Matthew Schultz, Michael Manning, Jeremy Smith, Brian Meade, Matthew Newman, and Paul Kozick
On 22 March 2020, the Wall Street Journal first reported a number of planned force structure changes for the U.S. Marine Corps—the nation’s naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. Within a few days, the Marine Corps officially released the long-awaited adjustments in Force Design 2030, following months of integrated planning, modeling, and threat-based wargaming. The sweeping changes within the document echoed the vision General David H. Berger, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, laid-out in his 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Taken together, these documents aimed to align the Marine Corps with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and steer the service’s efforts in redesigning itself for a future of naval campaigning in a new era of great power competition. Yet, despite serving as the first critical step in transforming the Corps, the much-awaited unveiling of the objective force of 2030, which proposed a force structure cut of up to 12,000 Marines, shocked many in the defense community. It also triggered a flurry of dialogue in professional journals and online periodicals regarding the Corps’ future direction.
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger (Warrant Officer Bobby J. Yarbrough/USMC Photo)
Many of the insightful articles published in the wake of Force Design 2030 have presented arguments for how the Marine Corps ought to organize, train, educate, and equip itself for the future. Similarly, these works also have analyzed the pending changes from a multitude of angles—some expressing support for the proposed modifications and others standing in passionate opposition. While the aforementioned topics must be analyzed and debated to generate new ideas and cull dated concepts, few, if any, of the publications have attempted to tackle the difficult, yet necessary, exploration of the doctrinal and cognitive reforms that must accompany this transformation process. After all, a leaner Marine Corps that is fully integrated with the naval service in the context of 21st century great power competition will have to evolve its thinking and approach problems in a fundamentally different manner.
In the coming era of distributable platforms, stand-in forces, and globally-integrated joint combined arms operations, the time has come for the Corps to join the rest of the U.S. military services in embracing the concept of operational art in its foundational, service-level doctrine. Doing so will assist the organization in tackling the challenges of the force design process as the service advances beyond the post Cold-War Marine Corps built upon the 20th century paradigm of large-scale amphibious forcible entry operations and the organizational construct of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. It will also enhance the Corps’ interoperability with the joint force in an increasingly complex global operating environment. Finally, the service can leverage the concept of operational art to progress past the concept of the Marine Air Ground Task Force Officer, focusing instead on the development and maturation of operational artists prepared for the conduct of naval campaigns and operations in the 21st century.
…the time has come for the Corps to join the rest of the U.S. military services in embracing the concept of operational art in its foundational, service-level doctrine.
According to Joint Doctrinal Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, operational art is the “cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks.” In contrast to the oft-debated concept of the operational level of war, which Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-2, Campaigning describes as the link between strategy and tactics, operational art is an integrative mechanism that can be used at all levels and in many contexts. Thus, operational art, contrary to popular belief, is neither synonymous with the operational level of war, nor is it confined to a specific rank or echelon of command. Likewise, operational art is not restricted to any specific band of activities along the competition continuum or a particular warfighting domain. It is instead a concept that, as stated in Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, Naval Warfare, can guide “warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.”
Yet, despite its broad utility and wide acceptance in the service-level doctrine of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, as well as joint doctrine, the foundational Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication series excludes any mention of operational art. While these publications do speak at length on the importance of topics such as the levels of war, the warfighting functions, and even the art of war, they are wholly devoid of operational art, putting the organization at odds with the rest of the joint force. This is problematic because at this moment, perhaps more so than any other point in the service’s history, the Corps needs leaders at all levels who are intellectually equipped to participate in what the National Military Strategy describes as the “conduct of operational art through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains.” Achieving this end will, in part, require revising the Corps’ key doctrinal publications and developing a theory of operational art that complements the service’s warfighting philosophy and design methodology.
The primary purpose of military doctrine, according to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, is to guide organizations in orchestrating activities and functions by providing a “basis for harmonious action and mutual understanding.” Further, the Marine Corps relies upon its doctrine to steer organizational and individual thinking about war while also providing “a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language.” It is, in this regard, why doctrine remains one of the most important tools used by the Corps, undergirding the socialization process of Marines and maintaining the service’s unique warfighting ethos and culture. That said, doctrine, which reflects an organization’s capacity to learn and anticipate the future, ought never remain static in the face of shifting strategic, social, or technological context.
Marines board an MV-22B Osprey (Lance Cpl. Devan Gowans/USMC Photo)
In his forward to the 1997 edition of Warfighting, General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote, “Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare.” Thus, “doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.” Doctrine is a dynamic instrument that must be adapted and revised to account for the ever-changing character of war. Therefore, given the significant organizational and cultural changes afoot in the Marine Corps, the service must take a hard look at where operational art can help prepare it for the future.
While the Marine Corps does acknowledge operational art as a cosigner of joint doctrine and Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, the absence of the concept in service-level doctrine greatly limits the exposure of the force to operational art. Therefore, the Corps should revise key publications such as Warfighting—the organization’s capstone doctrinal publication—in a manner that includes a descriptive concept of operational art. Such a revision will assist in the development of operational artists within the Corps who are prepared to lead, or at the very least participate in, the orchestration of activities, resources, and the generation of effects to achieve desired ends in war and in peace. The development of operational artists of all ranks who are skilled in carefully integrating ends, ways, means, and risk will enable richer dialogue and shared understanding to bolster the Corps’ on-going force design effort and its subsequent implementation.
The Marine Corps described in Force Design 2030 differs greatly from the one that participated in close to two decades of protracted conflict in the Global War on Terrorism. Instead of retaining the capability to participate in sustained operations ashore, the objective force will be prepared to assure allies, prevent major conflict, and deter the escalation of great power conflict. Additionally, the design of the future Marine Corps must also generate value for combatant commanders while overcoming the challenges of contested access, expeditionary logistics, and command and control in distributed operations that take place in an increasingly congested littoral operating environment. Yet, the aforementioned matters are not the only topics that require artful consideration in the design process.
The Corps must also balance the tension between its vision of renewed naval integration and the role it will play in the conduct of all domain, joint combined arms operations in an increasingly complex global operating environment. Additionally, given the immense spatial, cognitive, and temporal challenges associated with employing emerging concepts such as distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations in the expansive Indo-Pacific theater, the service needs to make fundamental changes to its guiding doctrine and the way it thinks. After all, while tactical excellence will remain a critically important facet of the Corps’ future success, it is no longer sufficient to design a force capable of competing, fighting, and winning in an era of great power competition. Operational art therefore provides an integrative mechanism that can help the service balance the commitment of limited means with its envisioned future. The utility of the concept doesn’t end there.
Indeed, while operational art can assist the service in the iterative processes of adaptation and modernization, so too can it help individual Marines seize and retain the intellectual edge needed in an era of great power competition. As it stands now, most Marines lack any meaningful exposure to the concept of operational art before attending intermediate-level education as field grade officers, either through distance education or resident courses at institutions such as Command and Staff College. Just as operational art should not be confined to any particular level of war, neither should the concept be restricted to the intellectual bastions of Quantico, Newport, Maxwell, or Leavenworth. Yet, in the absence of inclusion in the Corps’ foundational doctrine, operational art has limited diffusion across the service.
Thus, a concerted effort to develop and institutionalize a service-specific concept of operational art can ensure that Marines are exposed to it early and often over their careers, fostering the development of operational artists through apprenticeship over the course of a career. Similar to a musician who lacks experience in music theory or a woodworker who lacks apprenticeship in carpentry, a Marine who lacks exposure to operational art is at a disadvantage when it comes to the early development of operational thinking and future dialogue capacity with the rest of the joint force.
Much like the concept of maneuver warfare, Marines cannot master operational art overnight or through a casual perusal of definitions in joint doctrine. Instead, the development of an operational artist requires deliberate cultivation, learning, and experience accumulated over the course of years through a maturation process. At all levels and in partnership with joint and coalition partners, Marines must have the knowledge, skill, and ability to conceptualize how tactical actions from Marine forcescan contribute to achieving strategic aims and advancing the nation’s interests across the joint force.
In this regard, operational art can also allow the organization to achieve greater levels of unity of effort with small unit leaders operating in distributed, communications-denied environments in which they may have to make independent decisions that have significant operational and strategic effects. While strategic corporals in the Global War on Terrorism had the ability to generate effects with global reach, the stakes are much higher in an era of great power competition where poor decisions could trigger regional or global conflict. Thus, operational art is an idea that must be grasped at all levels—from the staff sergeant applying expertise in forward arming and refueling point location planning, to the recently-promoted major on the liaison team serving with a combined or joint force land component.
U.S. Marines with Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), advance toward the dock landing ship USS Comstock (LSD 45) via amphibious assault vehicles (AAV) after completing training for Exercise Alligator Dagger at Arta Beach, Djibouti, Dec. 21, 2016. (Sgt. Xzavior McNealUSMC Photo)
During the conduct of littoral operations in a contested environment—where low signatures matter and communications will likely be degraded—young leaders will find themselves in situations forcing them to make challenging decisions that will have tactical, operational, and strategic consequences with minimal contact with higher authorities. Thus, operational art will not only complement effective individual decision, but also enable Marines at all levels to contribute to the Corps being “an expeditionary learning organization, ready to recognize changing conditions and adapt accordingly.” Yet, the need for operational art extends far beyond the direct employment of America’s sons and daughters in the exercise of integrated American naval power alongside joint and partners.
Operational art is equally important at the highest echelons of the Corps—from Quantico to the Pentagon and each of the combatant commands—as Marine commanders and staffs integrate, dialog, and interact with joint forces, allied militaries, and global partners. Similarly, it is crucial for all Marines operating as part of the Fleet Marine Forces and as integral teammates within the nation’s maritime service to be skilled in the application of operational art. Not only must they understand the operational capabilities and limitations of Marine forces, but they must also have a grasp of what the rest of the joint force offers across each of the warfighting functions and domains. This is particularly important under conditions when a Marine headquarters may provide key operational level capabilities to the joint force, whether serving as a headquarters, a Marine logistics command, or as a service or functional component of a joint or combined task force. This calls for commanders and staffs to not only understand and dialogue in the realm of operational art, but also to have the resident expertise capable of orchestrating the convergence of the necessary joint and coalition resources, effects, and tactical actions across all domains with the right capabilities at the right time and place to achieve stated strategic objectives. If Marines fall behind the rest of the joint force in its ability to plan and converse in reference to operational art, the service runs the risk of being underemployed, misemployed, or worse yet, simply told what to do.
U.S. Marines on patrol in Helmand province, Afghanistan. (Cpl. Austin Long/USMC Photo)
While the adoption of operational art in Marine Corps doctrine and culture can provide the service with many benefits, it is important to acknowledge that simply codifying the concept into doctrine will not translate to instant cultural inclusion. Likewise, it is important to recognize that the concept is not a panacea to all the Marine Corps’ current and future challenges. Instead, it is a pattern of thought and a way of seeing that transcends each level of war and provides an integrative approach to problem solving that complements other ideas such as operational design, maneuver warfare, and joint combined arms operations.
As the Marine Corps continues to posture itself for a challenging, uncertain future, it is crucial that the organization uses this transformation process as an opportunity to revisit its foundational doctrine and adjust where needed to carry the service forward into the 21st century. Although strings of operational thinking already exist within the service’s doctrine and culture, the concept of operational art remains strangely excluded. As with the incorporation of any new idea into doctrine, it will require deliberate development, creative implementation, thoughtful application, and education to harvest a worthwhile return on investment. The addition of operational art to Marine Corps doctrine will allow the service to begin the process of educating operational artists and institutionalizing a way of thought that will improve the organization’s ability to thrive in a dynamic, complex operating environment against peer competitors.
Matthew Schultz, Mike Manning, Jeremy Smith, Brian Meade, Matt Newman, and Paul Kozick are the members of the U.S. Marine Corps student cohort of the 2020 Advanced Military Studies Program at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Marine Corps, the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Marine Corps Memorial, Washington, D.C. (National Park Service)