst Roundtable hosted by U.S. Army Japan applied a similar approach in assessing the relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The panel discussed how the brutal subjugation of Korea by Imperial Japan from 1910-1945, involving the forced labor of Korean women, remains a point of contention between present day Japan and the Republic of Korea.[10] A two-day senior leader staff ride to Okinawa included a facilitated tour of Hacksaw Ridge and historical recount of the World War II Battle of Okinawa, which occurred April 1 to June 21, 1945, and illuminated challenges associated with joint warfare in an archipelagic environment.
The U.S. Army Japan staff has also updated its cyclical outputs by incorporating academic-oriented presentations on various topics into its commander’s update brief that are relevant to the aggregated threats in the command’s area of interest. Examples include discussion of China’s “Three Warfares” concept, and publishing “This Day in History” vignettes.[11] These methods enable the command leadership to develop strategic empathy in its planning by cultivating an appreciation for the historical and cultural context of the operating environment.
U.S. Army Japan senior leaders discuss the Battle of Okinawa during a staff ride. (US Army Japan)
Look Inside to Understand Outside
Attempting to understand any state’s behavior without exploring its internal dynamics is an insufficient approach for increasing strategic empathy. U.S. Army Japan, which resides inside the weapons engagement zones of three authoritarian, adversarial regimes, prioritizes understanding the links between the domestic politics and international behavior of regional actors. This understanding is critical for increasing strategic empathy required to execute or advocate policy and strategy to deter conflict. U.S. Army Japan finds two variables particularly useful: leadership personality and leadership ambition. This is particularly true with respect to countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea because their engagement in the region and with the rest of the world is determined through the personality and malign ambitions of their leaders.
In authoritarian systems, regime survival is the preeminent security interest; internal and external decisions are filtered through the lens of what will ensure regime continuity.[12] Authoritarians are also necessarily paranoid about appearing weak for fear of losing internal control.[13] This often makes them prone to provocative, retaliatory, or escalatory behavior. Chinese President Xi Jinping exhibited this dynamic in his response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s retaliatory abrogation of negotiations with Japan over disputed territories after Japan sanctioned Russia for invading Ukraine is another example.[14] North Korean President Kim Jong Un’s development of nuclear and advanced missile programs are designed to protect and perpetuate the Kim Family regime.[15] Accordingly, U.S. Army Japan’s intelligence directorate incorporates leadership analysis into assessments of regional military activities.
To be sure, democracies are not immune from similar considerations. Domestic considerations such as elections, budget cycles, and national strategic document formulation can determine how fast and how far the anchoring ally in the Pacific is willing to negotiate with the U.S. on alliance issues, such as forward basing and posture. Consequently, U.S. Army Japan’s strategy directorate drafts and disseminates white papers in advance of and following major domestic political events in Japan to inform the development and revision of command objectives. Whether for allies or adversaries, understanding internal considerations informs analysis of state behavior and helps strategic leaders and practitioners operate with increased strategic empathy.
Tying it All Together
The premise of this article is that increasing awareness of geography, history, and domestic politics increases strategic empathy, reduces strategic narcissism, and ultimately results in better decisions. This has been internally validated by the staff at U.S. Army Japan where accounting for these three factors behind state perspectives informed command efforts. Increasing strategic empathy enabled its intelligence directorate to produce balanced, timely, predictive analysis on the aggregated threats in the region and influenced the operations directorate’s design of more realistic bilateral training events that incorporate nuanced considerations of these factors into training material. This year alone, U.S. Army Japan’s two signature bilateral mission rehearsal events, Orient Shield and Yama Sakura, achieved many firsts based on the simulation of more realistic ally and adversary objectives, capabilities, and behavior. Inclusion of geographic, historical, and domestic political considerations also enabled the strategy directorate to develop an executable campaign plan and inform contingency planning efforts. Collectively, efforts across the staff to operate with strategic empathy will enable the U.S. Army Japan Commanding General to make decisions, offer military advice to civilian leaders, and submit military recommendations to higher headquarters more likely to benefit U.S. national interests and avoid needless costs to those interests.
Strategic empathy is, in fact, an imperative.
Strategic empathy is, in fact, an imperative. Candidly, the stakes are too high to persist with self-centered approaches to the current challenges in the contemporary operating environment. The techniques employed by U.S. Army Japan to assess implications of geography, history, and domestic politics are not isolated to this small but mighty land component of a sub-unified command in the Indo-Pacific. The methods can be applied at echelon—from tactical to national-strategic organizations, including bilateral and multilateral commands. Doing so breaks the paradigm of strategic narcissism and its associated cognitive traps.
Major General J.B. Vowell is currently the Commanding General of United States Army Japan. Colonel Craig L. Evans is the United States Army Japan Senior Intelligence Officer. The views expressed are the authors’ alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: First Island Chain Perspective, 2022 (US Army Japan)
Notes:
[1] H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York, NY: Harper, 2020), 15–16, 127–33.
[2] McMaster, 16.
[3] U.S. Congress. Senate, Statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Indo-Pacific Command Posture, Senate, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., March 22, 2022, 2.
[4] Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2013), xviii.
[5] Lt. Gen. Kevin B. Schneider, “Remarks to the Japan National Press Club” (Tokyo, February 25, 2020), usfj.mil.
[6] Seth Robson, “Russia Deploys Bastion Anti-Ship Missile System to Island North of Japan,” Stars and Stripes, December 7, 2021; Jon Grevatt et al., “Update: Russia Deploys Bastion Coastal Defence System at New Military Facility in Disputed Kuril Islands,” Janes.com, December 7, 2021.
[7] Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 56–58.
[8] “Historian Addresses Wesleyan,” The New York Times, June 4, 1984, Late edition, sec. B, timemachine.nytimes.com.
[9] Doshi, The Long Game, 271–76; Brands and Beckley, Danger Zone, 27–28. Brands and Beckley note, "During the Century of Humiliation, China was forced to fight more than a dozen wars on its soil and suffered two of the deadliest civil wars in history: the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864, 20-30 million dead) and the Chinese Civil War (1927-1948, 7-8 million dead)."
[10] Timothy Webster, “A Formula to Resolve the South Korea-Japan Wartime Forced Labor Issue,” United States Institute of Peace, August 18, 2022, https://www.usip.org.
[11] For an executive synopsis of China' Three Warfares, see Seth G. Jones, Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare, First edition (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2021), 147–49.
[12] Regarding China, Australia’s former Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, explains Xi Jinping's world view using a heuristic of ten concentric circles, the first of which is Xi's and CCP's determination to remain in power. See, Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and XI Jinping’s China (New York: PublicAffairs, 2022), 77–94.
[13] See Freedom House's 2022 report for regional and country-specific assessments of tools authoritarian leaders use to maintain internal control. Brands and Beckley, Danger Zone, 49–51; Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2022, The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule” (Freedom House, February 2022), https://freedomhouse.org.
[14] Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “Russia Halts WWII Peace Treaty Talks with Japan in Response to Sanctions over Ukraine Invasion,” Washington Post, March 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
[15] Council on Foreign Relations, “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” Backgrounder, June 28, 2022, https://www.cfr.org.