Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Rise of the JO

Rise of the JO

Where are the “generation of military reformers” that some despair will ever arise from the ashes of Iraq and Afghanistan? Coming into their own. Over the last month, I’ve observed an encouraging sign for our military profession. Several junior officers have used the power of the pen to reach outside of their foxholes, moving well beyond the typical sphere of influence of a newly commissioned lieutenant. Through their words, they have helped bring about the change of existing policies, shared lessons on leadership, and sparked multiple professional conversations.

Strategy by Audit: The Cost of Accountability in Afghanistan

Strategy by Audit: The Cost of Accountability in Afghanistan

Established by the US Congress in 2008, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has drawn attention over the past couple of years for its aggressive pursuit of development project mismanagement by US and Afghan organizations. John Sopko, who became the SIGAR in 2012, struck the drum again this past month. Speaking at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank, Sopko reminded his audience that Afghan corruption could undo all that has been accomplished in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban unless the US implemented a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. The prognosis from his office remains a compelling indictment of what has not been accomplished in that country over the past twelve years.

The Myth of Mission Command

The Myth of Mission Command

To create decisiveness in leaders—and to increase tempo—the Army should decrease leaders’ reliance on thick doctrinal manual, reinforced by top-down demands for every detail, through training that remains out of touch with the latest progression in learning. It cannot rely on checklists or computer-generated orders to put in place the mind and voice of an experienced, imaginative commander. The importance of a calm commander talking to his subordinates cannot be stressed enough. A mutual understanding will come from well-written yet brief doctrinal manuals, enhanced with the use of radios and other digital technology. So-called secure radios with inexperienced officers at both ends resemble talk radio shows. The computer cannot replace essential voice communications, while technology cannot replace the well developed and prepared mind.

Russophobia

Russophobia

While the argument against Russian violations of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty is a valid one, those making this argument may not be doing so based on their expressed concern for that sovereignty, but rather because it offers the most legitimate challenge to Russian action. The inconsistency of the Wests past behavior with this argument implies the real logic behind the Western position may not about sovereignty but simply about opposing Russia.

Understanding the Need for a Balanced Joint Force: A Mix Martial Arts (MMA) Analogy

Understanding the Need for a Balanced Joint Force: A Mix Martial Arts (MMA) Analogy

Human conflict ranging from individual-on-individual fighting to nation states waging war has seen evolutionary changes to techniques used in combat. The world of martial arts, like warfare, has seen a rapid evolution in individual fighting techniques. Each has various philosophical underpinnings and was developed to address the unique challenges faced by practitioners. Throughout the ages, the question many asked was which technique, martial art, was the greatest of them all. The same debate has emerged in state-on-state and state-on-nonstate warfare regarding the effectiveness of landpower, seapower, and airpower. The history and development of Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) helps illustrate the utility and shortcoming of each style of fighting, stand up strikers and ground fighters, as an analogy of today’s debate between land, sea, and air, and the necessity of mixing things up.

The Cost of Power Miscalculation

The Cost of Power Miscalculation

In light of the recent East-West tensions due to Russia’s near-annexation of Crimea, China’s aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas, continued instability in the Middle East, and the threat of a nuclear Iran, or worse, a failed nuclear Pakistani state highlight the dangers the United States faces in the decades to come. The recently released DoD Budget and QDR both highlight the need to rebalance the force through greater investments in technological solutions at the expense of manpower along with the future applications of the joint force.

Russia’s European Designs: To Weaken, Not to Join

Russia’s European Designs: To Weaken, Not to Join

Current debate is focused on Russia’s actions in Crimea, the political crisis in Ukraine at large, or Western impotence. Russia’s long-term strategy is missing from the conversation. Perhaps Moscow does not have one, but that would be a foolish assumption. So what is motivating Russia to focus its attention on a tiny peninsula where some Russian speakers it could care less about reside?

Counter Terrorism, Continuing Advantage, and a Broader Theory of Victory

Counter Terrorism, Continuing Advantage, and a Broader Theory of Victory

When the strategist considers counter terrorism, they must grapple with the larger focus of their aim, which is the act of building a bridge between two unlike elements: policy and military action. At the tactical level, counter terrorism is an action meant to culminate in an event that prevents, preempts, deters, defeats, or punishes a terrorist. However, at the strategic level, counter-terrorism is meant “as a plan for attaining continuing advantage.” In order for our counter terrorism strategies to remain effective, we must reject the strategic heuristic of specific end states, and instead seek continuing advantage towards a better state of peace.

Enabling the Dragon: China’s Foreign Policy between Thucydides and Sun Tzu

Enabling the Dragon: China’s Foreign Policy between Thucydides and Sun Tzu

On March 8 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi gave his first major press conference against the background of the ongoing session of the National People’s Congress. More than 500 journalists listened to the FM for 95 minutes, but it was the very last statement that deserves the most attention. Wang outlined the three main foundations for China’s new age foreign policy and behind the traditional aesthetically sophisticated formulas one can see a pure case of Thucydidian realism.

Why the March 16th Referendum May Not Be the Disaster Everyone Thinks

Why the March 16th Referendum May Not Be the Disaster Everyone Thinks

Ultimately to use a cliché, annexation of Crimea or any intervention into the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine will back-fire, because it will rile up support for Kiev not for Moscow and it will allow the Ukrainian’s to dislodge themselves from the yoke of Russian power. Instead of creating the new Soviet Bloc that Putin desires, he will be creating a western style democracy, that will look westward for assistance and further isolate Russia.

Overestimating Putin: Russia’s Strongman May Be Anything But...

Overestimating Putin: Russia’s Strongman May Be Anything But...

Amid the media response to the ongoing crisis in Crimea, a surprising theme has emerged in certain political circles: Putin-envy. The Russian president who has strived to cultivate a macho image has garnered praise for authoritative leadership and strategic acumen, ostensibly in contrast to his chief international rival, President Obama.

Understanding Karzai: Building NATO’s Strategy Bridge in Afghanistan

Understanding Karzai: Building NATO’s Strategy Bridge in Afghanistan

NATO members have sacrificed a great deal in Afghanistan. They must resist the temptation to allow obvious slights and insults from driving policy and strategy to squander that sacrifice. Seeing Karzai’s persona from a balanced perspective is essential to reframing NATO’s policy and strategy in Afghanistan beyond the end of 2014. There is a way for the national interests of both Afghanistan and NATO member states to be jointly met, but it requires a long view, seeing the future in terms of generations and tempering our ambitions for immediate action and results.

War Games: What Will Be Our Next Conflict?

War Games: What Will Be Our Next Conflict?

If conventional war was suspect prior to the GWOT, the possible outcome of the Crimea conflict could almost cement the impossibility of such a war occurring again in the future. It may sound sick when I say that this current dynamic is actually a healthy exercise, as it should provide our government with a wake-up call concerning what a possible conventional war could look like.

Thinking Critically: Teachers Before Texts

Thinking Critically: Teachers Before Texts

Success will largely hinge on the willingness of the various services (critical thinking is important in all domains) to make significant changes. This is a goal that may be even more elusive than increased funding, however. If that is so, then the product of the U.S. professional military education programs will continue to be largely the result of the quality going in and luck in who facilitates instruction, thus remaining inconsistent.

Crimea: Russia Is Harvesting the Seeds Sown in the 1990s

Crimea: Russia Is Harvesting the Seeds Sown in the 1990s

The way out of the Crimea issue is achievable considering the national interests of both the US and Russia. Negotiations can be made, back doors can be opened, and assurances can be given to Kiev and Europe. What is happening in 2014 does not necessarily entail a Cold War part deux, yet the path our policymakers are on make that more likely; simply because we forego history for expediency and bluster.

Crimea: It’s About U.S. Power

Crimea: It’s About U.S. Power

The United States has a choice that the Crimean case illustrates very clearly: the U.S. can help shape this new world, or it can continue to be shaped by it. Based on the debate and news that the White House has not asked for any military options in Crimea, it looks like the latter is coming true (although, it should be said, there are some interesting non-military options, too). In the end, the endless debate about Crimea is truthfully not about its future, but about the decline of U.S. power. The United States only has its postwar self and current self to blame.