In 2019, The Strategy Bridge announced a writing contest on NATO at 70: The Past, Present, and Future of the Atlantic Alliance. Today, we’re pleased to present the third-place essay.
From the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the outset of the Cold War, the American approach to European efforts to establish independent defense institutions has ranged from initial rejection to qualified support. At the same time, periodic attempts to decrease European reliance on the United States have been a hallmark of European foreign policy, with varying success.[1] From the failed 1950s Pleven Plan for a European Army, to the post-Cold War St. Malo Declaration of 1998, the United States has been wary of any European defense efforts which might duplicate capabilities or detract from NATO’s role as the primary guarantor of collective security in Europe.[2] Reviewing these two historical cases can provide insights into how the United States should deal with more recent European efforts, from Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defense to France’s call for a European Army.[3] Based on a strategic assessment of current European efforts, the United States should take a pragmatic approach to non-NATO European defense institutions when they align with American interests and do not undermine NATO.
From the Pleven Plan of 1950 to Germany Joining NATO in 1955
With U.S. and United Nations forces preoccupied with stemming the tide of communist forces in Korea during the summer of 1950, NATO members were aware of the glaring imbalance of conventional forces in Europe. This imbalance was a remnant of the destruction left in Europe in the wake of World War II, demobilization of both Allied and German forces—and the failure of the Red Army to follow suit—and European, especially French, hesitancy to support German rearmament.[4]
The United States sought to capitalize on the shock of the Korean War by pressuring Europeans to contribute more to their own defense. Such an effort would occur under the political coordination of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the NATO command structure, which would be led by an American Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).[5] With American troops in Germany postured for occupation duty rather than external defense, military plans as late as 1949 had envisioned a fighting withdrawal west of the Rhine in the event of Soviet attack.[6] Realizing the prospect of abandoning the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to potential Soviet attack would have devastating impacts on German morale and their willingness to resist communist subversion, the United States demanded greater defense contributions from Europeans, cautiously advancing the idea of German rearmament.[7] Acknowledging that forward defense could only be realized by rearming the recently-defeated Germans, France’s leadership rushed a proposed solution.
Robert Schuman at the French embassy in Washington, after the signature of the treaty that created NATO, in April 1949. (Wikimedia)
The Schuman Plan—named for the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman—was a combined economic and military solution. It proposed a Franco-German coal and steel community as well as a European Army. The proposals for economic integration ultimately led to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1951; the proposals for a European Army followed a different trajectory.[8]
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson submitted a counter-proposal to Schuman’s European Army idea at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on September 9, 1950. Described as the Package Agreement, this counter-proposal hinged on convincing France, the most reluctant member of the Alliance, to agree to German rearmament.[9] The Package Agreement included the following stipulations, none of which had been coordinated with the FRG’s Chancellor Konrad Adenauer:
The NATO SACEUR should be an American.
The United States would increase its financial aid to Europe.
The United States would send more forces to Europe.
Allied forces would integrate Germany.[10]
Under this agreement, while German forces would be integrated into NATO, they would not be organized above division level and there would be no German General Staff.[11] To European leaders, the Package Agreement appeared to be a U.S. ultimatum. Either they accept German rearmament or they could forget the other elements. The discomfort this caused in Paris led to a counter-proposal.
French Premier René Pleven (Wikimedia)
French Premier René Pleven introduced his plan for a European Army in 1950. The key aspect of the Pleven Plan was that the European Army would be a military-economic entity under the existing political framework of the ECSC. It also proposed a European defense minister.[12] The plan would limit German contribution to regimental combat-team sized units and lower, with no German general staff.[13] The free countries of Western Europe would be invited to contribute to this European Army by providing integrated units at the lowest level. The French National Assembly approved of this approach, with the stipulation that this would not create a new national German Army. This contradiction was described as “rearm[ing] the Germans without rearming Germany.”[14]
Germany, as potentially the most impacted and least consulted party to the Pleven Plan, played its weak hand to advantage. As of 1950, the FRG had not yet regained full sovereignty.[15] Chancellor Adenauer also faced internal political opposition to the creation of the FRG as it implied reunification was hopeless. His political opponents already denounced him as a sell-out to the Allies for agreeing to participate in the ECSC. Adenauer, however, saw it as a necessary concession for greater sovereignty.[16]
Ironically, the greater the internal political opposition, the more Adenauer was able to press concessions from the Allies.[17] Adenauer accepted the Pleven Plan on its surface while shrewdly leveraging the Allies’ need for German participation. He demanded full sovereignty for the FRG, equal equipping and manning of German units, and German participation on Allied staffs—all of which Paris and Washington sought to preclude.
In contrast to France, who desired to link German rearmament to greater European economic and political consolidation, the United States did not regard the issues as mutually dependent.[18] The immediate reaction to the Pleven Plan was that it was completely impractical, both for its limits on German units and for its creation of a European Defense Minister, whose relationship with NATO political and military command structure would be confusing at best.[19]
Ultimately, Franco-American disagreement over the original Package Agreement and the Pleven Plan led the United States to separate the issue of German rearmament from the other three items. It was simply too important for the United States and its allies to establish the NATO command structure, under an American SACEUR, to allow it to be delayed by disagreements over German rearmament. Indeed, by December 1950 the NATO Council agreed to establish an integrated force, with General Dwight Eisenhower its first Supreme Commander.[20]
Eisenhower as SACEUR (NATO)
By early 1951, the United States had launched NATO with the appointment of a SACEUR and was willing to move forward on further European integration through a proposed European Defense Community (EDC).[21] Now the United States found itself in a position of promoting the benefits of European economic and political integration which it had previously dismissed as subordinate to military issues.[22] One glaring contradiction was the notion that the EDC, consisting of European soldiers, should fall under the command of SACEUR, an American. That General Eisenhower, who had stipulated he would never accept the position of SACEUR without a real prospect for command and control, would push for the EDC despite the European Army’s unclear command structure, is a measure of how far the United States had decided to promote the EDC project in hopes of some sort of agreement on German and European rearmament.[23]
However, by 1953 the strategic situation had changed. Eisenhower was President, Stalin was dead, and the Korean War ended with an armistice. The American defense policy shifted to its New Look, reviving nuclear deterrence with a policy of Massive Retaliation.[24] By May 1954, France had lost the battle of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, and the French National Assembly rejected the plan for the EDC on August 30, 1954.[25] The EDC’s demise ultimately paved the way for full sovereignty for the FRG and its integration into NATO. The FRG was formally admitted on May 5, 1955.[26]
Ultimately, the United States achieved its goal of greater European defense contributions, with German forces integrated directly under NATO. Yet France had also achieved its goals, to a degree, by delaying the military integration of Germany until it was more politically feasible. The American reaction to the Pleven Plan shows a blend of fortitude and pragmatism. Ultimately the United States achieved European military integration under NATO, but for a short period the United States was willing to entertain the notion of an EDC, albeit subordinate to NATO structure, to attain its ultimate policy goal of European participation in their own collective defense.
From St. Malo to Stability Operations in the Balkans
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the strategic environment for Europe and the United States. The original threat for which NATO had been organized was gone. European member states quickly began shedding the costly conventional forces they had fielded for decades to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion. After the 1991-92 Gulf War, the United States followed suit. Meanwhile Yugoslavia began a painful breakup that would lead to a decade-long civil war in the Balkans.
Anticipating its own identity crisis in the absence of the original Soviet threat, NATO published a Strategic Concept in 1991 acknowledging both the changing security environment and the opportunity for the Alliance to adopt out-of-area missions to enhance regional stability. This document proposed NATO alter its force size and posture to smaller expeditionary forces which could reinforce stability on NATO’s periphery, especially to its south.[27] Between 1990 and 1997, NATO force levels fell 25 percent; however, there was little in the way of restructuring to support expeditionary capabilities.[28]
Meanwhile, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (EU) and subsumed the European Economic Community (EEC) and its precursor, the ECSC. The deepest integration was economic, with a majority of EU members pledging to forego their own national monetary policy instruments by adopting a common currency, the Euro.[29] With foreign policy lagging behind economic integration, it would take until the Amsterdam Treaty of 1998 for the EU to establish the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[30]
In spite of these advances, the wars in the Balkans exposed Europe’s inability to resolve local regional conflicts without NATO intervention. Operating under UN mandate as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), European peacekeeping operations had achieved mixed results in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992. [31] France in particular, under President Francois Mitterrand, resisted any efforts to place the Bosnian mission under NATO operational command.[32] Without its own troops on the ground, the United States was hardly in a position to insist on the coercive use of NATO airpower, without the concurrence of UNPROFOR.
When Jacques Chirac replaced Mitterrand as France’s President in 1995, he pressed for a more robust mission in Bosnia, including a British-French-Dutch Rapid Reaction Force—yet still not under the auspices of NATO. He also pressed Washington to take a more active diplomatic approach.[33] Despite these changes, on July 11, 1995, Bosnian Serbs attacked the UN-protected enclave of Srebrenica, massacring an estimated 7,000 civilians.[34] This was the final catalyst for NATO to take action. NATO’s air campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, halted the civil war and led to the U.S.-brokered 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.
Srebrenica Genocide Memorial In Potocari, Bosnia (IslamiCity)
By 1998, ethnic tension and fighting was increasing in Kosovo, a province within Serbia. Against this backdrop, Britain and France signed the St. Malo Declaration at the EU conference in December 1998. This declaration called for the European Council to frame a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[35] The St. Malo Declaration aimed for the EU to have a defense capacity that could act both within, as well as autonomously from NATO.[36]
The immediate U.S. response to the St. Malo Declaration was to reject it. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright articulated U.S. policy through the “three D’s”: no Decoupling of European decision-making on defense from NATO; no Duplication of scarce resources between NATO and the EU; and no Discrimination against NATO members who are not also EU members.[37] The context was a decade in which the United States, in the wake of significant military reductions after the 1991 Gulf War, had felt compelled to assist Europeans to establish stability on their borders in Bosnia.
About six months after the St. Malo Declaration, the UN Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 to permit the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo.[38] While European diplomacy played a major role in convincing Serbian President Milosevic to accept terms, the United States provided the bulk of the air power and contributed ground forces for initial peacekeeping operations, again led by NATO.[39]
While the United States wanted Europeans to play a greater role in their own regional security, it cautioned against any initiatives which might detract from NATO’s leading role in that effort. By the April 1999 NATO Summit in Washington, NATO had agreed to allow greater EU access to NATO capabilities when the Alliance “as a whole was not engaged,” under provisions known as Berlin Plus—a reference to the 1996 NATO conference in Berlin.[40]
Two years after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Washington’s position towards ESDP began to change. With the nation’s focus on military operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. was eager for Europeans to take a larger role in the Balkans. Starting in 2003, the EU began deploying forces into the Balkans under Operation Concordia, and took over NATO’s SFOR mission while assuming peacekeeping responsibilities under Operation Althea in 2004.[41] The United States began to appreciate the growing ESDP capabilities, which freed up U.S. and NATO forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.[42] As with the earlier Pleven Plan, Washington’s initial rejection was tempered by the realization that both European and U.S. interests could be met by staunchly supporting NATO while pragmatically accepting greater European autonomy in the changing strategic environment.
From Crimea to Calls for Greater Strategic Autonomy
By 2014 the strategic context had changed again. The most significant change in Europe’s strategic security environment was the reemergence of Russia as a threat to security and stability on NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and support of Ukrainian separatists reawakened Europe’s focus on territorial integrity and collective defense. This has been especially true for the newest members of NATO and the EU in Eastern Europe.
NATO reacted swiftly to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, pledging at the September 2014 Summit in Wales that all member states would achieve 2% GDP spending on defense by 2024. Although the results varied by country, by 2017 overall NATO expenditures increased from 1.84% in 2015 to 4.87% in 2017.[43] NATO also took concrete steps to increase its readiness and force posture.[44] Through nationally-led exercises such as Operation Anakonda in Poland and NATO exercises such as Trident Juncture in Norway, the Baltic Sea, and North Atlantic, NATO reinvigorated its readiness for collective defense.[45]
Another change to the strategic environment came from the south and east. Unrest in the Middle East and Africa resulted in large refugee flows into Europe from across the Mediterranean and Bosporus. For European states, the flow of refugees fleeing North Africa and the civil war in Syria posed a new security challenge—one that NATO, with its focus on collective defense, has proven less well-equipped to handle than EU institutions that have either emerged or matured over the last decade.
As NATO adjusted to the new security environment, so did the EU. The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) for foreign and security policy called for “closer cooperation in security and defense” among member states. [46] Other EU efforts focused on synchronizing defense planning, funding, and procurement. These included the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), a Capability Development Plan (CDP), and European Defense Fund (EDF), all focused on synchronizing “defence planning cycles and capability development practices” among member states.[47] In response to increased migration from the south, the European Commission established the European Border and Coast Guard in October 2016, which included a rapid reaction pool of border guards and return specialists.[48]
Additionally, twenty-five European states entered a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): legally binding commitments focused on investing, developing, and procuring defense capabilities to “reinforce [the] EU’s strategic autonomy to act alone when necessary and with partners whenever possible….”[49] PESCO’s emphasis is on common acquisition from European defense contractors, but with mechanisms to include third party (non-EU) participants.[50] These combined EU initiatives envision greater autonomy for the EU in defense matters, including for those NATO members who also happen to be part of the EU.[51]
Outside the EU, European states have responded to domestic and regional political changes by proposing other forms of defense cooperation. In 2017 France published a Defence and National Security Strategic Review which specifically called for “building European strategic autonomy.”[52] Brexit, and the loss of the UK’s significant defense capabilities from the EU, may have contributed to French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal for a European Intervention Initiative (EII), which would include the UK.[53] By June 2018, nine European states had joined EII, which aims for a common budget and doctrine. [54] As PESCO is restricted to EU members, the French-proposed EII is a way to include militarily-capable European states who are not members of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).[55]
In response, the United States took a familiar approach of simultaneously criticizing European states for not doing enough for their own defense, while reassuring the NATO alliance. At the summer 2018 NATO meeting in Brussels, President Trump chastised NATO members for failing to attain their self-imposed goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense. [56] While criticizing Europeans for underinvesting in defense has been a common American theme since the start of the Alliance, President Trump’s remarks were unique for his failure, initially, to publicly reaffirm U.S. support of Article 5. The U.S. Senate quickly followed up with resolutions reaffirming America’s commitment. Meanwhile, American funding for and participation in exercises and defense preparations in Europe actually increased. For instance, the U.S. budget for the European Defense Initiative (EDI) supporting prepositioned equipment, rotational forces and exercises in Europe rose from $1B in 2015 to $6.5B requested for 2019.[57]
U.S. President Donald Trump arrives to the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on Wednesday, July 11, 2018. (Sean Kilpatrick/Canadian Press)
Perhaps the greatest skepticism has been directed at European efforts to establish an autonomous defense capability. In 2018 French President Emmanuel Macron resurrected the idea of a European Army. President Trump reacted negatively to the perceived slight when Macron mentioned that Europe might need to be able to defend itself from the United States—albeit in the cybersecurity realm.[58] Ironically, some observers claim President Trump’s skepticism may spur Europeans to pursue greater strategic autonomy.[59]
Conclusion
In spite of its legitimate concerns, the United States should pragmatically accept that Europe is seeking greater autonomy, and should support those aspects that align with American interests. As with the Pleven Plan and the St. Malo Declaration, the United States initially reacted by opposing recent European efforts to promote strategic autonomy. The failed Pleven Plan helped France meet its goal of delaying German military integration in the Alliance, while the United States achieved its objective of integrating Germany into Europe’s defense. Likewise, the St. Malo Declaration was initially rejected by the United States. After 9/11 the United States grew to appreciate the EU’s ability to relieve the burden of operations in its own region. [60] A similar mix of fortitude and pragmatism should apply today.
The United States should applaud when European states, either under the auspices of the EU’s CSDP or other multinational coalitions, conduct regional or out-of-area security operations that align with the strategic approach outlined in the National Defense Strategy.[61] Ultimately, a Europe that can enhance its own regional security and stability through military, economic, diplomatic, and judicial instruments, while more efficiently developing and procuring its military resources, aligns with U.S. interests. Such a security environment supports NATO’s focus on collective defense, as well as American ability to pursue its interests in other regions.
Robert Gleckler is a U.S. Army Strategist. A former Olmsted Scholar, COL Gleckler holds a Master’s in European Culture and Economy from the University of the Ruhr in Bochum, Germany as well as a BA in History from Towson University in Maryland. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, where he received the Army War College Foundation Award for an expanded version of this essay. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: NATO Flags (CNN)
Notes:
[1] Garey, Julie. "How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Seth A. Johnston. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017" Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 1 (2018): 281-83. doi:10.1017/s1537592717003401.
[2] Jonas, Manfred. The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, 291.
[3] "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - Factsheet." EEAS. Accessed July 1, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en; Jonas, Manfred. The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History, 291.
[4] Weigley, Russell. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973, 368.
[5] Oppen, Beate Ruhm Von. Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954. London: Oxford University Press, 1955, 517.
[6] Smith, Jean Edward., and Lucius Du Bignon. Clay. The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974, 679-680.
[7] McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971, 9.
[8] Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1998, 1084.
[9] Acheson, Dean Gooderham. Present at the Creation. New York, NY: Norton, 1969, 435-450; McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, 26-28, 44, 47.
[10] McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, 44.
[11] Ibid., 41-42.
[12] Ibid., 76.
[13] Jonas, Manfred. The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History, 291.
[14] McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, 65.
[15] Oppen, Beate Ruhm Von. Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954, 517.
[16] Jonas, Manfred. The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History, 288.
[17] McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, 71-72.
[18] Ibid., 63.
[19] Ibid., 76.
[20] Ibid., 87.
[21] Ibid., 96.
[22] United States. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1951. Vol. I and II. American Foreign Policy, 1950-55: Basic Documents. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957. 247.
[23] McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, 623-626.
[24] Weigley, Russell. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 401.
[25] Acheson, Dean Gooderham. Present at the Creation, 708; Ferrell, Robert H. America in a Divided World: 1945-1972; Cartography by John M. Hollingsworth. Columbia, SC: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1975, 53.
[26] Ferrell, Robert H. America in a Divided World: 1945-1972 ; Cartography by John M. Hollingsworth, 55.
[27] Johnsen, William Thomas. "NATO Strategy in the 1990s : Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?" Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, 16-17. Accessed September 25, 2018. nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsgpr&AN=edsgpr.000549635&site=eds-live&scope=site, 16-17.
[28] Ibid., 18.
[29] Hillison, Joel R. "The Relevance of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the United States in the 21st Century." Strategic Studies Institute, 2018, 25. Accessed October 25, 2018. http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3657.pdf.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Hoffmann, Stanley, and Charles G. Cogan. "The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (2002): 186. doi:10.2307/20033118.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ginsberg, Roy H. Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007, 301.
[42] Ibid., 371-372.
[43] "BURDEN SHARING DILEMMAS AND NATO'S TUMULTUOUS SUMMER." US Army War College War Room. September 21, 2018. Accessed September 27, 2018. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/natos-tumultuous-summer/.
[44] Ibid.
[45] "Key NATO & Allied Exercises in 2018." Accessed October 27, 2018. www.nato.int/factsheets.
[46] "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - Factsheet." EEAS. Accessed July 10, 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en; Rankin, Jennifer. "Jean-Claude Juncker’s Federalist Vision for the EU Is Far from Reality." The Guardian, September 13, 2017. Accessed October 25, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/13/jean-claude-junckers-federalist-vision-for-the-eu-is-far-from-reality.
[47] Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). November 29, 2017. Accessed July 12, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/36453/coordinated-annual-review-defence-card_en.
[48] "European Council 20-21 October 2016: European Border and Coast Guard- from Policy Decision to Operational Implementation." European Commission - European Commission. August 01, 2018. Accessed October 27, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/european-council-20-21-october-2016-european-border-and-coast-guard-policy-decision_en.
[49] Signatories included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - Factsheet." EEAS. October 28, 2018. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en.
[50] "FRANKEN-NATO: GIVING NEW LIFE TO AN OLD EUROPEAN DEFENSE AMBITION?" US Army War College War Room. May 31, 2019. Accessed July 10, 2019. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/franken-nato-giving-new-life-old-european-defense-ambition/.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Republic of France. Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017. October 2017. Accessed September 20, 2018. https:www.defense.gouv.fr/DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC REVIEW 2017-3.pdf.
[53] Witney, Nick. "Macron and the European Intervention Initiative: Erasmus for Soldiers?" ECFR. May 22, 2018. Accessed August 27, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_macron_and_the_european_intervention_initiative_erasmus_for_sold ; Lee, Katy. "EU Security Must No Longer Depend on US, Says Macron." Yahoo! News. August 27, 2018. Accessed August 27, 2018. https://news.yahoo.com/eu-security-must-no-longer-depend-us-says-111359202.html.
[54] PESCO members include France, the UK, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, Spain, and Portugal. Gorka, Alex. "The European Intervention Initiative: A New Military Force Established In Europe." Strategic-culture.org. June 27, 2018. Accessed October 10, 2018. , https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/06/27/the-european-intervention-initiative-a-new-military-force-established-in-europe.html.
[55] Witney, Nick. "Macron and the European Intervention Initiative: Erasmus for Soldiers?" ECFR. May 22, 2018. Accessed August 27, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_macron_and_the_european_intervention_initiative_erasmus_for_sold.
[56] "BURDEN SHARING DILEMMAS AND NATO'S TUMULTUOUS SUMMER." US Army War College War Room. September 21, 2018. Accessed September 27, 2018. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/natos-tumultuous-summer/.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Brown, David, and David Brown. "Trump Fights Macron's European Army over Words, Not Weapons." POLITICO. November 19, 2018. Accessed January 10, 2019. https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-fights-macrons-european-army-over-words-not-weapons-nato/.
[59] Dempsey, Judy. "Trump May Be Doing the European Union and NATO a Big Favor." The Washington Post. July 06, 2018. Accessed October 25, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/07/06/trump-may-be-doing-the-european-union-and-nato-a-big-favor/.
[60] Hoffmann, Stanley, and Charles G. Cogan. "The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (2002): 186. doi:10.2307/20033118.
[61] United States. Department of Defense Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Militarys Competitive Edge, 4.