Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century. Alexander Lanoszka. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

In this welcome addition to the literature on alliances, international relations scholar Alexander Lanoszka makes an optimistic case for the continued salience of the U.S.-led alliance system. In his two-hundred-page study, he reviews the most common areas that past studies have focused on: alliance formation, fears of entrapment and abandonment, burden-sharing, warfare, and alliance termination.

Accessible to both graduate students and seasoned authors on alliances, the book provides a compendium of theoretical support and criticism for alliances from international relations scholars.

The most useful element of the book is its detailed survey of the theoretical literature of the international relations sub-field. Evincing no preference for a single model, he approaches the broad range of arguments in each of the five areas and weighs the respective strengths and weaknesses, most often finding weakness in traditional international relations school models. Such criticism is as applicable to Stephen Walt’s theory on the origins of alliances[1] as it is to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein’s use of constructivism.[2] Accessible to both graduate students and seasoned authors on alliances, the book provides a compendium of theoretical support and criticism for alliances from international relations scholars.

Lanoszka takes a broad historicist approach, wherein it is stressed that each individual case should be studied on its own merits; this is quite helpful. This view is put most succinctly in the chapter on termination, where Lanoszka targets monocausal explanations and instead argues, “Each type of alliance [termination] has its own logic, thereby complicating any effort to provide a unified account of why or how any one alliance begins, endures, and ends.”[3] Much commentary on alliances offers less of an objective review of history, but rather a theory-driven philosophy of history. Former Czech President Václav Havel was a particularly apt example, in the case of NATO, of placing it not as a military alliance but as part of the broader, Western liberal international project, “one of the guarantors of human and civic freedom in the whole sphere of Euro-Atlantic civilisation.”[4]

Political scientist Francis Fukuyama and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul continue in this vein in arguing NATO expansion was not so much about the expansion of a security umbrella, but rather that the alliance “offered Western multilateral connectivity to the new democracies in eastern and central Europe and served as a bridge as they prepared bids to join the EU.”[5] Other authors take the converse view. The offensive realist scholar John Mearsheimer is perhaps the archetype of alliance criticism in the modern era, predicting both the disintegration of NATO in 1990[6] and pinning the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the alliance’s expansion.[7] Lanoszka avoids this ideological philosophizing, and instead pursues his assessment of what makes alliances form, continue, and terminate.

Lanoszka begins with an exacting definition for an alliance: “arrangements made between two or more sovereign states on the basis of a written treaty that serves to coordinate military policy toward at least one common goal.”[8] With a political scientist’s desire for precision, this definition strictly limits the study to formal treaty allies.

Over the course of the book, a specific difference is made between those allies with firm security guarantees, such as NATO or Japan, and those without such a guarantee, such as Israel and Taiwan.

This definition offers points with which to contend. Firstly, Lanoszka’s focus on formal treaty alliances, expressed through a metaphor of alliances as a marriage and security partnerships as just dating, overstates the line between alliances and partnerships. Lanoszka’s metaphor that “we distinguish between dating and marriage when we discuss romantic relations because they entail different expectations and obligations. We should make similar distinctions with respect to international security cooperation.”[9] However, and in keeping with this metaphor, if an individual is known for abandoning or cheating on each of their previous dating partners, would others not be worried about the same behavior within the marriage? The salience of this problem can be seen following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Syria in 2019, leaving behind their Kurdish partners. In the aftermath, other allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia expressed concerns that this could signal a broader trend of unreliable security commitments.[10]

Secondly, the author does not hold strictly to his own definition. Over the course of the book, a specific difference is made between those allies with firm security guarantees, such as NATO or Japan, and those without such a guarantee, such as Israel and Taiwan. This definition however only broadly refers to coordinating military policy, which does not necessarily delimit less firm partnerships. This difference goes beyond pedantry about definitions but impacts the case selection of the remainder of the book.

There are also some notable exclusions from the book, particularly for a work with an analytical focus on the twenty-first century. First and foremost, is Afghanistan. Declared a Major Non-NATO ally (MNNA) by the United States in 2012, there is little mention outside of the combat aspects of the International Security Assistance Force. It is notable that arguably one of the West’s most resource intensive and high-intensity efforts in the past thirty years receives so little attention. This is the case for each of the nineteen MNNAs. This designation, which does not necessarily entail an explicitly written security commitment (for example Israel and Taiwan are MNNAs), would add a layer of complexity to the analysis. Consider also that the U.S. Arms Export Control Act does not make an explicit difference between NATO and MNNA states.[11] For example, why would a treaty ally such as Japan or South Korea seek MNNA status when they already have an existing treaty? Might extending MNNA status create expectations of a security commitment even if one is not written explicitly? What is the reputational cost of not meeting this expectation?

This study is also limited by its meager engagement with the bureaucratic elements of alliances. While there is some mention of bureaucracy in relation to Wallander’s theories explaining NATO’s persistence after the Cold War, it is overly limited to the area of curbs on alliance termination.[12] Each of the five theoretical areas identified by Lanoszka are impacted by bureaucratic dynamics. International and military secretariats play significant internal roles in assuring allies against fears of abandonment or entrapment, play an administrative role in burden-sharing, and are often instrumental in the conduct of warfare.

 Lanoszka places himself among the modern optimists about alliances, most particularly NATO.

The bureaucratic lens offers an angle for a more rigorous comparative studies approach that Military Alliances lacks. An underutilized set of cases for comparison are the three U.S.-led regional security pacts of the Cold War, NATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as the Baghdad Pact). There has been some study, though dedicated efforts of comparison are quite scarce and generally limited. Lanoszka’s five areas of focus would provide an interesting frame for such a comparison, particularly as only one, NATO, survived the Cold War. Intriguingly, there is an existing entry point for scholarship. Part IV.A.1 of United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, otherwise known as the Pentagon Papers, is a detailed, 51-page comparison of SEATO with NATO.[13] This study provides insight into the role of structured secretariats in alliance outcomes. SEATO, unlike NATO, included only a small secretariat based in Bangkok, which left SEATO with fewer resources than the North Atlantic alliance. Additionally, it was unable to manage the divergence of member differences related to Vietnam, perhaps unsurprising in an alliance with members as varied as the United States, France, South Korea and Pakistan. The report itself notes, “The conflict in Vietnam is a crucible for SEATO; the future of the alliance will be profoundly affected by the outcome of the war.” Given its failure in the Vietnam War, this is an interesting comparative case, not only in the Cold War context, but also when considered alongside the more recent alliance experience of NATO in Afghanistan.

 This work provides a frame to consider other puzzles in strategic studies.

In his final conclusions, Lanoszka places himself among the modern optimists about alliances, most particularly NATO. Recent books on the alliance can be neatly summarized by one of Lanoszka’s concluding remarks, “Dysfunction is a permanent feature of alliance politics, not a temporary bug.”[14] Mark Webber, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith in their 2021 work What’s Wrong with NATO and How to Fix It[15] centers around a similar argument, as do Jussi Hanhimäki’s[16] and Timothy Sayle’s recent books on NATO.[17] That dysfunction is a feature rather than a bug is often the core logic of the optimists. This is in stark contrast to other recent works from the more pessimistic school, including Ted Galen Carpenter’s NATO: Dangerous Dinosaur[18] and Walt’s broader work targeting liberalism’s failings.[19]

This work provides a frame to consider other puzzles in strategic studies. Why might Russia and China develop a formalized treaty relationship? Why not? Fears of entrapment or abandonment and expected issues related to burden-sharing or warfare could be central to this puzzle. This is only one question going into the future. There are myriad questions related to how states may organize themselves in the face of shared challenges.

Newly developing research can find itself at a loss for objective scholarship to ground further study of the U.S.-led alliance system. It must consider Lord Palmerston’s speech in the House of Commons to ground them: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”[20] Whichever side of the divide scholarship may find itself on, that is not the point of Lanoszka’s contribution. In the end, and despite its shortcomings, the book reminds us to be wary of universalistic theories and to judge cases based on their individual merits and to be mindful of the salience of national interests in even the closest alliances. 

Davis Ellison is a Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a PhD Candidate in the King’s College London Department of War Studies. His research is on civil-military relations within and between NATO’s institutions. This review essay reflects the views of the author alone and not those of any institution referred to within this article.

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Header Image: Opening ceremony for Exercise Saber Strike at the Pabrade Training Area, Lithuania, June 8, 2015. (Sgt Paul Peterson/USMC Photo)

Notes:

[1] Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[2] Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607.

[3] Alexander Lanoszka, Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022), 166.

[4] Václav Havel, To the Castle and Back (New York: Random House Publishing, 2008), 303.

[5] Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul, “Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007-08): 23-45.

[6] John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56.

[7] John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October 2014): 77-89.

[8] Lanoszka, 13-14.

[9] Lanoszka, 15.

[10] Layla Quran and Bryan Wood, “Why the U.S. decision in Syria has left some allies anxious,” PBS Newshour, October 25, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-the-u-s-decision-in-syria-has-left-some-of-their-allies-anxious.

[11] Arms Control Export Act, Public Law 90-629 (2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1061/pdf/COMPS-1061.pdf.

[12] Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705-735.

[13] “NATO and SEATO: A Comparison,” in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Part IV.A.1, ed. Leslie Gelb (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1969).

[14] Lanoszka, 198.

[15] Mark Webber, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith, What’s Wrong with NATO and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021).

[16] Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Pax Transatlantica: America and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[17] Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).

[18] Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO: Dangerous Dinosaur (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019).

[19] Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Macmillan, 2018).

[20] “Lord Palmerston 1784–1865,” in Oxford Essential Quotations Fourth Edition, ed. Susan Ratcliffe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).