Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our sixth annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present an essay selected for Honorable Mention from Ignacio Daniel Maramba, Jr., a recent graduate of the U.S. National War College.
The South China Sea (SCS) is a vital transit artery between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.[1] "SEA-Merica 2040" is a peaceful strategy that denies China maritime concessions from the five principal SCS claimant nations (Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam—the "SCS Five"). The keystone of the strategy is a U.S. civilian-led scientific initiative to develop and offer coastal adaptation measures to the SCS Five before 2040. The strategy will save lives and property, build U.S. goodwill, and strengthen SCS Five resilience against Chinese coercion.
Assessment Of The Situation
U.S. National Interests
U.S. prosperity and security interests require free and open navigation in the SCS and healthy trade relationships in Southeast Asia.[2] The concession of the SCS to China would jeopardize trade and military relationships and unfavorably shift the balance of power. U.S. inaction would undermine American international leadership since Southeast Asian nations rely heavily on U.S. support in disputes with China.[3]
China’s National Interests
China’s Constitution identifies two SCS national interests: (i) safeguarding its sovereignty by attaining regional superiority and (ii) opposing U.S. hegemony.[4] These two interests are important to China and may elevate to vital interests if provoked.
China views regional U.S. allies as adversaries, exacerbated by U.S. military assets deployed across the region.[5] The strong U.S. presence inhibits China’s trade leverage, empowers U.S. regional partners, and maintains the U.S. as a regional hegemon. The U.S. presence is unacceptable to China, justifying to China the forceful defense of its core interests.[6]
China’s Excessive Maritime Claims
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) deems all states equal in sharing the same maritime rights and responsibilities at sea. [7] UNCLOS settles "crisscrossing" boundaries and prevents disputes from escalating to violence.[8]
UNCLOS boundaries apply to land above sea level on a 24-hour basis.[9] A low watermark running along the coast establishes coastlines. [10] Exclusive economic zones (EEZ) extend from these coastline boundaries to 200 nautical miles.[11] Islands with fresh water are entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, plus the rights to a 200 nautical mile EEZ.[12] But non-island (i.e., reefs) are limited to the 12 nautical mile territorial sea area.[13]
China claims a significant portion of the SCS as its territorial waters and EEZ, asserting indisputable sovereignty dating back to ancient times.[14] In 2016, the Philippines won a landmark ruling before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague that invalidated most of China's maritime claims in the SCS and reinforced Philippine fishing and seabed rights under UNCLOS. [15] The arbitration ruling reinforced the notion that the law of the sea applies equally to all claimant nations.[16]
Disputed spaces and UNCLOS decisions in the South China Sea (CIA/BBC)
China refuses to recognize the ruling. Instead, China continues to build and expand its artificial islands in the SCS, asserting excessive EEZ claims that impede international sea lanes. [17] China's military build-up in the SCS surpasses the total area of all other naturally formed features in the SCS.[18] The Chinese build-up includes military offensive and defensive capabilities on islands and reefs (including three airfields).[19] China's EEZ claims, coercive on-water escorts, and offensive and defensive capabilities disrupt crucial international shipping lanes.[20]
In contrast, the U.S. concurs with the PCA ruling and views the SCS as "global commons" not subject to sovereign claims by any nation.[21] The opposing views have international ramifications since one-third of international shipping passes through the SCS.[22] Nearly 40% of China's trade and 6% of U.S. trade transit the SCS annually.[23]
Threats
There are two imminent threats to U.S. security and prosperity: (i) China’s rising capabilities and (ii) China’s will to achieve SCS dominance now. First, China’s capabilities threaten the regional balance of power. China has the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological ability to challenge a stable and open international system.[24] China leverages its capabilities with predatory economic initiatives to intimidate its neighbors while simultaneously militarizing SCS features.[25] Second, China's aging workforce drives its immediate need to pursue its goals. Time is not on China's side. Due to the one-child policy and limited immigration, China faces a shrinking working-age population, projected to decrease by 28% (more than 260 million people).[26] China must accomplish its goals now, making the threat to regional security and stability more imminent.
Opportunity: Rising Sea Level
Climate change-induced sea-level rise is an inevitable threat to regional stability and security. Toward the end of the 20th century, the sea level in Southeast Asia rose 3 centimeters per year, with future projections in the 21st century reaching up to 40 centimeters total.[27] Rising sea levels will impact countries whose borders are mostly or entirely coastline.[28] Without effective mitigation, climate change effects will adversely impact regional security by inundating coastal cities (including Manila and Ho Chi Minh City), battering low-lying coastlines, and affecting food production, thus increasing costs.[29]
Coastal adaptation (both hard and soft measures) is the most available way to remediate resulting flooding.[30] Green energy is not immediately feasible—coal accounts for nearly 40 percent of the increased energy needs in the region.[31] Coal is available and cheap, driving nations to increase coal usage compared to oil, gas, and renewables.[32] Thus, even though the SCS Five signed the Paris Climate Agreement, there are few developed strategies to forestall rising sea levels.[33] The U.S. has a salient opportunity to leverage sea-level threats into peaceful influence gains and strengthen SCS Five resilience against Chinese coercion. With China's Belt-Road Initiative snags and age demographic issues, China would be hard-pressed to resist a peaceful U.S. initiative assisting the SCS Five with coastal adaptation efforts.
Moreover, China faces its own climate change challenge. Without effective mitigation against sea-level rise, some of China's low-lying islands in the SCS will likely disappear, damaging the legitimacy of its land-based maritime claims.[34] The workforce required would present a significant distraction and strain on Chinese resources, especially with a disproportionately aging workforce.[35]
Assumptions
Xi Jinping in 2018 (Chris Ratcliffe/EPA)
Four assumptions are critical. First, China will not concede SCS claims because it considers the SCS a “core national interest” as it does Taiwan. [36] Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, declared that the PRC "absolutely will not give up its legitimate rights, much less sacrifice its national core interests."[37]
Second, the U.S. will not withdraw from the region and surrender the balance of power to China. The U.S. has a long history of preserving the freedom of the seas, often calling on its military forces to protect that interest.[38] The U.S. believes China seeks unfair advantages, behaves aggressively and coercively, undermines the rules and values at the heart of an open and stable international system, and directly threatens U.S. values and interests, requiring U.S. response.[39]
Third, as is, the competition for influence over the SCS will occur mainly in the diplomatic, trade, and information/cyber arenas since neither the U.S. nor China desires war. Starting wars is against Chinese policy, with its 1979 war against Vietnam ending in stalemate.[40] The same is true for the U.S., especially after twenty years of war ending with the tumultuous withdrawal from Afghanistan.[41]
Fourth, regional confidence in U.S. reliability and resolve will decline if the U.S. does not proactively counter China’s excessive maritime claims. But the U.S. must calibrate its presence to avoid the appearance of imperialism or provocation. Southeast Asian leaders prioritize their own national interests and play China and the U.S. against one another. Thus, maintaining goodwill and a reputation for reliability is crucial to U.S. regional success.
Problem Statement and Political Aim
China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS threaten U.S. prosperity and security interests by inhibiting freedom of navigation, adversely affecting free trade, and undermining the balance of power in Southeast Asia. The desired political aim is a free and open SCS, maintaining freedom of the seas while denying China's domination of the SCS.
“SEA-Merica 2040”—A Peaceful Way to SCS Stability
SEA-Merica 2040 is a long-term denial strategy leveraging climate change needs to cement the relationships between the SCS Five and the U.S., strengthening SCS Five resilience against Chinese maritime coercion and concession. SEA-Merica 2040 focuses on denial rather than dominance.[42] The aim is to deny China’s ability to coerce maritime concessions from the SCS Five, thus denying China the fait accompli necessary for SCS dominance.[43]
SEA-Merica 2040’s hook offers hard and soft coastal adaptation assistance to mitigate climate change damage to SCS coastal regions predicted to occur by 2040. The designation of the year 2040 provides a finite timeline to avoid the appearance of an endless boondoggle, which will help gain political support. The goodwill and institutional knowledge gained from SEA-Merica 2040 will set a solid foundation for future Southeast Asian operations and a model for international cooperation. SEA-Merica 2040 would stabilize the SCS region, mitigate SCS Five coastal damage, and earn international goodwill toward the U.S. for its humanitarian assistance.
SEA-Merica 2040 has three specific objectives:
Objective 1 (First priority)—Treat Friends Like Family. The U.S. will cement strong bilateral and multilateral relationships with the SCS Five and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This objective is achievable due to friendly U.S. relationships with the SCS Five.
Objective 2 (Second priority)—Free The Sea. The U.S. will (i) deter China’s illegal enforcement of unfounded claims without provoking military conflict and (ii) deny the fait accompli of coercing maritime concessions from the SCS Five. Given China's strong political will against the UNCLOS decision, achieving behavior modification of Chinese views is not a goal. Due to existing operations and relationships in the region, the limited objective of deterrence/denial is achievable.
Objective 3 (Third priority)—Save the SEA: NOAA’s ARC. The U.S. will develop and deploy coastal adaptation programs to the SCS Five. This objective is achievable since coastal adaptation techniques presently exist.[44] The SCS Five will likely welcome proposals to remediate coastal flooding.
SEA-Merica 2040 Ends, Ways, and Means
Theory Of Success
The theory of success calls for establishing strong relations between the SCS Five and the U.S., thus denying China leverage to coerce concessions to its SCS claims. The fundamental approach is that strong diplomatic ties will build trust in the U.S. coastal adaptation package, solidifying the U.S. as an effective counterweight to Chinese coercion of SCS concessions.
Modes
SEA-Merica 2040 will orchestrate and blend instruments simultaneously. “Treat Friends Like Family” occurs now, led by the U.S. Department of State (DoS), acting in a bilateral mode with each member of the SCS Five and multi-laterally with ASEAN and the UN. “Free The SEA” takes place now with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) leading the military package continuing FONOPs and regional exercises.
“Save the SEA” will be a sequential operation. Phase 1 is assessment, with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leading an Association for Reclamation of Coastlines (ARC). ARC will start with a customized assessment of each member's coastal situation and the needs of the SCS Five. NOAA will lead Phase 2: the ARC will conduct research and develop feasible and cost-effective remedies. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) will provide liaison support regarding the involvement of the private sector in technology development. Phase 3 will be implementation, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) leading management of the projects and NOAA’s ARC overseeing the operational deployment and construction aspects.
Objective 1: Treat Friends Like Family. The U.S. will cement strong bilateral and multilateral relationships with the SCS Five and ASEAN.
Flags of Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam (Britannica)
Sub-objective 1: Strengthen Bilateral Relationships with the SCS Five. The DoS will lead the diplomatic efforts to conduct and manage bilateral relationships with each of the governments of the SCS Five. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will provide trade support. The Department of Defense (DoD), USAID, and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) will support DoS diplomatic initiatives with expertise and offerings in their respective areas of operation. The support efforts would include membership in state delegations, trade, foreign aid, humanitarian support, Rule of Law, and other pertinent areas necessary to bolster U.S. goodwill. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence Community (IC) will provide the Intelligence and Information support required to facilitate successful diplomatic relations and international support. IC support mechanisms include human intelligence, signal intelligence, and cyber-intelligence that would give the U.S. an advantage. IC information support mechanisms include operations and sharing relationships that encourage the SCS Five to embrace and welcome close diplomatic, trade, and military relationships.
Sub-objective 2: Strengthen Multilateral Relations with ASEAN. The DoS will also lead the way in conducting and managing multilateral relationships with ASEAN and its member states. In addition to the support outlined in Sub-objective 1 above from the DoD, USAID, DFC, and IC, the office of the UN Ambassador will also support this multilateral diplomatic effort to facilitate successful diplomatic relations and international support.
Objective 2: Free The Sea. The U.S. will deter China’s illegal enforcement of unfounded claims without provoking military conflict and deny the fait accompli of coercing maritime concessions from the SCS Five.
Sub-objective 1: Deter Chinese Escalation and Deny Coercion Opportunities. The DoD will show U.S. commitment and might by maintaining its readiness and deployments supporting existing defense agreements. The U.S. counters China's coercive use of its naval assets against the SCS Five and deters Chinese expansion by conducting routine freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the SCS. The U.S. also engages in military exercises with its partner nations. U.S. defense treaties with the Philippines and Thailand and the U.S. partnership with Australia justify U.S. military presence. There is no need to change this mode of operation, which serves as a deterrent to further Chinese expansion.
Sub-objective 2: Secure Information- and Cyber-Space. The IC and the U.S. Military will lead the efforts to secure the cyber domain. There will be an increased need for information operations to counter Chinese propaganda and misinformation regarding U.S. military activity, especially in advance of "Save the SEA" implementation operations. The U.S. must be wary to prevent portrayal as imperialistic, hidden agenda-driven opportunists to the SCS Five. The IC must upgrade cyber measures to prevent sabotage of "Free The Sea" and "Save the SEA" operations. The IC must proactively gather and process intelligence to stay ahead of hostile Chinese information and cyber-attacks well before the start of the "Save The SEA” operations. The information should be shared as needed with USAID, USTR, DoS, and the USACE to shape the development of technology and operational schemes for "Save the SEA" implementation, including working with local governments to tailor the information and messaging.
Objective 3: Save the SEA—NOAA’s ARC. The U.S. will develop and deploy coastal adaptation programs to the SCS Five.
Sub-objective 1: Develop Feasible Coastal Adaptation Measures for the SCS Five. NOAA will lead the ARC’s technological effort to ascertain SCS Five needs and facilitate the development of feasible coastal adaptation measures. The ARC will include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the DFC, and the DoS. The USACE will provide technological and personnel support similar to the DoD support of NASA during the 1960s space program. The DFC will lead the mobilization and facilitation of U.S. private sector support. The DoS will leverage U.S. relationships with international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation to facilitate the internationalization of the support effort.
Sub-objective 2: Secure Agreements For Coastal Adaptation Support To The SCS Five. With USAID support, the DoS will lead the effort to provide aid to the SCS Five, offering coastal adaptation ARC support for areas bordering the SCS. As part of ARC efforts, the DFC and the DoS will facilitate the involvement of international organizations and the private sector to provide the infrastructure and workforce for the projects. The military will provide security, and the IC will provide intelligence and information support to facilitate the closing of the respective agreements.
Sub-objective 3: Manage And Execute SCS Five Coastal Adaptation Measures. USAID will oversee the projects, and NOAA will provide operational oversight over ARC construction of the coastal adaptation projects. As part of ARC efforts, the DFC and international partner organizations will facilitate the involvement of the public and private sectors, emphasizing using local talent for the respective projects to provide an ancillary economic benefit. USAID will also provide legal oversight support to American entities to prevent corruption and misuse of aid funding and resources. The DoD will adjust its ongoing operational effort to afford security as an ancillary benefit to the operating theater. The IC will provide information and intelligence support, including cyber support, to prevent sabotage from hostile actors. The DoS will provide diplomatic support for the effort by coalition-building with international partners and serving as the liaison between the U.S., the SCS Five, and ASEAN.
Constraints
There are several constraints: (i) Governmental: The U.S. Congress may not support or grant sufficient funding for the initiative, (ii) Domestic: the U.S. Congress or public may not support SEA-Merica 2040, (iii) International: Opponents may portray the U.S. as imperialistic, (iv) media-driven polarization: the initiative may be attacked from within and become a subject of political polarization. Support must be bi-partisan to be sustainable.
First, this diplomatic effort must have support from the Presidential level. As seen in the 2000 and 2016 elections, administration changes can stop diplomatic efforts in their tracks. DoS must conduct the diplomatic effort in a way that garners bipartisan support to ensure stability and sustainability. Information channels, including the media, must be utilized to shape and obtain the political and public support necessary to avoid the politicization of the diplomatic effort.
Second, China may exhibit a thin skin when viewing increased U.S. diplomatic activity and retaliate with a "Wolf Warrior" response to intimidate ASEAN member states and the SCS Five. China will also likely employ misinformation and aggressive cyber-campaigns to portray the U.S. as insincere, disingenuous, and imperialistic. Information and Intelligence actors must be proactive in shaping the narrative to mitigate Chinese misinformation. Diplomatic, Economic, and Financial actors can also have trade and financial alternatives ready for the SCS Five, which would blunt any Chinese threats and deter China from bullying a regional trade partner exclusively into the U.S. orbit.
SEA-Merica 2040 Costs, Benefits, and Risks
Costs
SEA-Merica 2040 leverages existing missions and funding in the diplomatic and military arena for “Treat Friends Like Family” and “Free The Sea.” But the research and development effort will require additional funding for the assessment, development, and deployment of the technological needs for “Save The SEA."
"Save The SEA" requires further development of existing coastal adaptation technology into deployable projects permanently maintainable by the host nation.[45] The DoD and USACE will require funds and resources to assess each host nation’s needs adequately and thoroughly. The DFC will then require the resources to mobilize and involve the private sector in developing the necessary technology, including both "hard" and "soft" coastal adaptation measures to afford the versatility of courses of action. USAID will require increased resources and budget to manage the implementation and construction phase and afford proper oversight to guard against corruption. IC resources must prevent hostile cyber-attacks, sabotage, and misinformation campaigns.
Benefits
The benefits of SEA-Merica 2040 outweigh the costs. "Save the SEA" completes the foundation for a peaceful strategy to deny China dominance through coercion of the SCS Five. In the same way that the Marshall Plan cemented Europe's confidence in the U.S., "Save the SEA" will engender SCS Five goodwill and trust in the commitment and resolve of the U.S. by showing concern for the future of Southeast Asia in the face of impending climate change losses. Presenting a sustainable option to stave off the effects of climate change preserves the economic viability of the SCS Five benefits the U.S. by stabilizing the region. "Save the SEA" denies China the opportunity to capitalize on climate change, hindering its domination of the SCS. The investment benefits are a stable, free, and open SCS, increased regional resilience, climate change advances, and enhanced U.S. international standing – benefits well worth the investment.
Risks To SEA-Merica 2040
There are three key risks to SEA-Merica 2040: (i) lack of U.S. political support, (ii) failure to develop adequate technology, and (iii) SCS Five rejection of U.S. overtures.
First, political polarization and xenophobia may generate political opposition to SEA-Merica 2040 initiatives. Save The SEA and NOAA’s ARC should be presented to the Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus to forestall opposition. The Caucus, with an equal number of Republican and Democratic members, is dedicated to crafting and advancing bipartisan solutions to address climate change needs.[46] Tying in climate change with U.S. national security interests would help enhance congressional level support. A robust information campaign highlighting the importance of free and open seas to the targeted leaders and the American population mitigates this risk. So will the embedding of projects within programs and schemes already funded and not rising to the treaty level where Senate ratification is required.
Second, the technology for feasible, sustainable, deployable coastal adaptation packages may come slow or reach a dead end. A thorough assessment of each host nation's customized needs mitigates this risk. Maximum leverage of the U.S. private sector (and international private sector via the International Finance Corporation) to conduct the research and development spreads the cost and internationalizes the effort.
Third, the SCS Five may be hesitant to accept U.S. coastal adaptation support. The appointment of NOAA as the lead agency accomplishes the demilitarization of the U.S. effort. The internationalization of ARC presents the SCS Five with a joint scientific initiative rather than a predatory capitalistic effort (unlike the Belt-Road Initiative). The story of Noah and the Ark transcends societies and religions.[47] Thus, the branding of the NOAA team as the "ARC" communicates to the SCS Five the purpose: to remediate flooding from rising sea levels. The messaging cultivates trust from host nations, leading to confidence in the sincerity and effectiveness of U.S. coastal adaptation measures.
Risks From SEA-Merica 2040
There are three key risks from SEA-Merica 2040: (i) provocation of China, (ii) sabotage, and (iii) corruption.
First, China may feel threatened by U.S. peaceful overtures that influence the balance of power and, in retaliation, may engage in provocative military and economic action. Robust intelligence and information initiatives that allow the U.S. to calculate its moves and counter Chinese propaganda, misinformation, or military escalation mitigate this risk. Having a civilian agency such as NOAA lead the coastal adaptation effort also quells notions of militarization.
Second, China or other hostile nations might engage in acts of sabotage, including cyber-attacks and other nefarious means. China may also engage in corruption efforts or flood the area with projects to compete with or wall out SEA-Merica 2040. IC escalation of information and intelligence efforts to stay ahead of China and counter any propaganda, cyber-attack, misinformation, corruption, or pre-emptive commercial campaigns mitigates this risk.
Third, the private sector employment in the host nations, where the Rule of Law differs from the U.S., may result in corruption or mismanagement of "Save The SEA" assets. Providing resources to USAID for Inspector General audits from the outset of planning and throughout the process mitigates this risk. Unfortunately, after the "Save The SEA” projects are complete, Inspector General efforts may be less effective since the projects revert to the management of the host country. But deferring to the host nation to manage its affairs is the price of sovereignty and avoiding the appearance of U.S. imperialism.
Counter-Arguments
SEA-Merica 2040 stands up to criticism and alternatives. The most significant criticism is that the strategy is too expensive. Alternatively, detractors may deem SEA-Merica 2040 inferior to a head-to-head trade or military clash. Both arguments fail.
SEA-Merica 2040’s Benefits Outweigh The Costs
Since “Treat Friends Like Family” and “Free The Sea” use existing diplomatic and military funding, the only additional expense is developing and deploying versatile and sustainable coastal adaptation technology. "Save The SEA" is consistent with current national strategies and goals because coastal adaptation mitigation is an existing need. Senator Marco Rubio, a member of the Bipartisan Senate Climate Solutions Caucus, acknowledged the rise of sea level as a measurable fact against which the U.S. must mitigate and adapt.[48] With congressional support and Save the SEA's nesting within both U.S. national security and imminent environmental needs, obtaining bipartisan executive and legislative branch support is realistic and achievable.
Regarding funding NOAA’s ARC and USAID for assessment, management, and deployment of coastal adaptation assets, the investment directly results in valuable goodwill and confidence in the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia. This goodwill translates to influence and economic development in the region, thus increasing trade potential, cementing regional security, and effectively combating climate change. Peacefully leveraging climate change to gain a free and open sea and long-term U.S. influence is well worth the investment.
SEA-Merica 2040 Is The Most Achievable Approach
Direct trade or military competition involves behavior modification as an aim. China's interest in the SCS is well-ingrained into its society as a national goal. China's political will is too strong—no matter who the leader is, China will no sooner bend in its will for SCS domination than it would with Taiwan. A head-to-head trade battle would be costly. China's economy is too strong to starve out—the Cold War tactics used against the Soviet Union will not work. A military war is too costly and risky for the U.S. The American public is not receptive to war.
A peaceful focus on mitigating climate change is consistent with international moods and U.S. domestic concerns. Elimination of coastal flooding is a bipartisan issue, benefitting the U.S., partner nations, and even China. Like the Moon landing program, SEA-Merica 2040 can unite the world by proactively addressing coastal adaptation, with the U.S. taking the lead.
Conclusion
China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS destabilize and undermine the balance of power in Southeast Asia. The best way to achieve a free and open SCS is a peaceful strategy that nests the common needs of the SCS Five within U.S. security interests and capabilities, all without requiring modification of Chinese behavior for success. SEA-Merica 2040 does the job.
Ignacio Daniel Maramba, Jr., is a U.S. Army officer and a member of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Army. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Loyola University of Chicago, a Master of Science in National Security Strategy from the National War College, and a Juris Doctor from Loyola University School of Law. The views presented in this article are his own, and do not reflect the views of the National Defense University, U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Islands in the South China Sea (VCG)
Notes:
[1] Marvin Ott, "The South China Sea in Strategic Terms | Wilson Center,” accessed August 30, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-south-china-sea-strategic-terms; Christia Marie Ramos, “Despite UNCLOS, World’s ‘Most Disastrous Dangers’ Still Pertain to Maritime Issues – Locsin,” INQUIRER.net, August 22, 2019, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/179237/despite-unclos-worlds-most-disastrous-dangers-still-pertain-to-maritime-issues-locsin.
[2] Joseph Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” The White House, March 3, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/.
[3] Sui-Lee, Wee. "U.S. Tells Southeast Asia it Remains Committed to Investing in Region: [Foreign Desk]." New York Times, Jul 28, 2021, Late Edition (East Coast).
[4] “CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA,” n.d., 7.
[5] Kevin Rudd, “How Xi Jinping Views the World,” June 22, 2021, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-05-10/how-xi-jinping-views-world.
[6] Zhou, Jinghao, “China’s Core Interests and Dilemma in Foreign Policy Practice,” Pacific Focus, VO. XXXIV, No. 1 (April 2019), 34.
[7] Danielle Fallin et al., “Oceans of Opportunity: Southeast Asia’s Shared Maritime Challenges,” accessed December 5, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/oceans-opportunity-southeast-asias-shared-maritime-challenges.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Wilson VornDick, “Thanks Climate Change: Sea-Level Rise Could End South China Sea Spat,” accessed December 5, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2012/11/can-climate-change-wash-away-south-china-sea-dispute/.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ott, "The South China Sea in Strategic Terms."
[15] Fallin et al., “Oceans of Opportunity: Southeast Asia’s Shared Maritime Challenges.”
[16] Ibid.
[17] Zhou, “China’s Core Interests and Dilemma in Foreign Policy Practice” 31.
[18] Andrew Chubb, “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Policy,” Brookings (blog), January 22, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/xi-jinping-and-chinas-maritime-policy/.
[19] China’s National Defense in the New Era, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China July 2019, First Edition 2019 ISBN 978-7-119-11925-0 © Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., Beijing, China, 2019
[20] Ibid.; Chubb, “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Policy.”
[21] Ott, "The South China Sea in Strategic Terms."
[22] “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” ChinaPower Project (blog), August 2, 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/.
[23] Ott, "The South China Sea in Strategic Terms."
[24] Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 7-8.
[25] Zhou, “China’s Core Interests and Dilemma in Foreign Policy Practice,” 38.
[26] Erik Zhu and Tom Orlik, “When Will China Rule the World? Maybe Never,” Bloomberg.Com, July 5, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-07-05/when-will-china-s-economy-beat-the-u-s-to-become-no-1-why-it-may-never-happen.
[27] “Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030,” National Intelligence Council, 2009, 28.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Zachary Abuza, “Climate Change: The Implications for Regional Security,” Radio Free Asia, accessed December 5, 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/change-11012021170836.html.
[30] U.S. EPA (2009). Synthesis of Adaptation Options for Coastal Areas. Washington, DC, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Ready Estuaries Program. EPA 430-F-08-024, January 2009. 12-16.
[31] Murray Hiebert, “Security Challenges of Climate Change in Southeast Asia,” accessed December 5, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-challenges-climate-change-southeast-asia.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] VornDick, “Thanks Climate Change: Sea-Level Rise Could End South China Sea Spat.”
[35] Zhu and Orlik, “When Will China Rule the World?”
[36] Rudd, “How Xi Jinping Views the World.”
[37] Chubb, “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Policy.”
[38] U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress Updated August 4, 2021, Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R42784, accessed August 30, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42784.pdf.
[39] Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”
[40] "The Chinese nation has always loved peace. Since the beginning of modern times, the Chinese people have suffered from aggressions and wars and have learned the value of peace and the pressing need for development. Therefore, China will never inflict such sufferings on any other country. Since its founding 70 years ago, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has never started any war or conflict." China's National Defense in the New Era.
[41] “The United States should not, and will not, engage in “forever wars” that have cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars.” Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 15.
[42] Elbridge A. Colby. The Strategy of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021) 151.
[43] Ibid, 153.
[44] U.S. EPA (2009). Synthesis of Adaptation Options for Coastal Areas.
[45] U.S. EPA (2009). Synthesis of Adaptation Options for Coastal Areas. 12-16.
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