Predicting the future of warfare is at best a speculative affair. Any forecast can never be proposed with absolute certainty, no matter how robust the underlying analysis. The future is always somewhat uncertain. In fact, history is replete with examples of visionaries who have tried but failed to accurately divine the nature of change. Nonetheless, it is a necessary endeavour, because such is the cost of war today that the implications of failure can be far-reaching, even existential. From the Oracle of Delphi to the modern application of data analytics, military planners over the ages have sought greater clarity regarding the future conduct of war.[1] However, there is no crystal ball for future warfare. Instead, this essay argues that historical lessons provide the best means of determining its form, but only if they are used correctly. The context behind each case study must be carefully considered by military planners who seek to learn from the past so that the observations gathered can be accurately extrapolated onto the present situation, and the resulting lessons meaningfully applied.

Learning from the Past

The value of history as a means of informing the future conduct of war is not new. James Mattis holds that “a real understanding of history means that we face nothing new under the sun.”[2] The fundamental reason for this lies in the Clausewitzian adage that no matter the age, all wars conform to a set of universal principles that constitute its nature.[3] The great captains of the past would therefore not find the conflicts of today any more foreign conceptually than those they themselves experienced. The struggle they would have to overcome would rather be in adapting to the new means available with which to wage them.[4]

Another reason why learning from history is essential comes from the practical reality that many militaries do not engage in wars frequently. Whether due to resource constraints or an inward focus on security, such militaries go to war only as a matter of last resort. As a result, it is possible that most of their members, including the regular officer corps, would have no personal experience of war throughout their entire professional careers. History then, as argued by the influential military historian Sir Michael Howard, represents the best alternative to actual experience for the military institution to hone its craft, and by extension, to prepare for the next war.[5] The degree to which this is successful may in turn be the difference between victory and defeat

For example, while the tank was an entirely new invention that had been introduced during the First World War, the development of German armoured warfare in the interwar period saw it employed in a manner that reflected the army’s basic doctrine which had itself been refined through an objective study of Germany’s wartime experience, centering around the principles of initiative, exploitation, and manoeuvre.[6] In contrast, the French adopted a more limited study of their own experiences, influenced in part by the failure of their more offensive-minded doctrine in the war’s earlier years, and the subsequent success of a more controlled operational approach in 1918 that emphasised firepower over manoeuvre.[7] As a result, French armoured warfare developed under more narrow parameters, preventing it from being utilised to its full potential. This divergence in learning would ultimately culminate in Germany’s stunning successes against France in the early stages of the Second World War using its armour-enabled brand of manoeuvre warfare that has come to be popularly known as blitzkrieg.[8]

Yet, it should be noted that the Germans were not the pioneers on the subject of armoured warfare. That honour should go to the British, who had first employed the tank on the Somme. Unsurprisingly, they were for a time at the forefront of armoured warfare development, and their ideas would help to further refine German armoured warfare doctrine.[9] While the reasons why the British failed to hold on to their advantage go beyond the scope of this essay, it does highlight the point that learning from history is not as straightforward as it would seem. Indeed, two main pitfalls hamper the objective study of history in the conduct of war: the failure to understand context, and to extrapolate correctly. 

The Importance of Context

One of the common mistakes made when drawing lessons about war from history is a failure to fully appreciate the context of the case being studied. As suggested by Clausewitz, every age has “its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.”[10] As a result, every period has its own corresponding theory of war, derived from the conditions specific to the day. This means that while it remains true the universal principles of war lend to history’s evergreen value as a tool of instruction, there is still a need to discern the unique factors that define each conflict.

For example, while France’s building of the Maginot Line has since come to be a byword for failure, one of the key factors behind its construction was France’s declining birth rate in the interwar period, a strategic weakness that had to be considered against the relative population strength of its most likely enemy, Germany.[11] This made the construction of a system of fortifications a practical necessity to offset Germany’s numerical advantage in the event of a future conflict—France simply could not afford to match Germany’s growth in military power quantitatively.

Thus, putting aside any assessment of the Maginot Line’s ultimate utility, the decision to build it can only be fully understood when both military and non-military factors are considered. Ignoring either would result in a problematically narrow appreciation of France’s strategic conundrum at the time. And while it does not excuse France’s other strategic failings, it is necessary to prevent overly simplistic and frequently erroneous conclusions from being drawn, such as being too dismissive of the use of static fortifications, which continue to feature heavily in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.[12]

The need for a more holistic perspective is especially pertinent today given how deeply war and its causal factors have become intertwined with the social. A military cannot function outside of the structures and constraints imposed by the society in which it is embedded.[13] A study of past conflicts therefore cannot be divorced from the social forces that shaped them. Furthermore, the subjective way military success or failure is increasingly being defined requires deeper introspection into the context of victory itself to proximate how success can be achieved in future war.[14] Weapon platforms do not win wars on their own. They need to be employed in alignment with the prevailing social forces of the day.

A military cannot function outside of the structures and constraints imposed by the society in which it is embedded. A study of past conflicts therefore cannot be divorced from the social forces that shaped it.

The Risks of Extrapolation

Because no two events are identical, extrapolation is inherent when attempting to apply the lessons of past wars. The military planner must therefore discern what is useful from the case being studied, and project its relevance into the future. Paradoxically however, because the future is so filled with uncertainty, the extrapolated and actual results are prone to deviate from each other. The probability and degree of deviation is further increased when the time distance between the case study and the future point of reference is great.

Take, for example, the early airpower theorist Giulio Douhet. He drew from his experiences in the First World War and his observations of how airpower had been utilised to compose his treatise on airpower.[15] Yet, while many of his ideas remain relevant today, contemporary airpower has never fully lived up to the promise he saw in it. Unlike the more measured predictions of his intellectual peers such as William “Billy” Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard, Douhet saw airpower as the ultimate war-winning tool of the future, espousing its strategic potential. However, his conclusions were made at a time when airpower was in its infancy and assumed the inexorable progress of its supporting technologies. Advances in air defence systems which he had not foreseen ensured that the famous maxim ‘the bomber will always get through’ would not be realised in the Second World War, moderating the decisive impact he predicted airpower would have.[16] Time has also not been kind to Douhet’s ideas, with the targeting of civilian centres that he believed would bring a swift resolution to war increasingly being frowned upon by the international community.[17]

The true risk in extrapolation lies in taking expectations to the extremes. When the value of an object is overestimated, more emphasis may be accorded it than it deserves, resulting in a waste of valuable resources. The converse results in a slow adoption of what may be essential military reform. This has a flow down effect on a military’s ability to win in a future conflict as doctrine, training, and asset acquisition become locked to the extrapolated vision. Extrapolation is not made easier by the accelerated pace of technological change today. The present rate of technological advancement means that it is likely that a military professional will have to adapt to several weapon systems throughout his career.[18] Because of this, the military planner has a smaller range of historical examples to call upon, and his projection will only be valid for a decade at best, requiring constant review. There will also be a need to extrapolate across domains, as some emerging vectors of conflict, like cyber and space, have no precedent in history. For this, an appreciation of the connecting threads that hark back to war’s immutable nature is critical.

Looking into the Future

The discourse on future warfare today revolves around issues such as the threat of hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, the use of autonomous weapon systems, the militarisation of space, among many other emerging trends. And just like Douhet did in the early days of airpower, military planners today must assess the potential impact of these developments and draw the appropriate lessons, using observations from both the near and distant past to validate their findings. There are already examples of actors who have made bold predictions. For example, despite cyber power being in its relative infancy, Singapore’s establishment of the Digital and Intelligence Service has made it one of the first militaries in the world to establish an independent cyber force to operate alongside its more traditional counterparts from the domains of air, land, and sea, suggesting that it has own inherent strategic potential.[19]

While there is no single approach to how we should draw historical lessons, the above pitfalls suggest two points of caution. First, history should not be treated as a mirror for the future. While there is much it can teach, there is a danger in assuming that historical events repeat themselves in a cyclical manner. For example, many comparisons have been made between the current U.S.-China rivalry and the Cold War, but viewing the former merely as a repeat of the latter ignores the many contextual differences that require a varying set of responses.[20] Discernment must be exercised when extrapolating historical lessons into the future, taking note of unique contextual factors.[21]

Second, history must be studied in depth.[22] Studying the latest conflict is often attractive because its recency might suggest greater future relevance and there is more familiarity with the means used. However, the recency of the event also means a scarcity of available data with official sources often becoming available only years, or even decades, after its conclusion. While open-source data may be consulted as an alternative, the pervasiveness of disinformation makes it a less than reliable source, with care needed to discern fact from fiction.[23] Furthermore, if the conflict is still ongoing, drawing conclusions may be premature as events continue to unfold, sometimes with unexpected twists and turns.

The Russia-Ukraine War is a good example of this, already bearing witness to drastic fluctuations in the fortunes of both combatants in just less than a year.[24] It is therefore likely that any meaningful lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War can only be drawn postbellum as a more nuanced picture emerges following careful analysis.[25] Even better would be to compare the observations taken from the conflict with those drawn from samples across a wider timeframe, allowing for a fuller appreciation of the relevant trends and their impact. Patience and humility are therefore requisite traits for those who seek to scry the secrets of the future from the past. Nothing to come is inevitable and while history can help illuminate future pathways, the wise consult it with prudence.

Ian Li is an Associate Research Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore.

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Header Image: Sunny Night, 2018 (Hasan Almasi).

Notes:

[1] Jane Butler, Ross Coffey, Kathryn Pegues, and John Salvador, “Data Analytics in the Combatant Command: Improving the Approach to Decision-Making,” Strategy Bridge, September 6, 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/9/6/data-analytics-in-the-combatant-command-improving-the-approach-to-decision-making.

[2] Jill R. Russell, “With rifle and bibliography: General Mattis on professional reading,” Strife, May 7, 2013,

http://www.strifeblog.org/2013/05/07/with-rifle-and-bibliography-general-mattis-on-professional-reading/.

[3] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 85-89.

[4] Alex Roland, “War and Technology,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 27, 2009, https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/02/war-and-technology/.

[5] Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College 11, No. 1 (1981): 14.

[6] Williamson Murray, “Armored warfare: The British, French, and German experiences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–39.

[7] Ibid., 29–32.

[8] “The German ‘Lightning War’ Strategy Of The Second World War,” Imperial War Museums, accessed December 15, 2022, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-lightning-war-strategy-of-the-second-world-war.

[9] Azar Gat, “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality? Part I,” War in History 4, No. 2 (April 1997); Azar Gat, “British Influence and the Evolution of the Panzer Arm: Myth or Reality? Part II,” War in History 4, No. 3 (July 1997).

[10] Von Clausewitz, On War, 593.

[11] Indeed, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines it as “a defensive barrier or strategy that inspires a false sense of security”; Enno Kraehe, “The Motives behind the Maginot Line,” Military Affairs 8, No. 2 (Summer 1944): 112-113.

[12] Stephen Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver,” War on the Rocks, November 22, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukraine-and-the-future-of-offensive-maneuver/.

[13] Ian Li, “The Importance of Context for Military History and Education,” POINTER: Journal of the SAF 46, No. 2 (2020): 57-58.

[14] J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” Parameters 38, No. 2 (Summer 2008): 31-33.             

[15] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998).

[16] David Berkland, “Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and the Future of Airpower,” Defense & Security Analysis 27, No. 4 (December 2011): 389-390.

[17] Neta C. Crawford, “Targeting Civilians and U.S. Strategic Bombing Norms: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?,” in The American Way of Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from B-17s to Drones, eds. Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 64–68.

[18] Roland, “War and Technology.”

[19] “Fact Sheet: The Digital and Intelligence Service,” MINDEF Singapore, last modified October 28, 2022,

https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2022/October/28oct22_fs.

[20] Ian Li, “The U.S.-China Rivalry as Seen in the Cold War’s Rear-View Mirror,” Strategy Bridge, October 1, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/10/1/the-us-china-rivalry-as-seen-in-the-cold-wars-rear-view-mirror.

[21] Frank Hoffman, “Learning Large Lessons from Small Wars,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/02/learning-large-lessons-from-small-wars/.

[22] Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” 14.

[23] Julie Jargon, “How to Tell News Fact from Fiction, Even During a War,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-spot-fake-news-even-during-a-war-11646434626.

[24] Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver.”

[25] William Leben, “Let’s hold our horses on drawing lessons from war in Ukraine,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 19, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/lets-hold-our-horses-on-drawing-lessons-from-war-in-ukraine/.