President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
Just War Reconsidered is an absolute and urgent must-read for scholars of Just War, ethics, and strategy, as well as anyone involved in the enterprise of war—military and civilian alike. And after reading it, an energetic dialogue needs to develop and be sustained as the implications of this important contribution are gradually worked out.
On the surface, 4 December 1966, appears inconsequential. In the context of the 1960s, a decade rife with major milestones for humanity, 4 December 1966, exists on history’s periphery. Yet upon closer examination, this date is representative of what was until recently America’s longest war. Small events shape history, yet do so subtly. In that vein, Operation Geronimo revealed both the effectiveness and limitations of combating low intensity warfare with highly mobile forces. Deeper still, Operation Geronimo demonstrated that operational successes were not trustworthy indicators of progress towards victory during the Vietnam War.
What follows is a contribution to the debate on improving education in strategy and military affairs for potential leaders facing the major global issues of the 21st century. As it covers a single postgraduate course at a single university in the United Kingdom, it presents a way of teaching the subject, rather than the way, and is emphatically not a definitive guide on how to teach strategy. Rather, it is intended as a "think piece" and intended to provoke further discussion and give food for thought for others engaged in teaching in these fields, be they in military, government, or academic environments.
Ultimately, Thucydides’ enduring relevance lies in the fact that he forces us to wrestle with the notion that war, as a contest for power, strips bare human nature under the pressure of conflict—and the results are not appealing. The Peloponnesian War shows how strategic perceptions based on the innately human frailties of fear, honour, and interest lead a state to war. Thucydides then warns us that during conflict a state’s collective morality can decline under the strain of prolonged war based on the choices it makes. He helps us understand that creating a winning strategy is all about these choices, which are shaped by a state’s strategic and military culture.
Multi-Domain Battle offers a conceptual structure for an extension of the technological and doctrinal Second Offset. This combination can continue to offset any adversary's ability to mass effects in the cyber, information, and electro-magnetic spectrum as well as massed lethal fires. The desired capabilities needed to force seams in enemy defenses and establish temporary windows of opportunity in the physical and cyber domains will serve to set disciplined conditions for a conceptual and actual Third Offset.
Those of us who served with him know that he is a caring, erudite, warfighting general. And we know that there is a reason he uses the callsign Chaos: he is a lifelong student of his profession, a devotee of maneuver warfare and Sun Tzu, the sort of guy who wants to win without fighting—to cause chaos among those he would oppose. To Marines, he is the finest of our tribal elders. The rest of the world, very soon, will know how truly gifted he is. Our friends and allies will be happy he is our new Secretary of War; our enemies will soon wish he weren’t. I worked for General James Mattis three times: when he was a Colonel, a Major General, and a Lieutenant General.
Retire the Colors is a reference to the command given at the end of a service or ceremony directing the color guard to retrieve the national and unit colors and remove them from the ceremony. Rendering honors and retiring the colors marks the official end of the ceremony, and frequently, the transition to the informal social activities afterward. The reference is appropriate for this anthology of stories dealing with transition between military service and the civilian world.
Could Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great have achieved their unmatched successes were it not for the generals and advisors who played major roles in those successes? Arguably not. Strategy, by nature, is adaptive and evolutionary. While it is necessary for leaders to have strategic minds, it is perhaps even more important to have systems in place which allow for individuals to further develop their education and have the opportunity to influence the development of a nation’s strategy.
Deterrence strategy, too, is essentially timeless, which inherently means it is applicable even to cyber warfare. While a legitimate threat of force lies at the heart of deterrence, different modes of warfare may be necessary to accomplish the true purpose of strategy as Clausewitz saw it: the accomplishment political goals. The U.S. political goal in this case is to prevent attacks and other wicked acts perpetrated against America in the cyber realm. Though the U.S. definitely has heavy hands in the cyber boxing arena, a better strategy is to avoid punches altogether, rather than slugging it out in the middle of the ring.
Citizen Soldier's depiction of combat aims for a visceral reaction and challenges viewers to place soldiers’ sacrifices within the context of our ongoing wars. And it does an admirable job, leaving you tense and guessing about the outcome of the battles and ambushes the “Thunderbirds” fought their way through. The documentary’s focus on the trials of National Guard soldiers in our present conflicts, however, ignores the wider consequences of a repeatedly deployed and increasingly depended-on reserve echelon. The continued reliance upon and the “regularization” of the National Guard should force the Army, Congress, and American society to examine the role of the Guard in our current and future military operations, whether we want to watch it or not.
Hodgson fails to satisfactorily qualify JFK and LBJ as the titular “Last Two Great Presidents.” He does, however, succeed in building up Johnson’s reputation, one that is often denigrated for his part in escalating U.S. participation in Vietnam. Because of Hodgson’s account, we might consider reversing Reston’s characterization of the two: perhaps it was Johnson and his social reform success who made men think while Kennedy and his foreign policy dominance made men like Khrushchev act.
There is no such thing as terrorism. There is only war. Although Westerners typically do not agree because the West has narrowed its definition of war to preference certain acts while eliminating others. These preferences have reduced suffering and enforced order, but they may not be the best lens for strategists to utilize if they want to understand and anticipate an enemy.
The fact that our most cherished ally is no longer able to analyze its own strategic situation, or participate fully in our strategic debates, should be distressing. Britain’s generals, brilliant as they may be, are trapped in a series of historical and organizational labyrinths. Needless to say, this situation may change, and Elliott is one of many voices calling out for reform. Until then, America must remain wary of allies who promise more than they can deliver.
Strategic thinking can happen almost anywhere: in a conference room, a university lecture hall, or in the dark basement of a military headquarters. If you think about it, really anyone can do it, from a president to an Army private, from a subject matter expert to an armchair general. Although anyone can do it at any time and in any place, doing it well is neither easy nor is it commonplace.
The United States’ involvement in Syria forms the crux of a global strategic crossroads. Will the U.S. continue to involve itself in the Middle East, or finally complete its “pivot” to the Pacific? A no-fly zone in Syria would settle that strategic question, but unleash a host of others. A no fly-zone has never been implemented under the conditions faced in Syria, against a well equipped and prepared counterpart eager to embarrass the Western nations aligned against it. Global escalation between the United States and Russia under these circumstances is not guaranteed, but the United States must decide as a nation whether it is willing to accept such a risk. The consequences for the wrong choice range from the tragic to the unthinkable.
Our analysis is built on a foundation of sand. We offer bold proclamations and precise policy proposals designed to cajole, convince, or coerce a hostile nuclear power whose decision making process is utterly opaque to us. We theorize much, and assume more, but we still do not know why the Chinese do what they do. Most critically, we do not know how to find the knowledge we lack. This is an intellectual challenge we have not begun to meet. Understanding Zhongnanhai is a wonderful methodological puzzle—but a puzzle with nuclear stakes. Until we solve this puzzle, I doubt any number of policy prescriptions will be enough to ensure peace in the West Pacific.
At first it may seem intuitive that wars are measured on a scale from something more limited in commitment to something that resembles “total” commitment from a society. However, reflecting on this idea brings up the very important question of what exactly is being measured when describing a war, by whom is it measured, and what are the criteria that take a war from limits to totality?
This film is a patriotic tribute to simple men, placed in unbelievable situations, who did only as they felt duty demanded. Their virtues and ethics combine with their humility to present a well-rounded appreciation for what it means to serve both one’s nation and one’s comrades. By presenting these stories in such human terms, Lang has done an amazing service, making abstract stories relatable to not only veterans, but to everyday Americans as well. Beyond Glory is time well-spent and a fitting tribute to the Medal recipients.
