Jonathan Helton and Braeden Farley
“Hunger is actually the worst of all weapons of mass destruction, claiming millions of victims every year.”[1]
—Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, former President of Brazil
Yemen is a humanitarian disaster, and thousands have died in the conflict there so far. International organizations have done what they can to alleviate the crisis, providing health, education, and food assistance. The last is badly needed, as more than 20 million people face food insecurity.[2] However, aid agencies have encountered setbacks from rebel and government groups. Both sides have blocked, taxed, or stolen food aid, using it for nefarious gains.[3] The United Nations World Food Programme even withdrew food aid for a period of two months, citing these concerns.[4] Aid agencies in Somalia and Syria, too, have experienced similar difficulties, bringing into question food aid’s effectiveness.
For the United States, this question is salient, as it is the world’s largest donor of food aid.[5] In 2015, U.S. food aid fed 36 million people in 43 countries.[6] One in every nine people are still undernourished, so the necessity to extend a helping hand remains.[7] The COVID-19 pandemic has further damaged food security, with initial estimates stating that more than 100 million people could fall back into severe hunger.[8] Reforming the United States’ outdated food aid disbursement policies is one way to combat world hunger. However, some members of the maritime community believe these disbursement policies provide essential business for U.S.-flagged shipping, bolstering national security. This article discusses why this is unlikely. A reform of such policies could directly affect the lives of millions, while also creating the indirect benefit of reducing conflict in recipient countries.
Background
The U.S. food aid procurement policies trace their roots to 1954, with Public Law 480, known as the Food for Peace Act.[9] Significant among the laws governing food aid is the mandate that aid agencies source 100% of food purchased under the Food for Peace Program from the United States. This mandate has drawn ire from academia and aid organizations.[10] Today, though, with the creation of other aid accounts, aid agencies buy only 41% of food aid domestically.[11] Apart from the sourcing mandate, food aid doubly functions as a subsidy for the U.S. Merchant Marine. The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 required U.S.-flag vessels to carry 50% of food aid.[12] Congress amended this requirement twice—in 1985 they raised it to 75% and in 2012 they reverted to 50%. Cargo preference is standard policy for government-impelled cargo: defense equipment, Export-Import Bank cargoes, and half of other civilian agency cargoes all fall under cargo preference laws.[13]
Shipping with a U.S.-flagged vessel, however, entails higher costs for the taxpayer. Since these vessels must comply with U.S. tax law and operate with a U.S. crew, their annual operating costs run $6 million more than a comparable foreign-flagged ship.[14] This means aid agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development foot the bill for higher shipping costs, which consumes money that they would otherwise spend on food. Recent research estimates these costs to be up to $64 million annually.[15]
Food Aid and Maritime Security
These costs are ostensibly justified on national security grounds. Advocates of cargo preference have called it “a common-sense way to maintain the Merchant Marine.”[16] Some U.S.-flag operators view food aid cargoes, which comprise less than 11% of government-impelled cargoes, as “a critical component of America’s strategic sealift program.”[17] With a mere 82 U.S.-flagged ships in international trade, this additional sealift capacity is the primary impetus for supporting the private U.S.-flagged fleet.[18] Vessels participating in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement receive food aid and other preference cargoes in return for allowing the Department of Defense to use their capacity during crises. Absent sealift capacity, the Department of Defense would be forced to rely on smaller, more expensive air sorties to move cargo, hindering the ability to deploy troops, weapons systems, and ammunition.
USAID
Such support for the private U.S.-flagged fleet extends beyond cargo preference, however. The Merchant Marine also receives support from the Maritime Security Program—a $5 million annual stipend for qualified vessels.[19] Similar to the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, this stipend is contingent on the vessel pledging its availability to support Department of Defense activities during crises.[20] Vessels enrolled in the Maritime Security Program are also eligible to carry preference cargoes, as all Maritime Security Program ships are considered part of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement.[21]
As a policy tool, cargo preference for food aid has proven ineffective at supporting military needs. For example, only a handful of ships carry the bulk of all food aid. In fiscal year 2014, only seven ships carried 85% of U.S. food aid; in fiscal year 2016, five ships carried over two-thirds of food aid, and the Department of Defense considered only three of those militarily useful.[22] In addition, the average U.S.-flagged ship that carries food aid is six years older than its foreign counterpart.[23] Further, research suggests cargo preference for food aid funds multinational corporations like shipping giant Maersk.[24] Even the Department of Homeland Security expressed concern when the Senate suggested reversing the 2012 change from 75% to 50% stating that “this would have grave effects on United States humanitarian assistance programs.”[25]
Support for these older, arguably obsolete ships may be misplaced, especially when considering their hypothetical utility. Both the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and the Maritime Security Program operate as a backup fleet to government-owned ships. The Department of Defense-owned Military Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet are the military’s primary sealift resources. Ships in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement—the program into which many food aid-carrying ships fall—have never been called into action.[26] Even in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, before the creation of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, the military used foreign-flag ships, even when it had U.S.-flagged options. Foreign-flag ships carried twice as much cargo as private, U.S.-flagged ships.[27] Supporters of cargo preference correctly note that several foreign ships refused to enter the combat zone. However, the Government Accountability Office documented that U.S. citizen mariners have similarly refused on occasion.[28]
Food Aid and Armed Conflict
While food aid’s support for the U.S.-flagged fleet may be minimal, its impact on the lives of those who receive it is not. Apart from directly feeding those experiencing acute hunger, contemporary scholarship suggests food aid can lessen conflict. For example, food shortages can exacerbate conflict, as riots in Haiti and Madagascar have shown, and while hunger is not a categorical determinant of violence, it is a threat multiplier, especially when caused by price spikes.[29] Worse, conflict often destroys food supplies, leading to a vicious cycle of violence and food insecurity.[30] Food aid is certainly no panacea to these ills. However, it can provide much needed assistance, transforming “the vicious cycle of food insecurity and conflict” into “a virtuous cycle of food security and stability.”[31] As George Katsos wrote, “successfully managing food security can mitigate or prevent conflicts and civilian deaths.”[32] The United Nations World Food Programme documented several cases where they used food aid to that end.[33] Recent studies back this finding, showing that food aid reduces conflict incidence. One study from researchers from Universities of Kansas and DePaul discovered that food aid decreased both the duration and likelihood of armed conflict.[34]
North Africa’s short-lived Arab Spring of 2010-11 illustrates a disastrous cycle of conflict, food insecurity, and forced migration. (Food and Migration)
Still, food aid means international entanglements from critics who posit that it actually incites violence. Food aid may save lives, they argue, but it may also take them in the form of increased conflict. As the situation in Yemen demonstrates, warring factions sometimes hijack aid. Hijacked aid no longer functions as a gift, but as an arbiter of authority. In one Zimbabwe community, for example, food aid damaged social ties among the villagers, leading to fights, jailings, and inequality. The disbursement policies misidentified the “poorest and most vulnerable,” leading to their exclusion while feeding those who were relatively well-off.[35] Some studies have implicated food aid as a weapon of terror.[36] One study by Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian found that a 10% increase in food aid to a given country was related to a 0.7% increase in conflict occurrence.[37] Aid theft was one vehicle that prolonged the violence, Nunn and Qian asserted.
These claims, however, should not be accepted without scrutiny. Economists Christopher Barrett and Paul Christian reexamined Nunn and Qian’s methodology. Barrett and Christian’s work suggests that Nunn and Qian’s methodology suffered from several errors which led to inaccurate findings. Instead Nunn and Qian’s model, appropriately applied, actually showed food aid could be associated with a decrease in conflict.[38] A technical paper from the U.S. Agency for International Development further disputed Nunn and Qian’s original methodology. Nunn and Qian’s findings were only significant when they included the years 1971-1974 in their dataset, and omitted certain variables like other forms of support for rebel groups, such as their access to foreign bases.[39] Including those variables, and instead using the time period of 1975-2005, the technical paper reported that food aid’s likelihood of prolonging a conflict was very small.[40] In sum, current literature suggests that food aid probably diminishes conflict prevalence
Policy Recommendations
Feeding the hungry, a noble aim, especially in times of crisis, represents a humanitarian effort mired in conflicting policy objectives. On the one hand, food aid feeds millions, and on the other, it subsidizes the U.S. Merchant Marine. Additionally, aid agencies must ensure their disbursement policies do not allow armed groups to hijack food, increasing the scourge of conflict. Freeing food aid from this tangle of policy objectives would allow U.S. aid agencies to pursue their goals without expending their limited budget on inflated transportation costs. A straightforward policy option would entail Congress eliminating cargo preference for food aid and allowing aid agencies greater flexibility in disbursement. Simply ending the cargo preference requirement could feed approximately two million more people annually.[41] As the above analysis suggests, this would hardly jeopardize U.S. sealift capabilities.
In addition, allowing aid agencies greater autonomy in procurement would bring benefits, as research suggests aid agencies with greater flexibility perform better in volatile situations.[42] For example, cash transfers may be at less risk of diversion, since electronic methods exist for tracking such disbursements.[43] Still, aid agencies only spent 13% of food aid on cash transfers in 2019.[44] Aid agencies facing fragile, conflict-sensitive environments should not have their hands tied by stipulations that they must ship food from the United States, especially if that food is at risk of theft. Instead, they should be free to reach in-need recipients in whatever way is most practicable.
Apart from eliminating cargo preference for food aid altogether, Congress could reimplement a policy that it abolished in 2012. Before the 2012 reversion to 50% cargo preference for food aid, law required the Maritime Administration to reimburse aid agencies for certain excess shipping costs. In practice this created a tangle of conditions where the Maritime Administration paid for a portion of the price premium of U.S.-flagged ships.[45] Still, aid agencies did not bear the cost alone. If Congress felt the need to support those U.S.-flagged ships that depend on food aid for a substantial portion of their revenue, it could reinstate the reimbursement requirement. This would entail higher budgetary costs for the Maritime Administration, but it would free up additional funding for food aid purchases and place the burden of funding cargo preference on the agency that enforces it.
Faced with staggering levels of global hunger, the transportation, aid, and military communities need to evaluate the best use of a limited budget. It should not continue funding largely obsolete ships. Instead, it should be used to feed the hungry and use soft power to diffuse conflict before it occurs. Of course, policy is not limited to black and white binaries, and amending aid disbursement procedures will not come without some negative ramifications. However, eliminating cargo preference will almost invariably do more good than harm. Lives saved, people fed, and conflict assuaged, at little cost to maritime security.
Jonathan Helton is a student at Freed-Hardeman University, pursuing a bachelor’s degree in Law and Politics. He is also a research assistant with John E. Talbott and Associates. Braeden Farley is a freelance researcher specializing in foreign aid.
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Header Image: Food rations provided by a local charity to conflict-affected people in Yemen. (EPA)
Notes:
[1] Déborah B. L. Farias, Aid and Technical Cooperation as a Foreign Policy Tool for Emerging Donors: The Case of Brazil, 2018, https://rb.gy/emsrf8.
[2] “Yemen: Events of 2019,” Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/yemen.
[3] “The Houthi rebels wrestle with the UN over food aid,” The Economist, November 28, 2019,
[4] “UN food aid to Yemen will fully resume after two-month break, as Houthis ‘guarantee’ delivery,” UN News, August 9, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1044011.
[5] “Frequently Asked Questions,” United States Agency for International Development, January 14, 2020, https://www.usaid.gov/food-assistance/faq.
[6] “INTERNATIONAL FOOD ASSISTANCE: Cargo Preference Increased Food Aid Shipping Cost; Benefits Remain Unclear,” Government Accountability Office, October 19, 2017, pg. 1 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687836.pdf.
[7] “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World,” Food and Agriculture Organization, 2019, pg. 6, http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition.
[8] “COVID-19 Could Ignite Famine,” World Food Program, https://www.wfpusa.org/coronavirus/.
[9] Randy Schnepf, “U.S. International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, September 14, 2016, pg. 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41072.pdf.
[10] Christopher Barrett, Stephanie Mercier, Erin Lentz, “International Food Aid and Food Assistance Programs and the Next Farm Bill,” American Enterprise Institute, October 2017,
Ben Grossman-Cohen, “Saving Money and Lives: The Human Side of U.S. Food Aid Reform” Oxfam America, March 29, 2012,
[11] “Food Assistance Funding by Modality,” Food For Peace Fiscal Year 2019 Fact Sheet, United States Agency for International Development, https://www.usaid.gov/ffp-2019-fact-sheet.
[12] John Frittelli, “Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping,” Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2015, pg. 4, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44254.pdf.
[13] “Government Cargo. U.S. Vessels. Security in the International Market.” Maritime Administration, December 11, 2019, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/cargo-preference/cargo-preference.
[14] “MARITIME SECURITY: DOT Needs to Expeditiously Finalize the Required National Maritime Strategy for Sustaining U.S.-Flag Fleet,” Government Accountability Office, August 2018, pg. 24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693802.pdf.
[15] Philip Hoxie, Stephanie Mercier, and Vincent Smith, “The Cost of Cargo Preference for International Aid Programs,” American Enterprise Institute, March 2020, pg. 2, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/The-Cost-of-Cargo-Preference-for-International-Food-Aid-Programs.pdf.
[16] Bryant Gardner and Brian Schoeneman, “Congress has a responsibility to save the Merchant Marine,” The Hill, May 22, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/388862-congress-has-a-responsibility-to-save-the-merchant-marine.
[17] Frittelli, “Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping,” pg. 6. The 11% figure was in 2011. That year, cargo preference was at 75%, meaning food aid likely represents an even smaller percentage now; Brian Schoenman, Hearing On The Next Farm Bill: The Future of International Food Aid and Agricultural Development, Testimony of Brian W. Schoeneman Seafarers International Union on Behalf of USA Maritime, June 7, 2017, pg. 7, http://usamaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/170607-Written-Testimony-of-Brian-Schoeneman-Seafarers-for-USA-Maritim....pdf
[18] Mark Buzby, Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Forces, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces and Subcommittee on Readiness, U.S. House of Representatives, March 7, 2019, pg. 3, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109032/witnesses/HHRG-116-AS28-Wstate-BuzbyM-20190307.pdf.
[19] “DOT Needs to Expeditiously Finalize the Required National Maritime Strategy for Sustaining U.S.-Flag Fleet,” Government Accountability Office, August 2018, pg. 28, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693802.pdf.
[20] “Maritime Security Program (MSP), Maritime Administration, August 6, 2019,
https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-security/strategic-sealift/maritime-security-program-msp.
[21] “DOT Needs to Expeditiously Finalize the Required National Maritime Strategy for Sustaining U.S.-Flag Fleet,” Government Accountability Office, August 2018, pg. 2, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693802.pdf; Ibid, pg. 9.
[22] Phillip J. Thomas and Wayne H. Ferris, “Food Aid Reforms Will Not Significantly Affect Shipping Industry or Surge Fleet,” Centers on the Public Service, School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, June 2015, pg. 14, http://publicservice.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/GMU_Final_Rev_Food_Aid_Reform_Shipping_Rpt_June_30_2015.pdf; Philip Hoxie, Stephanie Mercier, and Vincent Smith, “The Cost of Cargo Preference for International Aid Programs,” American Enterprise Institute, March 2020, pg. 2, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/The-Cost-of-Cargo-Preference-for-International-Food-Aid-Programs.pdf.
[23] Philip Hoxie, Stephanie Mercier, and Vincent Smith, pg. 7.
[24] Philip Hoxie, Stephanie Mercier, and Vincent Smith, pg. 7.
[25] Brian de Vallance, Letter to Chairman Jay Rockefeller, April 17, 2014, pg. 1, https://www.scribd.com/document/220264499/DHS-Coast-Guard-Letter.
[26] Stephanie Mercier and Vincent Smith, pg. 22.
[27] Colin Grabow, Inu Manak, and Daniel Ikenson, “The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear,” Cato Institute, June 28, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/jones-act-burden-america-can-no-longer-bear#nation-more-secure.
[28] Darren McDew, Statement of General Darren W. McDew, United States Air Force Commander, United States Transportation Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee On the State of the Command, April 10, 2018, pg. 11, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McDew_04-10-18.pdf; “DOT Is Taking Steps to Obtain Interagency Input and Finalize Strategy,” Government Accountability Office, January 2020, pg. 5, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/703892.pdf.
[29] “Stability in the 21st Century: Global Food Security for Peace and Prosperity,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, report prepared by an Independent Task Force on Global Food Security, March 2017, pg. 1, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/stability_in_the_21st_century_march17.pdf; Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, “Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges,” World Food Programme, July 2011, pg. 2, https://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf; and Evan Andrew Buck, “Navigating the Arab Spring: The Power of Food Prices and the Stability of Monarchies,” Master’s thesis, Boise State University, August 2016, page vi, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e4db/1e0e9b08a6aa7e949203ac68d3a5cb7285a9.pdf.
[30] Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, pg. 4; María Alejandra Arias, Ana María Ibáñez, and Andrés Zambrano, “Agricultural Production amidst Conflict: The Effects of Shocks, Uncertainty and Governance of Non-State Armed Actors,” Universidad de Los Andes, May 7, 2013, pg. 30, https://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01589/WEB/IMAGES/ANDRES-2.PDF.
[31] Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, pg. 15.
[32] George E. Katsos, “The U.S. Government’s Approach to Food Security: Focus on Campaign Activities,” Joint Force Quarterly 87, National Defense University Press, October 1, 2017,
[33] Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, pg. 16.
[34] Sébastien Mary and Ashok Mishra, “Humanitarian Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” World Development, Volume 126, February 2020,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X19303626; Elizabeth C. Dippold, “Evaluating the Effects of Food Aid on Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Disaggregate Approach,” Master’s thesis, Iowa State University, 2016, pg. 67,
[35] Mark Chingono, “Food aid, village politics and conflict in rural Zimbabwe,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, September 2, 2019,
https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/food-aid-village-politics-and-conflict-in-rural-zimbabwe/.
[36] Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” American Economic Review, June 2014, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/faidconf_20130806_final_0.pdf;
Chi‐Yang Chu, Daniel J. Henderson and Le Wang, “The Robust Relationship Between US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” Journal of Applied Economics, November 20, 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jae.2558;
[37] Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, pg. 1632.
[38] Paul Christian and Christopher B. Barrett, “Revisiting the Effect of Food Aid on Conflict: A Methodological Caution,” World Bank Group, August 2017, pg. 21, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/723981503518830111/pdf/WPS8171.pdf.
[39] “(Re)assessing the Relationship Between Food Aid and Armed Conflict,” United States Agency for International Development, technical brief, October 2014, pg. 4, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID%20food%20aid%20technical%20brief.pdf.
[40] “(Re)assessing the Relationship Between Food Aid and Armed Conflict,” pg. 4.
[41] Philip Hoxie, Stephanie Mercier, and Vincent Smith, pg. 2.
[42] Andrew Natsios, Hearing on “Modernizing Food Aid: Improving Effectiveness and Saving Lives,” before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2018, pg. 3, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20180214/106858/HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-NatsiosA-20180214.pdf.
[43] Laura Gordon, “Risk and humanitarian cash transfer programming,” Background Note for the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers, May 2015, pg. 6, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9727.pdf.
[44] “Food Assistance Funding by Modality,” Food For Peace Fiscal Year 2019 Fact Sheet, United States Agency for International Development, https://www.usaid.gov/ffp-2019-fact-sheet.
[45] Randy Schnepf, “U.S. International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, September 14, 2016, pg. 27, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41072.pdf; Elizabeth R. Bageant, Christopher B. Barrett, and Erin C. Lentz, “Food Aid and Agricultural Cargo Preference,” Cornell University, June 2010, pg. 5, http://barrett.dyson.cornell.edu/Papers/Cargo%20Preference%20July%202010.pdf.