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#Reviewing The British are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777.

The British are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777.  Rick Atkinson. NY: Henry Holt and Co., 2019.


A mighty military with a global reach and a warrior tradition bogged down in the complexities of war waged in dispersed battlegrounds upon another continent. A fearsome host unable to achieve its goals despite outclassing the training, discipline, equipment, and resources of its foes. National leaders with every confidence in victory reinforced by a continuing stream of misleading and optimistic reports. Although evocative of a more contemporary conflict and military, war historian Rick Atkinson’s latest work is about the bloody birth of America and masterfully exposes the Revolutionary War in all its confusion, complexity, and discord. Indeed, Atkinson opens his new trilogy by repeatedly contrasting the clear and confident thoughts and intentions of the war’s participants with the messiness of war imposed by factors including distances, discipline, sentiments, logistics, and strategies involved…and, not least, by fortune.

…Rick Atkinson’s latest work is about the bloody birth of America and masterfully exposes the Revolutionary War in all its confusion, complexity, and discord.

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Atkinson tells of the clash of men, armies, and the duality of war, by weaving quotes from participants together with incredible detail. His is a genuinely literary style, vividly illustrating people’s thoughts, deftly painting scenes, and precisely recounting the flow of battle. The British Are Coming reads like a compelling novel. 

On the one hand, the scope of his work is sweeping. The book features scenes as varied as King George’s dinner in Portsmouth, pre-war debates in Parliament, and the counting of salt pork supplies. The author closely follows the mood of the fighters and their leaders, from the rebel’s rousing patriotic fervor after early victories in New England to bitter disappointment in George Washington following the Battle of Long Island. The king’s certainty in his moral authority and ultimate success withers to frustration and impatience with the inability of his Army and Navy to achieve general engagement with the enemy.

Yet, Atkinson’s account is resolutely focused on warfare. He avoids or brushes past events shaping the relationship of the American colonists with their king, such as the French and Indian War and its Proclamation, as well as the various Acts: Sugar Act, Currency Act, Stamp Act, Quartering Act, and the Townshend Revenue Act. (He does cover the Tea Act.) He focuses on telling the story without overtly rendering judgment by avoiding the temptation to engage in political philosophy; he also does not pretend to write a treatise on warfare. Avoiding such judgment is difficult and some parts of the text may seem to render a moral judgment through descriptions of combatants’ behavior, including “howling,” “baying,” and other animal-like characterizations.[1] That said, every war historian must carefully pick along the narrow track between glorifying combat and repelling the audience with the often grotesque and startling brutality of large-scale violence. For this reviewer, at least, it is a balance well struck.

Another delicate balancing act for the military historian is the tension between following the operational level of warfare—theatre-wide, sequential campaigns and objectives—and narrowing in on the flow of individual battles at the tactical level. Atkinson revels in the descriptions of significant actions such as Lexington, Bunker Hill, and Charleston, and these accounts are lovingly, if sometimes luridly, illustrated. In some places, the pace bogs down with detailed descriptions of marches, resupply operations, the evolution of battlefield communication. Still, Atkinson uses these interludes superbly to weave the battles into a coherent whole. The author appears keenly aware that wars are much more than the sum of a series of combat actions, and he provides ample discussion of bones and ligaments to the exciting meaty bits. Still, he recounts at least 19 battles, skirmishes, and encounters; more than enough action to show how durable the warriors were, how enduring their resolve, and how committed their intent.

Painting of the American retreat from Long Island after the battle of Brooklyn. (Wikimedia)

The crescendo of The British Are Coming is the fight for Long Island and subsequent retreat, recounted in a chapter aptly named “A Fight Among Wolves.” Washington’s ill-advised attempt to hold New York City with inexperienced and scattered land forces that he matched against a well-coordinated British force of infantry, artillery, and naval support, seemed to pose an excellent contrast to the picture developing within the broader context. In other words, in this instance, Washington’s strategy was dramatically wanting, and his troops, despite their morale and patriotism, proved no match for the force superior in numbers, equipment, and training. In contrast, strategy, experience, and fortune will overturn each of these trends by the end of the war. Having risen to its peak in this chapter, the author then descends in search of an ending that will entice readers to return for the second installment; in other words, one that ends on a more positive note for the rebels, or at least one in which hope has rekindled. He achieves his goal, but the tone of the epilogue suggests that he is not quite sure of his success and must hammer the point home.

Atkinson is not trying to reproduce the lofty Thucydides and his enduring account of The Peloponnesian War. He does not strive to extrapolate teachings of war from its history. Far from criticism, this reviewer prefers this approach and to reach his own conclusions and identify his own lessons from the material. Likewise, this work should appeal to any student of history, strategist, or national security policy-maker. Readers can gain much from examining the shifting public sentiment on both sides, the impact of local concerns on operational decisions, the friction between troops and the populace, and the difficulty of coordinating a single, internally consistent, and self-reinforcing strategy within a national effort. Readers can mine this meaning from an account so profound in its essence, well-supported in its sources, and compelling in its storytelling that it will assuredly serve as authority for years to come.


Alexander N. Pickands is a U.S. Army officer currently in residence at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a J.D. from William & Mary, an LL.M. from the University of Virginia, and an LL.M. from The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


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Header Image: The United States of America laid down from the best authorities, agreeable to the Peace of. London, 1783 (John Wallis/Library of Congress).


Notes:

[1] Rick Atkinson, The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2019), 433, 514, Henry Holt and Company eBook.