Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State. Ido Levy. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021.

Ido Levy’s Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State is a timely study of the effectiveness of the military tactics and strategy of the Islamic State (IS) from 2014 to 2019. Levy, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, surveys the major operations conducted by IS to examine the sources of its military effectiveness and to derive lessons for countering IS and other like groups.[1] Throughout his study, Levy examines how IS fought their form of an effective conventional war. He argues that IS created an innovative organization, extensively shaped the area of operation, maintained a high will to fight among its soldiers, and maintained a fast-paced offensive style based on the suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive device (SVBIED).[2] These factors are shown in his examination of major IS offensive operations and how they were affected when IS transitioned to defense.

In examining the effectiveness of IS military operations, Levy is one of the first to attempt to create a larger study on IS. Levy is restricted in his study by the novelty of his subject. The fall of IS is still very recent at the time of publication and many of the U.S. defense sources are still restricted to the general public. He does an admirable job of pulling together primary source material that is publicly accessible, using news reports of incidents, and conducting interviews with U.S. military personnel who were present and other experts on IS and jihadist operations. Levy admits that there needs to be further examination of the IS military structure and its effectiveness as historical distance is created and more information is gathered.

Levy holds that IS was most effective when it maintained its operational tempo, engaged with local tribes, and maintained the initiative through SVBIED-led attacks on coalition positions.

Levy begins Soldiers of End-Times by exploring the roots of IS in al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its multiyear evolution from terrorism to controlling territory.[3] He goes on to describe how the apocalyptic ideology of IS jihadism set it apart and helped to form the willingness to fight by IS fighters and their reliance on constant offensive operations. These sections lack an in-depth explanation. They give a cursory description of events like the Syrian Civil War, making it harder for those with less knowledge of IS to develop a firm historical understanding of IS solely from his writing. After setting the basic understanding of IS and the factors that contribute to its effectiveness, Levy’s third chapter provides two case studies of IS offensives and two case studies of defensives. In this chapter, Levy holds that IS was most effective when it maintained its operational tempo, engaged with local tribes, and maintained the initiative through SVBIED-led attacks on coalition positions. Levy shows that the IS form of conventional warfare worked best when on the offensive, most clearly shown in his case study of the battle of Ramadi.[4] However, IS failed when pushed into defensive actions. While able to conduct decent defense in-depth, IS lost its edge when it was not able to maintain or return to the offensive.

Dispelling the myth that the leaders learned how to fight under Saddam Hussain, Levy instead argues that the bulk of IS tactics and strategy were built during the AQI years.

The case studies provided in chapter three are significant when scrutinizing how IS operated. This chapter shows the importance of high motivation among IS soldiers, and how it was almost impossible to create mass surrenders from their ranks. It also showcases the importance of the coalition in defeating them. It took U.S. firepower and Kurdish/Iraqi coordination to finally destroy IS. Levy also discusses the sources of the effectiveness of IS military operations. Dispelling the myth that the leaders learned how to fight under Saddam Hussain, Levy instead argues that the bulk of IS tactics and strategy were built during the AQI years. He argues that the prevalence of Russian-speaking foreign fighters contributed to IS effectiveness, but it was not decisive in the overall operations of IS.[5] These two chapters are the most impactful of the book, providing accessible examples of IS tactics and how they were supported and created. Levy’s chapter on global IS affiliates is not as strong as the rest of his book; it lacks the enthusiasm that he had in earlier and in the later chapters. He could have expanded on the IS affiliate in the Philippines, as the military-wide shift towards INDOPACOM draws more eyes to the region, possibly putting greater significance on this work as a contribution to the body of knowledge on IS.

Soldiers of End-Times does an effective job at showcasing the strategy and effectiveness of IS military operations. The assertion that “jihadist conventionalism is here to stay”[6] by Levy should be discussed thoroughly by defense officials. The last two chapters of the book provide lessons learned and possible policy initiatives in order to combat IS, or IS like groups, in the future. Importantly, Levy examines the ineffectiveness of coalition psychological operations (PSYOP) against IS morale. He states that the ability of U.S. PSYOP to counter IS propaganda was negligent and slow—leading to a loss of respect and belief in the coalition mission. 

Levy’s work is a timely and concise examination of an adversary that the U.S. will continue to deal with for the foreseeable future.

However, the case studies in chapter three would have benefited from further expansion. Combining four case studies within a chapter limits deeper analysis and conclusion about the specific topic. There is also no analysis of the Battle of Kobane, which resulted in an IS defeat. It would appear beneficial to have another IS success to showcase the effectiveness of IS military operations, as Levy argues. Levy also detracts from his own work by failing to emphasize the IS operations outside of Iraq and Syria, which have not been as comprehensively reported on by conventional media or defense sources.

Overall, Levy’s work is a timely and concise examination of an adversary that the U.S. will continue to deal with for the foreseeable future. His assertions that IS will continue to fight a hybrid war with high morale is important for military planners to understand. As the Biden administration has announced increasing the U.S. military presence in Somalia, it is also important to continue discussing IS in professional military education. Despite the urge to transition to fight the near-peer enemy in large-scale combat, the threat posed by IS, and IS like groups, is not going to disappear. While not a book for readers to first understand Jihadism, Soldiers of End-Times is important for defense personnel and strategists to examine IS effectiveness.

Kyle Rable is a Ph.D. Student at Texas Tech University studying military history and is an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. He received his BA from the University of Toledo and his MA from Bowling Green State University. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or Texas Tech University.

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Header Image: ISIS Fighters (The Washington Institute).

Notes:

[1] Ido Levy, Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State (Washington DC; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021)2.

[2] Levy, Soldiers of End-Times, 37-43.

[3] Levy, Soldiers of End-Times, 9-22.

[4] Levy, Soldiers of End-Times, 55-64.

[5] Levy, Soldiers of End-Times, 144-152.

[6] Levy, Soldiers of End-Times, 258.