The 2015 terror attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris and similar incidents have drawn the attention of European security agencies concerned about returning foreign fighters. While security agencies are trying to ascertain the severity of this threat, a substantial number of Muslim youth are on their way to the conflict areas of the Middle East. Some of them will return with the operational skills to resume their ideological battle in western countries. As a countermeasure, European countries must learn to identify and adopt necessary steps to prevent foreign fighter returnees that pose a threat to internal security back into society. The successful and timely detention of these individuals largely depends on coordination and cooperation among different law enforcement and intelligence agencies that share a sense of collective responsibility. To counter such a non-traditional security threat, security agencies must employ non-traditional tactics and pool their available resources for intelligence sharing.
The threat arises when individuals with combat skills and experience acquired in overseas conflict return to their native countries with an intent to threaten its national security. In particular, the situation worsens in regions with inadequate law enforcement.
There are several bilateral and multilateral agreements among nations to support inter- and intra-agency coordination and cooperation. There are also global security institutions such as United Nations Counter Terrorism Centre and its sister agencies such as United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force. However, many of these agencies continue to operate independently. This is apparent in the case of the United Nations Security Council designated Counter Terrorism Directorate and the United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, agencies with few operational partners within the European Union that have yet to begin meaningful interactions with NATO.
The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks (Center for European Policy Studies)
The question that must be faced is this: Can the EU manage its vast resources to maximise its information sharing with partner agencies and tighten its grip around radical Islamic factions returning to Europe? To answer this question and provide an appropriate response to various other underlying questions, we must better understand foreign fighter factions, their agenda, and their operational mechanism.
Foreign Fighter Returnees and the Perceived Threat
The term foreign fighters as defined by security agencies are certain individuals who, without any financial remuneration, engage in armed insurgency in foreign lands.[1] Another definition refers to foreign fighters as combatants, largely unpaid, with no inherent connection with the conflict except allegiance to different aspects of religious identity and the associated psychology.[2] A threat arises when individuals with combat skills and experience acquired in overseas conflict return to their native countries with an intent to threaten its national security. In particular, the situation worsens in regions with inadequate law enforcement. This can be seen across European countries such as Kosovo, Belgium, and Denmark.[3] Even though the actual number of such individuals is hard to ascertain, some accounts estimate that between 4,700 to 5,000 have traveled from France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to join the current conflict in Syria and Iraq.[4]
Assessing the Threat of Foreign Fighter Returnees
While the perceived threat is subject to the idiosyncrasies of each state’s decision makers, it has many common undertones. There are cases where citizens leaving their homeland for overseas conflict have less or no desire to return home, while others chose to stay in those conflict regions to avoid prosecution by law enforcement agencies. Some individuals may or may not be prone to violence outside of the context of the conflict in which they are participating. These individuals are motivated by the idea of assisting those oppressed under a political regime which they believe can be successfully contested.[5] Further, from an operational point of view, many foreign fighters are either killed in combat, often by participating in suicide missions.[6] The number of foreign fighters killed in combat stands at roughly 20% of the total number who traveled to Syria and Iraq.[7] The U.S. Department of State puts the flow of foreign fighters in Syria at over 40,000, from more than 100 countries; a staggering number when compared to the examples of Afghanistan and Iraq.[8]
Combat experience is a concern particularly for lone wolf attacks, especially when radicalisation intersects with the leverage provided by social media networks.
The perceived threat also arises out of the radicalisation of foreign fighters. This radicalisation is in part facilitated and accelerated by the experience of combat. However, many foreign fighters find the realities of combat contrary to what their recruiters led them to believe when they were approached and recruited on social media or other platforms.[9] Some foreign fighters, especially those from western countries, draw the suspicion of their counterparts and many have restrictions placed on them by the local leadership in an attempt to check the leaking of information to intelligence agencies, and western volunteers are often tasked with menial, non-combat jobs.
To understand the nature of the threat and its significance, policymakers must consider that a foreign fighter returnee with combat experience plausibly has the ability to conduct an effective attack and inflict substantial damage. Combat experience is a concern particularly for lone wolf attacks, especially when radicalisation intersects with the leverage provided by social media networks.[10] Radical Islamic organizations such as Al Qaeda and Al Nusra Front perceive Western countries and their liberal philosophy as a strategic enemy. Their desire to perpetrate locally inspired attacks is demonstrated in online journals and texts published by Al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations calling for attacks on various Western cities.[11]
Reviving Inter-Intra Agency Trust and Cooperation
Some European countries have made progress in addressing the issue of foreign fighter returnees. Developments include the bolstering of law enforcement agencies, border security, and community-policing organizations, as well as new legal procedures that include the imposition of criminal charges for traveling to conflict zones, sharper enactment of counter-terror laws, and establishing de-radicalisation initiatives.[12] Additionally, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 has empowered member nations to tighten their border security by lending support to state laws designed to prevent the use of fraudulent travel documents. The resolution also tasked sovereign member states to strengthen their screening mechanisms to identify and apprehend foreign fighter returnees. Finally, the resolution also calls for a focus on community policing and community-focused assistance programs.[13] Despite having adequate funds and human resources available, these tools remain unused due to low levels of international coordination and affinity for states to work within their own comfort zones.[14]
There is still a need to assess and analyse actionable intelligence in addition to managing daily inputs from disparate domestic, national, or international security organizations. One way to achieve this coordination is through the establishment of a dedicated intelligence unit for NATO.
That said, the European Union has achieved modest progress towards countering the foreign fighter threat. The first development came in 2014 and addressed the security challenge on two fronts. First, the European Union modified the guidelines to strengthen judicial and law enforcement assistance mechanisms and passenger record systems to enhance the intra-agency coordination among its various agencies.[15] Secondly, the European Union was successful in developing a strategy to counter the threat from foreign fighter returnees. This progress was largely focused on streamlining the exchange of information supported by a counter-extremism strategy to disrupt foreign fighter recruitment and develop new legal mechanisms to apprehend foreign fighters entering member state.[16] A year later, in 2015, the European Union developed a five-year security strategy that covered both internal and external security initiatives, and stressed intra-agency cooperation and coordination.[17] This strategy aimed at setting up a dedicated counter-terrorism centre for cooperation between European Union and private information technology enterprises while increasing funds to strengthen the passenger record system.[18] Similarly, NATO emphasized cooperation and coordination between international and intra-national agencies across four primary levels, which included counter-terrorism, tactical operations centres, and military cooperation in its policy paper NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.[19]
The importance of alliances (Heritage Foundation)
However, despite these gains, there is still a need to assess and analyse actionable intelligence in addition to managing daily inputs from disparate domestic, national, or international security organizations. One way to achieve this coordination is through the establishment of a dedicated intelligence unit for NATO. Unfortunately, positive developments in this effort, such as the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit established by NATO in 2003, have suffered due to political concerns about sharing information across organizational and national boundaries. The Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit has continued to face challenges in disseminating intelligence and also struggled to maintain a steady flow of information. Even though it interacts with foreign intelligence agencies it has failed to assess their inputs effectively. Some of the challenges faced by the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit include the following:[20]
a) The intelligence sharing structure in Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit is ambiguous and unable to process and disseminate intelligence specific to an operation.[21]
b) The organizational structure of the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit remains indifferent to in-house flow of information.[22]
c) Interaction among intelligence officials and the leadership remains stove-piped, while their exchange with partner agencies is inadequate and intermittent.[23]
d) Intelligence sharing is largely limited to military engagements and is absent in the cases of civil-law enforcement and domestic security agencies.[24]
On 21 October 2016, a dedicated office was created by NATO with the post of Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, with a task to further strengthen exchange of information among its partners. The information sharing mechanisms that exist between the law enforcement agencies of European Union nations and non-partner countries such as United States, are limited. The European Union must take confidence-building measures to further strengthen inter-state and inter-agency collaboration.[25] Taking into account, the example of NATO’s Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit structure, which lacks a dedicated operational command for intelligence collection and dissemination, the European Union must establish a dedicated intelligence institution which incorporates the lessons learned from the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit. The preference for applying traditional counter-terror and intelligence operations in a non-traditional, domestic environment remains a challenge for the European Union. This apparent lack of trust continues to create a communication gap with their foreign counterparts.[26] While the challenges will continue to exist, policymakers must concentrate on developing confidence-building measures to strengthen information exchange among their partners to counter any threat posed by returning foreign fighters.
A moment of silence on the Place de la République, following the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris (Wikimedia)
Anant Mishra is a security analyst with expertise in counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations.
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Header Image: ISIS militants are seen near the Mosul Dam in northern Iraq in an image taken from a video posted online before Iraqi and Kurdish forces reclaimed the key site with the help of U.S. airstrikes. (CBSNews)
Notes:
[1] Weimann, Gabriel. 2016. Foreign Fighters under International Law. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-099-2.
[2] Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” International Security 35 (3): 53–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023.
[3] Clapper, James C. 2013. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Peter R. Neumann. 2015. “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s.” www.icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/, Adrian Shtuni. 2015. “Ethnic Albanian Fighters in Iraq and Syria.” CTC Sentinel 4 (8): 11–14.
[4] Techastro, E. (2017) Russia Named Top Source of Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Retrieved 9 May 2018, from: https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-named-top-source-of-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-59380.
[5] Qureshi, Asim. 2014. “Blowback: Foreign Fighters and the Threat They Pose.” CAGE, 8–9.
[6] Barak Mendelsohn. 2011. “Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends.” Orbis 55 (2): 189–202, Mary Anne Weaver. 2015. “Her Majesty’s Jihadists.” New York Times Magazine, April 2015.
[7] Byman, Daniel. 2015. “What Do the Paris Attacks Tell Us about Foreign Fighters?” The Washington Post, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/16/what-do-the-paris-attacks-tell-us-about-foreign-fighters/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5f354f8f2f06.
[8] Rasmussen, Nicholas J. 2015. “Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror.” http://www.docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150211/102901/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-RasmussenN-20150211.pdf.
[9] Shiraz Maher and Peter R. Neumann. 2014. “Boris Johnson’s Proposal for British Fighters in Syria and Iraq Is Dangerous and Counterproductive.” The Independent (UK), August 26, 2014. www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/boris-johnsons-proposal-for-british-fighters-in-syria-andiraq-is-dangerous-and-counterproductive-9692303.html. Moreover, the comments were made by a senior U.S. intelligence analyst on foreign fighter threat, during an unintentional discussion, November, 2016.
[10] Michael Steinbach, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2015. “Official Statement before the House Committee on Homeland Security.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2015. www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-urgent-threat-of-foreign-fighters-and-homegrown-terror
[11] Joshi, Priya. 2015. “Charlie Hebdo Paris Shooting: MI5 Head Warns Al-Qaeda Are Now Plotting ‘Large Scale Massacre.” International Business Times, January 9, 2015. www.ibtimes.co.uk/mi5-head-warns-al-qaeda-are-plotting-large-scale-massacre-britain-1482583, Lazar Berman. 2014. “Al-Qaeda Magazine: Strike NY, DC with Car Bombs,” The Times of Israel.” The Times of Israel, March 19, 2014. www.timesofisrael.com/al-qaeda-magazine-strike-ny-dc-with-car-bombs/.
[12] P Bąkowski, L Puccio. 2015. “Foreign Fighters: Member States’ Responses and EU Action in an International Context.” Brussels.
[13] UN Security Council. 2014. “UN Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014).” www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%282014%29.
[14] Teemu Sinkkonen. 2015. “War on Two Fronts: The EU Perspective on the Foreign Terrorist Fighters of ISIL.” The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 3.
[15] EU. 2014. “Conclusions of the European Council Meeting.” In Conclusions of the European Council Meeting EUCO 79/14. European Council. www.data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-79-2014-INIT/en/pdf.
[16] General Secretariat of the Council. 2015. “Outline of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Syria and Iraq.” In Outline of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Syria and Iraq, with Particular Focus on Foreign Fighters,” 5369/15. European Council. www.data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5369-2015-INIT/en/pdf.
[17] Suzanne Lynch. 2015. “EU Reveals New Five-Year Strategy to Combat Terrorism.” The Irish Times, April 29, 2015.
[18] Council of the European Union. 2017. “Regulating the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data.” Council of the European Union, 2017. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/.
[19] International Military Staff. 2011. “NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.” www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69482.htm.
[20] NATO. n.d. “Intelligence/Information Sharing in Combating Terrorism.” http://www.natolibguides.info/intelligence#s-lg-box-14472307.
[21] Ballast, Jan. n.d. “Trust (in) NATO: The Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance.” 2017. www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/aaa972b2-8bdb-4a4b-a011-86612394f76b/pdf.
[22] Ballast, Jan. n.d. “Trust (in) NATO: The Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance.” 2017. www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/aaa972b2-8bdb-4a4b-a011-86612394f76b/pdf.
[23] Ballast, Jan. n.d. “Trust (in) NATO: The Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance.” 2017. www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/aaa972b2-8bdb-4a4b-a011-86612394f76b/pdf.
[24] Ballast, Jan. n.d. “Trust (in) NATO: The Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance.” 2017. www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/aaa972b2-8bdb-4a4b-a011-86612394f76b/pdf.
[25] Nevers, Renée de. n.d. “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era.” International Security 31 (4): 34–66. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.34, Reveron, Derek S. 2006. “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror.” Orbis 3: 453–68.
[26] Anton Troianovski. 2015. “Germany Halts Some Intelligence Sharing With US,” The Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2015. www.wsj.com/articles/germany-restricts-some-data-sharing-with-us-1431021158