President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The attackers had perfect conditions to accomplish at their operational goals. Indeed, they enjoyed strategic surprise, crushing numerical superiority, a simultaneous two-front attack, and the complacent overconfidence of their enemy. Yet, they were dramatically beaten on the battlefield. Their crushing defeat can be primarily blamed on catastrophic tactical skill.
Proponents of strategic airpower argued endlessly with those who trusted in other ways to win. Yet, the resulting application demonstrated a far more complex and unified approach to airpower than envisioned by the inter-war airmen theorizing at the Air Corps Tactical School, who resolutely set out to determine how to bring Germany to its knees.
