As the United States steels itself for the coming decades of great power competition with China, strategists scour history for analogous frameworks to comprehend looming challenges. Graham Allison emphasizes the Peloponnesian War in his description of the Thucydides Trap.[1] Other researchers ask if Sino-American competition will culminate in a new great war.[2] Most recently, researchers turn to the Napoleonic Wars to draw strategic lessons for the years ahead.[3] It is impossible to judge the accuracy of these analogies as the shape of competition develops; however, taken together they are an incomplete set. Strategists contemplate great power politics by assuming that the previous century of American experience offers sufficient analogous historical examples while ignoring lessons that contradict that experience.

…strategists should consider analogies that look starkly different from great power politics during the twentieth century…

As a result, the accepted set of assumptions about great power competition rests on an anomalous period of world history during which ideology drove great power politics rather than calculated national interest. To challenge those assumptions, strategists must broaden the set of historical analogies from which they draw lessons for the twenty-first century. Instead of relying on examples from American history and analogies that resemble that experience, strategists should consider analogies that look starkly different from great power politics during the twentieth century; specifically that of the German experience during the nineteenth. Otto von Bismarck’s Germany experienced great power competition that was limited, controlled, and non-ideological, while Americans during the twentieth century experienced ideologically-driven total competition, inspiring a maximalist set of assumptions that overlooks the possibility of a limited and sustainable competitive posture toward China in the twenty-first century. 

Bismarck’s strategy to unify ethnic Germans into a single nation governed by an efficient Prussian state began in 1864 with efforts to resolve the Schleswig-Holstein Question, which began in the realm of diplomacy but culminated in war between Prussia and Denmark for control of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Bismarck managed to prevent an uncontrolled escalation to total war by pursuing limited war aims, ensuring that military strategy served diplomatic goals, and remained non-ideological. Through careful diplomacy, Bismarck kept other European states out of the war to prevent further escalation.[4] As such, the Schleswig-Holstein War neatly fit the Clausewitzian concept of “politics by other means.”

Bismarck repeated his success in 1866 during the Astro-Prussian War. Once again, effective diplomacy prevented third-party military intervention. Limited war aims and the absence of ideology prevented escalation. Prussia did not seek regime change in the Astro-Hungarian Empire, nor did Bismarck view such maximalist military objectives as necessary to achieve Prussian domination of the confederation of German states.[5] During the 1871-1872 Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck achieved a similar result. Even when a unified Germany laid siege to Paris, the war did not escalate because Bismarck’s priority remained on diplomatic aims. In pursuing peace, Bismarck negotiated the Treaty of Frankfurt am Main, which provided Germany with limited territorial acquisitions and financial reparations.[6]

Bismarck’s drive to unify Germany upended the power balance in Europe. However, Bismarck achieved his strategic goals without inadvertently starting a world war. He used nationalism to drive a domestic narrative, but in advancing foreign policy he remained non-ideological. After diplomacy failed and Bismarck resorted to war, throughout hostilities he ensured that military objectives served diplomatic ends, and ultimately ended conflicts through diplomatic resolution.[7]

If strategists relied solely on the experience of Bismarck’s Germany during the nineteenth century, they might assume that competition with China will be limited by narrowly defined national interest. Furthermore, while competition may escalate to hostilities, a strategist might assume that a war would be manageable and limited in scale based on the German experience.

A very different set of assumptions is generated by the American experience of great power politics. During the twentieth century, the confluence of technological developments and political ideologies shattered traditional norms of great power competition. Total war was not unheard of before the twentieth century, but it was exceedingly rare. After the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, warfare was characterized by limited diplomatic aims achieved by small, professional armies. By 1918, however, the old norm of non-ideological great power politics had given way to a new norm of scorched earth competition driven by ideological considerations.

World War I began as a nineteenth century great power competition but ended as a twentieth century total war…

Three major events shaped twentieth century great power competition, and to follow the progression of these events is to observe the breakdown of traditional geopolitics. World War I began, as many nineteenth century wars had, as a non-ideological conflict fought over imperial ambitions.[8] Escalation driven by technological progress that outpaced operational and tactical thinking resulted in an industrialized style of warfare, inflating what began as a normal great power conflict into a total war that fundamentally reshaped the international order. As such, World War I began as a nineteenth century great power competition but ended as a twentieth century total war characterized by complete societal mobilization that culminated in the destruction of empires and a new, albeit short-lived, world order.[9] Furthermore, while ideologies did not influence the beginning of World War I, by the end of the conflict they had come to drive the peace process as Woodrow Wilson pursued his fourteen points that would make a world safe for democracy and Tsarist Russia fall to a communist revolution.[10]

During World War II fascism, communism, and liberal capitalist democracies competed for preeminence on the global stage. Driven by ideology, competition escalated to total war as whole societies mobilized.[11] The German objective during World War II was not simply to retake Alsace-Lorraine, but rather to topple regimes and impose a new world order. Those objectives may have overlapped, but the distinction highlights the difference between nineteenth and twentieth century great power politics. Whereas Nazi Germany sought the maximalist goal to conquer and occupy France, Bismarck’s Prussia consistently pursued limited territorial acquisitions subservient to diplomatic goals. Likewise, the allies would not accept a diplomatic resolution that upheld the status quo world order, but instead sought unconditional surrender.[12]

Ideology, industrialization, and total war made great power politics during the twentieth century aberrant from the norm of historic competition between powerful states.

After the fall of Berlin and the subsequent bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the marriage of convenience between the liberal-capitalist camp and communism broke down and the third event to reshape great power politics calcified in the form of the Cold War. Once again, ideology drove great power competition, not narrowly defined national interest. As the U.S. and the Soviet Union jockeyed for influence around the globe, the competition resembled the great power politics of the nineteenth century on the surface. However, with the driving undercurrent of ideology, the prospect of total war loomed.[13]

Ideology, industrialization, and total war made great power politics during the twentieth century aberrant from the norm of historic competition between powerful states. The degree to which that distinction matters today is visible in how the twentieth century shapes contemporary American assumptions about the future of competition with China. Of course, the U.S. was never totally insulated from great power politics. It was embroiled in the Quasi-War with France and Britain shortly after winning independence and was a key player in a number of diplomatic disputes during the nineteenth century.[14] However, Americans began to participate in competition to a greater degree in the twentieth century than ever before.[15]

The American experience during the twentieth century is not representative of the broader history of great power politics.

The U.S. entered the arena during the final act of traditional competition only to be subsequently embroiled in the norm-shattering events that followed. As a result, the American perspective of great power politics is shaped by the American experience during an aberrant period of strategic competition that played out during the twentieth century. That perspective generates maximalist assumptions that strategists rely on to anticipate and comprehend the emergence of competition in the twenty-first century, driving the belief that hostilities with China could not possibly be limited in scope, geography, or scale, but must inevitably escalate to total war. Those assumptions are not necessarily wrong, but neither do they offer a complete understanding of the nature of great power politics, or a full picture of how competition may play out with an emergent China.

The American experience during the twentieth century is not representative of the broader history of great power politics. To achieve a fuller picture, strategists must broaden the set of historical analogies that they rely on to frame future competition. When strategists search for analogies beyond the American experience, they typically rely on historical analogies that are as anomalous as the twentieth century. For example, Graham Allison relied on the Peloponnesian War to argue that China and the U.S. are ensnared in a Thucydides Trap just like Athens and Sparta had been, making the two “destined for war.”[16] Strategists turn to these examples because they inspire a similar set of assumptions to that generated by the American experience of great power politics, thereby supporting what is already widely accepted.

The Wars of German Unification were fought by professional armies to achieve limited strategic goals that supported diplomatic efforts. As such, the period is more representative of the broader history of great power competition since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia than the American experience during the twentieth century.[17] Traditionally, strategic competition has been driven not by ideology, but by competing economic and strategic interests. Most great power wars have not been total societal conflicts that topple governments and overturn the international order, but instead limited affairs fought between professional armies.[18] Outside of the American experience, victory is typically not won with unconditional surrender; instead, it is usually achieved through diplomatic resolution.

The validity of an assumption can only be observed after the fact. Therefore, while assumptions based on the American experience of great power politics during the twentieth century might prove correct, all that can be said with certainty today is that they offer an incomplete set based on an unusual period of strategic competition.

It is important to note that maximalist assumptions based on the American experience are not necessarily wrong or irrelevant in the twenty-first century. The validity of an assumption can only be observed after the fact. Therefore, while assumptions based on the American experience of great power politics during the twentieth century might prove correct, all that can be said with certainty today is that they offer an incomplete set based on an unusual period of strategic competition.

To more fully grasp how competition might take shape in the twenty-first century, strategists must challenge assumptions derived from the American experience by considering the broader history of great power politics, specifically searching for examples that appear distinctly different from the norm of twentieth century competition. The Wars of German Unification were limited, subservient to diplomacy, and non-ideological. They were driven by imperial ambition and a realpolitik perspective.

As American national security experts contemplate the developing geostrategic rivalry with China, they should not overlook the possibility that Chinese interest in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong might be more similar to the objectives of Bismarck’s Prussia than of Hitler’s Germany. The historical analogies we use to draw assumptions about contemporary great power competition will shape the decisions leaders make. While the maximalist assumptions derived from the scorched-earth competition of the twentieth century could prove correct when all is said and done, it is imperative at this early stage where fluidity and uncertainty reign that strategists first challenge those assumptions in the hopes of adopting a more balanced and sustainable competitive posture before embracing the perceived inevitability of catastrophe.

Nicholas Wainwright is an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve and a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of Booz Allen Hamilton, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Scan of plate (cropped version) facing p. 62 from Men I Have Painted by John McLure Hamilton. A sketch of Otto von Bismarck by Mr. Hamilton, 1921 (John McLure Hamilton).

Notes:

[1] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York, NY: First Mariner Books, 2017).

[2] Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014).

[3] Matthew Flynn, “What Napoleon Can Teach Us About the South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, 12 April 2021.

[4] Richard J. Evans, The Pursuit of Power: Europe, 1815-1914 (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2016), 252-253.

[5] Ibid., 254-257.

[6] Ibid., 260-271.

[7] Ibid., 252-271.

[8] Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (New York, NY: Random House, 2014).

[9] Jorn Leonhard, Pandora’s Box: A History of the First World War, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018).

[10] Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York, NY: Random House, 2003).

[11] Ibid..

[12] Roger Chickering, Stig Forster, and Bernd Greiner, eds., A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[13] John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2006).

[14] Kori Schake, Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

[15] Robert B. Zoellick, America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Twelve, 2020).

[16] Allison, Destined for War, 2017.

[17] Bell, The First Total War, 2007.

[18] Jeremy Black, The Age of Total War, 1860-1945 (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006).