Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

U.S. Army

#Reviewing The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen

#Reviewing The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen

The subject of John W. Lemza’s scholarly study The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen is a U.S. Army-produced documentary television series called The Big Picture that ran from 1951-1971 on network, local, and educational stations, as well as on the Armed Forces Network of overseas stations. Lemza’s study is relevant to our own era in which a gaping civil-military divide separates the American public from the military, and in which the military largely fails to communicate a compelling appreciation of its goals, virtues, and activities.

#Reviewing: Mud Soldiers: Life in the New American Army

#Reviewing: Mud Soldiers: Life in the New American Army

Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army is an examination of the post-Vietnam U.S. Army and the pre-Gulf War Army. It serves as an excellent supplement to recent works on the AVF by authors like Beth Bailey, Bernard Rostker, and William A. Taylor. Author George C. Wilson writes a broad study of Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (2-16), 1st Infantry Division spanning two generations of soldiers.

Paying for Tomorrow’s Readiness with Today’s

Paying for Tomorrow’s Readiness with Today’s

As the ground force provider with constant missions, the United States Army has, post-WWII, attempted to maintain readiness while it modernized simultaneously and in-stride. However, the force the U.S. Army wants to field in the future is transformational and therefore requires a more deliberate approach. The U.S. Army must determine not only how and when to modernize, but also how to mitigate the cost of modernization.

Marketing Land Power: Lessons from the Atomic Army to the Present

Marketing Land Power: Lessons from the Atomic Army to the Present

Marketing of the U.S. Army going forward should focus less on recruiting young Americans and more on promoting the Army as a critical component of national defense, necessary to support the country’s international interests. The focus, then, would turn from marketing the U.S. Army to high-school students and toward shaping a narrative appropriate for key decision-makers in Congress.

The Weaker Foe – Part 3: Transforming to Win Future Wars

The Weaker Foe – Part 3: Transforming to Win Future Wars

For the past several decades the Army has promoted agile and adaptive leadership. This type of leadership is good when you are the strongest Army in the world and you’re focused on rapidly adapting to dynamic situations during operations. However, an entirely different type of leadership is necessary if you intend to transform the organization from the way it is today to the way you want it to be in the future. In the years ahead our Army needs transformational leaders who will shape our culture to one that demonstrates cunning, embraces asymmetry, generates unforeseen problems, and takes risks in order to win decisively.