Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our fifth annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present one of the essays selected for Honorable Mention, from Michael Gardiner, a student at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Strategy is the art of aligning means and ends towards the accomplishment of national goals. However, strategy making is not an exercise that can be isolated from leaders’ cultural understandings of their country and the world. As China continues to pivot away from a strategy of keeping a low profile and hiding intentions towards one of striving for achievement, it is crucial to understand what these changes mean in the context of China’s peripheral and global relationships.[1]
The concept of strategic culture gives fresh insights into China’s current strategy and behaviour, particularly in North-East Asia. Strategic culture also demonstrates the difficulty in separating the connection between ideational forces and the development and execution of strategy. This essay expands on the concept of strategic culture by incorporating relationality into the analysis. The argument is that a state’s strategic preferences are shaped normatively over time through consistent inter-state relations. This means numerous strategic cultures can exist at once, as each inter-state relationship conditions a different set of state preferences in their strategy towards specific actors. This concept of a relational strategic culture is important in understanding China’s behaviour towards specific actors as well as in understanding the formulation of strategy generally. This essay looks at China’s relationships with North Korea and Japan as case studies, before commenting on the implications of relational strategic culture for China’s future actions and the future of strategy.
Strategic Culture
Strategic culture challenges the assumptions of neo-realist theory in International Relations. Neorealism is focused on the distribution of material power in determining national strategies. However, the shaping of strategy is not preordained despite the pressures from the system. Historical and cultural experiences influence the decision making of states, often in unconscious ways. This is why states are dissimilar in how they rationalise their place in the world, create strategies, and act.
Strategic culture does not argue that the distribution of power is inconsequential. Rather, it shifts away from the neorealist assumption that states will behave the same given the same structural conditions. Instead, strategic culture argues that while states operate within the same structural confines of the international system they have agency to act in different ways. Strategy is not merely constructed according to power dynamics, but it is also shaped by the pervasive ideas and preferences within that state’s prevailing culture. These culturally based assumptions, biases and beliefs lead to a “particular interpretation of material conditions” that is distinctive, held collectively by leaders and fixed over time.[2] Strategic culture operates as a bridge which combines material and ideational explanations to strategy making.[3] Without an understanding of strategic culture, intentions are more likely to be miscalculated as strategic culture “gives meaning to, strategic behaviour.”[4] In the context of rising great power competition between the United States and China, miscalculation has never been more important to avoid.
China’s Strategic Culture—Traditional Views
One of the first scholars to systematically study strategic culture including in the context of China was Alastair Iain Johnston. In his seminal work Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Johnston sought to understand if a consistent and persistent Chinese strategic culture existed, and if so, to what extent it influenced Chinese military decisions. He argued China possessed two strategic cultures, one which represented a symbolic or idealised set of strategic preferences and another which was actively employed in Chinese statecraft.[5] The purpose of the symbolic strategic culture was to justify strategic decisions in culturally acceptable terms, which masked China’s true perceptions on the best way to achieve national security objectives.
Johnston characterised China’s true strategic culture as “Parabellum.” Earlier assessments of Chinese strategic culture argued it was defensive in nature, favouring other measures over the use of force.[6] This would be consistent with the aphorisms of renowned ancient Chinese general Sun-Tzu who mused: “Ultimate excellence lies; Not in winning; Every battle; But in defeating the enemy; Without ever fighting.”[7]
…it is the conditioned thought and practice of Parabellum which compels decision-makers towards coercive behaviour, not the system itself.
However, Johnston challenges these views and criticises the scholarly reliance on Sun-Tzu’s Art of War. Equivalent to a Chinese version of hard realpolitik, Johnston argued Chinese decision-makers were driven by a mindset influenced by power concerns, where the most effective way to deal with security threats to China was to “eliminate them through the use of force.”[8] Chinese leadership is well attuned to the relative capabilities of China and given the pervasiveness of Parabellum mindsets conditioned in Chinese decision-makers, their preferences often align with more coercive behaviour.[9] While a neo-realist understanding of power distribution is important to Chinese decision-makers, it is the conditioned thought and practice of Parabellum which compels decision-makers towards coercive behaviour, not the system itself. A set of preferences has developed over time where Chinese decision-makers have “placed a high degree of value on the use of pure violence to resolve security conflicts.”[10]
But Johnston concedes that there was another strategic culture in play—one which was focused more on defence, peace, and harmony. Johnston refers to this as a ‘Confucian-Mencian’ strategic culture. Such a strategic culture materialises from the teachings of Chinese philosophers Confucius and Mencius, who believed in the ideas of moral government. Virtuosity and righteous rule would legitimise the state and promote harmony over violence. In implementation this appears in the form of favouring a defensive posture, defusing security threats through diplomatic overtures, trade and alliances.[11]
Under a Confucian-Mencian strategic culture, China would shy away from confrontation, instead prioritising the promotion of harmonious relationships under heaven. In saying this, Johnston highlights the difference between the normative ideal of a Confucian-Mencian strategic culture and strategic practice – how China chooses to behave in reality. The Confucian-Mencian strategic culture was not operationalised. Instead, Chinese decision-makers favoured the ruthlessness of the Parabellum approach to resolve security issues. As Johnston explains: “The texts that do mention the role of diplomacy, international rectification and other nonviolent political strategies view these behaviours either as preludes to the application of violence, as actions that can consolidate the political gains of warfare, or as part of an idealized strategy that has little relation to the central advice of the text.”[12] Therefore, while Confucian-Mencian is a valid strategic culture in China, it lacks the “reflexive” or operational influence of the Parabellum strategic culture.[13]
…in China’s long history there has been minimal expansion by military means…
However, this judgement is not shared throughout academic circles. Looking at China’s decisions during the Korean, Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese Wars of the Cold War period, Huiyun Feng contends Chinese decision-makers have internalised the tenets of a defensive Confucian strategic culture. This mirrors the Confucian-Mencian typology established by Johnston, where Chinese behaviour is essentially defensive. Wars must be morally justifiable according to Confucian principles and leaders display a preference for peaceful solutions over violent ones. Feng places great significance on the outcome of the Warring States Period (463-222 BC) in guiding Chinese strategic culture. Institutionalisation of prominent philosophies were taking place, with Confucianism and Legalism being the most significant.
Despite the initial pre-eminence of Legalism, eventually Confucianism would constitute “the most essential elements in Chinese military thought and Chinese conduct of international relations.”[14] It stressed the inherent benevolence of human nature, and it was through virtuosity that China could achieve peace and harmony under heaven. Mencius, a pupil of Confucius, would expand on these ideas further by condemning the use of military force outside of defensive purposes, for it would turn the world against China.[15] Consequently, in China’s long history there has been minimal expansion by military means, meaning the influence of Confucian thinking holds a greater influence on Chinese decision-makers than Johnston gives it credit for.[16] These defensive inclinations suggest China would lean towards a peaceful and cooperative stance as it rises, unless provoked by other powers.
Further studies have not deviated substantially from this traditional dichotomy in the study of China’s strategic culture. Liu and Ashraf argue in favour of a defensively focused strategic culture, while Ghiselli believes Chinese strategic culture is an ingrained realist interpretation of the world.[17]
Introducing Relationality to the Strategic Culture Debate
The idea of relationality rejects the premise that strategic culture must be observable across actors. That is, just as there can exist more than one overarching strategic culture, states can also have collective preferences in their strategies towards specific states.
The study of strategic culture currently suffers from too much coherence and continuity, where it is unable to explain change in behaviour. Traditional views of China’s strategic culture are too monolithic, with the idea of numerous strategic cultures created through inter-state relationships providing a more useful and detailed understanding of China’s actions towards other countries.[18] Long histories of practice and socialisation condition states towards certain mindsets vis-à-vis other actors over time.[19] In China’s case, it distils the traditional notion of an overarching Chinese strategic culture into component parts (e.g., a unique Sino-North Korean strategic culture), as each relationship conditions a different preferred strategy. While Chinese behaviour towards certain states may exhibit characteristics applicable to Parabellum or Confucian understandings, relationality emphasises the uniqueness of each inter-state relationship in producing specific strategic cultures that can harness different elements depending on the cultural context.
China’s Relational Strategic Cultures — The Cases of North Korea and Japan
North Korea
North Korea is a state bordering China’s region of Dongbei. The two states are separated by the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. North Korea was founded following World War II, when the Soviet Union and United States divided the Korean Peninsula along the 38th Parallel. Separate governments were formed in 1948, where North Korea has been governed by the Kim dynasty since its inception. Since the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korea has ranked poorly in terms of human rights and economic development. However, its committed approach to militarisation has seen North Korea construct the world’s fourth largest military force and recently develop nuclear weapons capabilities.
To Chinese decision-makers, North Korea exists as a buffer state—often understood as a barrier between two competing great powers.
North Korea constitutes a major threat for Chinese security interests. Certainly, when North Korea began in earnest to develop a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s, China joined the rest of the nuclear club in seeking to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions threatened China’s ability to project power outside of its immediate neighbourhood, jeopardised stability on the Korean Peninsula, and impacted China’s ability to influence North Korean policy, as nuclear weapons would decrease North Korean reliance on China as a security partner.[20] Unsurprisingly, China’s aim was to restrain North Korea’s nuclear development, and it did not lack points of leverage over the North Korean regime. After all, “Beijing was well positioned to take a more active part in the resolution of the nuclear issue—it could have fully used leverage in its capacities as North Korea’s sole treaty ally, key trading partner, and major aid donor.”[21]
China’s failure was because of longstanding sets of preferences and beliefs towards its North Korea strategy. China’s relational strategic culture with North Korea (Sino-North Korean strategic culture) conditioned it to pursue familiar actions towards its unpredictable neighbour. To Chinese decision-makers, North Korea exists as a buffer state—often understood as a barrier between two competing great powers. Security concerns are naturally an important element of this historic conceptualisation of North Korea, as geographic contiguity puts China’s internal security at risk of North Korean instability, reducing China’s ability to pursue punitive measures towards North Korea.[22]
However, China’s vision of North Korea runs deeper than core security interests as it also intersects with the traditional mindsets of Chinese leaders towards North Korea. Despite being uncertain allies, the relationship has been historically understood through the “teeth-to-lips” metaphor, i.e., without the lips (North Korea) the teeth (China) would be vulnerable to external forces.[23] The concept of a buffer state should not solely be understood as a geographic and structural limitation for China’s actions but also as an ideational one. The perception of a buffer state “stems from the Korean peninsula’s role as the traditional battleground, both literally and figuratively…”[24]
U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-Un found themselves in a rhetorical war of words.
The buffer state concept aligns with China’s ‘siege mentality’ and fear of encirclement.[25] These pervasive ideas in Sino-North Korean strategic culture explain why there has been little change in China’s behaviour despite North Korea’s growth in relative gains, bellicosity, and potential for the so-called hermit kingdom to drag China into a war on the Korean Peninsula. China’s behaviour also did not change despite normalised and ameliorating ties with South Korea.[26]
This remained the case following the successful test of the ICBM Hwasong-14 in July 2017 – a ballistic missile capable of hitting the continental United States. U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-Un found themselves in a rhetorical war of words. Tensions and the United States’ maximum pressure campaign eventually eased in 2018, culminating in a historic summit held in Singapore on 12 June which was advertised to have committed the two countries to the aim of a “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”[27]
Sino-North Korea strategic culture was the primary driver for China’s behaviour during the 2017-18 North Korean nuclear crisis. Despite the deteriorating security situation, China behaved as would be expected under the existing Sino-North Korea strategic culture. Despite added pressure from the U.S. to induce changes in North Korea’s behaviour, China acted as it had in the past with North Korea—going only so far as to call for diplomatic measures and restraint. An envoy was sent to warn North Korea against more nuclear tests which could further antagonise the U.S., and China increased its oversight along the 1,420-kilometre-long border.
Nonetheless, the trafficking of illicit goods across the border continued and sanctions were not stringently enforced, with exports of grain increasing by 400 percent from January to April 2017 compared with the year prior.[28] China was careful not to isolate the North Korea regime completely. It was the traditional understanding in the Chinese mindset of North Korea as a buffer state which compelled China towards these measured actions.[29] While it is questionable whether North Korea has acted like a ‘tributary’ state in recent decades, China has conditioned itself into believing North Korea must be shielded from external pressure. Thus, while there are diminishing returns towards a status-quo relationship with North Korea, China’s view of North Korea as a buffer (however unreliable) will continue to dominate China’s strategy and behaviour.
Japan
Japan undertook large-scale reform in the mid-1800s, becoming an industrial powerhouse during the Meiji Period. The extent of its modernisation surpassed that of some traditional Western powers, enabling Japan to obtain victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Imperialistic ambitions led the then Empire of Japan to annex Korea in 1910, using it as a springboard to invade China in 1937 before joining the Axis powers in World War II. After defeat at the hands of the Allied forces and devastation of Nagasaki and Hiroshima from the atomic bombings in 1945, Japan embarked on significant political, economic, and social changes. Now a successful liberal democracy, Japan boasts one of the largest economies in the world. While it maintains a reasonably large and modern military , constitutional and cultural barriers limit Japan’s ability to use force.
In a marked difference to Sino-North Korean strategic culture, China’s relational strategic culture with Japan is characterised by competition and rivalry
Arguably, North Korea poses as much if not more of a security threat to China than Japan. Yet, since the normalisation of relations in 1972, Sino-Japanese relations have been mired in tension. Despite large degrees of economic interdependence, in terms of security, China often adopts a more confrontational stance towards Japan. China conflates the threat of the U.S. and Japan, given their security alliance and nuclear umbrella. It equates Japan’s actions as part of a wider containment strategy pursued in tandem with the U.S. that China deems “an attempt to constrain its rise in East Asia, as well as a potential threat to the resolution of the Taiwan issue.”[30] China’s suspicion of Japan’s strategic aims and position is one driver of tension. The other is historical memory where China feels Japan has not adequately compensated it for its actions in World War II. The legacy of that war and China’s use of history contributes to distrust and nationalistic anti-Japanese messaging.[31]
In a marked difference to Sino-North Korean strategic culture, China’s relational strategic culture with Japan (Sino-Japanese strategic culture) is characterised by competition and rivalry. In China’s view, coexistence is highly unlikely given that “there is no way for two tigers to live together peacefully on the same mountain.”[32] It is a competitive mindset partially fed by strategic and nationalistic factors, but mainly because of the way China has historically perceived its relationship with Japan. Well before the Meiji Period, Japan had demonstrated the propensity to refuse submission to a Chinese world order. Even as diplomacy warmed up and economic ties between the two countries grew throughout from the 1970s to the early 1990s, relations reflected China’s desire to use Japan to eventually surpass it, rather than achieve reconciliation. China’s strategy towards Japan has traditionally been rooted in conflict, where “the twenty-first century saw a clear resumption of the time-honoured testing between the two countries.”[33] China will pursue strategies consistent with this mindset. Its instinct is to compete with Japan.
Of course, China’s mindset moves beyond the Senkakus. China is ramping up its challenges towards Japan militarily on a wider scale.
The 2010 Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands (henceforth Senkakus) demonstrates the influence of this distinct Sino-Japanese strategic culture. China, Japan, and Taiwan claim the Senkakus as their territory. They comprise five islets and three rocks, which while only making up a small area carry economic, strategic, and ideational weight. These come in the form of oil/gas reserves, military access to the island chain and nationalism.[34] As such, it had become habitual for China to challenge Japan through naval and air activities in the areas around the Ryuku Island chain, which the Senkaku Islands are adjacent to. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats near the Senkakus, resulting in the arrest of the Chinese skipper by Japanese officials. The exercising of Japanese domestic law to charge the skipper implied Japan had sovereignty over the Senkakus, which China vehemently protested. Eventually the skipper and crew returned to China, but it was only after China had suspended rare earth exports to Japan, among other readily imposed retaliatory measures.
The incident was widely lauded in China as a victory over its historic foe.[35] The 2010 Senkakus dispute demonstrates the core elements of a Sino-Japanese strategic culture. Past flare ups were usually met with more restraint, especially as China prioritised its economic recovery under Deng Xiaoping.[36] But as mentioned, such restraint was parallel to China needing Japan for its economic recovery, to eventually supplant it as the economic powerhouse in North-East Asia. This highlights China’s zero-sum view of Sino-Japanese relations which “can be seen in the dispute moving from mutual diplomatic sabre rattling to becoming increasingly militarized.”[37] Of course, China’s mindset moves beyond the Senkakus. China is ramping up its challenges towards Japan militarily on a wider scale. Japanese fighter jets intercepted Chinese military aircraft 675 times in 2019—a 5.8% increase on the previous year.[38] Japan’s navy is now significantly outspent and outmatched by China, and China is acting with greater assertiveness towards Japan in the wider East China Sea.[39] Given the nature of Sino-Japanese strategic culture, this should not come as much of a surprise.
Conclusion
Relational strategic culture is a critical concept to understand for strategists and strategy making. In the case of China, relational strategic cultures with North Korea and Japan have dictated the currents of those respective relationships, regardless of changes to China’s wider strategic aims. Rather than being solely influenced by an ultimate strategic culture characterised by a Parabellum of Confucian style, China’s inter-state ties have a strategic culture unique to those relationships. Given current circumstances, analyses leveraging relational strategic culture would expect China’s current behaviour towards North Korea, Japan, and other states to remain the same. While the creation of all-encompassing strategic documents and grand strategy is a worthwhile exercise, they can be significantly influenced by the underlying significance of strategic culture, particularly in a relational sense. Considering the invisible power of strategic culture in strategy creation will be crucial in assessing inherent thought-processes and developing contemporary strategies that meet modern challenges.
Michael Gardiner graduated at Victoria University of Wellington with First-Class Honours in International Relations in 2020. He is starting a Masters in Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in July 2021. The views expressed are the author's own and do not reflect the official policy or position of Victoria University of Wellington or Nanyang Technological University.
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Header Image: Qilian Mountain, Sunan Yugur Autonomous County, Zhangye, China April 2020 (Men Yuan).
Notes:
[1] Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153.
[2] John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore, eds., Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture. (Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 48-50.
[3] Jeffrey S. Lantis. “Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific.” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no. 2 (2014): 166.
[4] Colin S. Gray. Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 130.
[5] Alastair Iain Johnston. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), x.
[6] Johnston. Cultural Realism. 22-25.
[7] Sun-Tzu. John Minford, ed. The Art of War. (London: Penguin, 2014), 17
[8] Johnston. Cultural Realism, x.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Johnston. Cultural Realism, xi.
[11] Johnston. Cultural Realism. 117.
[12] Johnston. Cultural Realism. 144.
[13] Johnston. Cultural Realism. 153.
[14] Huiyun Feng. Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 19.
[15] Feng. Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 21.
[16] Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 26.
[17] Tiewa Liu. “Chinese Strategic Culture and the Use of Force: moral and political perspectives.” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2014): 556-74;Junaid Ashraf. “String of Pearls and China’s Emerging Strategic Culture.” Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2017): 166-81; Andrea Ghiselli. “Revising China’s Strategic Culture: Contemporary Cherry-Picking of Ancient Strategic Thought.” The China Quarterly 233 (2018): 166-85.
[18] Alan Bloomfield. “Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate.” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 3 (2012): 444.
[19] Yaqing Qin, A Relational Theory of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), xiv.
[20] Dong Sun Lee, Iordanka Alexandrova andYihei Zhao, “The Chinese failure to disarm North Korea: Geographical proximity, U.S. unipolarity, and alliance restraint,” Contemporary Security Policy (2020): 2.
[21] Lee, Alexandrova and Zhao, “The Chinese failure to disarm North Korea,” 3.
[22] Lee, Alexandrova and Zhao, “The Chinese failure to disarm North Korea,” 4.
[23] Jae Ho Chung & Myung-hae Choi, “Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China-North Korea Relations, 1949-2010,” Pacific Review 26, no. 3 (2013): 244-45.
[24] Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “North Korea’s security implications for China,” in China and North Korea: Strategic and policy perspectives from a changing China, ed. C. Freeman, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 44.
[25] Leif-Eric Easley, “China’s norms in its near abroad: understanding Beijing’s North Korea policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 101 (2016): 658.
[26] Scott Snyder. China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 137
[27] White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” (2018): https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.
[28] Jackson, On the Brink, 123.
[29] Howard W. French Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push For Global Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), 169.
[30] Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “The Political and Security Dimension of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust and Fragile Stability.” Pacific Focus 26, no. 2 (2011): 167.
[31] Atanassova-Cornelis, “The Political and Security Dimension of Japan-China Relations,” 184.
[32] Michael Heazle and Nick Knight, eds., China-Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), 127.
[33] French, Everything Under the Heavens. 199.
[34] William Choong, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.” Adelphi Papers 54, no. 445 (2014): 60-61.
[35] Kosuke Takahashi, “China signals V for victory,” Asia Times (5 October 2010): https://archive.vn/20101031211613/http://atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LJ05Dh01.html#selection-1253.0-1253.27.
[36] Balazs Szanto, China and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Escalation and De-Escalation (New York: Routledge, 2018), 138.
[37] Szanto, China and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, 139
[38] Franz-Stefan Gady. “Japan Intercepted Chinese Military Aircraft 675 Times in Fiscal Year 2019,” 10 April 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/japan-intercepted-chinese-military-aircraft-675-times-in-fiscal-year-2019/.
[39] David Axe. “The Chinese Navy Now Outguns Japan’s Own Fleet—But Don’t Panic Quite Yet,” 25 May 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/05/25/the-chinese-navy-now-outguns-the-japanese-fleet-but-dont-panic-quite-yet/#682207ff5a83; Tetsuo Kotani, “Why Did the Chinese Coast Guard Pursue a Japanese Fishing Boat in the East China Sea?” The Diplomat (2 June 2020): https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/why-did-the-chinese-coast-guard-pursue-a-japanese-fishing-boat-in-the-east-china-sea/