Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Gaza

Are Israeli Operations Against Gaza Rockets Productive?

Are Israeli Operations Against Gaza Rockets Productive?

Since 2005, Hamas and other Gaza militants have fired over 12,000 rockets at Israel. They caused at least ten deaths, over 1,100 injuries, and over $50 million in property damage. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded with three military operations against Gaza. Their stated goal was to protect Israeli civilians from the rockets. How productive were the operations relative to their goals? Leaving aside their many secondary effects, were they effective and efficient at protecting Israelis from rockets? This issue is studied in an examination of Israeli rocket countermeasures covering Operations Cast Lead in 2008-2009, Pillar of Defense in 2012, and Protective Edge in 2014. The research estimated the operations’ effects, benefits, and costs. With limited data available, the estimates are rough but nonetheless informative.