In Afghanistan, the United States has reached a strategic crossroads. On the current path, bilateral negotiations with the Taliban are considered a means of withdrawing the American military presence while securing long-term security interests. However, due to the Taliban's refusal to end violence against the Afghan state and the group’s continued cooperation with transnational terrorist organizations, this desired outcome is unlikely.
An alternative path would require American policy makers to acknowledge the Taliban will never accept a political compromise so long as an American withdrawal can deliver the group a military victory. As the United States intends its presence to be temporary, denying a Taliban military victory can only be achieved by enhancing the security capability of the Afghan state and continuing the advisory mission. This path has definitive merits. The 2014 shift to an advisory focus has sped the development of important Afghan assets, such as special operations, aviation, and local holding forces. If these gains can be consolidated they offer a means to securing greater Afghan self-sufficiency and compelling the Taliban to accept an intra-Afghan political settlement. An American withdrawal without further development of Afghan security forces, by contrast, would empower extremists, degrade international security, and invite humanitarian catastrophe.
The Rocky State of Negotiations
Since 2001, the American objective of denying safe haven to terrorists has hinged on the need for a stable Afghan state capable of permanently countering such threats. This objective has been complicated by the Taliban-led insurgency, which has allied and integrated with transnational terror organizations.[1] Frustrated with open-ended international commitments, the Trump administration has pinned its Afghanistan policy on military withdrawal and expeditious negotiations with the Taliban.
Afghan Taliban fighters listen to Mullah Mohammed Rasool, the newly-elected leader of a breakaway faction of the Taliban, in Farah province, Afghanistan. (AP)
This aggressive pursuit of an agreement has created a polarizing effect.[2] On one side, both the Trump Administration’s America First supporters, along with the conflict’s many skeptics, demonstrate a strong appetite for withdrawal.[3] In opposition, the talks have been widely criticized by human rights advocates who anticipate the abandonment of vulnerable populations to the Taliban.[4] Criticism has likewise emanated from the Afghan government, which has been excluded by its erstwhile American allies in a matter of existential significance.[5] Even within Washington, the talks have provoked alarm.[6] Prominent examples of criticism include a chorus of nine former American Ambassadors with service in Afghanistan, all of whom cite the potential for state collapse and the indication that current Taliban posture could make peace impossible.[7]
Within the talks themselves, sudden reversals from the Trump administration have continuously mired progress. On September 9th, 2019, negotiations were frozen after President Trump declared the deal dead.[8] President Trump further exacerbated the situation by abruptly ordering a withdrawal from north-eastern Syria, while disparaging the contribution of Kurdish allies.[9] This withdrawal may have been partially rescinded, but not before it led to speculation that all ongoing American military deployments could face sudden and conditionless reversal.[10]
By November 28th of the same year, President Trump once again reversed his policy by announcing a renewed interest in an agreement and a ceasefire.[11] However, American optimism has been repeatedly disrupted by Taliban counter-claims. As of February 2020, the Taliban has stopped short of accepting a ceasefire and only offered a reduction in violence, thus leaving negotiations hotly contested.[12]
A Deal Without Peace
In the absence of all-encompassing military options, a diplomatic process remains the key to resolving conflict between the Afghan state and the Taliban, as well as to providing the United States with assurances Afghanistan will not revert into a terrorist safe haven. However, this end state depends on preconditions the Trump administration’s bilateral talks lack. Among its failings, the prospective deal unnecessarily undermines allies, depends on dubious means of enforcement, and relies on a poor position of leverage before the emboldened Taliban.
Under the deal’s publicly disclosed parameters, the Taliban would end cooperation with transnational terror organizations in return for a phased withdrawal of international troops, beginning within 135 days of the agreement’s signing.[13] Ambassador Khalilzad also made assurances of a future intra-Afghan ceasefire and prolonged support for the Afghan government.[14]
Taliban negotiators have voiced a contradictory understanding of the agreement. While refusing to negotiate directly with the Afghan state, the Taliban has only consented to talks with non-government delegations and simultaneously refuted any agreement for an intra-Afghan ceasefire.[15] This posture indicates the group’s dismissal of political settlement and contravenes the American narrative of impending intra-Afghan diplomacy.
Taliban fighters drive on a road in the Khogiani district of Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, on Dec. 11, 2019. (Lorenzo Tugnoli/Washinton Post)
Peace on Taliban Terms Means Subjugation
At present, the Taliban has no intention of compromise and remains focused on total military victory. Senior Taliban officials underscore this by clearly articulating the deal will only take the U.S. out of the fight before a renewed offensive against the isolated Afghan government.[16] The likelihood of future power sharing has also been put into doubt by unyielding Taliban demands that any post-war order adhere to the organization's self-proclaimed definition of an Islamic government.[17]
In what should stand as the clearest red flag for American policy makers, Taliban ties with transnational terror groups are operational and unshaken. [18] While the Taliban espouses a nationalistic character, al-Qaeda maintains its position as an oathsworn ally.[19] Additionally, the Haqqani Network, itself deeply intertwined with al-Qaeda, is well integrated within the Taliban. This integration exists to the point that Haqqani chief Sirajuddian Haqqani acts as the Taliban’s deputy military leader.[20] Although complex in character, these interrelationships constitute the transnational threat that underpins the logic for an American presence.[21]
Substantive Enforcement Impossible Post-Withdrawal
Ultimately, success in bilateral talks relies on the good faith of the Taliban. As the group enjoys its most advantageous post-2001 position and continues to pursue victory through force of arms, this is a problematic formulation.[22]
The Taliban’s proven ability to weather America’s offensive power, combined with the state of American domestic support, would greatly hamstring a proportionate military response to duplicity.[23] These lopsided terms lie at the root of Taliban eagerness for an agreement.
After a U.S. withdrawal, if the Taliban considers continued cooperation with transnational terror groups—or even conquest of Afghanistan—to be the order of the day, what could it possibly have to fear? Having already survived decades of warfare, the threat of limited retaliatory air strikes or special operations raids is a trade well worth taking for such a war-altering paradigm shift.
The Peril of Circumventing Allies
Diplomatic resolution requires buy in from all parties and cannot circumvent major stakeholders like the Afghan national government. Not only have talks excluded the administration of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, they have also denied the Afghan government an improved bargaining position by rushing ahead during a fraught election process.[24] Such casual mistreatment of a partner could have enduring consequences.
Although it possesses considerable hard-power advantages, American strength relies on international partnerships. When the poor state of U.S. leadership leaves even ardent allies questioning the feasibility of cooperation, American condescension and potential abandonment of Afghanistan does significant damage to its trustworthiness abroad.[25]
Beyond discrediting the United States as a reliable partner, such actions expedite the formation of sub-state, anti-Taliban armed groups.[26] By taking up arms, vulnerable populations demonstrate their growing insecurity, directly fueled by the sidelining of the Afghan government and the emphasis on withdrawal.[27] In light of the poor track record of demobilization efforts, such groups have the potential to ignite a civil war beyond even the magnitude of the current crisis.[28]
The Advisory Mission’s Merits
When facing an insurgent adversary, precise and adaptable special operations forces are the premier offensive tool. Through the steadfast work of international advisors, Afghanistan possesses numerous such units across the Defense and Interior Ministries, including the Commandos, Special Forces and the General Command of Police Special Units.[29] Bearing special mention, formations like the Afghan Ktah Khas are regarded as “top-knotch” and favored partners of U.S. Special Mission Units.[30]
Over their lifetime, such forces have evolved from promising small teams to fully-fledged organizations responsible for country-wide operations.[31] Presently, these units are not only undertaking most offensive operations, but also 80% of Afghan operations occurring independent of international support.[32]
U.S. Security Forces , advise members of the Afghan Air Force during a mounted and dismounted patrol outside of Kabul. (SSgt Clay Lancaster/USAF Photo)
To complement offensive forces, the U.S. has long realized the importance of attracting security buy-in from rural communities.[33] Past forays into forming local police forces as part of village stability operations were promising in some cases, but also susceptible to corruption and misconduct.[34]
By comparison, the Territorial Force has proven more professional, effective, and accountable.[35] This has directly followed from a grounding in oversight and gradual expansion.[36] By making community approval a prerequisite and combining local volunteers with officers from the Afghan National Army, the Territorial Force is developing successfully and sustainably.[37] If fully realized, the formation will harness the determination of individual communities to resist the insurgency, while engendering a compromise between Kabul’s legitimacy and local autonomy.
The development of Afghan aviation assets has benefited equally from the focus on advising. In 2015 Afghan military aviation could not function independently.[38] Presently, more than half of all aerial operations are undertaken by Afghan personnel.[39] Swift improvement in capability and accountability have been greatly aided by the 2014 mission shift, allowing advisor deployment at all echelons of command down to the tactical level.[40] Additionally, a Special Mission Wing, capable of more sophisticated operations like night-flights, has grown to support elite units.[41] A major boon to Afghan mobility and precision fire support has followed.[42]
These specialized forces are not just miniaturized versions of larger dysfunctional formations. In any military, commandos and pilots are rare and valuable assets, and yet the advisory mission has a proven track-record of developing them. Simultaneously, the focus on conditions-based expansion is allowing for improved models of localized security like the Territorial Force. This kind of quality-over-quantity approach was sorely lacking in the Surge-era and is now directly facilitated by the emphasis on advising.[43] As a result, Afghan forces possess capabilities that would have been unimaginable in earlier stages of the conflict.
Undeniably, Afghan institutions are afflicted with systemic problems. Most gallingly, ministerial infighting and corruption have presented ongoing stumbling blocks to development.[44] On the American end of the equation, the tendency to narrow objectives along with abrupt shifts in strategy and troop numbers have often foiled progress.
The merits of continuing the advisory mission do not detract from such challenges. However, if preventing state collapse and the empowerment of transnational militants remain American priorities, a diplomatic settlement will not be possible absent greater Afghan self-sufficiency.
Likewise, a decision to continue security force assistance need not rely on the indefinite deployment of thousands of advisors. Long-standing American capacity building missions have taken a myriad of forms, with examples spanning from post-war Europe to South-East Asia and with partners as divergent as the Philippines and Columbia. Such a history of sustainable long-term security partnership demonstrates numerous potential paths to refine American engagement in Afghanistan overtime.
Skepticism for further involvement would be more constructively put to use in proactive oversight. Conditionality in funding has been central to preventing the misuse of Afghan special operations forces, but it is sorely lacking within conventional units.[45] Correspondingly, countering corruption depends on efforts to support Afghan-led programs. One such effort known as Inherent Law has made headway in identifying and forcibly removing underperforming or criminal officers within the security forces.[46]
Additionally, ongoing biometric enrollment of Afghan personnel offers tools for long-awaited transparency in force structure.[47] All of these mechanisms can be used to improve the advisory mission, but they will be wasted without recognition and exploitation.
Conclusion
At Afghanistan’s current crossroads, American policy makers have to choose between bilateral talks, which show dubious indications of success, and continuing the advisory mission. The advisory mission may not be a panacea, but it is a prerequisite for consolidating gains made in key Afghan forces and to compelling the Taliban to abandon armed struggle in favor of political compromise. Withdrawing before the Taliban seriously considers intra-Afghan negotiations will not cut American losses, but it will add to them through the consequences of destabilization and potential state collapse.
Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub is an independent researcher with a thematic focus on asymmetric warfare, security force assistance, and sub-state militant groups.
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Header Image: U.S., Taliban and Qatar officials during a meeting for peace talks in Doha, Qatar. (Al Jazeera)
Notes:
[1] Thomas Joscelyn, The Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Policy (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2019), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/09/19/the-trump-administrations-afghanistan-policy/.
[2] Mark Landler, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, Taliban Talks Raise Question of What U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan Could Mean (The New York Times, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/U.S./politics/U.S.-withdrawal-afghanistan-taliban.html.
[3] Doyle Mcmanus, Column: Trump’s draft deal with the Taliban looks ugly, but it may be the best we can get (The Los Angeles Times, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-30/trump-prepares-for-an-awful-deal-with-the-taliban.
[4] Karishma Vyas and Liz Gooch, Don’t Leave Us Now (Al Jazeera, 2019), https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2019/dont-leave-U.S.-now/index.html?fbclid=IwAR0PxWEkQ8gzX7yRDcMly2eN5PWSk2gvD-ULixBWIHidGVrrN9JUMMRtk0s.
[5] Craig Nelson, Afghan Government Criticizes Proposed U.S.-Taliban Accord (The Wall Street Journal, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-government-criticizes-proposed-u-s-taliban-accord-11567706877?mod=article_inline.
[6] Landler, Taliban Talks Raise Question of What U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan Could Mean.
[7] James Dobbins, Robert P. Finn, Ronald E. Neumann, William Wood, John Negroponte, E. Anthony Wayne, Ryan Crocker, James Cunningham, Hugo Llorens, US-Taliban negotiations: How to avoid rushing to failure (Atlantic Council, 2019),
[8] BBC staff, “Afghan peace deal: Trump says Taliban talks are 'dead'” (BBC, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-U.S.-canada-49642655.
[9] Aaron Blake, “‘They didn’t help us with Normandy’: Trump abandons the Kurds — rhetorically if not literally” (The Washington Post, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/09/trump-has-abandoned-kurds-least-rhetorically/.
[10] Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube, “Pentagon draws up plans for quick Afghanistan withdrawal in case Trump blindsides military” (NBC News, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/pentagon-draws-plans-quick-afghanistan-withdrawal-jU.S.t-case-trump-blindsides-n1069611.
[11] Michael Crowley, “Trump Visits Afghanistan and Says He Reopened Talks With Taliban” (The New York Times, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/28/us/politics/trump-afghanistan.html.
[12] Hasib Danish Alikozai, Mohammad Habibzada, “Afghan Government Demands Full Cease-Fire, Taliban Commit to Reduction in Violence,” (Voice of America News, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/afghan-government-demands-full-cease-fire-taliban-commit-reduction-violence.
[13] Nelson, “Afghan Government Criticizes Proposed U.S.-Taliban Accord.”
[14] Colum Lynch, Lara Seligman, and Robbie Gramer, “Khalilzad Edges Closer to Pact With Taliban,” (Foreign Policy, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/28/khalilzad-edges-closer-to-pact-with-taliban-zalmay-khalilzad-negotiations-afghanistan-war-diplomacy-new-details-on-peace-negotiations-ashraf-ghani-elections-kabul/.
[15] Mujib Mashal, “U.S. and Taliban Agree in Principle to Peace Framework, Envoy Says” (The New York Times, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/world/asia/taliban-peace-deal-afghanistan.html?auth=login-email&login=email&module=inline.
[16] Abdul Qadir Sediqi, Jibran Ahmed, U.S., Taliban deal will not stop attacks on Afghan forces, some Taliban say (Reuters, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/U.S.-U.S.a-taliban-talks/u-s-taliban-deal-will-not-stop-attacks-on-afghan-forces-taliban-say-idU.S.KCN1VG0NB.
[17] Ashley Jackson, There Will Be No Peace for Afghanistan (Foreign Policy, 2019) https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/04/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks-2.
[18] Javid Ahmad, Husain Haqqani, “The Taliban still hasn’t broken with al-Qaeda” (The Washington Post, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/07/taliban-still-hasnt-broken-with-al-qaeda/.
[19] Thomas Joscelyn, “Ayman al Zawahiri swears allegiance to the Taliban’s new leader” (FDD’s Long War Journal, 2016), https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/ayman-al-zawahiri-swears-allegiance-to-the-talibans-new-leader.php.
[20] Ahmad and Haqqani, “The Taliban still hasn’t broken with al-Qaeda,”
[21] Joscelyn, “The Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Policy”
[22] Bill Roggio & Alexandra Gutowski, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, (FDD’s Long War Journal, 2014-2019) https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan
[23] Baxter Oliphant, After 17 years of war in Afghanistan, more say U.S. has failed than succeeded in achieving its goals, (Pew Research Center, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/10/05/after-17-years-of-war-in-afghanistan-more-say-u-s-has-failed-than-succeeded-in-acheving-its-goals/.)
[24] Lynch, Khalilzad Edges Closer to Pact With Taliban.
[25]James Traub, RIP the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, 1945-2018 (Foreign Policy, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/11/rip-the-trans-atlantic-alliance-1945-2018/.
[26] Scott DesMarais, Afghanistan's Warlords Prepare for Civil War (Institute for the Study of War, 2019), http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/08/afghanistans-warlords-prepare-for-civil.html.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Kate Clark, Graft and Remilitarisation: A look back at efforts to disarm, demobilise, reconcile and
reintegrate (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2018), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/graft-andremilitarisation-a-look-back-at-efforts-to-disarm-demobilise-reconcile-and-reintegrate/
[29] Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (United States Department of Defense, 2018), 9-10, 83-85, 102-103, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Dec/20/2002075158/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-DECEMBER-2018.PDF.
[30] Mitchel D. Silber, Al-Qa`ida’s Center of Gravity in a Post-Bin Ladin World (CTC Sentinel, 2011), 13, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2011/12/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss11-12.pdf, Jospeh Trevithick, This Shadowy Afghan Unit Fights Alongside America's Most Elite Forces (The Drive, 2017), https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/10114/this-shadowy-afghan-unit-fights-alongside-americas-most-elite-forces.
[31] John Friberg, Afghanistan’s National Mission Brigade – New Afghan SOF Unit (SOF News, 2017), http://www.sof.news/afghanistan/national-mission-brigade/.
[32] Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (United States Department of Defense, 2019), 67.
[33] James Gant, One Tribe at a Time (Nine Sisters Imports, 2009), http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5042~v~One_Tribe_at_a_Time___A_Strategy_for
_Success_in_Afghanistan.pdf.
[34] Fazal Muzhary, Kate Clark, How to Set up a ‘Good ALP’:The experience of Yahyakhel district,
Paktika and how it became more peaceful (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2018),
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/how-to-set-up-a-good-alp-the-experience-of-yahyakhel-districtpaktika-
and-how-it-became-more-peaceful/.
[35] Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (United States Department of Defense, 2019), 53
[36] Clark, Kate, The Afghan Territorial Force: Learning from the lessons of the past? (Afghanistan
Analysts Network, 2019), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-afghan-territorial-forcelearning-
from-the-lessons-of-the-past/.
[37] Ibid..
[38] Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (United States Department of Defense,
2018), 38-39.
[39] Ibid..
[40] Government Accountability Office, AFGHANISTAN SECURITY Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces’ Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Oversight of U.S.- Purchased Equipment (Government Accountability Office, 2018), 10-15, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/695012.pdf.
[41] Global Security Staff, Special Mission Wing (SMW) (Global Security, 2018), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/smw.htm.
[42] Kyle Rempfer, The Afghan Air Force may be one of the few success stories in a 17-year war (The Air Force Times, 2018), https://www.airforcetimes.com/flashpoints/2018/06/04/the-afghan-air-force-may-be-one-of-the-few-success-stories-in-a-17-year-war/.
[43] Rebecca Zimmerman, Training Foreign Military Forces: Quality vs Quantity (War on the Rocks, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/07/training-foreign-military-forces-quality-vs-quantity/.
[44] Kate Clark, “Reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior: A way to ‘tilt’ the war?” (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2017), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/reforming-the-afghan-ministry-of-interior-a-way-to-tilt-the-war/.
[45] DoD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (2018), 43-45.
[46] Ibid., 37,39-40.
[47] Ibid., 40-41.