“Food will win the war and write the peace.”
—The U.S. Department of Agriculture[1]
The presence of several hundred Chinese fishing vessels near the Galapagos Exclusive Economic Zone in late 2020 sparked immediate interest by government and defense officials across the globe. However the presence of such a large Chinese fishing fleet, far from Chinese territorial waters was not an isolated phenomena.[2] From the South China Sea to the Arctic, the Chinese fishing fleet has raced to strip foreign fishing stocks to feed increased domestic consumption. Where fishing fleets have traveled, so too has international dispute, often backed by Chinese military power in the form of Maritime Militia, Coast Guard, and even People’s Liberation Army Navy elements. While much analysis has focused on how fishing and other related maritime resource disputes play into great power competition and the national security implications for the U.S., comparatively little analysis has focused on the impacts of any disruption of not only the Chinese fishing fleet but China’s international food imports in the event of a Pacific conflict. Although China remains more vulnerable than the U.S. to food disruption in such a scenario, the ripple effects of a Pacific war will force China, regional actors, and even the U.S. to carefully manage national food policies, with drastic consequences should their attempts fail. In a future Pacific conflict, food policy and management by all parties is, to paraphrase Sir Michael Howard, a likely root of either victory or defeat for any unprepared participants.
China
In August 2020, Chinese social media companies, responding to President Xi Jinping’s comments on rampant food waste, sought to crack down on a social media trend of influencers and celebrities promoting the eating of vast quantities of food.[3] While designed to combat food insecurity due the disruption to global food networks as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the campaign highlights a deeper problem with Chinese food security. China’s domestic food production has struggled, despite massive government subsidies and investments to match the explosive growth in not only China’s population but the growth of an increasingly wealthy and sizable middle class driving increased food expenditure and consumption.[4] The resulting need to increase global imports and harvesting has not only driven the highly publicized Chinese fishing fleet into international and foreign waters, but also their other overseas investments into American pork production, American and Brazilian soybeans—a vital component for animal feed—and mass international land sales.[5] At the start of any conflict, such food imports would be threatened even before actual rounds are exchanged between the participants.
Fishing and tourist boats are anchored in the bay of San Cristóbal, Galapagos Islands, Ecuador. (Adrian Vasquez/AP)
Under wartime conditions, Chinese international food importation from any hostile belligerent would immediately cease, Even imports from neutral nations would virtually vanish, the result of a combination of American diplomatic pressure to isolate China from her One Belt One Road investments, attempts by domestic actors to regain control over their own domestic food production, and a predicted difficulty in finding ships willing to carry cargo into Chinese waters, which would be at minimum a dangerous war zone and at maximum a place declared off limits by an American blockade. While Chinese attempts to counter such a disruption would include adapting food supply networks to offload cargo in neutral or friendly neighboring countries such as Pakistan or Russia and continue their shipment train or air, such efforts, even if unobstructed by American diplomatic and economic pressure on assisting nations, are unlikely to cover even a minimum of the anticipated disruption. This is a brutal reality of the relative inability to transport mass volumes of cargo by hasty air and rudimentary train routes compared to maritime shipping networks. Overseas Chinese fishing fleets, if not hunted down by American and partner naval forces or impounded by neutral nations capitalizing on a distracted China to restore maritime sovereignty in national waters, will also struggle to transport their catch back to the Chinese domestic market; these fleets may become additional victims of an American military and diplomatic blockade.
Attempts by China to compensate for overseas disruption by increased domestic production may not work out as it would hope. The almost complete depletion of Chinese near water fishing stocks has driven the Chinese fishing fleet abroad, making a return to such waters highly unlikely to cover the loss of international access. No doubt the attempt will be made, but such attempts will be hamstrung by American and partner nation combat operations. Multiple American Naval and Marine commentators have called for American offensive mining to be undertaken at the start of any Pacific conflict, recalling the devastating effects of Operation Starvation against Japan in 1945.[6] While such a mining campaign would likely spare small Chinese fishing vessels, larger vessels designed for deep-sea and distant-water fishing opportunities may find themselves in the crosshairs of such a coordinated mining strategy. While these commentators have suggested that such mining be accompanied by new naval mines capable of selecting specific targets and communicating with other strike assets, such mines are years in development, leading the brunt of American mining to fall on converted bombs and torpedoes such as the M65 Quickstrike and MK67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine, which lack the ability to distinguish between a metal hulled fishing boat and a People’s Liberation Army Navy warship.[7] Furthermore, the dual role of the Chinese Fishing Fleet and People’s Maritime Militia for an array of missions including intelligence and reconnaissance operations, counter-reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and offensive minelaying is likely to lead to targeting by American strike assets as well.[8] Agricultural production increases are likely to struggle as well, the result of shortages in animal feed due to a stoppage of imports, combined with miniscule increases in crop production, itself a combination of lack of arable land and heavy groundwater pollution.[9] While in a short conflict, Chinese domestic reserves are likely to cover immediate shortages, a long conflict would force the Chinese central government to implement rationing and other food mitigation measures likely to diminish public support for the war.
Regional Actors
Unlike the People’s Republic of China, any attacked smaller nation, outside perhaps Japan and Australia, would not have the capability to sustain adequate levels of food supply in even a short conflict. The clash between the Chinese anti-access and area denial perimeter and American distributed naval, air, and land strike assets will likely turn large portions of the Pacific into free fire zones. For national fishing fleets, harassment by Chinese forces would likely turn into deliberate targeting designed to spread food shortages and resultant instability amongst a targeted nation. Such nations, unable to adequately protect their fishing fleets due to both asymmetrical and symmetrical naval imbalance would be forced to turn to additional imports to maintain sufficient food supply.[10] This is a dangerous proposition considering the heavy reliance of most Pacific nations on food imports under peacetime conditions. In war, such actions would be made difficult, not only by the high likelihood of the Chinese targeting of key logistics hubs such as ports and airfields, but due to a predicted hesitancy of non-government owned civilian merchant fleets to sail into a combat zone, both in terms of personal willingness and the willingness of companies to deal with heavy wartime insurance premiums.
It is at this point that partner nation food policy and supply management would directly impact U.S. military strategy. Partner nations’ militaries will increasingly be deployed to maintain internal security, not to counter Chinese offensive actions as food shortages increase. For American military strategists hoping to utilize partner nation forces to help contain China such a move would be unwelcome. Perhaps more unwelcome would be calls by such partner nations not only for additional American combat support, but American logistical support as well. In a future Pacific conflict, American military leaders and governmental officials will likely face an array of requests for food related assistance, not only in protecting national fishing fleets and escorting and supplementing civilian shipping, but also assisting in the transport of any delivered aid amongst the civilian populace. Such a situation would immediately place American military and political leaders in a tough position. Providing such assistance would divert limited naval and other forces into defensive convoy operations—a mission that has seen little American emphasis—and slow American reinforcement into the Pacific as scarce naval and air resources are redirected to food and other critical supply transportation.[11]
The United States
For the U.S., food policy and management is also a dangerous vulnerability. While the possibility of a Pearl Harbor style surprise on American Pacific forces that unites the country around revenge and national patriotism exists, it is likely that due to hostile Chinese information operations and ongoing partisan domestic politics there will remain a sizable population opposed to the conflict and another sizable population for whom support of the conflict is dependent on its impacts to their continued domestic stability. Thus, while domestic and international U.S. supply chains have the capability to handle critical food needs and prevent the drastic rationing and other measures likely in the Pacific and China, the United States is not completely safe from a perceived threat to its national food supply.[12] During the Second World War, despite national unification towards victory and the lightest amount of civilian rationing in the world, discontent still existed.[13] As the Coronavirus pandemic’s run on toilet paper and a variety of food products indicated, Americans are not only still sensitive at even the slightest disruption to food security, but likely to panic should food security be even remotely threatened.[14]
Maersk Bogor container ship approaches Middle East terminal (Maersk)
Furthermore, while physically unable to enforce a blockade or target logistics and agricultural networks, China can use her formidable cyber capabilities to introduce an actual threat to the American food supply. Not only could cyber attacks target port facilities, mimicking the 2017 hack of Maersk terminals, but also the ships themselves, disrupting increasingly automated ship functions including power generation and navigation.[15] While mobilization of the National Guard and other government entities to assist in port clearing and transportation through traditional analogue operations could mitigate such attacks, such actions would take time and cause a massive redirection of American government resources away from the war effort and into ensuring domestic contentment. Even domestic agricultural centers and meat producers would likely be under heavy Chinese cyber attack while simultaneously experiencing attacks launched by other U.S. adversaries or cyber criminals seeking to capitalize on an overwhelmed American cyber defense community.[16] Such actions backed by an influence campaign preying on American food security fears and ambivalence to the war could be devastating to American attempts at marshaling combat power in the Pacific to defend her allies and be victorious in any conflict.
Conclusion
In the event of war, food policy and management are likely to be key drivers of success or defeat for the belligerents. For the Chinese government, shortages in food production are guaranteed in any conflict due to a heavy reliance on food importation. While China possesses reserves of grain and other products to minimize the disruption in a short conflict, a long conflict would demand rationing and other drastic food-saving measures. In contrast, the U.S. faces little threat to production capacity, but instead is at risk from targeted disruption campaigns against key logistics and agricultural centers and networks preventing the plentiful supply from reaching its consumer. For the smaller belligerents, the survival of their populace depends on the ability of American hard and soft power to protect food supply routes and ensure the safe delivery of such food from areas of disembarkation to areas of need. While less dramatic than clashes of traditional military power, the ability of both China and America to manage food production and supply will be key to establishing victory in the Pacific.
Joshua Ratta is an officer in the United States Army. He holds a B.A. in History from Texas A&M University. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.
Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.
Header Image: Wheat Field, Zelenyi Hai, Ukraine, 2018, (Polina Rytova).
Notes:
[1] Collingham, E. M. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food. New York, NY: Penguin Books, Published by the Penguin Group, 2013.
[2] Woody, Christopher. “Hundreds of Chinese Fishing Boats Lurking off South America Add to Fears about a Future War for Fish.” Business Insider. Business Insider, August 21, 2020. https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-fishing-boats-near-galapagos-sign-of-competition-for-fish-2020-8.
[3] “China Cracks down on 'Big Stomach Kings in Fight against Food Wastage.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, August 13, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-food-wastage/china-cracks-down-on-big-stomach-kings-in-fight-against-food-wastage-iduskcn259140.
[4] “How Is China Feeding Its Population of 1.4 Billion?” ChinaPower, August 26, 2020. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-food-security/.
[5] “How is China Feeding Its Population of 1.4 Billion?” ChinaPower
[6] Hevey, Christopher, and Anthony Pollman. “Reimagine Offensive Mining.” Proceedings, 1415, 147, no. 1 (January 2021). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/january/reimagine-offensive-mining.; Sinclair, Wayne. “Equip the Battle Fleet for Mine Warfare.” Proceedings, 1423, 147, no. 9 (September 2021). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/september/mine-warfare-littorals; Winnefeld, James, and Syed Ahmad. “The Other Mine Warfare Will Work.” Proceedings, 1385, 144, no. 7 (July 2018). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/july/other-mine-warfare-will-work.
[7] Hevey, Christopher, and Anthony Pollman. “Reimagine Offensive Mining.”; Winnefeld, James, and Syed Ahmad. “The Other Mine Warfare Will Work.”
[8] Erickson, Andrew S.; Murray, William S.; and Godstein, Lyle J., "Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy 'Assassin's Mace' Capability" (2009). CMSI Red Books, Study No. 3. 32; Kraska, James. “China's Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives During Armed Conflict.” The Diplomat, July 8, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/chinas-maritime-militia-vessels-may-be-military-objectives-during-armed-conflict/.; Landreth, James. “The Strategic Significance of the Chinese Fishing Fleet,” Military Review,( May-June 2021), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2021/Landreth-Chinese-Fishing-Fleet/
[9] “How is China Feeding Its Population of 1.4 Billion?” ChinaPower.
[10] Alman, David. “Convoy Escort: The Navy's Forgotten (Purpose) Mission.” War on the Rocks. Texas National Security Review, January 5, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/convoy-escort-the-navys-forgotten-purpose-mission/.
[11] Alman, David. “Convoy Escort: The Navy's Forgotten (Purpose) Mission.”
[12] Zeihan, Peter. The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder. New York: Twelve, 2016.
[13] Collingham, E. M. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food.
[14] Borter, Gabriella. “No Milk, No Bleach: Americans Awake to Coronavirus Panic Buying.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, March 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-shoppers/no-milk-no-bleach-americans-awake-to-coronavirus-panic-buying-iduskbn211171.
[15] Osler, David. “One Ship Is Hacked Every Day on Average.” Lloyd's List, July 6, 2021. https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1137457/One-ship-is-hacked-every-day-on-average.; Saul, Jonathan. “Global Shipping Feels Fallout From Maersk Cyber Attack.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 29, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-maersk/global-shipping-feels-fallout-from-maersk-cyber-attack-iduskbn19k2le.
[16] Dam, TuAnh. “Russian Hackers Target Iowa Farm Co-Op.” Axios, September 22, 2021. https://www.axios.com/russian-hackers-target-iowa-farm-co-op-60857f6d-f4f2-4b08-bf8e-a332a3dd3c34.html.