President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
In the future, national decision makers will expect joint land forces to seamlessly transition from dynamic theater shaping to combat operations. Decreased indications and warnings, compressed planning timelines, and austere defense budgets drive planners to consider more adaptive ways of organizing and employing landpower, and the JFLCC construct at both theater and joint operations area echelons presents viable options to do just that.
To achieve unity of effort among joint forces in the land domain, U.S. Pacific Command directed U.S. Army Pacific to establish a Theater JFLCC, with support from Marine Forces Pacific and Special Operations Command Pacific. In many ways this organizational structure formalizes what service components have been doing in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility for 70 years—coordinating with one another and synchronizing the application of landpower.
