On the 24th of February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within weeks, U.S. generals began pointing to examples of lessons learned from the early days of the conflict that reinforced preexisting beliefs. For example, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General James McConville, repeated the maxim that amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics; General Mark Kelly, Commander of Air Combat Command, pointed to a lack of air superiority as Russia’s problem; while General David Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, used the conflict to argue that “winning the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance fight early on [is] critical.”[1] As the war approached the six-month mark, the conversation increasingly turned to the familiar question of what allies and potential adversaries might be learning tactically, operationally, strategically, and geopolitically.[2]

The challenge here is twofold. First, the desire to collect lessons learned often drives analysis to the tactical or, at best, operational level where information is more granular and events and actions are easier to measure or quantify. Second, these analyses look to apply these lessons to preparation for the next conflict–though we cannot know how, when, or where it will take place. Militaries are notoriously bad at predicting future conflicts, an argument Lawrence Freedman makes in his book The Future of War.[3]

How then should we reflect on this experience? For 2Q23 we want to look back instead of to the future, and ask: What happens to previously held assumptions in the wake of Russia's naked aggression? Which are challenged and which are validated?

Submissions should conform to our submission guidelines. They should be concisely written, 1000-2000 words in length (excluding citations), and must include appropriate footnotes formatted consistent with the Chicago Manual of Style.

Submissions should be scoped narrowly enough to make a complete and meaningful argument that is backed up by evidence. All submissions must be received no later than 3 April 2023. Those submissions selected for publication will be published beginning in early May 2023. We highly encourage writers to download our submissions template to save you time and to ensure that your submission comports with our editorial requirements.

We know our community will have ideas to add to this conversation and we look forward to reading your writing.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Operation in Eastern Ukraine, 2022 (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine).

Notes:

[1] Valerie Insinna, “Top American Generals on Three Key Lessons Learned from Ukraine,” Breaking Defense, March 12, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/top-american-generals-on-three-key-lessons-learned-from-ukraine/.

[2] Evan A. Feigenbaum and Charles Hooper, “What the Chinese Army Is Learning From Russia’s Ukraine War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 21, 2011, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/21/what-chinese-army-is-learning-from-russia-s-ukraine-war-pub-87552; Franz-Stephan Gady, “6 Wrong Lessons for Taiwan From the War in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/02/lessons-ukraine-russia-war-taiwan-china-military-weapons-strategy-tactics/.

[3] Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War (New York, NY: Hachette Book Group, 2017).