Vladimir Putin’s own military blunders in Ukraine have proven the friction studied by the strategist, and soldier once in Russian service, Carl Von Clausewitz.[[1] However, Clausewitz’s discussion of friction as an ever-present attribute inseparable from the very nature of war has already been well established and is therefore only mildly interesting regarding what can be learned in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the U.S. has successfully, though perhaps somewhat unintentionally, been testing out the strategy proposed by American fighter pilot and strategist John Boyd. Boyd mused that Clausewitz’s friction could be operationalized against an adversary rather than just accounted for in one’s own planning process.[2] Putin’s war in Ukraine proves the validity of Boyd’s strategy of applied friction and recommends that the U.S. give greater credence to extending this strategy by externally applying friction in future conflicts.

Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Classic strategic wisdom, as well as recent experience with successful territorial incursions likely bolstered Putin’s confidence that his strategy in Ukraine would succeed.[3] Yet, Putin’s assumptions failed him once they encountered not only the concept of Clausewitz’s traditional friction of war, but also Boyd’s concept of applied friction. The two notions are fundamentally different and will be examined at length in the next section. For now, the combination of these two variants have made Putin’s eventual success in Ukraine highly unlikely.

As political scientist Richard Betts states, “Strategies can be judged looking backward, but they must be chosen looking forward.”[4] This article has the advantage of hindsight in a way that strategists never do. Using that advantage, I propose that Russia, and the former Soviet Union, present four comparable case studies demonstrating externally applied friction, à la Boyd, can be successful at thwarting aggressive international actors without committing to direct conflict. These cases are interwoven throughout the following analysis of Putin’s assumptions and considered as evidence that the U.S. should give thorough consideration to consciously choosing a strategy of externally applied friction in future conflicts.

Defining Friction

Clausewitz argues that friction exists as details gone awry that could derail a plan.[5] John Boyd takes this idea farther and asserts that when in conflict, forces should find ways to increase an adversary’s friction.[6] To implement applied friction, additional refinement of the concept may prove useful. In physics, friction is defined as “the resistance that one surface or object encounters when moving over another” and is further subdivided into two categories: static and kinetic.[7] As the name implies, static friction is the friction applied to something up to the point of motion, at which point it becomes kinetic.[8] In the context of this analysis, static friction is equated with deterrence. At the point deterrence fails to prevent conflict and hostile actions are in motion, the strategy of deterrence progresses to a strategy of applied friction.

External influence in a war may suggest a proxy war; but externally applied friction does not implicitly equate to a proxy war, such as is the case of Ukraine. In this instance, the U.S. did not instigate conflict with Russia, rather it has continued to support a friendly nation in the defense of its sovereignty against an invading aggressor.[9] These attempts have gone beyond deterrence by externally applying friction as opposed to expanding and directly entering the war, as it would have if Ukraine was a NATO ally.[10] The Ukrainians have impressively and steadfastly resisted Russian forces since the invasion.[11] However, Putin’s success has been predominantly hindered due to externally applied friction from the international community in support of the Ukrainians. If not for these forces of externally applied friction, such as the influx of advanced western weapons and intelligence support, expansive economic sanctions, and mounting diplomatic pressure—Putin’s assumptions should have prevailed.[12]

Assumption 1: The Stronger Force Would Easily Best the Weaker Force in Battle

At the outset, Putin assumed he could quickly defeat Ukraine. Had Putin expected the war to be as long and complicated as it has become, it is likely that he would have brought the full weight of his military force to bear from the beginning. Instead, looking at how swiftly he managed to defeat Georgia in 2008 and annex Crimea in 2014, Putin launched the 2022 offensive into Ukraine largely unprepared for a protracted conflict—from his supply chain, to personnel and equipment readiness.[13] For instance, Putin began the conflict with his only aircraft carrier in an inoperable maintenance status, or “in the yards,” for six years.[14] Despite the emphasis on the land war, Ukraine is a coastal nation and the Russian Navy’s ability to encircle, blockade, and launch attacks from the sea has been limited by the absence of the carrier option.[15] This oversight, an example of Clausewitz’s friction, was apparent when he suffered an embarrassing blow to his Navy. Though unconfirmed, it was widely reported that Ukrainian ground forces received intelligence that enabled them to sink the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. If any intelligence sharing did contribute to the sinking, that would be an example of Boyd's applied friction having kinetic impacts in the battlespace. Regardless, Putin’s lack of military readiness for a fight he initiated can be explained by the flawed assumption that his victory would be swift and decisive.

Russia’s military might, especially had it been appropriately welded and fully prepared, seemed capable of a quick and decisive victory.

In fact, it seemed as though most of the world held a similar assumption.[16] Russia’s military might, especially had it been appropriately welded and fully prepared, seemed capable of a quick and decisive victory. The Ukrainian armed forces were estimated at 22% strength of the Russian forces at the outset of the war and projected to be far less militarily capable.[17] However, when the Ukrainian leadership rallied the people and challenged that assumption through tenacious resistance, the world was inspired to support the underdog in contributing to battlefield friction by providing intelligence and weapons to Ukraine.[18]

Assumption 2: The Norm of Tough Talk and Limited Response Would Continue

Putin assumed that his aggressive act would invite the ire of the West, but that, ultimately, no significant cost would be levied against him for the war. Though the 2008 Russo-Georgian war had complicated underpinnings, Russian forces claimed lands from the former Soviet country, and the world moved on.[19] In February 2014, when Russia took Crimea by force, the annexation was complete within roughly a month.[20] While the west imposed a few sanctions and ejected Russia from the G8, Putin had easily achieved his objective with greater benefits gained than costs imposed.[21] With those two quick wins in recent memory, Putin was emboldened to believe that invading Ukraine again would be no different, but this is the costliest assumption he made.

In both of these instances, little to no friction was applied in the conflicts—consequences were only imposed after Putin had achieved his primary objectives. However, in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, economic sanctions were immediately imposed against Putin and continually increased the squeeze as the war continued. Where Putin was counting on Europe’s dependence on Russian oil, the continent quickly sought other sources of energy, to their own economic sacrifice, that will result in the long-term loss of Russia’s majority export market.[22] Though this economically applied friction did not have an immediate effect either on the battlefield or to change Putin’s aggressive intentions, it has and will continue to have an impact over time that will at minimum affect the costs of the war and reduce Putin’s ability to sustain the fight.[23] 

Assumption 3: A Russian Victory in Ukraine Would Deter NATO Expansion

Putin assumed his show of force would dissuade a NATO expansionist agenda. Conquering Ukraine, a former Soviet bloc country and second largest European nation, seemed the thing to do to accomplish his goal, especially as the fledgling democracy at his doorstep hedged further to the west.[24] He likely also believed that NATO would not aid Ukraine to the extent that it has since Ukraine is not a NATO nation. To the contrary, NATO allies and many other nations globally have united in support of Ukraine, determined to treat Russia as an outcast. Foreign forces seem to be all that is missing from the military support flowing to Ukraine from NATO nations.[25] Further, Finland and Sweden, two nations that were previously proud of their neutral status, have applied for full NATO membership in response to Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine.[26]

Putin’s premise of exhibiting his military prowess to halt NATO expansion has failed due to his own disregard of the basic security dilemma principles that had concerned him in the first place.

In 2008, Putin invaded Georgia four months after attending the Bucharest Summit, where NATO extended the opportunity to join the alliance to Georgia and Ukraine through the Membership Action Plan.[27] The invasion in Georgia and subsequent 2014 invasion of Ukraine affirmed France and Germany’s concerns that offering membership to the former Soviet nations would threaten Russia.[28] However, due to Russia’s iteratively aggressive behavior, they are now ready to apply the friction they avoided applying in the previous two invasions.[29]

Clausewitz posits that friction is ever-present in all wars, as is the nature of war; but friction has not been operationalized in all wars as Boyd recommends.

Additionally, there is support for Ukraine to become part of NATO—perhaps not in the midst of hostilities, but eventually.[30] Therefore, Putin’s premise of exhibiting his military prowess to halt NATO expansion has failed due to his own disregard of the basic security dilemma principles that had concerned him in the first place. This diplomatic friction applied to Putin directly resulted in the loss of a primary objective of the war.[31]

Judging Backward, Choosing Forward

Clausewitz posits that friction is ever-present in all wars, as is the nature of war; but friction has not been operationalized in all wars as Boyd recommends.[32] In Georgia and Crimea, Putin was met with little externally applied friction, resulting in quick victories for Russia.[33] In the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, by arming the Mujaheddin, the U.S. externally applied friction to the Soviets, who were not successful in their Afghan endeavors.[34] Due to externally applied friction in Ukraine, each of Putin’s assumptions—that the invasion of Ukraine would be quick and easily accomplished, that the world would denounce but not stop it, and that it would sufficiently deter NATO expansion—have been invalidated.

There are a host of ways to intervene and shape the battlespace prior to setting an American foot in it.

Even if Russia defeats Ukraine in battle, Putin has lost this war, arguably as a result of applied friction. International relations theorists, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, further support the idea of applying friction before directly committing to war, which they refer to as “husbanding U.S. strength” by “offshore balancing.”[35] They recommend that the United States “encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary” while assuring that “Washington could provide assistance to allies and pledge to support them if they were in danger of being conquered.”[36] Bringing whole-of-government solutions to bear—from implementing diplomatic and economic tools, to supplying military training, intelligence, and equipment—there are a host of ways to intervene and shape the battlespace prior to setting an American foot in it. Therefore, as the U.S. looks to develop its future strategies for conflicts, greater deference should be shown to John Boyd’s strategy of applied friction, within the fight and externally, beyond the static deterrence phase, into and throughout the kinetic phase of war.

Alessandra Nisch is a United States Naval Officer and currently a graduate student of Security Studies in the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Project 1164 Moskva, 2009 (George Chernilevsky).

Notes:

[1] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz On War, Indexed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[2]John Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2018).

[3] The quotes from classic war strategists are in reference to and support each of the assumptions Putin made. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz On War, Indexed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).; Sun Tzu and Michael Nylan, The Art of War (New York, NY: W. W. Norton et Company, Inc, 2020).; Antoine Henri Jomini and J. D. Hittle, Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War: A Condensed Version (Cranbury, NJ: Scholar's Bookshelf, 2006).

[4] Richard Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 5-50.

[5] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz On War, Indexed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[6] Jason M. Brown, “Uploading John Boyd,” The Strategy Bridge (The Strategy Bridge, January 22, 2021),

[7] CK-12 Foundation, “Normal Force and Friction Force,” CK-12 (CK-12 Foundation, September 1, 2016).

[8] Ibid.

[9] NATO, “NATO's Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine,” NATO (NATO, February 24, 2023).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ukrainian resistance

[12] NATO, “NATO's Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine,” NATO (NATO, February 24, 2023).

[13] Michael Kofman, “The August War, Ten Years on: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War,” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018; Kurt Volker, “Where's NATO's Strong Response to Russia's Invasion of Crimea?” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2014; Kelly A. Grieco, “Testing Assumptions about the War in Ukraine, One Year Later ,” Stimson Center, February 15, 2023.

[14] Tomasz Grotnik, “Russian Carrier Kuznetsov Leaves Dry Dock... at Last,” Naval News, February 24, 2023.

[15] Basil Germond, “Ukraine: Russia's Inability to Dominate the Sea Has Changed the Course of the War,” The Conversation, February 24, 2023.

[16] Kelly A. Grieco, “Testing Assumptions about the War in Ukraine, One Year Later,” Stimson Center, February 15, 2023.

[17] Angela Dewan, “Ukraine and Russia's Militaries Are David and Goliath. Here's How They Compare,” CNN (Cable News Network, February 25, 2022).

[18] Gerry Doyle, Anurag Rao, and Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa, “How Weapons from Western Allies Are Strengthening Ukraine's Defence,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, March 10, 2023).

[19] Michael Kofman, “The August War, Ten Years on: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War,” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018.

[20] Kurt Volker, “Where's NATO's Strong Response to Russia's Invasion of Crimea?” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2014.

[21] Alison Smale and Micheal D. Shear, “Russia Is Ousted from Group of 8 by U.S. and Allies,” The New York Times (The New York Times, March 24, 2014).

[22] Reuters Person, “Factbox: How the EU Ban on Russian Oil Imports Affects Oil Flows,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, March 15, 2023).

[23] Maxim Trudolyubov, “War as Putin's New Normal,” Wilson Center (Kennan Institute, February 24, 2023).

[24] Jonathan Masters, “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, February 14, 2023).

[25] Unknown NATO, “NATO's Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine,” NATO (NATO, February 24, 2023).

[26] Roger Cohen, “War in Ukraine Has Changed Europe Forever,” The New York Times (The New York Times, February 26, 2023).

[27] “NATO,” NATO (NATO, April 3, 2008).

[28] Roger Cohen, “War in Ukraine Has Changed Europe Forever,” The New York Times (The New York Times, February 26, 2023).

[29] Ibid.

[30] “NATO,” NATO (NATO, April 3, 2008).

[31] Jonathan Masters, “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, February 14, 2023).

[32] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl Von Clausewitz On War, Indexed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).; John Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2018).

[33] Michael Kofman, “The August War, Ten Years on: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War,” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018; Kurt Volker, “Where's NATO's Strong Response to Russia's Invasion of Crimea?,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2014.

[34] Bruce Riedel, “Could Ukraine Be Putin's Afghanistan?” Brookings (Brookings, February 24, 2022).

[35] John  J. Mearsheimer and Stephen  M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing - A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016): 70–83.

[36] Ibid.