The United States is entering a new phase in the era of great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The stakes remain high as the Biden administration has taken the reins from the outgoing Trump administration. Some speculate that the prospect of war between Washington and Beijing is “frighteningly real” at any moment.[1] Beijing may lunge for geopolitical gain in Taiwan while ultranationalists within the Chinese Communist Party seek a more aggressive and pointed foreign policy.[2] Despite the previous National Security Strategy’s prioritization of China, it is unknown what role China will play in the next national strategy currently under draft.[3] China looms large so it is critical to fully appreciate what assumptions guide that new document's strategic formulation, especially if it is premised on conventional wisdom. In that case, those assumptions may need to be reevaluated.

Previous Conventional Wisdom on China Was Unsuccessful; What Has Changed?

Since the 1970s, conventional wisdom assumed that consistent diplomatic engagement, economic investment, and political recognition would thrust the People’s Republic of China onto a more liberal and democratic trajectory. If the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 was not a wake-up call, it should now be clear that trying to mold China into a “responsible stakeholder” has proven unsuccessful.[4] “Coupling” with China after more than 40 years has failed, and there is much hand wringing over the presumptions that undergird that strategy. Now numerous strategic proposals vie for policymakers’ attention from Envelopment to Competitive Co-Existence to Cooperative Rivalry to Constrainment and a refresh of Containment theory along with allusions to a second Cold War.[5] Some strategies seek to operationalize specific actions on China, such as focusing on countering malign Chinese behavior.[6] Yet these strategies gloss over or miss the prospect of a leadership transition in China or the seismic cracks in American politics; both of which are important. Ostensibly, some choice items from this menu of strategies will likely inform the next national security strategy.

Looking back to the Cold War, most analyses, including American intelligence estimates, underappreciated the systemic weakness of the Soviet Union before the precipitous fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

More pointedly, these strategies share many of the same core assumptions on China. For example, the Hold the Line strategy assumes Chinese influence and power will begin to unwind by 2035 as “demographic decline, debt overload, and societal expectations" take hold.[7] If only such rosy presumptions were correct. On the contrary, a broader analysis and understanding of recent Chinese history at best crushes these assumptions or, at worst, questions their fundamental validity.

Before the U.S. embarks on a new, multi-decade strategy and bakes these assumptions into a new national security strategy, it may be worth recalling other strategic assumptions that went bust. Over the last two decades, faulty assumptions bedeviled U.S. national security policies from ephemeral nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan to navigating internecine conflicts in Libya and Syria to reigning in Iran’s nuclear ambitions or ‘resetting’ relations with Russia.[8] Looking back to the Cold War, most analyses, including American intelligence estimates, underappreciated the systemic weakness of the Soviet Union before the precipitous fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Demographic decline may not necessarily augur a weaker China.

Currently, many over-appreciate systemic weaknesses in China linked to demographic decline, debt, and large migrant populations, among other issues, as signs of distress. Today, strategic analyses miss a possible leadership transition in China or gloss over the domestic fissures in American society. Therefore, it is critically important, now more than ever, to question conventional strategic assumptions and logic. Otherwise, the U.S. will be caught by surprise and face utter disappointment with its China policy once again in the not-too-distant future.

Demographic Decline Will Not Be a Limiting Factor

One line of conventional thought is that China will get old before it gets rich.[[9]] Some strategies, like Hold the Line, highlight the catastrophic demographic decline that beset Japan to extrapolate out a future Chinese plight. Others point to Russia’s experience to portray a dire picture of demographic decline that permeates all strata of society.[10] But demographics may not be a critical factor for a country as populous as China or for a population that has exhibited resilience in the face of multiple tragedies and depravations. Demographic decline may not necessarily augur a weaker China.

…the Chinese population may well absorb the adverse effects in the furtherance of other, more important national priorities, such as maintaining the rule of the Chinese Communist Party or challenging the U.S.

On the contrary, the Chinese people's recent history indicates an alternate narrative - one of enduring astronomical loss and hardship in the pursuit of broader national goals by the Chinese Communist Party. Famine wiped out tens of millions of Chinese during collectivization and the failed Great Leap Forward.[11] As China entered the Korean War, it threw hundreds of thousands of military “volunteers” against the U.S. and NATO forces, resulting in a stalemate.[12] Millions more perished during various purges and the internecine conflict that marked the Cultural Revolution.[13] And since 1984, it is estimated that the One-Child Policy terminated over 400 million births.[14] The point is that population count matters. Demographic decline matters too. But the Chinese population may well absorb the adverse effects in the furtherance of other, more important national priorities, such as maintaining the rule of the Chinese Communist Party or challenging the U.S. China will still have more than 100 million military-age males for the next few decades, if the need arises.[15]

Debt Is High Everywhere, Not Just in China

A second assumption is that China faces an impending economic reckoning. Indeed, China may be in financial hot water. As of July 2020, Chinese debt as a percent of gross domestic product ballooned to a record 331 percent, which means that China exceeded the total value of goods produced and services provided by a factor of over three times.[16] For comparison, the United States’ ratio is around one-third of that at 128 percent.[17] But debt burden is now a global phenomenon that is not only constrained to China. The international ratio for all nations surpassed 330 percent or $258 trillion in 2020.[18] Unsustainable debt already contributed to the national defaults of Zambia, Lebanon, and Venezuela in 2020.[19] This list will likely grow as other nations, stretched thin by the pandemic, begin to fail. If China falls into an economic tailspin, it will not do so in isolation. It will more than likely trigger a larger global decline as Chinese investment abroad shrinks and Chinese producers and consumers pull back.[20]

…the social contract, to the extent that one exists in China, binds the Chinese Communist Party more and more to its citizens' desires and well-being.

An economically hobbled China may not necessarily translate into a dramatically weakened China, at least as far as prioritizing its national security goals, for many reasons. First, consider that China continued its military build-up in the face of economic headwinds after the American financial crisis in 2008 and China's own domestic stock market crash in 2015. Second, in the face of broad economic concerns such as the growing real estate bubble, collapsing state-owned enterprises, and growing defaults in its bond market, China has doubled down on new military modernization goals by 2027.[21] Meanwhile, record-high American defense budgets may become unsustainable as the U.S. chalked-up over $3.1 trillion in stimulus relief for the pandemic in 2020.[22]

Suppose the Biden administration takes serious action on the debt, deficit, or reallocates funding to other areas within the U.S. government, such as coronavirus relief. This would likely put downward pressure on the future U.S. national security budget. Finally, Chinese Communist Party officials may dial-up, or down, nationalistic sentiment in response to economic stressors. The Chinese Communist Party has proven adept at seizing opportunities to present and promote a sense of shared national sacrifice and solidarity even as conditions deteriorate.[23] For example, the domestic and global narrative for China's coronavirus response and “Mask-Diplomacy” highlight this very capability.[24] It is reasonable to believe that similar methods will leverage nationalism in future contingencies, such as economic malaise.

Chinese Citizens Do Expect More, But Nationalism Trumps

Another conventional presumption is that China's societal expectations rise in tandem with economic prosperity. Purportedly, these expectations spur a more liberal Chinese government, triggering the collapse or replacement of the Chinese Communist Party. Moreover, the social contract, to the extent that one exists in China, binds the Chinese Communist Party more and more to its citizens' desires and well-being. This presumption mirrors the strategic logic behind the broad engagement with China over eight American presidential administrations. But facts in China tell a different story. The Chinese Communist Party is more emboldened and enjoys broader support than at any previous point, even as it exercises a ‘controlocracy’ over its citizens and revises the social contract.[25]

Chinese expectations rose dramatically after a generation of sustained economic growth.[26] However, there is no reason to assume Chinese citizens’ social expectations to challenge or impede the ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party in the future. Instead, they may even support the Chinese Communist Party on multiple grounds. First, research suggests Chinese citizens are more enthralled with their leadership than ever before, even amid a pandemic.[27] Furthermore, the groundswell of jingoistic or nationalist sentiment crowds out, counters, or shuts-downs divergent or 'counter-revolutionary’—to borrow a phrase from the Cultural Revolution period—points of view.[28] Additionally, the relative freedom to speak critically of the regime remains a privilege, not a right.[29] Second, the Chinese Communist Party is not afraid to crush the expectations of even its better-to-do and privileged citizens, just as it did to its students in Tiananmen in 1989. Recently, Chinese authorities reigned in billionaires Jack Ma, over his critique of government financial regulators, and Ren Ziqiang for his derisive comments about General Secretary Xi’s handling of the pandemic.[30]

If globally recognized billionaires succumb to the will of the Chinese Communist Party, so can the average citizen. Third, China is building a slew of capabilities and capacities to better monitor and control its population.[31] The convergence of invasive and extreme authoritarian and digital censorship measures, like the social credit system in development, proliferates and is ominously labeled by the U.S. government and Western media as “digital authoritarianism,” "digital dictatorship,” or the “new panopticon.”[32] Ultimately, these means enhance Chinese authorities' ability to curate content, control information, and stifle dissent. The cumulative effect of these factors overwhelmingly points to a more supportive, submissive, or cowed Chinese population by 2035.

Neither solidarity among Hong Kongers nor protests by ethnic Mongolians was enough to stem Beijing's encroachment in 2020.

The revisions of the social contract by the Chinese Communist Party offers another example of how the party bends social expectations to its will. The contract, too, is amorphous as recent actions suggest the Party can revise the social contract at any point to suit national political, social, and economic necessities. In 2018, General Secretary Xi made a pointed political move by shelving term limits for himself, crushing expectations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. In Hong Kong, China broke long-standing hopes regarding legal and democratic norms, generating condemnation from Hong Kong citizens and the global community. Cultural and education laws now strip ethnic minorities of previously enjoyed freedoms to practice language and religion as manifested in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.[33] This is in sharp contrast to the relative freedom many of these ethnic communities enjoyed for years. Finally, long-standing entitlement and benefit programs face a similar fate. For example, draft laws under review include raising the Chinese retirement age to save trillions of dollars.[34]

Each of these actions triggered dissent and ridicule by some aggrieved Chinese citizens that continues to persist in some quarters. Suffice to say, outbursts of frustration by the Chinese people will persist, as they do daily.[35] They may increase in frequency and spread nationally in the future. However, this same dissent may not reach a critical mass to topple or significantly weaken the Chinese Communist Party to such a degree as some surmise. Neither solidarity among Hong Kongers nor protests by ethnic Mongolians was enough to stem Beijing's encroachment in 2020. In total, China watchers should not underestimate the power of the Chinese Communist Party to control its population even more than it does now, has in the past, or will in the future.

Chinese Leadership Transition: An Outlier

Strikingly, one assumption that many strategies are silent on is who will lead China in the future. At the moment, General Secretary Xi Jinping has not designated a political heir, which may undoubtedly change. For example, General Secretary Xi Jinping will be 74 years old in 2027, a date which aligns with new Chinese military modernization goals. While speculative, there may be a different Party leader by 2027 or sooner. But it is just as plausible that there will not. The previous General Secretary Jiang Zemin turned over leadership in 2012 at the age of 70. And Chairman Mao Zedong ruled until the age of 83. On Mao’s death in 1976, Chinese politics plunged into a high-stakes power grab by those seeking to steer not only the destiny of the Chinese Communist Party but also the Chinese state. Hopefully, a similar situation will not reoccur.

…in the event of a leadership transition, purges or large-scale internal strife, such as a Second Cultural Revolution, are not improbable.

But in the event of a leadership transition, purges or large-scale internal strife, such as a Second Cultural Revolution, are not improbable. Even so, the regime may still maintain control in such a circumstance. Perhaps such an incident may rehabilitate the regime and elevate it to a more consolidated position of strength vis-à-vis the U.S. Unfortunately, most strategies do not address this profound possibility. But this is not the only concerning gap in strategic logic. Sustained American political consensus on China is another underappreciated assumption.

American Political Wild Card

There are profound social, economic, and political fissures that exist in America which may impair any future strategy, even if there is currently relative bipartisan support on China. The storming of the U.S. Capitol in January of 2021, and the protests which preceded it during the summer of 2020, show the deep divisions roiling America’s social fabric. Unless remedied, these fractures will become more apparent as the lingering effects of COVID bear down. The American political system was struck by the Occupy Movement on one side and the Tea Party movement on the other in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse. It is unknown what the social, economic, and political fallout from the 2020 stimulus packages, six times the magnitude of the Temporary Asset Relief Program in 2008, will be, especially given the hyperpolarized and politicized environment that exists in Washington.[36]

The storming of the U.S. Capitol in January of 2021, and the protests which preceded it during the summer of 2020, show the deep divisions roiling America’s social fabric.

Additionally, there is the specter that polarization may divide American political consensus over whether Russia or China is the preeminent threat.[37] Disunity over prioritization may conceivably lead to foreign policy deadlock. Timing is critical, and there may be a limited window of opportunity for implementation.[38] On the contrary, America cannot 'bide its time' as China did until recently.[39] For the Biden administration to craft and enact a new, long-term strategic approach to China, it will require sustained bipartisan support. It will then take concerted political stamina to carry out that strategy.

Assumptions Are Everything in Strategy

Strategic assumptions overly focused on demographics, economics, and societal expectations, but missing other looming issues like a Chinese leadership transition or American domestic politics are troubling. Further examination of each of these assumptions is needed. No strategy is without risk, but to frame the next few years or longer on these assumptions is hazardous. That is not to say that these strategies or their logic collectively should be shelved. Quite the opposite, these strategies provide a variety of thoughtful analyses and commentaries on a pressing and much-needed debate over the future of American national security strategy vis-à-vis China. Policymakers and strategists should seek a positive, reciprocal, and mutually beneficial relationship with China to the extent that one is achievable.

…the U.S. must get its strategic suppositions with China right…

As some strategies elucidate, it is worthwhile to leverage a slew of whole-of-government responses in order to impose costs or confront unacceptable Chinese behavior. And pursuing ideas like a novel “defensive diplomacy” with like-minded nations may very well alleviate friction points leading to confrontation or even conflict.[40] But the U.S. must get its strategic suppositions with China right in any new national security strategy given the trail of U.S. strategic missteps premised on faulty assumptions, in southwest Asia and elsewhere. If it does not, the U.S. will be disappointed once again at some future point when the stakes may be much higher.

Wilson VornDick is a China Aerospace Studies Institute Associate, RANE Network Analyst, and Duco Expert on China. He is also an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Xi Tang, Jiading District, Shanghai, China, (Manos Koutras).

Notes:

[1] Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “Competition with China Could Be Short and Sharp,” Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-12-17/competition-china-could-be-short-and-sharp.

[2] Chris Buckley, “China’s Combative Nationalists See a World Turning Their Way,” The New York Times, December 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/world/asia/china-nationalists-covid.html.

[3] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2017).

[4] Evan Feigenbaum, “China as a Responsible Stakeholder? A Decade Later,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/03/23/china-as-responsible-stakeholder-decade-later-pub-63115.

[5] Wilson VornDick, “America Must Have a Grander Strategy for China,” The National Interest, March 16, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-must-have-grander-strategy-china-133677; Andrew Erickson, “Make China Great Again: Xi’s Truly Grand Strategy,” War on the Rocks, October 30, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/make-china-great-again-xis-truly-grand-strategy/; Li Huiru and Li Xiaohua, "China, U.S. Not in 'Cold War', but Cooperative Rivalry," Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, January 11, 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/china-us-not-cold-war-cooperative-rivalry; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the "Constrainment" of China," International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 107-35, accessed January 22, 2021, https://doi:10.2307/2539044; Ravi Velloor, “Containment 2.0 - with China in the crosshairs,” The Strait Times, October 12, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/containment-20-with-china-in-the-crosshairs; Amy Zegart, “The Race for Big Ideas Is On,” The Atlantic, January 13, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/end-simple-foreign-policy-tropes/604783/.

[6] Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold the Line through 2035: A Strategy to Offset China’s Revisionist Actions and Sustain a Rules-Based Order in the Asia-Pacific,” Rice University Baker Institute for Public Policy, November 12, 2020, https://doi.org/10.25613/4fzk-1v17; Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “Into the danger zone: The coming crisis in US-China relations,” American Enterprise Institute, January 4, 2021, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/into-the-danger-zone-the-coming-crisis-in-us-china-relations/.

[7] Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold the Line through 2035,” 3.

[8] Daniel Runde and Conor Savoy, “Nation Building by Any Other Name,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 23, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nation-building-any-other-name; Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-Russia Relations: “Reset” Fact Sheet,” The White House, June 24, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet.

[9] “China’s median age will soon overtake America’s,” The Economist, October 31, 2019, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/10/31/chinas-median-age-will-soon-overtake-americas.

[10] Lilya Palveleva and Robert Coalson, “Echoes Of War And Collapse: Russia's Demographic Decline As Small 1990s Generation Comes Of Age,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 12, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-demographic-data-dip-as-small-1990s-generation-comes-of-age/30373049.html.

[11] Tania Branigan, “China's Great Famine: the true story,” The Guardian, January 1, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/01/china-great-famine-book-tombstone.

[12] “The Korean War,” U.S. Army Center of Military History, accessed January 21, 2021, https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/korea/intro/index.html.

[13] World Peace Foundation, “China: The Cultural Revolution,” Tufts University Fletcher School, December 14, 2016, https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/.

[14] Justin Parkinson, “Five numbers that sum up China's one-child policy,” BBC News Magazine, October 29, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34666440.

[15] “China’s demographic future has a big problem,” South China Morning Post, December 6, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2052220/chinas-demographic-future-has-big-problem.

[16] Emre Tiftik, Khadija Mahmood, and Sonja Gibbs, “Global Debt Monitor Sharp spike in debt ratios,” Institute of International Finance, July 16, 2020, https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/Research/Global%20Debt%20Monitor_July2020.pdf.

[17] U.S. Office of Management and Budget and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, December 22, 2020, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S.

[18] Andrea Shalal, “Global debt hits record high of 331% of GDP in first quarter: IIF,” Reuters, July 16, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-debt-iif/global-debt-hits-record-high-of-331-of-gdp-in-first-quarter-iif-idUSKCN24H1V5.

[19] Elliot Smith, “Zambia becomes Africa’s first coronavirus-era default: What happens now?,” CNBC News, November 23, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/zambia-becomes-africas-first-coronavirus-era-default-what-happens-now.html; “For the first time, Lebanon defaults on its debts,” The Economist, March 12, 2020, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/03/12/for-the-first-time-lebanon-defaults-on-its-debts; Ben Bartenstein, “Venezuela Defaults on Its Last Bond, Setting Up Legal Showdown,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-28/venezuela-defaults-on-its-last-bond-setting-up-legal-showdown.

[20] China Power, “Does China Dominate Global Investment?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed January 21, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/.

[21] Katsuji Nakazawa, “Analysis: Xi floats 2027 as new milestone year,” Nikkei Asia, December 10, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Xi-floats-2027-as-new-milestone-year; Stella Yifan Xie and Mike Bird, “The $52 Trillion Bubble: China Grapples With Epic Property Boom,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-property-real-estate-boom-covid-pandemic-bubble-11594908517; Anjani Trivedi, “Bankruptcy Is Exactly What China Needs,” Bloomberg, December 2, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-02/china-puts-new-bankruptcy-muscle-into-cleanup-of-state-led-firms; Rebecca Choong Wilkins and Molly Dai, “The Ticking Debt Bomb in China’s $15 Trillion Bond Market,” Bloomberg, January 13, 2021, "https://www.bloomberg.com/news/storythreads/2020-12-03/the-ticking-debt-bomb-in-china-s-15-trillion-bond-market.

[22] “DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Proposal,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 12, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1782623/dod-releases-fiscal-year-2020-budget-proposal/; Jeff Stein and Andrew Van Dam, ”U.S. budget deficit breached $3.1 trillion in 2020 as pandemic slammed economy,” Washington Post, October 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/10/16/2020-budget-deficit-coronavirus/.

[23] “China Sacrifices a Province to Save the World From Coronavirus,” Bloomberg, February 5, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-05/china-sacrifices-a-province-to-save-the-world-from-coronavirus.

[24] April Herlevi, “Fighting the Battle for the Pandemic Narrative: The PRC White Paper on Its COVID-19 Response,” China Brief 20, Iss. 11 (July 2020), https://jamestown.org/program/fighting-the-battle-for-the-pandemic-narrative-the-prc-white-paper-on-its-covid-19-response/; Alicia Chen and Vanessa Molter, “Mask Diplomacy: Chinese Narratives in the COVID Era,” Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, June 16, 2020, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/covid-mask-diplomacy.

[25] Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold the Line through 2035,” 15.

[26] Barry Eichengreen, “Revolution of rising expectations could hit China's economy,” The Guardian, November 12, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/12/revolution-of-rising-expectations-could-hit-china-economy.

[27] Cunningham, Edward, Tony Saich, and Jessie Turiel, “Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time,” Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, July 2020, https://ash.harvard.edu/publications/understanding-ccp-resilience-surveying-chinese-public-opinion-through-time.

[28] Chris Buckley, “China’s Combative Nationalists See a World Turning Their Way,” The New York Times, December 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/world/asia/china-nationalists-covid.html; Tom Phillips, “The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion,” The Guardian, May 10, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion.

[29] “Freedom of Expression in China: A Privilege, Not a Right,” U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, accessed January 23, 2021, https://www.cecc.gov/freedom-of-expression-in-china-a-privilege-not-a-right.

[30] Jing Yang and Lingling Wei, “China’s President Xi Jinping Personally Scuttled Jack Ma’s Ant IPO,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-president-xi-jinping-halted-jack-ma-ant-ipo-11605203556; Javier C. Hernández, ”Chinese Tycoon Who Criticized Xi’s Response to Coronavirus Has Vanished,” The New York Times, March 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/world/asia/china-ren-zhiqiang.html.

[31] Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold the Line through 2035,” 15.

[32] Samantha Hoffman, “Social Credit,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 28, 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/social-credit; “China’s Digital Dictatorship,” The Economist, December 17, 2016, https://www.economist.com/leaders /2016/12/17/chinas-digital-dictatorship; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The New Big Brother: China and Digital Authoritarianism, July 21, 2020, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020%20SFRC%20Minority%20Staff%20Report %20-%20The%20New%20Big%20Brother%20-%20China%20and%20Digital%20Authoritarianism.pdf; and Ross Andersen, “The Panopticon Is Already Here,” The Atlantic, September 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/.

[33] David R. Stroup, “Why Xi Jinping’s Xinjiang policy is a major change in China’s ethnic politics,” Washington Post, November 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/19/why-xi-jinpings-xinjiang-policy-is-major-change-chinas-ethnic-politics/; Emily Feng, “Parents Keep Children Home As China Limits Mongolian Language In The Classroom,” National Public Radio, September 16, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/912623822/parents-keep-children-home-as-china-limits-mongolian-language-in-the-classroom.

[34] Tom Hancock, “Old and young, Chinese vent anger at move to raise retirement age,” AlJazeera, November 30, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/11/30/china-stirs-trouble-with-plan-to-hike-retirement-age-from-60.

[35] Max Fisher, “How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day,” The Atlantic, January 5, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/how-china-stays-stable-despite-500-protests-every-day/250940/.

[36] “TARP Programs,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 15, 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/tarp-programs/pages/default.aspx.

[37] “National Security Strategy,” The New York Times, accessed January 23, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/2020-democrats-national-security-strategy-foreign-policy.html

[38] Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold the Line through 2035,” 15.

[39] Tobin Harshaw, “Emperor Xi's China Is Done Biding Its Time,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, March 3, 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/emperor-xis-china-done-biding-its-time.

[40] Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hold the Line through 2035,” 3.