Buzzwords impersonating military strategy are not a new phenomenon in the United States. Concepts like Flexible Response, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Full Spectrum Dominance each failed to successfully transition from idea to policy.[1] The current iteration of this seemingly recurring error is the military variant of the “long-term strategic competition,” a phrase upon which the entire 2018 National Defense Strategy rests.[2] Like its predecessors, the underpinning of the idea—that the United States must tailor its military efforts to confronting great powers—is reasonable. However, like the other examples, the window to implement a coherent policy and strategy based upon the National Defense Strategy is fast closing. The pattern starts when a meritorious idea leads to a catchphrase, which is then appropriated to serve the pre-existing goals of several domestic parties. Eventually, the initially coherent idea becomes nothing more than an umbrella term for a muddle of conflicting interests.
Possessing a long-term strategy for military competitions is important, but to avoid repeating the failed pattern, a return to basics is in order. The cliché of building a shared understanding is, in this instance, necessary. Without foundation, the more complex aspects of this concept will have nothing to stand on. Military competitions must be defined, simplified, and understood to prevent their misappropriation by competing domestic interests. Unfortunately, as several analysts have noted, the publicly available National Defense Strategy provides a vague foundation to begin with, even as the general idea behind it appears promising.[3]
For nations, a military competition is fundamentally a relationship between two factors associated with the actors, as Clausewitz framed it: “...the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”[4] If there is one golden rule of military competition, it is that no nation possesses an unlimited quantity of either means or will. Therefore, the most unforgivable failure in formulating a military competition is that of over-extension. A competitor attempting to accomplish everything at once is likely to accomplish nothing at all. When a catchphrase becomes an umbrella term, over-extension will likely result due to a misunderstanding of the critical factors. Hard choices and prioritization, anchored to specific and measurable objectives, are thus paramount.
The problem, then, is linked. Solidifying a basic and shared understanding of a military competition will also serve to reduce the prospect of over-extension. Simplicity in words and actions, even at the expense of certain widely accepted tenets of strategy, may serve to boost the military competition concept in the initial stages. In that spirit, there is nothing simpler than a picture, in this case, a graph—the competition matrix. If one’s conception of a military competition cannot be plotted on this matrix, it is likely the degeneration of viable ideas into buzzwords has already occurred.
The competition matrix (Author’s Work)
The matrix shown serves as a plot on which the actual or anticipated trajectory of a military competition takes a simple form. In a similar spirit to the Clausewitzian dictum, the horizontal axis represents means, and the vertical axis represents ends. Naturally, a strategy spanning the entire graph is most desirable. It is also an idealistic fantasy. To prevent over-extension and ground an idea, the line of competition must have an identifiable origin and terminus on the graph and rely upon a realistic relationship between means and ends.
Tactical Language, Strategic Results
It is worth noting that the matrix relies on decidedly un-strategic language. The use of finite terms blatantly contradicts the fluid and enduring nature of a true strategic competition. However, using simple and finite language represents a necessary sacrifice on the altar of policy implementation. The diffuse powers in government required to implement the concept of military competitions are collectively incapable of forming a consensus on abstract complexities. For example, the Cold War policy consensus did not derive from widespread strategic brilliance across government, but rather from the embrace of a simple and understandable narrative. Additionally, Ronald Reagan’s use of tactical language—“we win, they lose”—toward the ends of a strategic contest demonstrated the value of oversimplifying.[5] The simple concepts in the matrix represent a realistic—though strategically incomplete—way of building shared understanding and furthering policy.
Ends: Entire volumes exist that analyze the word deterrence, but it suffices to say that deterrence is fundamentally a preservation of the status quo.[6] The absence of a competitor’s action defines success. Therefore, it is an appropriate place to begin for determining ends. As one moves along the horizontal axis, deterrence either fails or is cast aside, and the kinetic threshold—indicated by the red box—is crossed. Now the goal becomes physical destruction, initially to coerce or deny, before attempting to eliminate a capability or capabilities, and at the end of the line to inflict enough destruction to induce an unconditional surrender. A full annihilative strategy is so unthinkable among nation states today that it lies off the visible chart.
Means: A progression in means relates more to ease of commitment—a political calculation—than existing capability. At the bottom of the chart lies force structure, taken as an entirely passive approach. Here, the mere existence of military force is enough to support the desired ends. Moving up the vertical axis, one approaches military deployments and rotations. This technique is the peacock's tail of the United States military, a predictably frequent, if a somewhat superficial course of action, though arguably effective. A deployment involves relocating existing assets to achieve the desired effect. Above that, though still in the bottom half, is a demonstration. Here, actual activity ensues, usually in the form of a large-scale exercise such as the upcoming Defender 2020.[7] Beyond, one crosses the kinetic threshold. The upper half of the chart begins with airpower and naval assets—the go-to modern military option—before progressing into light infantry and finally into heavy mechanized units and artillery, each of which represents a more significant commitment. At the apex of the vertical axis is nuclear war, the physical and psychological threshold of total war, at which point a nation likely uses every available weapon at its disposal.
The Goal. The goal of any military competition is to defeat an opponent. Here, it is useful to redefine defeat, departing from “frustration by nullification or by prevention of success,” its definition in joint military doctrine.[8] Any finite competition must inherently involve a winner and a loser; one side must defeat the other. If determining winners and losers is a subjective or artificial judgement, then for the purposes of policy this illusion is a practical one. In military competitions, defeat need not require the use of force. Deterring a competitor from doing something they wanted to do is a form of defeating them. Defining defeat as U.S. military doctrine does—as one of thirty-two strategic effects, which is not an all-inclusive list—does not support clarity.[9] Moreover, the definition espoused by the U.S. Army, as a “seldom permanent,” state of affairs, while realistic, can feed into the already dangerous over-extension trap and may encourage the false perception that the ends and means to sustain a competition are infinite. [10] The goal of any contest, neo-Darwinian as it may sound, must reside in a readily definable and finite conception of defeat, even if indicated by absence of action. By doing so, both acts of deterrence and destruction become sub-components of defeat, and thereby tied to a finite and comprehensive goal. Two examples follow.
First, to illustrate what a potential competition looks like, view two plotted historical examples on the matrix. World War II, as shown, began as a kinetic contest progressing in means, before taking a sharp right turn, ending with the call for unconditional surrender at the Casablanca Conference, a result obtainable only through inflicting destruction on the enemy.[11] It concluded with an escalation tot the use of atomic weapons. World War II thus took the form of a kinetic escalation into total war. This is not to imply an artificial causality or completeness in these events. What it does demonstrate is that American policy during World War II can be simplistically explained. As the graph indicates, albeit simplistically, the overall war aims vis-à-vis the enemy possessed an incremental logic, remaining coherent throughout the contest. Defeat, defined as unconditional surrender, required destruction.
World War II (left) and Eisenhower’s New Look (right) plotted on the matrix. (Author’s Work)
For a peacetime example, consider President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look. While it might appear to span the spectrum of the graph, it represents a type of zero to one-hundred escalation, skipping other steps. The New Look relied upon the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, the notion that any conventional attack by Soviet troops on Western Europe would automatically incur an overwhelming nuclear response from the United States.[12] Because the United States could not anticipate a finite termination of the Cold War, the strategy prioritized economic means for a long-term competition by using nuclear weapons as a cheaper alternative to a massive conventional land army. Furthermore, defeating the enemy, in this case, was defined as maintenance of the status quo. It called for deterring a Soviet attack and expansion while appreciating the likely impossibility of winning in nuclear combat.[13] However, the fact that defeat lies so low on the spectrum depended on the ability—even if a bluff—to escalate to the maximum in ends and means. In this instance, given Eisenhower’s belief in the untenable nature of the Soviet system, simply biding time represented winning.
These are two very different forms of military competition, but the point is one can plot them on the matrix and explain their basic precepts to the uninitiated in minutes. That clear understanding, even if incomplete, provides a common foundation for initial widespread policy implementation. None of this is to suggest that war, the most unpredictable of human endeavors, is reasonably nor completely plottable on a graph. It is only to indicate that if unexplainable with the essential simplicity concerning ends, means, and defeat, then no foundation for success exists to tackle the necessary complexities coherently.
Plotting the National Defense Strategy
With this understanding, it is difficult to plot the 2018 National Defense Strategy on the matrix, and impossible to plot or define defeat in this context. A holistic understanding remains elusive based upon the publicly available document. The Department of Defense’s 2019 Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, The Competition Continuum, does rectify some of this uncertainty by making clear that competitions can span the full spectrum of military activity, often with no clear beginning and end.[14] While capturing the complex reality of conflicts is admirable, The Competition Continuum falls prey to the same pattern as concepts like the Revolution in Military Affairs: the more nebulous the initial idea, the less value it will have for formulating policy. Simplicity must precede complexity. Regardless, The Competition Continuum is not authoritative, and both documents encourage over-extension.
While World War II and the New Look prioritized one goal above all others in word and deed, the U.S. still has a long way to go to achieve the latter for long-term competitions. China and Russia are prioritized one and two, respectively, but peripheral operations degrade the United States’ ability to confront them.[15] An unstated implication is that future conflicts will not involve nuclear weapons, but vast amounts of money pour towards nuclear modernization.[16] It is unclear whether the U.S. believes deterrence can work on Iran and North Korea, and both documents mention the maintenance or restoration of deterrence using the threat or use of force.[17] The vast expenditure of means in Afghanistan with no finite end continues to defy logic, as numerous senior leaders acknowledge.[18] These factors need addressing before the competition concept atrophies to uselessness like the other, eventual, banal buzzwords and concepts mentioned at the outset of this article. To answer any of these questions incorrectly is dangerous, but to leave them unaddressed is even more so. Any attempt to plot U.S. priorities vis-à-vis Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, the Islamic State, or the Taliban—and fit the result nicely in a graphical form—reflects a difficult reality: U.S. strategy is an incoherent mess. Indeed, the inherent simplicity of the competition matrix makes the policy look better than it is.
Plotting the National Defense Strategy on the Competition Matrix (Author’s Work)
Concluding Lessons for Competition
This simple visual tool illustrates some fundamental challenges and realities of conceptualizing military competitions. American policymakers should ask some questions. Can a given military competition be plotted on this graph? Are U.S. goals vis-à-vis opposing powers tied to an identifiable definition of defeating an opponent? Do U.S. goals account for a clear relationship between ends and means, and the finite nature of both? If the answer to any of these questions is no, and if therefore the nature of the competition cannot be coherently explained, then competition has likely passed form reasonable idea to a meaningless buzzword. To preserve the integrity of the long-term strategic competition concept as found in the National Defense Strategy, and to prevent the predictable over-extension which will certainly drain the idea of its worth, policymakers must first develop a simple and coherent foundation to build upon. The trend towards coherence is thus far positive, but the U.S. must continue to do more to address over-extension.[19]
Remember the adage: “In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing.”[20] If one plots military competition on the matrix incorrectly— metaphorically speaking, this is only one conceptual tool—failure may indeed result. If one fails to plot it at all, failure will assuredly result. Flawed decisions are understandably human, but indecision, in this case, is inexcusable.
Sam Canter is a U.S. Army Officer. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
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Header Image: The Mandelbrot set within a continuously colored environment. (Wolfgang Beyer/Wikimedia)
Notes:
[1] For examples of these failures see: for the RMA, Eliot A. Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 395-407; for Full Spectrum Dominance, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2010,” (Fort Belvoir: DTIC, 1994); for Flexible Response, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Assessment of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[2] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, (January, 2018), 1. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
[3] Gregory D. Foster, “The National Defense Strategy is No Strategy,” Defense One, April 4, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/national-defense-strategy-no-strategy/156068/; Anthony H. Cordesman, “The New National Defense Strategy: Some Good Broad Goals, and Bad Buzzwords, But No Clear Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 19, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-national-defense-strategy-some-good-broad-goals-and-bad-buzzwords-no-clear-strategy.
[4] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 77.
[5] Hal Brands, “The Vision Things,” University of Virginia Miller Center, January 14, 2016. https://millercenter.org/issues-policy/foreign-policy/the-vision-thing
[6] The most succinct and accessible is Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
[7] Jen Judson, “Reforger Redux? Defender 2020 to be 3rd largest exercise in Europe since Cold War,” Defense News, October 7, 2018.
[8] The Merriam-Webster.com Thesaurus, s.v. “defeat (n.),” accessed December 26, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/defeat.
[9] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 2019), 2; for deterrence and destruction as separate goals from defeat see, Department of the Army, ADP 3-0: Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2018).
[10] Department of the Army, ADP 3-0, 2-4.
[11] Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address on the Casablanca Conference,” February 12, 1943, accessed from Jewish Virtual Library December 26, 2019. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/president-roosevelt-address-on-the-casablanca-conference-february-1943
[12] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 41-2; Richard H. Immerman and Robert R. Bowie, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: The Competition Continuum, (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, June 2019).
[15] Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Eyes Africa Drawdown as First Step in Global Troop Shift,” The New York Times, December 24, 2019.
[16] Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF; Eric Gomez, “New Bill Renews Debate on Nuclear Modernization,” The Cato Institute, November 1, 2019.
[17] Duyeon Kim, “Can North Korea be Deterred?” Council on Foreign Relations, June 17, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/can-north-korea-be-deterred; Christopher J. Bolan, “Deterrence Is Failing — Partly Because Iran Has No Idea What the US Really Wants,” Defense One, June 14, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/06/restoring-deterrence-iran/157756/.
[18] Craig Whitlock, “The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2019.
[19] The Pentagon is displaying an increased, if incremental, willingness to prioritize and make hard choices. See: Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, Savage, and Schmitt, “Pentagon Eyes Africa Drawdown,” New York Times; Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, “Night Court Comes to the Pentagon,” Defense News, August 28, 2019; Matthew Beinart, “Army’s Legacy System Cuts Move Future Weapon Systems Towards Procurement By Middle Of FYDP,” Defense Daily, March 13, 2019, https://www.defensedaily.com/armys-legacy-system-cuts-move-future-weapon-systems-towards-procurement-middle-fydp/army/.
[20] “Theodore Roosevelt Quotes,” Theodore Roosevelt Center, https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Quotes. “This statement is often attributed to Theodore Roosevelt, but no known source can be found to verify the attribution.”