Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East. Steven Simon. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2023.

American overreach in the Middle East since the Iranian revolution is examined by Steven Simon in his new book Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East.[1] Simon reviews more than four decades of American endeavors in the region from the perspective of eight presidential administrations ranging from Jimmy Carter to Joe Biden. The book’s chapters illuminate cabinet-level thinking on vexing national security issues: Iranian influence in the Levant in the 1980s, the response to the U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, the Persian Gulf War, the unsolvable Israel-Palestine quandary, and the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein and the resultant chaos in Iraq and Syria.

Simon, a former diplomat and policy advisor with deep experience in American Middle East policy, skewers the catastrophic choices made by one administration after another. The author’s experiences allow him to go  inside many of these decisions, revealing the motivations, assumptions, and often broad confusion underlying the few triumphs and many blunders. Simon’s explanation of the sad specter of America’s war in Vietnam War and its role in shaping policy in the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations is illuminating. Simon served in these administrations and observed the role of American sentiment and memory of that war in adjudicating policy in the Middle East. Simon also cleverly demonstrates, in revealing fashion, the surprising similarities between American presidential administrations in dealing with Iran. Many of the chapters are full of critical analysis and the kind of insight only someone involved in the decision-making can offer. In particular, the author’s insight on the Clinton administration’s development of the Oslo Accords is largely unavailable elsewhere.[2]

In the end, however, the book is not quite the sum of its parts and falls short of delivering a conclusive perspective, a comprehensive view, or a broad set of proposed policies. In focusing on his own observations and role in making decisions about American policy in the Middle East, the author does not go far enough to provide the kind of insight the book proposes to offer. Indeed, the narrow focus and the failure to provide alternative perspectives, particularly regarding the American response to a complex region’s deeply entrenched divides, ultimately diminishes the depth of the book’s insights.

A View of Misguided Ambition in the Middle East

Grand Delusion tends to oversimplify the multifaceted issues facing the Middle East. Simon frequently reduces complex geopolitical, cultural, and historical dynamics to convenient explanations. Some of these reductions seem to be a stylistic decision: Simon appears to want to get in and out of critical moments quickly to move the narrative along. This makes sense, given that there are many books covering in detail the major events he glosses over such as the Iranian hostage crisis, the Persian Gulf War, the rise of ISIS,  and more.  

At times, however, Simon seems to intentionally limit the material presented to that which fits his narrative. This reductive approach hinders the reader's understanding of the intricate and often contradictory motivations behind various actions. For example, he attributes the failure of the Arab Spring entirely to American mismanagement and lack of understanding.[3] This section of the book does not consider the domestic factors, historical legacies, and geopolitical interests that shaped the outcomes of the movement in different countries. By neglecting the complex interplay between external and internal dynamics, Simon's analysis falls short of a full exploration of the events he describes.

Throughout, Simon consistently reinforces his argument that American ambition in the Middle East has been inherently flawed and misguided, even when it does not make sense to do so. For example, Simon dismisses the development of an international coalition that defeated ISIS through a combination of precision airstrikes and ground assaults–a rare and remarkable strategic and operational success.[4] Simon claims, without much exploration, that ISIS’ territorial control was unsustainable irrespective of any opposing counteroffensive.

Similarly, Simon dismisses the Abraham Accords–the 2020 normalization of relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain–in a mere 127 words.[5] The historic series of agreements serves as perhaps the Trump administration's signature diplomatic achievement in the Middle East.[6] By bringing the Israel Defense Forces and Arab militaries together in collaborative deterrence planning, the set of agreements created a new bulwark against Iran and advanced a new regional security architecture organized around shared threats. Indeed, the Abraham Accords represent a significant opportunity for American interests as well as stability in the region and deserve more analysis. Simon derides the agreements because the Emirates are disinclined to partner with Israel in a war with Iran. While this is accurate, the agreements, by fostering trade relations, seek to build a regional deterrence that might preclude a war with Iran. This oversight is consistent with Simon’s narrow perspective on regional complexities.

The book is more memoir than history, and its rigid structure–each of its eight chapters covers the decisions of a single administration–confines its diagnostic scope. Throughout, Grand Delusion focuses on events as they occurred without delving into the historical underpinnings that shaped the region's trajectory. This omission weakens the analysis by neglecting the historical grievances, conflicts, and power dynamics that continue to reverberate in the present.

The first portion of the book especially could use more context. The book’s sweep starts in 1979 and ends with the present-day decisions rendered by the Biden administration. However, an understanding of the American response to regional chaos at the end of the Carter administration must build on a foundation of historical understanding. While earlier presidents generally partnered with Iran, the dynamic shifted with Jimmy Carter. This shift in the region is due almost entirely to the Islamic Revolution and the stunning loss of the Shah–Henry Kissinger’s “king of kings” and champion of American interests in the Middle East.[7] Indeed, Kissinger's empowerment of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi–a policy that helped drive the Shah’s fall, the Iran-Iraq War, and the subsequent spiraling chaos–goes unexamined in the book.[8] While Simon's extensive experience within the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council grants him a unique perspective on the intricacies of U.S. policies and the resultant failures, that perspective was surely rooted in the critical decisions American administrations made about Iran before 1979.[9]

Indeed, the Carter administration itself–which presided over enormous consequential moments such as the Camp David Accords, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s Israeli visit, and the calamitous attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran–comes in for a mere 17 of the books 422 pages.[10] Worse, Simon makes only passing reference to the 1953 U.S.-aided coup of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, an action with generational impacts on American policy in the region.[11] Indeed, the view of American motivation by not only Iranian hardliners but also many Arab leaders is based, at least in part, on the lingering legacy of the removal from power of Iran’s democratically-elected leader.[12] 

No Solution: A Lack of Policy Prescription

While Grand Delusion effectively highlights the failures and pitfalls of American ambition in the Middle East, it falls short in offering concrete policy prescriptions for moving forward. Critique, while valuable, is only part of the equation; a comprehensive analysis should also explore potential pathways for improved policy-making.

Grand Delusion compels readers to question prevailing assumptions about American motives in the Middle East. By exposing the gap between rhetoric and reality, the book urges us to critically examine the narratives presented by policymakers and media outlets. Simon's retrospective analysis carries valuable lessons for shaping future American foreign policy. However, this book provides no real roadmap for avoiding the pitfalls of unchecked ambition.

Simon’s critique is scathing. Deservedly so. But it is also limited. That’s unfortunate. At a time when Iran’s nuclear enrichment nears weapons-grade levels, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia looks to broker normalization agreements without American involvement, and violence on the West Bank and Gaza continues unabated, the stakes of American policy for the Middle East are too important for criticism without fulsome understanding or an alternative solution.

Joe Buccino served as the Communications Director for U.S. Central Command from April 2021 until July 2023. His book Burn the Village to Save It, about the 1968 Tet Offensive, is due out in the fall of 2024.

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Header Image: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at the White House in 1978. (Diana Walker/Getty)

Notes:

[1] Simon, Steven. Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2023.

[2] U.S. Department of State. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo.

[3] Al Jazeera. What Is the Arab Spring, and How Did It Start? Arab Spring: 10 years on News | Al Jazeera, December 17, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start.

[4] The Coalition Against ISIS.  The Global Coalition Against Daesh, June 9, 2023. https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/.

[5] The Abraham Accords - United States Department of State. U.S. Department of State, January 13, 2021. https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/.

[6] Daroff, William. Abraham Accords: A Diplomatic Success Story Worthy of US Support. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-735717.

[7] Grandin, Greg. How One Man Laid the Groundwork for Today’s Crisis in the Middle East. The Nation, September 29, 2015. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-one-man-laid-the-groundwork-for-todays-crisis-in-the-middle-east/.

[8] Indyk, Martin. Master of the game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy. New York, NY: Knopf, 2022, pages 121 – 179.

[9] IISS. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20130812192055/http:/www.iiss.org/en/persons/steven-s-simon.

[10] U.S. Department of State. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david; Hazaimeh, Hani. “When Sadat Went to Israel.” Arab News, October 6, 2021. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1659751; Bowden, Mark. Guests of the Ayatollah: The first battle in America’s war with militant Islam. New York: Grove Atlantic, 2018, 119 – 147.

[11] Wu, Lawrence, and Michelle Lanz. How the CIA Overthrew Iran’s Democracy in 4 Days. NPR, February 7, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days.

[12] Gambrell, Nasser Karimi and Jon, ToI Staff, Robert Philpot, Agencies and ToI Staff, Emanuel Fabian, Jacob Gurvis, Afp, et al. 70 Years Later, a CIA-Backed Coup Still Roils Iran-US Relations. The Times of Israel, August 25, 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/70-years-later-a-cia-backed-coup-still-roils-iran-us-relations/.