From Hope to Horror: Diplomacy and the Making of the Rwandan Genocide. Joyce E. Leader. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2020.
Rwanda in the early 1990s was going through a transition to democracy that obligated its society to resolve decades old disputes between two native ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. A U.S. diplomatic team assisted in negotiations that resulted in the Arusha Accords, outlining a provisional government for the transition that included a power sharing agreement. Without a way to enforce the accords, the U.S. diplomatic team struggled to resolve embittered ethic differences so that a viable peace could be maintained, and the growing instability deteriorated into the genocide of 1994. From Hope to Horror is the detailing of the events that led to the atrocities of the Rwandan genocide written by Joyce Leader, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Rwanda from 1991-1994. Leader provides in-depth analysis of the U.S. diplomatic team’s efforts to promote a peaceful transition of power. She also takes the U.S., and the international community, to task for a lack of commitment, which allowed the despotic government to take advantage of the disenfranchised minority Tutsi. Interpolating this lesson for the future, strategists can learn about how the instruments of national power must be employed in a coordinated fashion to effectively influence international situations and project U.S. power worldwide.
…the diplomatic team underestimated the intensity of the underlying generational animosity between the Hutu and the Tutsi.
Leader was assigned to Rwanda following an assignment as a refugee officer at the U.S. mission in Geneva. She received two weeks of training prior to her arrival in Rwanda and was aware of the potential for a violent uprising, but her writing emphasizes that the diplomatic team underestimated the intensity of the underlying generational animosity between the Hutu and the Tutsi. While the bulk of the book focuses on chronicling the events that took place, Leader incorporates a “Comments” section at the end of each chapter in which she details her personal reflections and retrospective analysis on the events covered. The frustration with the negotiations, anguish over uncommitted resources, dread of impending doom, and finally the shock of the genocide still reside with Leader and these feelings are apparent throughout the book. It also, more broadly, offers insight into American diplomacy and the challenges diplomats face in the pursuit of advancing U.S. global influence.
From Hope to Horror provides an example of an instrument of national power operating in solitude and illustrates the necessity for multifaceted commitment from multiple forms of national strength for strategic gain.
The instruments of national power are a categorized means of achieving national interests via capability and influence. U.S. grand strategy serves as the plan to deliberately employ resources from each necessary instrument, in a coordinated fashion, to successfully advance national objectives.[1] U.S. policy has often found success by combining economic sanctions with military posturing and diplomatic engagement to solve a crisis but only rarely has the U.S. succeeded in applying a singular instrument of national power in isolation. From Hope to Horror provides an example of an instrument of national power operating in solitude and illustrates the necessity for multifaceted commitment from multiple forms of national strength for strategic gain. The paltry U.S. diplomatic team in Rwanda consisted of the ambassador, Leader, and various staff personnel. This team, despite its small size, was charged with facilitating negotiations between rival ethnic groups—the Hutu and the Tutsi—to implement a power sharing agreement and constitutional government. Leader discusses how the transition effort came with no economic commitment, no humanitarian assistance, and no military commitment to help preserve peace and enforce the Arusha Accords, a negotiated transitional plan which implemented a government with shared power between the Hutu and the Tutsi. As violence and instability increased, the UN committed forces to assist with weapons turn-in sites, monitored demilitarized zones, and peacekeeping operations, but Leader makes clear that this force was a paltry contribution at best.
Compounding the lack of commitment, the U.S. government failed to provide the diplomatic team with clear objectives or a strategy. With no means of enticement, retribution, or enforcement the U.S. diplomatic team did not have a strong negotiating position. It would be worth exploring what options the U.S. had which could have affected the negotiations in a more positive manner and Leader discusses these considerations in her comments sections. One of the largest issues confronting the negotiations was the method of returning displaced refugees in neighboring countries. These refugees could have benefitted from U.S. or U.N. led teams to protect them as they returned to and resettled in Rwandan territory. Leader explains how this would have been a meaningful step forward in the stabilization and that the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) planned to reintroduce displaced refugees, but the two-phase operation was not implemented due to complications with another refugee crisis in neighboring Burundi.[2]
After the Rwandan president, a prominent Hutu, was killed when his airplane was shot down, the militarized Hutu took full advantage of their power to seize control of the nation.
Leader highlights how the U.S. diplomatic team could have exploited U.S. or U.N. assistance to provide a means of stabilization in negotiations and to establish credibility on both sides of the negotiating table. The U.S. diplomatic team had no effective way of persuading the existing Hutu-led hegemony to give up power or persuade the primary Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan People’s Front (RPF), from standing down their hostilities against its oppressors. There was no military presence for enforcement, nor were there economic sanctions. The internet of the early 1990s was not nearly as robust as it is today so providing information on the negotiations and hostilities was significantly more difficult. As Leader explains, the Hutu regime came to understand that the international community lacked a viable path to enforce the Arusha Accords. After the Rwandan president, a prominent Hutu, was killed when his airplane was shot down, the militarized Hutu took full advantage of their power to seize control of the nation. The resultant power imbalance exacerbated tension between the ethnic groups and catalyzed the violence which devolved into the eventual genocide.
Reliable and accessible communication tools give diplomats the ability to enforcement the gain support across the range of stakeholders as well as provide a means to draw attention to maleficent behavior from recalcitrant parties.
While the absence of a strategy and lack of resources impeded the diplomatic mission, it is important to consider how the different instruments of national power could have been leveraged to successfully implement U.S. strategy. Strategy is described in U.S. joint doctrine as how “a nation often determines the national, or multinational in the case of an alliance or coalition, guidance that addresses strategic objectives in support of strategic end states and develops and uses national resources to achieve them.”[3] Leader explains how the overtasked, understaffed diplomatic team was further hampered by weak technological infrastructure. Communicating over distances was a necessary inconvenience since the primary negotiations took place in Arusha, Tanzania while the Rwandan president, and the Hutu-run government, remained in the Rwandan capital of Kigali. She details how the dispersion of parties made it significantly more difficult for negotiating parties to collaborate, especially given the poor access to communication technologies like fax machines or computers. Reliable and accessible communication tools give diplomats the ability to enforcement the gain support across the range of stakeholders as well as provide a means to draw attention to maleficent behavior from recalcitrant parties.
According to Leader, another difficulty the team faced was misinformation, which she refers to as “webs of ambiguity.”[4] She describes how each side manipulated situations and spun stories to deflect blame; without verification, acts of violence and atrocities went unattributed and unpunished. Having a means of fact-checking and evidence gathering could have helped them make determinations about which side was perpetrating violence and use that information to effectively curb further peace violations to move negotiations forward. This would also require a peace-keeping force for enforcement to prevent escalations of violence. Leader explains how shortly before the genocide the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights Abuses released a report which showed that the Rwandan government led by the president had committed human rights abuses.[5] Some of the perpetrators were detained, but were soon released, and received no further punishment. The impunity of such abusers demonstrates the futility of preventing a descent into genocide in the absence of an enforcement mechanism, much less facilitating a transition to democracy.
Leader describes the rampant mistrust by all parties of the negotiations which further contributed to non-compliance with the Arusha Accords. She details how the Coalition pour la Défense de la République, CDR, a Hutu extreme supremacist party, at one point had wanted to sign-on to the Arusha Accords but by including them in the negotiations, the U.S. delegation was seen as endorsing their extremist position and the violence they inflicted on the Tutsi.[6] The inherent ambiguity of verification and attribution of information presented unique challenges. A more robust technological infrastructure could have enabled use of a central location for collecting, verifying, and distributing data and could have mitigated the effects of the misinformation campaigns.
The utilization of sanctions and aid to resolve a crisis are only valid, though, if they are effectively communicated and further strengthened by cooperation from American allies.
Economic employment via financial support or sanctions can have a large impact on encouraging a country to act according to U.S. desires. The utilization of sanctions and aid to resolve a crisis are only valid, though, if they are effectively communicated and further strengthened by cooperation from American allies. This is how the economic and informational instruments of national power can work together to support diplomatic efforts. Leader repeatedly states that without any support or backing from other U.S. agencies, the diplomatic team in Rwanda was only able to provide advice to the different sides without a way of incentivizing their recommendation or enforcing the agreed upon conditions in the Arusha Accords. Leader also mentions that they did not consider aid or sanctions to curb the human rights violations.[7] She describes how, as the situation worsened, the UN, Belgium, and France sent small contingents of troops to enforce weapons turn-in sites and curb violence, but these forces were so small that they were unable to keep the peace or positively affect the outcome. In a harrowing account, she recalls how these forces were so ineffective that when ten Belgian soldiers were specifically targeted at the onset of the genocide, the whole team was ultimately killed.
Leader persuasively argues that despite the myriad resources available to the U.S., without a monetary commitment or military force employed to enforce terms there is little the U.S. could have done to positively affect the outcome. This sentiment is echoed in the UN “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda” which reads as follows: “The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness.”[8]
In the case of Rwanda, Leader places blame upon America’s unwillingness to commit resources, for allowing years of ethnic divide, deep-seated resentment, and fear of losing power to culminate in one of the worst genocides the world has known. She concludes that the U.S. must lead and coordinate with allies to prevent such atrocities from happening again. By building credibility in combating human rights abuses, Leader believes that the U.S., UN, and other international organizations can achieve swifter, more successful interventions to avert greater suffering.
Could greater U.S. commitment have positively swayed the outcome of the Rwandan negotiations?
From Hope to Horror offers the reader a glimpse into the infeasibility of diplomacy bereft of will and resources as well as the human toll of such failures. Strategists can gain valuable insight from Leaders’ account into the nature of diplomatic relations, the importance of understanding other cultures before trying to influence them, and the necessity of having clear, supportable goals when leveraging an instrument of national power.
Considering the centrality of political purpose in the context of the Rwandan genocide described in this book raises several questions on U.S. strategic interests for strategists to consider. Could greater U.S. commitment have positively swayed the outcome of the Rwandan negotiations? If the Rwandan situation had garnered greater political attention, which form of national power(s) should have been used? What was the impact to America’s reputation as a result of the failure to affect the transition to democracy? From Hope to Horror provides an outstanding starting point for contemplating the aforementioned considerations.
Note:
The independent inquiry in 1999 into whether the UN and the international community could have prevented the genocide determined that a lack of resources, political will, and improper use of available resources were causal in preventing the Rwandan genocide. The website for UN Rwanda UNAMIR displays a hyperlink to the independent review but returns a “404, Page not found” error when clicked. The links to the International Tribunal for Rwanda on the U.N. website leads to either a 404 website not found or a link to “Interior Beauties of Turkey”; a website for Turkish food.[9] These resources can be found by individually searching for them but not having these important documents readily available from their website is detrimental to UN credibility.
Robert “Wolfman” Spencer is a KC-135 pilot in the Arizona Air National Guard who has also flown the F-16 and the RC-26. He has held positions as the Chief of Weapons and Tactics, Chief of Training, and is currently the Chief of Safety at his unit. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Air National Guard, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. James R. Kriesel, deputy commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), looks at a display showing photographs of genocide victims at the Kigali Genocide Memorial in Kigali, Rwanda, May 7, 2019. (Tech. Sgt. Shawn Nickel).
Notes:
[1] Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-19, Strategy, 10 December 2019, vi.
[2] Leader, J. E. (2020). From hope to horror: Diplomacy and the making of the Rwanda genocide. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 218
[3] Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (25 March 2013, Incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017): I-7 – I-8.
[4] Leader, From hope to horror, 55.
[5] Ibid., 151.
[6] Ibid., 246.
[7] Ibid., 156.
[8] United Nations Security Council. (n.d.). Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Retrieved February 15, 2021, from https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S%2F1999%2F1257e.