Stephen M. Saideman, Philippe Lagassé, and David Auerswald

In most democracies, legislatures have far less oversight power over their militaries than we might expect. The U.S. Congress and its relationship with the American armed forces is the exception, rather than the rule. Indeed, many legislatures around the world lack some of the basic instruments required to understand what their armed forces are doing, notably security clearances, subpoena power, and adequate staffing. In this article, we address the hypothesized role for legislatures in democratic civil-military relations and then demonstrate that many bodies fall short of what scholars might expect based on theories derived from the American case. We then focus on two key factors that shape whether a legislature will be a relevant actor in a democracy’s civil-military relations: the number and scope of committees charged with defense oversight and executive control over them.

The Role Legislatures Could Play in Civil-Military Relations

Democracies face a common challenge in contemporary international relations: how to ensure transparency and accountability at home while competing against authoritarian regimes.[1] Legislative oversight is one way to finesse this contradiction—that the public may not be able to directly monitor the executive branch, but legislators do so on its behalf, as in the American case. The U.S. Congress matters greatly in American civil-military relations, because it has access to information, the willingness to engage in oversight, and the power to use that information in ways that are meaningful to the executive branch and the armed forces. The U.S. Congress has at least six committees that conduct some form of oversight of U.S. national defense agencies. Committee members have security clearances, sizable staffs composed of experts, and can, in theory, compel witness testimony and subpoena documents. Prior to the dramatic polarization in Congress over the past 20 years, the localized nature of candidate selection and the traditional weakness of party discipline permitted Representatives and Senators to exercise oversight powers.[2] Today, legislative oversight increasingly depends on partisan control of each congressional chamber. Finally, Congress can use the information it gathers to influence the defense budget, alter defense policy through legislation, and confirm or reject the appointment and promotions of military officers and senior defense officials. The latter is getting much attention lately due to Senator Tommy Tuberville’s blocking of hundreds of promotions.[3] The key here is that congressional oversight powers put the Congress into the heads of military officers and those in the Department of Defense before, during, and after they act.

The American case might suggest that significant legislative oversight over the armed forces is normal in democracies, but, as we found in our research, the norm is actually one of much weaker scrutiny by most legislatures.

In a comparison of fifteen democracies in North and South America, East Asia, Oceania, and Europe, we found that only the German Bundestag has a legislature with as much information, interest, and influence as the U.S. Congress. While it may seem obvious that having access to classified information would be necessary for a defense committee to do its job, many members of many defense committees have no access. Most defense committees also have very small staffs compared with the U.S. Congress. Of the democracies we studied, only the Bundestag has an impact on line-items in the defense budget akin to that of the American legislature. When we interviewed members of the Chilean Congress, they were focused on trying to learn how much was being spent on the military, not on influencing the spending. When we asked members of the various militaries if they considered the legislature as an overseer, whether the Parliament or Congress was in their heads when making decisions, most said no or not much.

Our study focused on three attributes that together produce oversight: whether legislators have access to information, whether they are willing to engage in oversight, and whether they could use the information in ways that would get the attention of the military and the executive. The table below summarizes what we found via interviews in each of these countries.

Explaining Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces

Our initial hunch was that there were key differences among different types of democracies. We believed that Westminster (British-style) parliaments, European parliamentary systems, and congresses in presidential systems should behave differently. Our research quickly disabused us of that notion. We found significant oversight variation within each regime type, and that two key factors mattered across all of these systems: the number and focus of legislative oversight bodies and executive control of these bodies. In other words, who is supposed to be overseeing the military and how much discretion do they have to do it?

Defense committees are given most of the legislative responsibilities to oversee the armed forces in democracies, but many countries do not have a dedicated defense committee. In several democracies, the relevant committee is a combined Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. This does not necessarily result in weak oversight; the Foreign and Defense Committees of the French and Australia Senates, for instance, conduct greater oversight than does Canada’s dedicated National Defence Committee of the House of Commons. That said, in other cases, defense is often treated as a secondary consideration in these mixed committees, leading to weaker oversight.

In some democracies, legislators do not need to conduct oversight because alternative actors do it for them. The extra-parliamentary Swedish Defense Commission is an example of such an actor. The point is that alternative oversight mechanisms allow parliamentarians to focus on other issues instead of oversight. In such places, there may not be less oversight overall, but it will be performed by unelected agents rather than legislators. In other cases, we found government actors that empowered legislative oversight in a complementary fashion. Germany’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, for example, is a super-ombuds position selected by the Bundestag’s defense committee with the charge of reporting its findings directly to the committee.

The second question focuses on whether the executive can muzzle legislative overseers, as no President or Prime Minister wants to be exposed to criticism. Strong executive control means weak legislative oversight. This factor helps to explain why presidentialism, systems where the head of government is not selected by the legislature but by the public, did not produce the outcomes we expected from institutional rivalry between the president and legislature. Some presidential systems are actually hyper-presidential, where the executive branch utterly dominates the legislature.[5] We found low oversight in these countries, as is the case in Brazil and Chile. Westminster systems vary more than we expected, as party discipline in Canada and New Zealand usually squelches oversight, whereas greater backbench independence in the United Kingdom and the lack of a government majority in the Australian upper house allows oversight to thrive. Coalition politics in European parliaments produces varying levels of oversight. Parties in a governing coalition will want some oversight if their party does not control the defense portfolio, since scandals will hurt all parties in the coalition. At the same time, they do not want too much scrutiny since any bad news will rebound against them. It is not surprising that many of our moderate cases, such as Belgium, Finland, and Norway, fit into this category.

Conclusion

The big takeaway is that there is far less legislative oversight over militaries around the world than one might expect. Even in those places where military overreach led to catastrophe, such as pre-World War II Japan, there are far fewer legislative guardians guarding the guardians. The American example does not help us understand how civil-military relations works in most democracies, given that the U.S. Congress has more power and influence than other legislatures, save for the German Bundestag. Instead, we found significant variation in legislative oversight across democracies.

Reforms do not have to be heroic to improve legislative oversight. Establishing a dedicated defense committee and granting members access to classified information would go a long way to improving oversight, without involving major constitutional change. For those countries with non-parliamentary oversight institutions, we suggest building connections between those and legislative defense committees so that the latter is empowered rather than disincentivized. Finally, in countries where legislators see themselves as party loyalist first and parliamentarians second, effective legislative oversight may remain frustratingly out of reach. Asking tightly disciplined parties in Canada and elsewhere to loosen their control of committees would likely be fruitless. As partisanship and polarization take over American politics, in fact, our study suggests that even congressional oversight may weaken as a result.[6]

Stephen M. Saideman is the Paterson Chair of International Affairs at Carleton University, Director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network, and co-host of the Battle Rhythm podcast. His address at various social media outlets is @smsaideman. 

Philippe Lagassé is the Barton Chair of International Affairs at Carleton University. He provided independent, third party oversight of major Canadian defence procurements from 2012-2022. 

David Auerswald is a Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. This review essay reflects his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Flags of NATO Countries (University of Notre Dame)

Notes:

[1] Michael P. Colaresi, Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National Security (Oxford University Press, 2014).

[2] Linda L. Fowler, Watchdogs On The Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of US Foreign Relations (Princeton University Press, 2015).

[3] To be clear, Tuberville is using this power to push the Biden administration to change its policies regarding abortion, not because he is seeking to correct military misbehavior that he learned via oversight. All the same, he has a power that most legislators around the world do not, as few legislatures have any role in the promotion of senior officers. See Erin B. Logan, “Tommy Tuberville’s Blockade On Military Promotions, Explained,” Los Angeles Times, September 6th, 2023, https://www.latimes.com/politics/newsletter/2023-09-06/tuberville-military-promotion-block-abortion-biden-essential-politics.

[4] For coding, see our article David Auerswald, Philippe Lagassé, and Stephen M Saideman, "Some Assembly Required: Explaining Variations in Legislative Oversight over the Armed Forces," Foreign Policy Analysis 19, no. 1 (2023).

[5] David Samuels and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidents, Parties, And Prime Ministers : How The Separation Of Powers Affects Party Organization And Behavior (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents And Assemblies : Constitutional Design And Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/91045043.html. Gary W Cox and Scott Morgenstern, "Latin America's reactive assemblies and proactive presidents," Comparative Politics  (2001); and  Marcelo Alegre and Nahuel Maisley, 'Presidentialism and Hyper-Presidentialism in Latin America', in Conrado Hübner Mendes, Roberto Gargarella, and Sebastián Guidi (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Constitutional Law in Latin America (2022; online edn, Oxford Academic, 13 Jan. 2022),.

[6] Linda L Fowler, Watchdogs On The Hill: The Decline Of Congressional Oversight Of US Foreign Relations (Princeton University Press, 2015).