Russia and Ukraine are locked in a war that has outlasted any realistic forecast. Why are these nations still engaged in a conflict that is so detrimental to both sides? Because these two countries have a shared history that includes scorched earth and the willful destruction of personal property rather than forfeiture, the most likely outcome is either complete victory for one party, or regime change that brings the war to a rapid conclusion. Over a thousand years of invasions, occupation, and suffering have influenced the psyches of both the Ukrainians and Russians in ways that make only these two outcomes likely. Analyzing Russian and Ukrainian history through invasions, scorched earth policies, and popular uprisings provides a clear understanding that control of Crimea is the ultimate objective of each nation, and the endgame will be determined by whoever is willing to suffer the most to achieve their goal. 

To understand the current conflict in Ukraine, it is important to first acknowledge that Russia and Ukraine each claim Kiev as the birthplace of their respective cultures. The origins of each culture have been lost to history and were first documented centuries later by monks, but the fact remains that each country has rooted their identity and origin in what is known as Kievan Rus. Rus refers to the people loosely united in principalities across Ukraine and Western Russia prior to the invasion of the Mongols and subsequent rise of Moscow and a unified Russian state. Following the victory of Muscovy over the Mongols, Ukraine often enjoyed long periods of freedom from Russia intermixed with Russian conquest of Ukrainian territory. During Russian domination, Ukrainian culture was squashed by Russian officials and laws that prohibited printing in the Ukrainian language. Ukrainians at times welcomed and accepted Russian culture and protection while tsars often employed the Ukrainian Cossacks to safeguard the borderlands as well as pacify indigenous peoples of the steppe as the Russian Empire expanded east into Siberia. The Cossacks, as fierce defenders of the border, were appreciated by tsars, when they weren’t rebelling or supporting foreign incursions into Russia, because Russia and Ukraine share a history of invasions. 

Mongols, Teutonic Knights, Napoleon, and the Germans are but a few of the many invaders who wreaked havoc from the Vistula to the Urals and created a fear of invasion that is deeply ingrained in the Russian psyche. Prior to the Mongol invasion of the 13th century, Kievan Rus was loosely connected through blood and economic relationships. A collective military force was only achieved in an ad hoc manner and limited in scope to principalities that found it beneficial to temporarily unite in battle. Thus, when the Mongols invaded what is now Russia and Eastern Ukraine they encountered limited resistance and subjugated the Rus for nearly two centuries. While the Russians were under Mongol rule, the Teutonic Knights invaded from the West. The Russians rallied under Alexander Nevsky and repulsed the invaders. This event is celebrated every year and is used by Russian President Vladamir Putin as an example of the continuous threat the West poses to the motherland also referred to as the Rodina.[1] Invasions continued from the west through the centuries, but Napoleon’s march across Russia and into Moscow, known in Russia as the Patriotic War, and Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa, known as the Great Patriotic War are two more examples of invasions of Western powers which reaffirm the suspicions Russians have of the West. The anxiety these invasions created has been passed down from generation to generation. It has also provided, in both cultures, the fortitude required to survive as nations on the fringes of both the East and the West.

Unwavering defense of the Rodina, as well as Ukrainian actions during collectivization, show the willingness of both countries to suffer all things rather than submit to invaders. During our trips into Russia, the crews I flew with had a saying, “you can’t out suck the Russians.”  In the process of interacting with the Russians it seemed there was no limit to the amount of suffering the Russians were willing to endure. On a trivial level, this was recognized in the meals, lodging, and temperature controls on the exhaust-filled buses in Siberia whenever we landed in the country. However, there are historic examples that show how much the Russians and Ukrainians are willing to endure for their homeland and their posterity. During the Patriotic War, Russians set their crops and towns on fire during their retreat to prevent Napoleon’s forces from scavenging for resources despite the complete destruction that was brought upon their own territory. When Napoleon reached Moscow, he found it ablaze. Napoleon waited a month in the heart of Russia for a surrender, but the Russians refused to give up their land. Napoleon was forced to retreat and lost over half a million men, predominantly to the elements and starvation. This was repeated during the Great Patriotic War. Four million people were left in Stalingrad for two years as it was besieged by the Nazis while both sides died of hunger and the elements. Nearly a million more civilians died in the Siege of Leningrad (St. Petersburg).

Soviet military, partisans, and civilians destroyed anything from factories to fields that could be used by the Nazi war effort. On 28 July 1942, Stalin issued order number 227, commonly known as “not one step back.”  This order prevented troops from retreating during battles by establishing lines of soldiers behind the front who were ordered to shoot anyone retreating. Soviet citizens and soldiers had to suffer all things rather than surrender. This mentality is true for the Ukrainians as well. During collectivization under Stalin, the Ukrainians were ordered to hand their livestock and land over to the government. Rather than allow the government control of their property, the Ukrainians killed their livestock and burned their crops. This, along with the disastrous policies of collectivization, led to the death of millions of Ukrainians in a single year in the famine known as Holodomor.[2] These are but a few examples that lend credence to the facetious saying “you can’t out suck the Russians.” In Eastern Ukraine, there are two peoples with distinct cultures and intersecting histories that prove neither nation is willing to give in and relinquish their claim to sovereign soil, particularly Crimea. These claims are once again deeply rooted in history, but also in strategic significance. 

Ukrainian Cossacks and Russian soldiers have fought and died on the Crimean Peninsula since the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century. The territory from the River Don to Crimea, once dominated by Tartars and Turkish tribes, became a haven for nomads, bandits, and Russians who were unable to effect change in their society and chose to vote with their feet by leaving their homes and joining the ranks of the Cossacks. Russian tsars often tasked the Cossacks with defending this territory from invading Turks. Through several centuries, Cossacks also aided foreign invaders and supported uprisings and usurpers from this region. During this same time, Russia grew as an empire. Russia dealt with two issues simultaneously. First, there was an inferiority complex; Russia grappled with this problem by expanding its territory to “civilize” its neighbors, believing this would elevate their status in the eyes of Western Europe. Second, Russia’s maritime trade is limited by its warm water access. St. Petersburg was established to help solve this issue, thereby gaining access to the Baltic Sea. This, however, was not enough. Russia needed another port, one that would provide access to the Mediterranean and true access to global trade. This could only happen through the Black Sea. Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Nicholas I are a few of the most well-known rulers who have gained and/or lost Crimea for the Russian Empire prior to Putin’s invasion in 2014. The problem with competing globally for prestige and resources is that the Russian government’s desires may be too lofty for the people to bear.

Silent protest has been a hallmark of Russian and Ukrainian defiance to authoritative figures, but both cultures share a propensity for violence against malevolent regimes. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, peasants and serfs in the Russian Empire and rural people in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) made up the majority of the Russian population. Only in the 1950s was the majority of the population “urban” by Soviet definitions of urban, which was defined by growth in “industrialization, transportation accessibility, and immigration.”[3] This meant there was no representation for the common Russian in an autocratic society or for rural citizens of the U.S.S.R. The only means of influence serfs before Emancipation in 1861 and peasants had over the government was their ability to vote with their feet. Peasants and runaway serfs fled to Siberia, Ukraine, and Poland. This was, perhaps, the safest way to defy the government.

The other option was rebellion. The most well-known of these rebellions was the Pugachev Rebellion. Led by a Cossack, peasants rose up against Catherine the Great’s policies that had become more burdensome and as a result the state’s reach into regions where they had fled became tighter. The 19th century was full of protests, secret clubs, and assassination attempts on the tsars who resisted the liberties associated with the enlightenment that had already swept across the Atlantic and Western Europe. This culminated in 1917 when Nicholas II abdicated the throne. Among the numerous problems Russia faced was that Russia was locked in World War I, fighting for ethnic Slavs, and losing young men at an unconscionable rate. Analogous to today, as the war went on Russians were untrained, ill equipped, undertrained, and sent to the front without weapons. This was one of the three main issues – economic depression and lack of land for peasants are the others—that led to the October Revolution. Additionally, Ukraine promptly declared independence from the Russian Empire in 1917 and went through several different systems of governance through the end of the Russian Civil War in 1921. The Ukrainians demonstrated, similarly, their willingness to protest in the streets in the winter of 2013-2014. The Maidan Uprising was a revolt against Victor Yanukovych, the President of Ukraine, whose government chose to tie the Ukrainian economy to Russia instead of the European Union, against the will of the people. I had the opportunity to walk through to the streets of Kiev shortly after the protests to see the damage done, the makeshift barriers built of burnt tires, the gas masks abandoned in the streets, and flags of nations within the EU flying high on wooden poles. The result was the ousting of Yanukovich and eventually, the election of a comedian as  president, who has become the embodiment of Ukrainian independence and defiance in the face of what once appeared to be inevitable destruction. Now, two nations are entwined in Eastern Ukraine battling for what is left of Eastern Ukraine. The ultimate prize is Crimea. 

Russia achieved a symbolic victory when it invaded and captured Crimea with little resistance from the international community, but Ukraine is likely to continue fighting at this point until Crimea is back under Ukrainian control. The history discussed above proves each nation is willing to suffer unimaginable loss before relinquishing the land they believe is rightfully theirs. The difference between Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the invasion in 2022 is that the international community did not support Ukraine in 2014 the way it has for the last year. Now, Ukraine has put up a resistance that has cost the lives of so many Russian military members that a partial mobilization was required to replenish the forces lost. During this time, Russian men were quick to vote with their feet. Russia had to ban one-way flights, women and children were left behind as men waited in lines backed up over 10 miles from the Kazakh border, and European countries began accepting applications of Russian citizens fleeing the mobilization.[4] The current estimate of the number of Russians who fled since the conscription in 2022 is 500,000 men to 1 million; compare that with the 209,000 men who were charged with draft dodging over a ten year span during the Vietnam War.[5]

If the war continues, there are two likely outcomes. One is the Russian body count of lost soldiers will continue to climb, the mobilization will resume, and the people will react by forcing an end of the war through protest or regime change as they did during World War I. The other possible outcome, and certainly even worse than the first, is that Ukraine begins to take Crimea back and Putin feels the only way to avoid defeat is a scorched earth policy. In this case, he is likely to use a tactical nuclear weapon, thus preventing Ukrainian victory and destroying Crimea in the process. Diplomacy has not worked yet in this conflict. I hope I am wrong and there is a third option. I recommend we all pray that the third option materializes, but if history is to be a guide the outcome is likely listed above.

Robert Umholtz is an officer in the U.S. Air Force and teaches Russian History at the United States Air Force Academy. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Cat in Ruins, Borodianka, Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine, 2023 (Alex Fedorenko).

Notes:

[1] “Battle Reenactments in Russia More than History Recreated Mediaeval Campaigns [sic] against Western Foes Fuel Local Support for the War against Ukraine,” Taipei Times, August 25, 2022, accessed October 1, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2022/08/25/2003784115.

[2] “Holodomor: The Ukrainian Genocide,” College of Liberal Arts Holocaust and Genocide Studies (University of Minesosta, n.d.), accessed October 2, 2022, https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/holodomor.

[3] Lewis, Robert A., and Richard H. Rowland. “Urbanization in Russia and the USSR: 1897-1966.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 59, no. 4 (1969): 776–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2561838.

[4] Kareem Fahim, Zeynep Karatas, and Robyn Dixon , “The Russian Men Fleeing Mobilization, and Leaving Everything Behind,” The Washington Post, September 28, 2022, accessed October 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/28/russia-turkey-partial-mobilization-ukraine/.

[5] Ebel, Francesca and Ilyushina, Mary, “Russians Abandon Wartime Russia in Historic Exodus.” The Washington Post. February 13, 2023.   https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/13/russia-diaspora-war-ukraine/; Jessie Kindig, “Draft Resistance in the Vietnam Era,” Civil Rights and Labor History Consortium (University of Washington, 2008), last modified 2008, accessed October 2, 2022, https://depts.washington.edu/antiwar/vietnam_draft.shtml.