For U.S. strategists seeking to thwart rising Chinese hegemony or Russian military imperialism, the idea of America leaving a volatile Middle East to its fate may sound appealing. Civil war in Syria and Yemen coupled with the troubled democracies in Iraq and Sudan are only a few examples showcasing Washington’s ongoing regional challenges. President Biden’s withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 perhaps reflected the country’s general frustration with America’s Middle East engagement over the past two decades. Indeed, U.S. ambivalence towards recent Iran-backed Houthi strikes against Saudi and Emirate oil facilities suggest that Washington is ready to accept broader strategic disengagement from the region, come what may. But strategic disengagement from the Middle East to focus on China and a war-bound Russia will likely come at high cost for Washington. Indeed, without a U.S.-supported Middle East security architecture, the long simmering tensions could erupt into a firestorm of region wide conflict inevitably requiring American military intervention to prevent an oil crisis or renewal of transnational terrorism. This would completely undermine Washington’s desire to pivot strategic focus towards the Indo-Pacific. But insuring against negative outcomes in the Middle East—the region of traditional U.S. focus—also provides the opportunity for the rise of positive outcomes in economic growth and institutional development. This would not only provide positive trade benefits for the U.S., but it would also promote an American friendly regional order while limiting the growing influence of China and Russia. Fortunately, the tools to prevent strategic crises and promote Middle East regional growth lie increasingly less in military capacity and more in the realm of diplomatic and economic engagement. This excess of military capacity in the Middle East could prove highly valuable in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe.
The Arab-Israeli Coalition Versus Iran
Members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (AFP)
Establishing a Middle Eastern security architecture centered on a balance of power is crucial to American interests in ensuring uninhibited movement of global trade and energy resources. Importanly, the relationship between Iran and the Arab-Israeli coalition is central to ensuring this regional order and stability. But the current American strategy of diplomatic disengagement coupled with unabated conventional arms buildup of Gulf Arab partners only serves to exacerbate regional tensions. Notably, U.S. maximum pressure sanctions following Washington’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran has severely limited the Iranian government’s ability to match the Arab-Israeli arms buildup with its own conventional weaponry.[1] But to compensate, Iranian leadership has concluded that increased asymmetric warfare and developing a turnkey nuclear weapons program is currently their best option to ensure the state’s geopolitical security.[2] This increased asymmetric warfare includes using their Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to supply Hezbollah with nearly 130,000 inexpensive rockets for high volume strikes against Israel, testing the limits of the vaunted Iron Dome defense system.[3] The Revolutionary Guard’s capture of oil tankers demonstrates Iran’s growing willingness to challenge the free flow of critical energy resources in the Strait of Hormuz.[4] Iran’s sponsoring of Yemeni Houthi drone and missile strikes against both U.A.E. and Saudi Arabian oil facilities threatens to further destabilize the global oil markets, with prices already soaring from inflation and Russia’s war in Ukraine.[5] And the U.S. government's use of sanctions, cyber methods, and joint-covert action has only served to delay Iran’s buildup of advanced centrifuges and near-weapons grade nuclear material. Perhaps worst of all, Iran’s one-year nuclear breakout time following the 2015 nuclear deal has now been reduced to a matter of 3 weeks since U.S. withdrawal in 2018.[6]
A Potential Nuclear Powder keg in the Making
These attacks by Iranian irregular-proxy forces, combined with their turnkey nuclear program, suggests that the U.S. maximum pressure strategy has placed America’s interests of regional stability and energy security at serious risk. Additionally, U.S. disengagement from the region—signaled by America’s reluctance to counter Iran’s attacks—has led the Arab-Israeli coalition to determine that accelerating a conventional weapons buildup is the only way to ensure their own protection.[7] U.S. disengagement, Arab-Israeli arms buildup, and Iranian asymmetric warfare may have the potential to become its own cycle of violence and instability. Left unchecked, this cycle could contain grave risk of escalation towards regional conflict—one in which Iran could resort to completing its nuclear weapons program and spark incipient proliferation. A Middle Eastern war between Iran and an Arab-Israeli coalition could place the security of the Hormuz Strait and Suez Canal at risk, requiring active intervention by the European and Asian powers whose economies fundamentally rely on the energy and trade flow from these vital trade corridors. Some may argue that with America’s limited energy imports from the region, these outside powers should be the ones to resolve such a conflict.[8] But allowing other great powers such as China, Russia, and others to rewrite the Middle East’s security architecture with the U.S. on the sidelines is not in the geopolitical interests of the American government. To prevent such an outcome, finishing a renewed nuclear deal is a central imperative for U.S. interests.
Foundations of a Regional Order
If a renewed nuclear deal could be completed, the U.N. Security Council plus Germany would be able to extend Iran’s nuclear breakout time from three weeks to six months, establish a verifiable nuclear inspection regime, and forestall a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.[9] Despite these crucial benefits, there are still some who call for the U.S. to reject the deal entirely. Critics often state that the economic benefits to Iran will only increase Tehran’s ability to wage proxy warfare, building an ever-larger arsenal of missiles and drones against the U.S. and regional partners.[10] Indeed, Iran’s economy grew by 13.4% in 2016—all before full sanctions relief implementation, strongly suggesting that Iran stands to benefit from a renewed deal.[11] But it is important to remember that although Iran has long maintained its asymmetric and ballistic missile capabilities, the scale and severity of attacks against strategic oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Persian Gulf came after U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. This suggests that while Tehran is not likely to surrender the Revolutionary Guard and proxy-force funding in the short term, it is possible for the U.S. to establish a security dialogue that minimizes regional tensions and builds momentum for further diplomatic victories in the long term.
A regional security architecture in the Middle East must be founded on reassurance to Arab-Israeli partners, continued deterrence against Iran, and good faith negotiations. The U.S. should revitalize its diplomatic engagement with Arab-Israeli partners. Importantly, this requires astute diplomacy that recognizes that a general pivot to other regions does not equate to complete strategic disengagement from the Middle East. The U.S. should reassure its Arab-Israeli partners that the American government will diplomatically support the coalition against attacks by Iran while offering economic assistance in the aftermath of Iranian strikes. To deter Iran, the U.S. must re-signal its willingness and determination to conduct proportional military counterstrikes in response to Tehran’s military aggression that threatens American partners in the region. With U.S. security assurances established, the coalition can slow the pace of their arms buildup. This would reduce Iran’s perceived need to respond with asymmetrical strikes, thus limiting the escalation cycle. By reestablishing Iranian deterrence, Washington will garner greater maneuvering space to negotiate mutually desirable outcomes.
Diplomacy First
For example, the U.S. may seek to reduce some of its local military capability in exchange for Iran’s quantifiable limits on both their direct and proxy-based military strikes within the region. Specifically, the American government could redirect its Bahrain based aircraft carrier to the Indo-Pacific after Tehran demonstrates that it is willing and able to curtail its strikes against strategic oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The benefits for the American government would be numerous, as it would achieve significant limitations on Iranian missile and proxy strikes while adding a much-needed aircraft carrier to the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, this trade would come at limited cost as the U.S. would still retain numerous strike aircraft across the region and could always decide to return the carrier group if Iran reneges on its end of the deal. Importantly, Iran would have many incentives to uphold this bargain. Tehran would garner significant security benefits while also achieving a pressing domestic political victory. Indeed, many Iranians have criticized the government's financing of proxies at the expense of domestic welfare.[12] Moreover, the pillars of allied reassurance, Iranian deterrence, and a willingness for diplomatic negotiations could serve as the foundation for a regional security order. This regional security architecture should seek to genuinely address the security concerns of all Middle East governments stretching from the Persian Gulf through North Africa. Additionally, preventing the negative outcomes within the Middle East—the traditional U.S. foreign policy focus—also opens the opportunity to seek positive economic benefits in the long run.
The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, followed by the USNS Arctic and the USS Nitze, passes under the Freedom Bridge while transiting the Suez Canal in 2016. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class J. Alexander Delgado/U.S. Navy)
Economic Opportunities Next
With a security framework in place, the U.S. stands to benefit from multiple vectors of economic investment and trade within the region. The first major effort of the U.S. should be to explore Iranian energy shipments to the European Union and further abroad. In the short term, Iran’s oil sales to the world market will provide much needed price relief and diversification following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the long term, Iran could potentially supply up to 20% of Europe’s gas needs, given the potential of the new Chalous Field discovered in the Caspian Sea.[13] Though some may criticize this move as trading one risky energy supplier for another, it seems far less likely that the E.U. would experience a geopolitical crisis threatening wholesale energy shutdown with Iran as it would with Russia. Moreover, refusing natural gas and oil from both Iran and Russia only serves to further increase European energy prices and tangentially depress economies worldwide. In addition to promoting Iranian-European energy trade, the U.S. should seek further investment opportunities throughout the region. Washington could explore investment and aid opportunities to alleviate the tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over the latter’s Grand Renaissance dam project. This project—while designed to meet the growing energy demands of Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population—also threatens Cairo’s downstream access to the Nile, the historic lifeblood of Egyptian civilization.[14] Namely, the U.S. could seek to aid and invest in Ethiopia’s energy needs, limiting full exploitation of the dam at Egypt’s expense. At the same time, the U.S. could explore further aid and investment options to enhance Egypt’s water use and security. While neither investment would be risk free, the potential alternative of Egypt resorting to military force could escalate into a regional conflict. The prospect of the Suez Canal and Red Sea shipping lanes under threat, in addition to reduced Sudanese grain supplies, would risk multiple states participating in a conflict with significant costs to regional trade and economic stability. Lastly, broad regional economic investment by the U.S. can limit the drivers that spawn international terrorism with the added benefit of countering Chinese investment and influence.
Conclusion: Physical and Moral Equilibrium in the Middle East
While such a regional order may seem far-fetched, the U.S. government would at least benefit significantly from renewing its geostrategic appreciation of the Middle East. Importantly, this focus should rely on diplomacy and economics as the primary instruments to achieve a stable balance of power and regional order. The likely alternative of escalating tensions, expanded conflict, and abdicating American regional influence to strategic competitors would only serve to further erode U.S. geopolitical strength in the Middle East and beyond. Furthermore, Washington will have to undertake a concerted effort to renew progress towards a Palestinian-Israeli resolution to achieve broader regional stability. The U.S. will also have to consider the implications of recognizing disputed territory—such as the Western Sahara as part of Morocco, and the Golan Heights as part of Israel—with America’s assertion that military force should not be used to rewrite borders, as in Russia’s occupation of Crimea. A physical equilibrium must match its moral counterpart. As Henry Kissinger remarked in Diplomacy, a regional balance of power “reduces the opportunities for using force” while “a shared sense of justice reduces the desire to use force.”[15] Indeed, if there is any hope to complete the Indo-Pacific military pivot, the U.S. must commit to restore world class diplomacy in the Middle East.
H. Brandon Morgan is a U.S. Army Officer and a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Rabat, Morocco, March 29, 2022 (Freddie Everett)
Notes:
[1] Sajjad Safaei and Trita Parsi, “Saudi Arabia Is Ratcheting up the Middle East's Arms Race,” Foreign Policy, February 1, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/saudi-arabia-is-ratcheting-up-the-middle-easts-arms-race/.
[2] “Confrontation between the United States and Iran | Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran.
[3] Yaakov Katz, “Hezbollah Is Testing Israel and so Far It's Succeeding - Analysis,” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, August 2021, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/hezbollah-is-testing-israel-and-so-far-its-succeeding-analysis-676119.
[4] Parisa Hafezi and Hyonhee Shin, “South Korean-Flagged Tanker Seized by Iran, Seoul Demands Release,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, January 4, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-tanker-int/south-korean-flagged-tanker-seized-by-iran-seoul-demands-release-idUSKBN299188.
[5] Al Jazeera, “Houthi Missiles Target Saudi Arabia and UAE as Escalation Grows,” Conflict News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, January 24, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/uae-says-intercepted-and-destroyed-houthi-missiles.
[6] Bret Stephens, “A New Iran Deal Leaves US Meeker and Weaker,” The New York Times (The New York Times, March 22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/opinion/iran-nuclear-deal-biden.html.
[7] Safaei and Parsi, “Saudi Arabia Is Ratcheting up the Middle East's Arms Race.”
[8] Stephens, “A New Iran Deal Leaves US Meeker and Weaker.”
[9] Stephens, “A New Iran Deal Leaves US Meeker and Weaker.”
[10] Nahal Toosi, “Democrats Want to Rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal. It's Not That Simple.,” POLITICO, July 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/20/iran-nuclear-deal-democrats-1424113.
[11] Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “Sharp Relief: Automatic Benefits and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” European Council on Foreign Relations, November 11, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/sharp-relief-automatic-benefits-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal/.
[12] Vali Nasr, “Iran and U.S. Are Trying to Renegotiate Nuclear Deal,” NPR, November 20, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/11/20/1057618815/iran-and-u-s-are-trying-to-renegotiate-nuclear-deal.
[13] Umud Shokri, “Will Iran Become a Gas Exporter to Europe?,” Gulf International Forum, September 12, 2021, https://gulfif.org/will-iran-become-a-gas-exporter-to-europe.
[14] Mohamed Saied, “Egypt Deepens Military Ties with Sudan as Ethiopia Moves Forward with Nile Dam,” Al-Monitor, March 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/egypt-deepens-military-ties-sudan-ethiopia-moves-forward-nile-dam.
[15] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 79.