President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
Net resources offer an additional insight into historical, present, and future trends of the global balance of power, enhancing and expanding our understanding of great power politics and competition. They can be a modern-day oracle—imperfect and imprecise, but nonetheless useful…The concept of net power resources and what it indicates is relevant, and deserves closer analysis by those wishing to understand the topography of the past, present and future geopolitical challenges.
There isn’t much grand about America’s post-Cold War grand strategy. Such is the consensus among the academic scholars, think-tankers, pundits, and many former national security officials who have chastised U.S. foreign policymakers for lacking strategic sophistication, or worse, failing to craft a coherent grand strategy at all...In their well-crafted and important new book, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris join this discussion orthogonally, arguing that the United States has altogether abandoned the economic dimension of grand strategy.
