Since Xi Jinping’s accession to Central Military Commission chairmanship in 2012, United States national security leaders have closely watched his reinvention of the Chinese military.[1] Approaching a new era of military technology where China looks to prioritize civil-military integration simultaneous to a new United States administration, national security strategists must focus on a key question when rewriting United States policy: How will China’s military modernization necessitate a change in United States competitive strategy in Asia?[2] American national security depends on a comprehensive understanding of China’s recent defense reforms and weaknesses so that decision-makers remain aware of how willing Xi may be to go to war and how U.S. strategy in Asia should be adjusted to mitigate this potential.
The primary concern of the new administration’s National Security Strategy in responding to China’s military modernization should be an equivalent focus on military capabilities, through a reinforced defense budget and collaboration with allies, and secondarily, greater efforts to increase high-level talks with Chinese officials on areas of potential collaboration. An increased military budget would allow the United States and its Asian allies and partners to maintain a presence in the South and East China Seas, build up other states’ ballistic missile defense capabilities, and incentivize allies geographically closer to China to develop their own anti-access area denial systems.
Areas such as climate change or broader Asian security, such as in relation to North Korea, could provide opportunities for extended collaboration…
Should miscalculation occur and war break out, the effects on the global economy, climate collaboration, nuclear nonproliferation standards, and other foreign relation tensions would be catastrophic. Therefore, while ensuring that the United States’ military remains competent and able to respond to a provocation of war, the National Security Strategy should also promote maintenance of high-level communications between the United States and China. Areas such as climate change or broader Asian security, such as in relation to North Korea, could provide opportunities for extended collaboration while ensuring to the global community that the United States is committed to making every effort to avoid a costly war. Similar to the hotline agreement between Russia and the United States during the Cold War, efforts to ensure direct and regular communication between nations could prevent catastrophe.[3]
Xi’s Military Evolutions
China’s meteoric military growth seeks to achieve parity with American forces, especially as it pursues a completed triad of nuclear capabilities and increases civil-military collaboration. The People’s Liberation Army, driven by perceived nuclear insecurity and desired power projection, has continued to evolve under Chairman Xi. As Xi’s strategy expands Chinese military capabilities, People’s Liberation Army developments will surpass past growth rates and create a formidable force, requiring an amended U.S. National Security Strategy that focuses on both building up defense capabilities, and increasing communications so as to avoid costly miscalculations.
To understand the necessity of a renewed China strategy, United States policymakers must appreciate the growth of Chinese military capabilities. First, Chinese leadership has refocused on incorporating civil involvement in technology development and Chinese Communist Party integration. This push, initially known as Civil Military Integration, incentivizes the civilian sector to enter the defense market, and it quickly evolved from a small program to a core aspect of national strategy. Civil Military Integration—now referred to as Military Civil Fusion—has facilitated increased coordination as well as a more equal balance of emphasis on military and civilian developments in the defense and technology fields.[4] By fusing military and civilian science and technology assets and resources, Chairman Xi has brought China closer to its goal of becoming a technological and military superpower.[5]
As China’s international investment and global footprint expand through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative, one can expect these operations to increase and People’s Liberation Army presence and involvement across the South and East China Seas to continue…
In China’s efforts to degrade the reliance of other states on U.S. forces and to disrupt greater U.S. influence across East and Southeast Asia, some of its modernization efforts have focused toward infrastructure that supports non-war missions. These include counterpiracy operations, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and noncombatant evacuations. These missions reflect a degree of power projection that threatens nations who contest the sovereignty of the waters and an increased emphasis on anti-access, area denial efforts.[6] Not only does this force other states to rely on Chinese ships and manpower in such operations, but it also allows China to be involved in multilateral operations where its presence may sway international decision making, providing an excuse to patrol disputed waters. As China’s international investment and global footprint expand through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative, one can expect these operations to increase and People’s Liberation Army presence and involvement across the South and East China Seas to continue, threatening the peace of the region.
The strike range from the first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, and future planned—and domestically built—aircraft carriers reflects China’s ability to wage war outside the first and second island chains…
In addition to a refocused modernization strategy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has rapidly grown both in quantity and quality. With about 350 ships, 130 of which are major surface combatants, China’s operational reach has significantly increased past the range of land-based defenses. The strike range from the first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, and future planned—and domestically built—aircraft carriers reflects China’s ability to wage war outside the first and second island chains and within the maritime zones of other Asian nations. The Navy planned the next generation of aircraft carrier with lessons from the first in mind, and it will make upgrades to enhance overall naval endurance.[7]
The People’s Liberation Army Navy also has a considerable number of ships that operate with the sole purpose of replenishing long-term deployments of ships and aircraft, which further increases the ability to conduct long-distance missions across the Indo-Pacific.[8] These capabilities enhance military operations of all kinds, but their growth also expands China’s ability to facilitate less overt uses of military force. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy operates in increasingly distant waters, its involvement in task group deployments and non-military missions like counterpiracy allows it to grow in experience and skills. With the continued evolution and improvement of naval strength, weapons, and equipment, China approaches a complete triad of combat capabilities on air, land, and sea, and the People’s Liberation Army will have taken great strides toward complete military dominance over any nation in the region.
This development should reinforce to policymakers how critical United States military capabilities are. As China’s army and navy grow in quality and quantity, American strategy should simultaneously take steps to ensure that its own military remains fully capable should the situation require it. A steady U.S. presence in the contested waters increasingly traveled by Chinese ships demonstrates awareness of increasing aggression and signals commitment to the conservation of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Xi’s Weaknesses
Aside from military successes, American lawmakers should also have a thorough understanding of Chinese military weaknesses in order to exploit them, should war occur. Xi’s modernizations have greatly improved the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities, but the Chairman also faces challenges that could become long-term weaknesses. Operational hindrances, including reliance on Western and Russian aircraft imports and lack of a robust underwater submarine capability, threaten the stated goal of self-sustainment.[9] In addition, growing pains in leadership and training—reminiscent of the 2016 transition from seven military regions to five theater commands—continue to plague the military’s senior management.[10] Even as new technologies are developed and implemented at an unheard-of pace, the People’s Liberation Army will be unable to capitalize on its strengths if it fails to address these weaknesses.
Therefore China’s self-reported goal of self-sufficiency will be a good gauge for when it may be more willing to risk war.
Understanding Chinese military reliance is important because China currently relies on other states to maintain some capabilities of its military forces. Therefore China’s self-reported goal of self-sufficiency will be a good gauge for when it may be more willing to risk war. China has long pursued domestic aviation production through two state-owned companies that have designed both military and commercial aircraft, and it is the second-largest exporter of unmanned aerial vehicles. Even so, China has struggled to perfect domestic alternatives to Western- and Russian-made aircraft engines, complicating their push for self-sufficiency. Without the ability to replicate aircraft engines required for high-performance military operations, such as the H-6N and H6-K bombers, the People’s Liberation Army depends on outside resources to sustain military operations. This is not uncommon globally, but it contradicts China’s own Mao-era slogan of self-reliance and assures long-term dependency on other nations.[11]
Another area of continuing concern since 2000 is China’s sea-based nuclear program. This area of rapid development poses a massive threat to the security of the continental United States. Military experts see underwater nuclear capability as critical to an overall nuclear deterrent strategy. Importantly, the People’s Liberation Army recently achieved a new milestone in this pursuit. In releasing a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, China achieved its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.[12]
Although the Chinese media reported it as a massive victory, its navy still faces massive operational and technological challenges before achieving a comprehensive sea-based defense program.[13] Currently, the range of such missiles launched underwater does not compare to air- and land-based missiles, as they do not have the ability to target the United States from Chinese littoral waters. Further, the program remains stunted by operational challenges as China’s Navy does not yet have the required resources to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence.[14] The number of submarine launched ballistic missiles required to ensure this level of deterrence is difficult to estimate, but U.S. intelligence suggests that China needs at least one more submarine to maintain a minimum continuous presence.[15] Thus, even as the People’s Liberation Army races to pursue viable underwater nuclear capabilities, it has yet to achieve a complete capability.[16]
China’s military growth necessitates attention in the development of the new National Security Strategy.
Finally, the chaos resulting from the 2016 reorganization from seven military regions to five theater operations has not been completely mitigated.[17] As this division greatly affects the tactical efficacy of the Chinese military, it is beneficial for other states to understand how it impacts China’s willingness to engage in combat. Chinese media sources have reported how effective communication, practical training, and strong leadership continue to suffer greatly at the operational and tactical level.[18] Many unit leaders simply cannot employ these new capabilities as training methods have not changed at the same pace as technology.[19] This lack of expertise leads to inaction and stymied growth, which cannot be counterbalanced by any number of new aircraft carriers or missile capabilities.
Mitigating Miscalculation
Traditional U.S. strategy in Asia seeks to ensure that no power becomes strong enough to challenge its hegemony. While the past 20 years have been relatively peaceful, China’s military growth necessitates attention in the development of the new National Security Strategy. Although various presidential administrations have implemented their own strategies in managing potential Chinese threats, war has never been nor is currently the preferred method of containment. Rationalists argue that war often occurs when one side miscalculates the other’s willingness to engage in armed conflict; in this situation, miscalculation could be deadly.[20] If the new U.S. administration truly hopes to avoid an immensely costly war, it must take specific actions to signal its commitment to high-level and continual dialogue.
Despite an awareness of its own weaknesses, China sees itself as able to achieve all of its desired national objectives, including complete domestic control and power projection.
China’s current hesitancy to engage in armed conflict may not last as its military power grows in size and capability, which reflects just how critical a reinvention of United States strategy towards China is. The present aversion to provoking conflict stems primarily from senior Chinese generals who demonstrate little enthusiasm in committing to warfare, as they see critical shortcomings in training and capabilities at the tactical level.[21] If anything, their criticisms of People’s Liberation Army capabilities have grown sharper during President Xi’s time as Central Military Commission Chairman as its training, doctrine, and organization are still developing.
China has not yet fought a modern war; but it has studied U.S. combat operations intensively. Despite an awareness of its own weaknesses, China sees itself as able to achieve all of its desired national objectives, including complete domestic control and power projection. This confidence may explain why, for example, in 2019 a record number of Chinese government vessels entered the waters of the contested Senkaku Islands.[22] Although war did not erupt, China’s increasing presence in contested territory signals to nearby states and a global audience that it is willing to risk increased provocations even as it recognizes that it is not perfectly prepared for war.
To respond to some signs of growing Chinese confidence, the U.S. National Security Strategy should ensure it reengages Chinese officials on potential areas of collaboration, such as climate change, to signal intentionality while profering an opportunity to lessen the chance of costly miscalculations. To reduce the possibility of miscalculation and accidental nuclear war during the Cold War, the United States and Russia set up a hotline with the sole purpose of streamlining and expediting high-level communications.[23] With the success of this hotline, other practices were established to improve efficient communication between leaders. While today’s technology makes such direct communication easier, the underlying principle remains timeless. Trust building through diplomatic means, opening lines of dialogue specifically for improved communication, and collaborating on areas of common interest are all old ideas that would serve the United States well today.
Necessity of Military Response Capabilities
As the People’s Liberation Army continues to modernize and address its weaknesses, China will become a much bolder adversary, and its willingness to engage in combat will adjust accordingly. In assessing Chairman Xi’s military reforms, it is important for U.S. national security leaders to note what factors would indicate a military equipped and ready to engage in combat with the United States. Should the Military Civil Fusion strategy play out as successfully as Chairman Xi hopes, there will be increased independence in the domestic development of underwater capabilities and aircraft. Chinese officials are confident that rewarding civilian companies and innovators will pay off through the ability to recreate and replace imported military products that China has yet to replicate.[24] Despite China’s expression of confidence, it remains a question of if more than when. Military Civil Fusion has been a beneficial strategy to People’s Liberation Army development so far, but it could consume excessive resources or stall out.
Lastly, as China pursues nuclear triad capabilities, any confirmation of extended submarine-launched ballistic missile launches should be seen as a completion of robust nuclear capabilities. The recent development and confirmed success of a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile that is air-to-air refuelable, especially in conjunction with improving ground-based nuclear proficiency, is impressive, but the People’s Liberation Army seeks a complete triad. Should its submarine-launched ballistic missile power expand, China will finally hold a viable triad of nuclear delivery systems capable of striking nations well outside its periphery.[25] Thus, it is essential that the National Security Strategy not make the naive choice to focus primarily on preventing war entirely; instead, it should make specific choices to reinforce the defense budget to continue to strengthen and enhance U.S. military technology.
A greater, more constant U.S. presence in the South and East China Seas would signal the United States remains committed to protecting a free and open Indo-Pacific. Additional resources would also allow the United States to better equip allies with missile defense and anti-access area denial technology. By working alongside states like Japan, Australia, South Korea, the United States can ensure that China’s novel technologies and growing naval capabilities can still be mitigated.
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These ideas should equip incoming U.S. national security leaders with a better understanding of Chairman Xi’s People’s Liberation Army so that the National Security Strategy can be adjusted to ensure U.S. safety and prosperity. Through a comprehensive understanding of People’s Liberation Army shortcomings and strengths, including how it views itself, U.S. leaders can better calculate Chinese willingness to engage in warfare, and thus reassess their own grand strategy toward a critical region of the world.
The consequences of major war between China and the United States could be colossal…
It is evident that Xi’s military strategy focuses on developing new technology and capabilities that would enable China to engage in combat successfully. The United States should react with a dual focus to ensure all avenues toward peace and stability are pursued, while not turning a blind eye to the immense steps taken by China towards military dominance. First, the National Security Strategy should reinforce the defense budget to allow the United States and its allies to maintain a presence in the South and East China seas, where tensions are highest and China has increased its presence. This increased emphasis on military growth should also stress cooperation with allies in the region, to ensure they are equipped with ballistic missile defense to counter China’s nuclear triad, and to push toward greater permeation of anti-access area denial programs that would limit Chinese naval freedoms. Second, a renewed commitment to engaging in consistent high-level talks and collaboration with China on shared goals like climate change mitigation would lessen the chances for war to arise from a miscalculation or miscommunication. The consequences of major war between China and the United States could be colossal, and this administration has a responsibility to adjust its strategy in response to Chinese military modernizations in order to protect peace and prosperity both domestically and abroad.
Hannah Goda is an MA candidate at the Georgetown University Asian Studies program. She focuses on United States grand strategy and alliance management in East Asia. All opinions expressed in this piece are the author’s alone.
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Header Image: Tiananmen Square, Dongcheng, China, (Photo by Hennie Stander).
Notes:
[1] Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications,” Washington. D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2017.
“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” United States Department of Defense, August 21, 2020,
[2] “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” United States Department of Defense, August 21, 2020, 36.
[3] “Hot Line Agreement,” U.S. Department of State June 20, 1963, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4785.htm.
[4] Audrey Fritz, “China's Evolving Conception of Civil-Military Collaboration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2, 2019. https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinas-evolving-conception-civil-military-collaboration.
[5] “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” United States Department of Defense, August 21, 2020, pp. 18-19.
[6] Ibid, pp. 32.
[7] Ibid, pp. 47-68.
[8] Ibid, pp. 23.
[9] Abraham Ait for The Diplomat, “Does Russian Military Aviation Have Anything Left to Offer China?,” The Diplomat, April 11, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/does-russian-military-aviation-have-anything-left-to-offer-china/.
[10] “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” United States Department of Defense, August 21, 2020, pp. 69.
[11] Ibid, pp. 8.
[12] Ibid, pp. 46.
[13] Sebastien Roblin, “China Touts New Submarine-Launched Nukes In Quest For More Survivable Deterrence,” Forbes (Forbes Magazine, May 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/05/13/china-touts-new-submarine-launched-nukes-in-quest-for-more-survivable-deterrence/?sh=2959bf6a1755.
[14] “Does China Have an Effective Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent?,” ChinaPower Project, August 26, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/ssbn/.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Adam Ni, “The Future of China's Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine Force,” ASPI The Strategist, May 7, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-chinas-nuclear-powered-ballistic-missile-submarine-force/.
[17] PLA Weaknesses and Xi’s Concerns about PLA Capabilities, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired).
[18] Dennis Blasko, “The Chinese Military Speaks to Itself, Revealing Doubts,” War on the Rocks, February 18, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/.
[19] Ibid.
[20] James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414, Accessed February 2, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903.
[21] PLA Weaknesses and Xi’s Concerns about PLA Capabilities, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired).
[22] Shun Niekawa, “Chinese Ships Set 65-Day Record for Closing in on Senkaku Waters,” The Asahi Shimbun, June 17, 2020, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13465411#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20a%20total%20of,the%20number%20of%20vessels%20involved.
[23] “Hot Line Agreement,” U.S. Department of State, June 20, 1963, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4785.htm.
[24] “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” United States Department of Defense, August 21, 2020, pp. 6.
[25] Ibid, pp. 50.