The space race of the 1960s was characterized by global superpowers vying for prestige and attempting to demonstrate the superiority of their ideological systems on the world stage. A new space race could be characterized by actors exploiting unclear language within treaties that govern the use of space, providing an upper hand to challengers who have already declared their intent to militarize space in pursuit of their national interests.

This article proposes that the United States’ space efforts should once again be backed by the government and the military, much as the original space program of the 1960s was and as the current-day space program of China is. The government should take an active interest in refining the language in the treaties to make them clearer in their restraints, as well as work to meet any rising military threats. As a matter for national determination and the preservation of power projection capabilities, it is important that the United States’ space efforts meet the efforts of adversarial nations. Failing to do so could lead to numerous national security problems.

Allowing adversarial nation-states to develop or declare primacy in space would allow those same nation-states the ability to dictate the terms of engagement by virtue of being the first to develop and maintain a military presence in space. It would give an adversarial nation-state, like China, the ability to selectively allow or deny access to resources in space based on specific readings of treaties and the absence of enforceable international space law. Finally, allowing space to become contested territory reduces the ability of civilian and private entities to operate there, which will have a chilling effect on future non-military research, development, and resource extraction.

By including the military more concretely in the space program, the United States will ensure the basic tenets of the Outer Space Treaty are met: that outer space shall be free for exploration, not subject to claim of sovereignty, and that space shall never be conceived of as military high-ground from which to threaten the landbound denizens of Earth. Integrating the military within the space program is not without controversy. Even though some have written about the necessity of militarizing space, others have countered the argument with a warning that militarizing space would create a self-fulfilling prophecy making space conflict inevitable.[1] But the discussion of where, and how, to use the military in space is one that dates back to the beginning of the space program, where military missiles were used to put up satellites in order to provide intelligence gathering capabilities.

President Dwight Eisenhower wanted a more robust intelligence picture of the arms and military posture of the Soviet Union for two reasons: first, to counter the service chiefs’ requests for funds from congress, and second, to ensure the United States was not causing a self-propagating arms build-up which would lead to confrontation or war with the Soviets.[2] In other words, an accurate overview of the Soviet military posture could preclude a military build-up based on paranoia and inaccurate information—a build-up that had the possibility to trigger a Soviet build-up, causing a recursive situation where each side is building up to match the other. At the start of the American space program in the 1950s, part of Eisenhower’s vision was to use satellite reconnaissance to offer a more complete intelligence overview of Soviet activities, thereby enabling policymakers to make more informed budgetary decisions.[3] Aerial surveillance over the Soviet Union, carried out by U-2 spy planes, was illegal under U.S. and international law.[4] However, satellites could be legally used to gather intelligence and information on adversaries.

The United States military also lobbied for expansion into space in order to capitalize on the strategic advantages of being first. In the 1950s, the US Army's Project Horizon laid out the requirement for a lunar outpost, stating in its report that “a manned base of operations on the moon has tremendous military and scientific potential,” and “invaluable scientific, military, and political prestige will come to the nation that first establishes a lunar base.”[5] The report’s authors knew there was value in posture and in being first. Unless the United States was the first nation to establish a presence on the moon, it would “not be in a position to exercise an option between peaceful and military applications...the establishment of the initial lunar outpost is the first definitive step in exercising our options.”[6] The Air Force, meanwhile, argued that “positive effects would accrue” to the nation who detonated a nuclear device on the moon first.[7]

As the space program continued to develop, non-military aspects of the government, to include defense contractors, began to play a larger role in the program as contracted suppliers of people, platforms, and ideas. Instead of continuing the overtly militarized route, at the end of the Eisenhower administration the American space program changed in nature from a military enterprise to a civil-military fusion controlled by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Though NASA was not an arm of the Department of Defense, observers knew there was “no real distinction between rocket research conducted for purely military purposes and rocket research conducted with nonmilitary scientific objectives.”[8] For all intents and purposes, NASA was a civilian agency partnering with and conducting tests along-side the military under the guise of pure scientific inquiry. Explorer I went into orbit atop a Jupiter-C rocket, a modified and improved version of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's Redstone rocket, which had its own origins in the German V2 rocket from World War II. Launches for the Mercury and Apollo programs were similarly performed with modified intercontinental ballistic missiles, with astronauts and satellites replacing nuclear payloads at the top. In the case of the United States, space has traditionally been the domain of the government, with the military present in an overt or covert capacity depending on the period.

Because space has traditionally been the purview of governments, one might expect that there are rules, norms, and legislation in place to guide its use. While there are some laws and treaties governing how nation-states act and interact in space, the largely unlegislated nature of outer space is more likely to cause instances of brinksmanship than prevent conflict. The Outer Space Treaty, the baseline from which all other United Nations space treaties are derived, was ratified by the United States on December 19, 1966, and by 109 other countries at various times.

The Outer Space Treaty affirms that “States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner,” and that the “Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.”[9] The treaty also declares that space exploration should be conducted for humanity’s benefit, that space should be free for exploration, and that space is not subject to national appropriation.[10] Importantly, some of the language from the space treaties is flexible enough to allow dangerous latitude in their interpretation and implementation.[11] What are “peaceful purposes”? Can a nation successfully make the case that anything not overtly hostile is peaceful? The United Nations' Moon Agreement, which was considered binding as of 1984, makes the same mention of “celestial bodies” as the Outer Space Treaty.[12] What is a celestial body? Does this just mean asteroids, moons, and planets? Can a man-made satellite be considered a celestial body? If not, then there appears to be no prohibition to arming them.

That latitude of interpretation within the treaties has important implications today. Chinese leaders, for example, have already declared their nation’s space program a civil-military fusion as well as their intent to place weapons on the moon. [13] Current Chinese policy is that the militarization of space is a “historical inevitability.”[14] Multiple countries have already demonstrated an anti-satellite capability.[15] Allowing the militarization of space without objection or challenge means allowing the development of a unipolar power structure in space, which would put the United States at a disadvantage in what some have called the developing new cold war between China and the United States.[16]

One way to head-off an upcoming conflict about space and its use is for the United States to engage in messaging and outreach. At the height of the space race, NASA’s budget was enormous, but the money was not spent just on rockets, components, and supplies. NASA also helped to train scientists and engineers from around the world—not only to share information but also to influence scientists and leaders around the world to embrace the United States, its vision for space, and its vision of the world order. Assisting in this effort, the United States Information Agency (USIA) promoted the American space program in every medium imaginable, from pamphlets to television shows.[17] The United States should once again engage in an outreach campaign aimed at proactively working to develop a new set of international expectations about space, through the lens of twenty-first century technology and capabilities.

Another way to prevent conflict in space is for the United States to take the lead in ensuring that the treaties regarding the use of space are clear and concise in their language. For example, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty proclaims, “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”[18] States shall not place weapons of mass destruction in space, but is this meant to cover conventional weapons? Are man-made satellites celestial bodies? This seems to be a case where the letter and spirit of the law come into conflict. In the face of a rising, seemingly belligerent space power, these distinctions need to be made clear.

In addition to the two previous methods of conflict containment, the United States Space Force could and should be as integrated in the development and maturing of the space program as the People’s Liberation Army is in China’s. While this runs the threat of developing our capabilities along a predictable arc with threats and adversaries, it would serve as an effective form of deterrence when used with other methods of conflict management.[19] In support of this idea, Space Force’s primary doctrine document, Spacepower, attempts to address this need, stating that “barriers to access, maneuver, and recovery make it impractical to completely partition the domain among civil, commercial…[and] military actors—the components of national space power must coexist.”[20] This is an important point. If adversarial nations declare their intent to transform space into a weaponized, militarized zone of activity, as China has done, then space becomes an area of potential conflict until “acceptable” space activity is defined. Space Force later addresses this in Spacepower, stating “the vast size of the military space apparatus necessitates that military space forces play a leading role establishing and reinforcing any standards and norms of behavior in the space domain.”[21] In other words, the military must develop thresholds and limits of acceptable action.

The United States, along with all other space-faring nations, should work multilaterally to codify laws, norms, and mores of activities in space. The unclear verbiage of space law invites conflict and confrontation. As nations and corporations continue to expand into space—and as nations make it known that space is an avenue for military expansion—questions remain. To what lengths is the United States willing to go to defend itself or its corporations in space? What is the threshold for overt military or diplomatic response in the case of an incident? When does an incident in space justify an earthbound response?[22]

These questions are important because it is possible that ceding primacy in space may even provoke eventual armed conflict on Earth. Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu (among others) have theorized that, prior to military conflict, “the rising challenger must delegitimize the hegemon’s global authority and order.”[23] Refusing to answer the looming questions about space and its use, being unwilling or unable to counter adversarial military expansion into space, and not ensuring that the laws and treaties which govern space are clear and unambiguous could result in something far more well-understood: conflict between two nations.

Wesley White works as an analyst in a United States Air Force Research and Development office and is a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida. His research focuses on the development of an American space culture in the 1950s and 1960s. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Untitled, 2015 (NASA).

Notes:

[1] For the discussion in favor of militarizing space in the name of national security, see Everett Carl Dolman, “New Frontiers, Old Realities,” in Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, Issue 1, Spring 2012. 78-96. For a discussion against space militarization, and a direct response to the Dolman article, see Matthew Burris, “Astroimpolitic: Organizing Outer Space by the Sword,” in Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 7, Issue 3, Fall 2013. 108-129.

[2] COL A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record October 3, 1956. (Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Matters (2); NAID #12008420). See also: COL A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, February 10, 1958. (Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Matters (4); NAID #12008421).

[3] Robert Dienesch, Eyeing the Red Storm: Eisenhower and the First Attempt to Build a Spy Satellite (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), pp. 26-57.

[4] According to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed by the United States on August 9, 1946, aircraft used in “military, customs and police services” were deemed state aircraft, and “no state aircraft of a contracting State [could] fly over the territory of another State or land without authorization by special agreement.” Even though the Soviet Union was not a signatory of this agreement until 1970, the USSR’s reaction to Francis Gary Powers shows that the Soviets agreed that military planes flying over sovereign airspace was (or should be) illegal.

[5] Project Horizon Reports, NASM.2020.0031, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, page 2.

[6] Project Horizon Reports, NASM.2020.0031, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, page 4.

[7] Reiffel, L. Fri. “A Study of Lunar Research Flights,” United States, page 2.

[8] William Roy Shelton, American Space Exploration: The First Decade (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967), 96.

[9] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). New York: United Nations, 1967.

[10] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). New York: United Nations, 1967.

[11] Henry R. Hertzfeld, Brian Weeden, Christopher D. Johnson, “Outer Space: Ungoverned or Lacking Effective Governance?: New Approaches to Managing Human Activities in Space,” in SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2016, page 16.

[12] Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. New York: United Nations, 1984.

[13] Baohui Zhang, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospect for Arms Control,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011), page 311.

[14] Richard D. Fischer, “China’s Global Military Power Projection Challenge to the United States,” Testimony Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives, May 17, 2018.

[15] Bruce W. MacDonald, Council Special Report No. 38, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security,” September, 2008. See also Ashley Tellis, "India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success" from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/15/india-s-asat-test-incomplete-success-pub-78884 The United States has recently called for a moratorium on anti-satellite missile tests. Ankit Panda and Benjamin Silverstein, "The U.S. Moratorium on Anti-Satellite Missile Tests Is a Welcome Shift in Space Policy" from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/20/u.s.-moratorium-on-anti-satellite-missile-tests-is-welcome-shift-in-space-policy-pub-86943

[16] Alan Dupoint, The US-China Cold War Has Already Started, in The Diplomat, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-us-china-cold-war-has-already-started/. Yoshiaki Nohara, US-China Cold War Has Japan Caught in the Middle, in Bloomberg, at https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2022-us-china-cold-war-risk-rattles-japan/. Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis, The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes of History, in Foreign Affairs, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-10-19/new-cold-war.

[17] Teasel Muir-Harmony, “The Space Race and American Foreign Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History.

[18] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), Jan. 27, 1967; 18 UST 2410; 610 UNTS 205; 6 ILM 386 (1967).

[19] For an interesting discussion on the correct use of the term “deterrence,” see Al Mauroni, “Deterrence: I Don't Think it Means What You Think it Means,” from the Modern War Institute, October 8, 2019 at https://mwi.usma.edu/deterrence-dont-think-means-think-means/.

[20] Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower (SCP), Headquarters, United States Space Force, June 2020, 13.

[21] Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower (SCP), Headquarters, United States Space Force, June 2020, 14.

[22] This is also an unanswered question with regards to the newest military domain, cyberspace.

[23] Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” in International Security, Volume 36, Issue 1, page 44.