Introduction: Seeking the Ideal Verb
Relationships imply action. They drive interactions; they show movement; they journey. Examining the verbs that fit between strategy and theory—the action of one on the other—can elucidate the nature of the nouns and their relationship. Here, let us consider the verb in the sentence “Strategy [verb] theory.”
Strategy preempts theory. Strategy trumps theory. Strategy impersonates theory. Upon close examination, even works of classic military theorists—Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, and Liddell Hart, among others—defy the ideal relationship between military strategy and military theory, in favor of these dysfunctional ones.
Ideally, theory informs strategy, as Everett Dolman writes in Pure Strategy.[1] In the idealized relationship, as in the idealized scientific method, military theory begins with observations about the world. Through astute pattern recognition, deductive reasoning, and hypothesis testing, the military academic develops a theory. Colin Gray says theory “can only educate;” it does not direct activities.[2] Theory explains. It describes and predicts. It observes. From theory, strategy is born. Strategy prescribes; it tells practitioners what to do. Dolman explains that an iterative cycle of inductive and deductive reasoning epitomizes the ideal relationship wherein theory informs strategy.
Instead, as principled maritime strategist Julian Corbett observes, leaders often mistrust theory because its application is not immediately practical.[3] Leaders’ desire for unequivocal answers and how-to manuals erodes the relationship between theory and strategy. An exploration of classic military authors exposes that, in reality, strategy preempts, trumps, and impersonates theory.
Pre·empt vt : To Come Before
In his enduring work On War, Clausewitz writes about evidence and critical analysis, the hallmarks of the scientific method. Few authors match his reverence for military theory, but even the Prussian priest of military ideology demonstrates that strategy preempts theory.
Clausewitz leans on the tenets of empiricism and rationalism, but he steps off the scientific method’s ladder to theory in his writing on critical analysis, saying, “Critical analysis is…an evaluation…of all possible means.…One [cannot] condemn a method without being able to suggest a better alternative.”[4] In a chapter that touts an application of theoretical truths, Clausewitz over-emphasizes the means and their ability to instruct. He does so because “in the art of war experience counts more than any amount of abstract truths.”[5] This assertion suggests critical analysis is about finding proof of one strategy’s superiority to another. Clausewitz’s analysis is essentially a battle of the means rather than the deduction of strategy from theory de novo. In the ideal relationship, where theory precedes strategy, strategy only succeeds as a critique of theory. On the contrary, Clausewitz reverses this order, implying that the successes or failures of strategy derive theory.
Furthermore, his style of argumentation continues to place strategy ahead of theory in military reasoning. Clausewitz catalogues historical examples, drawing heavily on exemplars Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. From their battles and campaigns, he inductively infers common causes and themes. Induction is not unscientific; it is, however, ordinal—a point Clausewitz overlooks. In the ideal relationship, deduction from theory comes first; inductive reasoning from individual strategies comes second. Clausewitz’s argumentation style further inverts the ideal relationship when he invokes the dialectical method. In building his theory, he pits two opposing ideas—attack and defense—against one another with a dialectic inquiry.[6] His argument suggests theory arises from two feuding plans. Does whichever one wins become theory? The ideal relationship assumes strategy is predicated upon theory, but the very styles of argumentation Clausewitz employs belie a different kind of relationship—one where strategy comes first.
“Frederic the Great at the Battle of Zorndorf” painted by Carl Röchling (Wikimedia)
Yet again, in his discussion of military genius, Clausewitz orients strategy before theory. According to a popular musicians’ anecdote, a student argues with Mozart that he is not too young to write a symphony and that Mozart was younger than he when composing Symphony No. 1. Mozart replied simply, “True, but I never had to ask how.”[7] Clausewitz evokes this kind of genius, bereft of theoretical foundation, with his generals who possess “[special] gifts of intellect and temperament”—precursors to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s and Jomini's “pre-vision” and strategic coup-d’œil.[8] What will such genius generals know at a glance? They will know what to do. That is, genius is about knowing military strategy, not theory. Were theory truly first in Clausewitz’s mind, perhaps he would write about what theory a military genius can foreknow.
By applying the scientific method’s steps out of order; by pitting historical examples against one another to infer theoretical truisms; and by endowing generals with a genius for strategy and not theory, On War erodes the ideal relationship between theory and strategy. It suggests, rather, that strategy preempts theory.
Trump vt : To Override
Jomini and Douhet continue corroding theory and strategy’s ideal relationship through excessive advocacy, prescription, and pragmatism; they consistently show that in reality, strategy trumps theory.
Jomini makes no great show of trying to hide his belief: strategy trumps theory because strategy sells.
Jomini’s advocacy borders on naked salesmanship. The very brevity of his “Supplement…” pamphlet conjures an infomercial aesthetic. As commentator John Shy remarks, Jomini seems confident that discovering truth is less demanding than “packaging and marketing it.”[9] What is Jomini so intent on selling? He insists those “who clearly perceive the importance of [his] truths…will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate coup-d’œil,” but the truths to which he refers—47 articles’ worth—are in fact strategies, not theories.[10] He boasts that those who buy and follow his popular methodology will get ahead in military life. While Clausewitz clearly intended to put theory first—his success or failure notwithstanding—Jomini makes no great show of trying to hide his belief: strategy trumps theory because strategy sells.
Jomini’s exaltation of strategy stems from his pragmatism. He entertains no Clausewitzian thought experiments, undertakes no Platonic argumentation—if war is real, ease of use rules the day. Jomini coos, “In the military science…the study of details is easy…there is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity…in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front.”[11] He could as easily strategize from a football huddle this military option offense. Jomini bows to strategy’s practicality and eschews theory’s abstraction.
Douhet also subordinates theory to strategy, but his prescriptiveness is bolder. He forces his prescription of strategic bombing by delivering bleak prophecies of a world without his air power remedy. With Deuteronomical admonition, Douhet preaches his prescription as salvation. He testifies, “There is only one valid way to defend oneself from aerial offensives;” disobeying his laws can only result in “an inhuman, an atrocious, performance…these are the facts.”[12] For Douhet, the prescriptive value of strategies trumps the description or prediction a theory provides.
He-111 over London in 1940. (Imperial War Museum)
Jomini and Douhet's advocacy-cum-salesmanship, their prescription-as-salvation dogma, and their utmost devotion to the practical make their books popular reads. And most importantly of all, those books contend: strategy trumps theory.
Im·per·son·ate vt : To Assume the Character Of
While putting strategy ahead of, and asserting its superiority over, theory is one kind of vice, impersonation is a vice of a wholly different kind. To the value of theory and its instruction on the way war is, nothing may be more dangerous than strategy masquerading as theory. Dolman’s self-referential comment about his book—“Pure Strategy is more properly a philosophy of strategy…an inquiry into the fundamental truth of strategy”—errs in calling the distillation of foundational truths “strategy.”[13] Truths state what is. Strategy translates what is into a plan of what to do. Though nuanced, this concept is essential to the ideal relationship between theory and strategy. One describes; the other prescribes. By minimizing theory, at least Dolman fails conservatively—he fails to give theory the distinction it is due. On the other hand, Liddell Hart, in his discussion on grand strategy, the science of war, and principles of war, fails broadly. Liddell Hart artificially elevates strategy and parades it as theory.
…nothing may be more dangerous than strategy masquerading as theory.
First, Liddell Hart treats grand strategy as if it were theory. He writes of the controlling influence of grand strategy on strategy, over-emphasizing the derivation of strategies from each other and diminishing the relationship between theory and strategy. “Strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand strategy,’” he writes, putting grand strategy in the role of and on equal footing with theory.[14] When strategy B derives from strategy A, and when strategy A is imbued with the vision and distinction ideally reserved for theory, strategy B is in danger of no longer being informed by theory. And strategy A is in danger of being an imposter.
Theory is philosophically grounded on falsifiability…
Furthermore, Liddell Hart’s mistreatment of the precepts of science in war reveals how strategy comes to impersonate theory. Liddell Hart hints at his view of the scientific when he describes Clausewitz’s theory as “carried away by his passion for pure logic.”[15] By disdaining “reasoning in the abstract,” Liddell Hart shuns one of the most important characteristics of theory—that it be falsifiable.[16] He then fails to consider his argument’s null hypothesis, which is as important in philosophy as it is in science. Liddell Hart argues for the indirect approach in war, but in testing it with examples from history, he does not fully evaluate the null: that wars fought by the indirect approach are no more (or less) successful than those fought by the direct approach.[17] This failure underscores Liddell Hart’s lack of a scientific methodology for what he calls theory. He seems the most contemptuous toward the science of military theory when he scoffs that Clausewitz was merely “a codifying thinker, rather than a creative or dynamic one.”[18] What does Liddell Hart’s apparent scorn for science in war have to do with mistaking strategy for theory? Theory is philosophically grounded on falsifiability, the null hypothesis, and methodically codified results. What Liddell Hart puts forth—a strategy prescribing the indirect approach—he treats as theory. He claims it derives from sound evidence, but his reasoning does not meet evidentiary standards.
What Liddell Hart does appreciate, however, is the prestige of science. In creating principles, laws, axioms, dicta, and essential truths, he and other classic military authors display their penchant for elevating strategy to the level of theory. They do so by giving their prescriptions lofty, scientific-sounding names. Did Colin Gray, for instance, reach the highest academic altitude only to publish 21 rules that are, at their root, prescriptive? He even gives them a name—the 21 Dicta—to put them on a level with scientific law and theory.[19] Likewise, in the same breath that J.C. Slessor says, “The majority of the so-called principles of war are not principles at all,” he adds, “But there are three great fundamental rules which are really worthy of the title of principles”—principles found in Field Service Regulations.[20] At least he acknowledges his principles are rules in disguise, a distinction Liddell Hart fails to make. Liddell Hart’s axioms—named to connote mathematical purity—are written in the second person.[21] They command. Nonetheless, by ascribing them axiomatic certitude, Liddell Hart gives them the impression of theory.
A theme runs throughout Liddell Hart’s work: strategy can be equated with or take the place of theory—it is, in fact, theory. In Liddell Hart’s theme, strategy impersonates theory.
Conclusion: A Dysfunctional Relationship
The age-old chicken-or-egg question has a scientific answer: the egg came first by about a billion years. Ideally, the same is true for strategy and theory. Theory comes first. It informs strategy, and strategies derive from theory through deduction. As more strategies are developed, induction can lead to new theory in an iterative loop. When strategic thinkers conflate strategy with theory or give it precedence over theory, the relationship becomes dysfunctional. Theory becomes the handmaid of strategy. Without strategy, theory has no one to tell it what it got wrong. Without leveled theory, strategy is bound to be lopsided. Fortunately, strategists choose to read authors not to fixate on their immutable, sacred truths, but to see farther from atop their shoulders. As strategists, we can begin by viewing rightly the in-between words that relate theory and strategy. Theory must inform strategy. Strategy ought never to preempt, trump, nor impersonate theory.
Rachel Reynolds is a U.S. Air Force officer. She is currently a student at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. All statements of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author's and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense or any of its components, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, and Liddell Hart (Various Sources)
Notes:
[1] Everett C. Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age, Cass Series--Strategy and History 6 (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 17.
[2] Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 244.
[3] Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 3-4.
[4] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. and eds. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, First Paperback Printing (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 161.
[5] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. and eds. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, First Paperback Printing (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 163-4.
[6] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. and eds. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, First Paperback Printing (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 523.
[7] Ian Page, “Mozart at 250: How to Explain a 10-Year-Old Talent for All Time,” The Guardian, January 9, 2016.
[8] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. and eds. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, First Paperback Printing (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 100, 109. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 392. Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, Virginia: Wilder Publications, 2008), 256.
[9] John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 163 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986).
[10] Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, Virginia: Wilder Publications, 2008), 260.
[11] Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Radford, Virginia: Wilder Publications, 2008), 256.
[12] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, 1921st, Reprint ed. (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2009), 185, 191.
[13] Everett C. Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age, Cass Series--Strategy and History 6 (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 187.
[14] Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York: Meridian, 1991), 319, 322, 353.
[15] Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York: Meridian, 1991), 341.
[16] Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York: Meridian, 1991), 341-2.
[17] Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York: Meridian, 1991), 5.
[18] Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York: Meridian, 1991), 340.
[19] Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 26.
[20] John Cotesworth Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2009), 62.
[21] Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed (New York: Meridian, 1991), 335-6.