Autumn of Our Discontent: Fall 1949 and the Crises in American National Security. John Curatola. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022.
In Autumn of Our Discontent, John Curatola contends the Soviet creation of an atomic bomb was not the single determinant for the United State’s 1949 decision to establish a large defense structure. Rather, the almost simultaneous confluence of several events during Autumn of 1949 “sowed the seeds for a review of national security policy.”[1] A principal military historian at the National World War II Museum, Curatola highlights the key game changers as the implementation of George Kennan’s containment policy, the loss of mainland China to communism, the release of the China White Paper, arguments on the ethics of creating a thermonuclear bomb, and the very public rivalry between the U.S. military services. Because each occurred so closely in time, he skillfully asserts, the effect they had on the country’s perspective toward national security “was greater than the sum of their parts.”[2]
Curatola’s title appears to be a salute to the opening speech in William Shakespeare’s Richard III, where Richard of Gloucester declares, “Now is the winter of our discontent, made glorious summer by this sun of York,” revealing the victory of the House of York after years of conflict.[3] Similarly, Curatola reflects on the time of bleak discouragement in U.S. foreign affairs during the autumn of 1949 that led to NSC-68 and its recommended creation of a national security state to defend against the threat of communism.
The book is divided chronologically. Curatola begins his tome with the riveting story of U.S. Air Force intelligence crews uncovering evidence of the first Soviet nuclear test. The rest of the introduction examines other key defense and foreign policy events that occurred immediately following World War II. The essential core of the book, however, the critical events of 1949, are separately explored in two long chapters of 78 and 99 pages, respectively titled “Summer” and “Autumn.” These are followed by a 29-page conclusion, appropriately named “Winter,” covering the related changes in national policy and illuminating the legacy of those changes.
Curatola brilliantly guides the reader through detailed accounts of lesser-known conflicts and debates of the time. He delves into the bitter fight between the Air Force and Navy over roles and missions, revealing the political drama that ensued both publicly and in Congressional hearings. He unveils the muted debates over how to best help the anti-Communist Kuomintang fight in China without supporting their corruption and exploitation of peasants. He also highlights the disconnect between the Atomic Energy Commission and Strategic Air Command over atomic weapon requirements. He reveals the ethical and moral struggles over whether to create a super nuclear fusion bomb or to rely solely on the fission weapons developed at the time.
Joseph Stalin, left, meets with Mao Zedong in Moscow in December 1949. (Sovfoto/Universal Images Group/Getty)
Curatola focuses on obscure debates to show how they influenced public opinion and the perceptions of national leaders toward national defense strategy. By tying events into one narrative, he also highlights how closely bound each event was to the others and how their cumulative influence on the nation’s perspective toward national defense was greater than any single part taken separately. He supports these accounts with precise and comprehensive citations and a comprehensive bibliography to guide researchers on the less familiar debates.
However, Curatola’s most important accomplishment is creating a comprehensive look at how the United States changed its perspective on national security policy during 1949 by identifying and highlighting the importance of the lesser known national security issues that may have been hidden by the creation of the nuclear bomb. While his focus on 1949 may be too narrow, Curatola acknowledges that events outside of this year also had a significant impact on the creation and/or approval of NSC-68. Thus, his discussion of Cold War events beyond 1949 complement his central thesis that a critical convergence of events that appeared to present an existential threat ultimately convinced both the American people and their leaders to discard their fears of a standing army and served as the catalyst to create a strong defense structure.
Although a solid contribution to Cold War scholarship, the book suffers slightly from the drawbacks of its format. Composing two extremely large chapters bookended by a shorter introduction and final chapter was a bit off-putting. Curatola could have better presented the historical facts and his analysis by developing them through shorter, focused chapters on each topic, highlighting critical points or themes from the timeline in the chapter titles. However, this is a minor critique that does not negate the research or insights provided by the author.
In August 1949, President Harry Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty, which marked the beginning of NATO. (Getty)
Today’s foreign policy events make Curatola’s book even more intriguing. In the near future, a similar book could be written about events occurring under the radar of the Russia-Ukraine conflict that are currently changing the look and mission of NATO. Overall, Curatola’s book is a welcome addition to the historiography of the early Cold War, identifying how key events worked together to reframe the U.S. perspective toward a standing army and a strong military deterrent. Students and scholars of the early Cold War, NSC-68, the development of thermonuclear weapons, the Navy-Air Force rivalry, and the loss of China will all find value in this work.
David W. Bath is an Assistant Professor of Military History at Rogers State University and a former U.S. Air Force officer. He is the author of Assured Destruction: Building the Ballistic Missile Culture of the U.S. Air Force.
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Header Image: Autumn (Shairaa/Shutterstock)
Notes:
[1] Curatola, 160.
[2] Curatola, 7.
[3] William Shakespeare, Richard III: Entire play, accessed January 30, 2023, http://shakespeare.mit.edu/richardiii/full.html.