The recent coups in sub-Saharan Africa have ushered in a new era in civil-military relations in the Francophone states of the continent. While military intervention and insurgency have long been a feature of politics in the region since decolonization, the quick succession of regime change and the seizure of power by a new generation of juntas against long standing personalist dictatorships suggests a break in previous political patterns. And this is especially true in light of assumptions that have informed thinking since the Third Wave of Democratization at the end of the Cold War.[1]

Put simply, over the last three decades many states had gone the way of electoral authoritarianism or personalist rule, rather than continue the older and more precarious tradition of military regimes.[2] This state of affairs seems to be changing. Previous studies on coup dynamics can helpfully inform our understanding of this moment, but the new, cascade-like contagion of military-led regime-changes requires an analytic approach that is sensitive to the specific conditions of the geopolitical environment and internal domestic transformations operating in the region today.

To that end, we can shed light on the contemporary phenomenon unfolding in parts of West and Central Africa today by emphasizing two relevant conceptual dimensions that interact with each other. First, the internal guardianship self-perception of institutionalized and semi-institutionalized armed forces in the relevant states.[3] Second, the deep and abiding concentration of multigenerational resentment at foreign influence (in this case, specifically French post-colonial quasi-hegemony).[4]

Self-perceptions of a guardianship role for the armed forces mixed with decades of resentment has crystalized specifically within the officer corps of a range of Francophone African states. And this combination has been, perhaps surprisingly, supported by important elements within the urban poor and middle-classes. Yet this sharply and specifically motivated discontent has only been activated recently, and has been operationalized into critical, regime-defying political expression due to a rapidly shifting geopolitical context. Indeed, broader uncertainty surrounding the international state system and the flagging relative primacy of Western states and institutions has opened a new, political opportunity structure in which non-French alternatives to security have become at least symbolically available.

Intriguingly, all of this can be profitably conceptualized through recourse to the mid-20th century label of praetorianism. The praetorian framework was popularized by the eminent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, in parallel with several French theorists of the state in the 1950s and 1960s.[5] Concisely put, the praetorian state is one in which political groups fight each other directly for power, rather than through mediating institutions, and in which armed organizations hold a significant advantage due to their relative professionalism and self-conception vis-à-vis weakly institutionalized but mobilized political structures and are able to use independent political power to achieve their aims.[6] As a result, praetorianism is sustained military intervention in civilian politics, unbarred from prior norms of restraint, divide-and-conquer coup-proofing, or either subjective or objective control.

The focus on praetorianism in Africa, which had once been a core concern of political-military analysis in the 1960s and 1970s, receded in the subsequent decades. This diminution in the application of the concept was due to the consolidation of a variety of personalist dictatorships in the wake of military coups and counter-coups of the prior era, as well as the survival and evolution of many former single-party nationalist regimes into dominant-party regimes (which still maintained an overall authoritarian character).[7] The number of coups across Africa declined precipitously after the end of the Cold War, and outside of the Arab world (which continued to experience significant military rule), a transition to either personalist or party-based authoritarianism—or electoral democracy—has been the modal outcome.

The new era represents a return to the praetorian dynamic, in which militaries are intervening ever more frequently in the affairs of sclerotic and underperforming personalist or oligarchic-electoral authoritarian regimes. This article surveys this reality, and suggests that the model of a self-perceived guardianship claim interacting with deep-seated resentment at decades of post-colonial influence from the metropole explains the cascade of regime-changes across Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. Yet this is only possible due to a new political opportunity structure disfavoring long-standing elites and old imperial legacy security provisions.

Inherent Civil-Military Antagonism

In a system with competing power centers, relations can often become antagonistic. Carl Schmitt’s concept of friend/enemy distinction views all political struggles as consisting of a bipolarity.[8] This bipolarity is equally applicable to civil-military relations, especially in cases where one is not unquestionably subordinate to the other. Institutional separations coupled with distinct interests can heighten these antagonistic tensions. One type of enemy is the internal enemy that must be fought and destroyed rather than the enemy that can be negotiated with and tolerated. Civil-military relations can become so strained that the military leadership ends up viewing the civilian leadership as an internal enemy that is unacceptable. In stable regimes, civil-military relations can remain generally rivalrous. In unstable ones, however, this antagonism reaches new heights whereby each ends up viewing the other as an existential threat in what is perceived as a zero-sum competition for power.

In his work The Soldier and the State, Huntington argues, “The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power.”[9] However, this creates an inherent contradiction in unstable states, such as those sub-Saharan states that have suffered from terrorism and insurgent warfare:

 “The subjective definition of civilian control presupposes a conflict between civilian control and the needs of military security…The steps necessary to achieve military security are thus viewed as undermining civilian control. On the other hand, the effort to enhance civilian control in the subjective sense frequently undermined military security.”[10]

Weakening militaries, possibly in pursuit of regime survival and wanting to coup-proof their system, makes it harder for civilian elites to manage security challenges effectively, which in turn creates tensions with military officers. Meanwhile, simply being unable to provide security, even if not intentionally seeking to weaken the armed forces, can also produce the same effects.

Resentment can be defined as a subjective feeling of discontent caused by either real or perceived marginalization. Unstable regimes, which are at risk of collapse due to either internal or external pressures, have a smaller reservoir of power that can be shared by their very nature. As with any resource, the less there is of it, the fiercer the competition over it becomes. The greater the instability, the more existential the struggle becomes. In the case of countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, a confluence of factors has meant that civilian conduct and failures have produced resentment. This frustration, coupled with growing terrorist violence, has enabled militaries to seize powers and upend the pre-existing civil-military relationship status quo. Foreign interference, worsening security, and deteriorating civil-military ties all contribute to the shrinking of the reservoir of power, intensifying the battle for authority.

French Hegemony as a Source of Resentment

External actors, whether intentionally or not, can provoke resentment through their mere presence. In Francophone Africa, high levels of dependency on France by political rulers has resulted in the civilian elites being viewed by the military as an oligarchic elite captured by the French or enabling French economic interests to remain dominant, which in turn has generated generational grievances.[11] In the face of entrenched inequalities, whether ethnic or regional or defined by some other identity markers, militaries tend to enable greater levels of social mobility. Upwardly mobile officer classes are particularly susceptible to the feeling of resentment, and the feeling that in an extraordinary situation they can actually do something about it.

The recent spate of coups in the Sahel region have often been accompanied by anti-French sentiments. The new military leaders, as well as a large part of the citizenry, have framed their coups in the context of resentment against French neo-colonialism, often symbolized by the large French military presence in their countries. These coups stand in contrast to previous French-backed ones. In the recent cases of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the expulsion of French forces is often framed as a reclaiming of national sovereignty. Following France’s President Emmanuel Macron announcement that French troops would leave Niger, Niamey’s new rulers issued a statement noting that “we are celebrating this new step towards Niger’s sovereignty,” describing the departure as “a historic moment.”[12]

Resentment in the region comes in two distinct yet connected forms. French military presence has created discontent but so has the civilian willingness to enable it. In his speech at the second Russia-Africa summit, Burkina Faso’s interim president Ibrahim Traoré expressed his view that “[w]hat is the problem are African heads of state who contribute nothing to these people who are fighting, but who sing the same song as the imperialists, calling us militias, calling us men who don’t respect human rights.”[13]

Seizure of power does not necessarily result in the immediate abatement of resentment, which can in fact carry on and become a guiding force in a military junta’s entrenchment. A recent example has been the debacle surrounding France’s ambassador to Niger. Following the ouster of President Bazoum, the new rulers in Niamey insisted on the departure of French military forces and its ambassador. Instead of accepting the new status quo, Macron refused to recognize the new government and resisted pressure to withdraw his emissary and troops. While Macron eventually relented, this brazen disregard of the military’s wish not only further deepened the military’s resentment but also strengthened popular hatred of all things French, resulting in the military’s resentment becoming widely shared with the general populace.

Guardianship as a Praetorian Prerequisite

Armed forces are often viewed both by themselves and society at large as playing a unique role in society, namely as a guardian.[14] This self-perception has resulted in frequent military interventions in domestic politics.Civilianized governments, by excluding the armed forces from political decision making may risk exacerbating resentment. Exclusion during times of crises in particular can worsen the relationship. This combination of self-perception as protectors of the nation from foreign and domestic threats along with a sense of alienation from civilian leaders creates a particular hostile civil-military relationship. By being cut out from a traditional role that they may have grown accustomed to, the challenge to the military’s power may increasingly seem existential.

In unstable states, existential threats may be confronted through extra-constitutional means. Successful military coups often combine resentments internal to the military and wider social discontent held by the wider citizenry. Oftentimes, such coups can be described, as Nadine Olafsson does, “as acts of social justice.”[15] A defense of the population from the threat or danger that the civilian leadership is seen as posing can be a trigger. In 2023 Mali’s new rulers declared 14 January “National Day of Recovered Sovereignty.”[16] This was a patriotic commemoration of the one year anniversary of popular protests in response to the threat of sanctions by the French-backed Economic Community of West African States. While not explicitly targeting a previous civilian government, albeit neighboring ones, it did build on the idea that national sovereignty was defended by the people and the military, not a civilian authority. It reinforces the notion that even in violating a constitution, the military remains the ideological guardian of the nation. Similarly, the establishment of the Alliance of Sahelian States by Ougadogou, Bamako, and Niamey has further signaled the perceived legitimacy of the military as the ultimate source of sovereignty.

Military juntas, such as those in Latin America, can often be non-ideological or define themselves by their opposition to a particular ideology, such as communism. In Francophone Africa, however, guardianship is itself the ideology, protecting the country from its direct enemies, such as Islamist rebels, or their indirect ones, such as incompetent or self-interested civilian rulers. Following the ousting of President Bazoum, General Abdourahamane Tiani did not declare himself the new president of the Republic of Niger but rather as “president of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland,” arguing that his civilian predecessor tried to convince the populace that “all is going well… [but] the harsh reality (is) a pile of dead, displaced, humiliation and frustration.” [17]

A military guardian self-identity compels armed forces in unstable states to intervene in politics, producing a praetorian state of affairs. In his article focusing on praetorianism in former British colonies in West Africa, Claude E. Welch found that a key factor was the “precipitous declines in the legitimacy and effectiveness of civilian governments.”[18] This actually creates a reinforcing cycle, since ineffective governments produce resentment while simultaneously becoming more vulnerable to military coups. In the case of contemporary Francophone Africa, civilian failures to combat terrorism while simultaneously often producing non-power sharing regimes have created the necessary conditions and incentives for praetorianism to emerge.

Changing International Environment

While military resentment is by no means new in postcolonial Francophone Africa, changing circumstances both regionally and globally have allowed it to play a significant role in the militaries’ growing assertiveness. Over a century of colonial or neocolonial hegemony has rapidly given way. Unlike before, the region’s military leaders have greater room to maneuver with a smaller risk of backlash. During the Cold War, popular souverainiste political figures like Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara or the Congo’s Patrice Lumumba were easily replaced through force, either directly or indirectly, and replaced by more compliant and pro-Western—usually pro-French—leaders.

In the 2020s, however, new actors have appeared on the scene. The Russian Federation along with its Wagner fighters were seen as viable alternatives to the French military.[19] Economically, China’s astonishing development along with its active role in building Africa’s infrastructure without any strings attached to domestic politics has made Beijing more attractive than Paris. Multipolarity, as well as a growing willingness more broadly in the Global South to resist perceived hegemony of the Global North, alters the framework in which resentment is understood. Previously, military leaders may have been resentful but unwilling to act on it due to the absence of a potential support structure, which could manifest itself in the forms of counter-coups or foreign interventions. Now, however, the previous check that maintained the civil-military balance has been removed in favor of the latter.

Despite being governed by a civilian government, the Central African Republic has come to represent a potential pathway that is not dependent on old colonial masters. With Moscow’s backing, Bangui has been able to push back rebels while throwing off the yoke of Paris.[20] The Russian presence has attracted much attention, both by faraway observers as well as neighboring military officers. Notably, neither Russian nor Russian-backed groups have played a direct role in military coups in recent years in Africa. However, their proximity and willingness to aid post-coup governments have changed the internal calculus with direct consequences for civil-military relations.

Roman Emperor Septimius Severus’ final advice for his sons and successors was, “Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and scorn all others.”[21] In recent years, however, several Francophone African countries have had governments that were discordant, causing a feeling of scorn among the soldiers while enriching the civilian elites. A failure to recognize the fundamental antagonism that exists in civil-military relations in unstable states while losing legitimacy due to worsening violence and dependency/alignment with France has turned civilian governments into easy targets. An ingrained sense of guardianship, intensified by growing resentment, coupled with a changing international milieu has given military officers across the region both the motivation and the capacity.

Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom is a doctoral student at the University of Cambridge and a former guest researcher at the Swedish Defence University, Université libre de Bruxelles, and the Hans Blix Centre at Stockholm University. His research focuses primarily on post-war military and diplomatic history and he writes widely on contemporary security policy and international affairs.

Dr. Julian G. Waller is a Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses and a Professorial Lecturer in Political Science at George Washington University. His research areas include authoritarian politics, illiberal ideological dynamics, Russian strategic decision-making, and political-military affairs. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of his employers or affiliated institutions.

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Header Image: Flags of the African Union member states. (GCIS)

Notes:

[1] Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

[2] Morse, Yonatan L. "From single-party to electoral authoritarian regimes: The institutional origins of competitiveness in post-Cold War Africa." Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2015): 126-151; Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa." World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994): 453-489.

[3] Kandil, Hazem. “Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change: Explaining the Power Triangle” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2021.

[4] Hunter, Lance Y, Josh Rutland, and Zachary King, “Leaving the Barracks: Military Coups in Developing Democracies,” Politics & Policy, Volume 48, Issue 6, 2020, pp. 1080.

[5] Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, foreword by Francis Fukuyama, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996

[6] ​​Perlmutter, Amos. “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities.” Comparative Politics 1, No. 3, 1969, pp. 382–404.

[7] Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

[8] Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007

[9] Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1967, pp. 84

[10] Ibid.

[11] Gerits, Frank, “La France en Afrique: pourquoi les politiques de Macron ont accru la méfiance et la colère,” The Conversation, 7 September 2023, url: https://theconversation.com/la-france-en-afrique-pourquoi-les-politiques-de-macron-ont-accru-la-mefiance-et-la-colere-212988

[12] “Niger : le régime militaire « célèbre une nouvelle étape vers la souveraineté »” Le Point, 25 September 2023, url: https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/niger-le-regime-militaire-celebre-une-nouvelle-etape-vers-la-souverainete-25-09-2023-2536722_24.php#11

[13] ‘“A slave who cannot assume his own revolt does not deserve to be pitied,” says Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso,’ Peoples Dispatch, 2 August 2023, url: https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/08/02/a-slave-who-cannot-assume-his-own-revolt-does-not-deserve-to-be-pitied-says-ibrahim-traore-of-burkina-faso/

[14]  J. Patrice Mcsherry, “The Emergence of “Guardian Democracy”,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 32:3, pp. 16-24, 1998

[15] Olafsson, Nadine, “When Military Coups d'état Become Acts of Social Justice,” E-International Relations, 17 January 2020, url: https://www.e-ir.info/2020/01/17/when-military-coups-detat-become-acts-of-social-justice/

[16] “Journée nationale de la souveraineté retrouvée,” Secrétariat Géneral du Gouvernement, 2023, url: https://sgg-mali.ml/fr/actualites/90/journe-nationale-de-la-souverainet-retrouve.html,

[17] “Niger's General Abdourahamane Tiani declares himself leader after coup,” France 24, 28 July 2023, url: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230728-niger-s-general-abdourahamane-tchiani-declared-new-leader-following-coup-state-tv

[18] Welch, Claude E., “Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 1972), pp. 207

[19] Habtom, Naman Karl-Thomas, “The Potential Consequences for Africa of an FTO Designation of the Wagner Group,” Lawfare, 6 March 2023, url: https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/potential-consequences-africa-fto-designation-wagner-group

[20] Lechner, John, Are Russian mercenaries bad for the Central African Republic? Responsible Statecraft, 11 April 2023, url: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/04/11/are-russian-mercenaries-bad-for-the-central-african-republic/

[21] Cassius Dio, Roman History, Book LXXVII.