The gray zone is the space below the threshold of major war, or, “the operational space between peace and war.”[1] China employs maritime militia against regional adversaries, and weaponizes international law by constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea. North Korea games sanctions and engages in cyber operations, while fostering a menacing nuclear strike capability. Russia maneuvers through cyber and information operations in Eastern Europe and worldwide. Action in this space exemplifies hybrid warfare: the “blurring of the modes of war…produc[ing] a wide range of variety and complexity” against an adversary nation or alliance.[2] These are now the principal venue and method of contest, in play in every operational theater.

…in a hyper-connected world where conventional war offers limited utility, hybrid warfare will be the dominant form of conflict.

The ultimate target of hybrid warfare is not territory or military forces, but the political decision-making process itself. How will the United States deter aggression and dominate conflict in this environment, and how will decision-making processes adapt to remain relevant? This is the question that should most inform the new U.S. National Security Strategy, because in a hyper-connected world where conventional war offers limited utility, hybrid warfare will be the dominant form of conflict.

America’s peer competitors elucidated doctrines of hybrid warfare, exemplified by the writing of Gen.Valery Gerasimov in Russia[3] and Unrestricted Warfare by Cols. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in China.[4] Vocabularies vary, but each writer describes multi-domain, whole-of-government engagement to achieve political objectives while avoiding conventional military confrontation. The gray zone is this battlespace: neither declared war nor uncontested peace.

Hybrid warfare un-concentrates combat power.

Strategists seek effects by concentrating overwhelming combat power at particular points in space and time, or by acting faster than adversaries can respond. The American way of war has evolved to excel in such contests. Hybrid warfare un-concentrates combat power. Forces disaggregate among conventional, unconventional, cyber or criminal elements and apply effects across various domains: kinetic strikes, irregular warfare, information operations, or “lawfare” against international norms. Likewise, time dilates in the gray zone. Rather than acting before an adversary responds, action occurs so gradually that the adversary never concentrates against it.

The Australian military theorist David Kilcullen describes Russian hybrid operations as “liminal maneuver” designed to accomplish political objectives over the long term while remaining below the thresholds of attribution or response.[5] Contemporary American and allied response to liminal maneuver is often tolerance, perhaps with some diplomatic opprobrium, or a counter with conventional force. These responses are inadequate: Liminal action left unchecked accumulates over time to reach the actor’s goals, so tolerating liminal action is accepting defeat in the gray zone.

Conventional reaction to liminal maneuver is unsustainable. For example, when the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces scramble fighters against every Peoples’ Liberation Army-Air Force incursion to Japanese airspace, they not only fail to deter such conduct, but exhaust their aircraft and personnel in the process.[6] This type of reaction promotes adversary objectives. Conventional response is worse than tolerance, for the adversary progresses toward his desired political end state, while degrading friendly capability at no additional effort. Neither party may desire to escalate to kinetic engagement, but in this example, the Chinese liminal maneuver foists that decision upon Japan.

Consider the American response if Chinese Coast Guard or maritime militia vessels escalate their hybrid tactics to shouldering an American warship. The ships collide. The American combatant is pushed off course by a nominally civilian vessel, perhaps attached to Chinese law enforcement. Failing to respond is  a signal of weakness. Escalating with force conjures the image of a military attack upon an unarmed non-combatant. The first nation to broadcast the encounter to international media may win the battle of the narrative. A new National Security Strategy must offer a guiding framework for this paradigm.

Harmony and Mission Command

Joint Publication 1 defines mission command as “The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.”[7] The U. S. must establish a strategy for hybrid warfare that leverages mission command and emphasizes speed of decision. Ignoring the gray zone or responding conventionally to liminal maneuver will fail. The National Security Strategy must answer how America will compete in this space to protect its political decision-making process. As Kilcullen points out, the threshold of response is a matter of political decision-making capacity.[8] This is a whole-of-government effort, so the National Security Strategy is the ideal forum for direction. While this will not be a uniquely military document, it should be informed by military historical thought: Consider Col. John Boyd’s inquiry into human conflict and decision during the German Blitzkrieg of World War Two, and in later Communist insurgencies.

John Boyd is known for the “OODA loop” decision model, but his insights into the nature of conflict predict the gray zone. Outlining the goal of his conception of war, Boyd writes: “Collapse [the] adversary’s system into confusion and disorder, causing him to over and under react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading.”[9] This is the essence of the gray zone. Boyd’s concepts will inform the future National Security Strategy on both gray zone conflict and decision-making capacity. The U. S. has invested significantly in capabilities that enable observation and orientation. This fixation is reflected in America’s obsession with networks–the word itself appears 24 times in the U.S. Navy’s December 2020 maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea.[10] However, networks have no intrinsic value. Networks are only as valuable as the decisions they enable, and the competence of decision has lagged. 

At the present time, a pervasive zero-defect mentality has enveloped American military decision-making. Complex rules of engagement and standing orders emanate from every level of the chain of command.

American decision-making processes require a rethink to enable hybrid warfare and dominate in the gray zone of future conflict. The precise nature of this redesign should be a question for the next National Security Strategy. At the present time, a pervasive zero-defect mentality has enveloped American military decision-making. Complex rules of engagement and standing orders emanate from every level of the chain of command. Decisions are made slowly, often at the highest possible level, with “an obsessive focus on risk.”[11] Speed of decision is ignored. Returning to Boyd: This is precisely the opposite of his prescription.

Hybrid methods are similar to Boyd’s “moral warfare,” a category he originally ascribed to Communist insurgency. The adversary seeks to create “menace, uncertainty, mistrust,” which must be countered with “initiative, adaptability, harmony.”[12] Boyd asks: “How do we want our posture to appear to an adversary? What kind of mental picture do we want him to generate?”[13] The National Security Strategy must frame answers for these questions. While Boyd defines “initiative” and “adaptability” in ways congruent to modern concepts of mission command, his use of “harmony” warrants deeper inquiry. Defining it in “Patterns of Conflict” as “Interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way,”[14] Boyd does not specify any means of implementation.

Arguments against the idea of gray zone competition focus on its perceived novelty, or on its incongruence with the theoretical dialectic between peaceful rivalry and declared war.

The modern American officer might conceive of Boyd’s harmony as enabled by shared information and communications networks. If that is the case, it is weak harmony, for it disintegrates if an adversary disrupts the facilitating signals. Conversely, a Trafalgar-era officer of the Royal Navy under Admiral Horatio Nelson would likely think of harmony as shared understanding derived from aligned outlook, doctrine and personal relationships. This is strong harmony: it cannot be degraded by an adversary acting against communications, for it resides within the actors themselves.  

Conceived in this way, harmony is a corollary of mission command: independent action driven by common situational awareness. The next National Security Strategy may unlock unique value in the theory and practice of mission command, enabled by strong harmony. The theory will arise from professional education and historical study. The practice will occur in war-gaming and exercises where junior leaders are challenged to make rapid, imperfect decisions. Strong harmony complements mission command by nurturing intuition, accelerating decision and obviating communication.

Ambiguity in Theory and Competition

A recent report from the RAND Corporation notes that there is currently no unified military-civilian office or structure to coordinate hybrid warfare, or to execute in the gray zone.[15] Nathan P. Freier et al write further, “There is no common perception of the nature, character, or hazard associated with the gray zone…. There is [no] animating grand strategy.”[16] Freier specifically identifies decision-making as a weak point: “The [combatant commanders’] limited ability to act…was endemic to the current decision-making environment.”[17] The National Security Strategy must close these loops, establish these structures, and answer the questions on how America will compete in this space.  

There is ultimately little value in reinforcing a Maginot line of theory that hybrid actors have already bypassed in practice.

Arguments against the idea of gray zone competition focus on its perceived novelty, or on its incongruence with the theoretical dialectic between peaceful rivalry and declared war. Benjamin Armstrong argues against the newness of the concept, while rightly averring that the study of history may inform efforts toward modern gray zone competition.[18] Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside object to the concept itself, fretting that it does not fit into existing Clausewitzian categories. Finding no gray space in the Procrustean bed of “war” and “peace,” they proclaim that the idea of the gray zone is ambiguous and inherently dangerous.[19]  

The ambiguity between “war” and “peace” is precisely the point that the hybrid threat exploits. Freier notes: “The traditional conceptions of peace and war have muddied the waters when it comes to recognizing emergent threats.”[20] Kilcullen warns of falling victim to the Chinese model of “’conceptual envelopment,’ a situation in which an adversary’s conception of war becomes so much broader than our own.”[21] Rather than sheltering in Clausewitz’s duality of military and non-military affairs, theorists may find more relevance in Sun Tzu: “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.”[22] There is ultimately little value in reinforcing a Maginot line of theory that hybrid actors have already bypassed in practice.

Great power competition is understood in American military circles, but there is a difference between “great power competition” and “preparing for great power war.”[23] An overarching National Security Strategy must clarify that the hybrid threats are the adversary great powers and that the gray zone is the space of great power competition. The document must further examine how the U. S. will compete in it. Hunter Stires explains: If American competition never rises beyond preparation for war, then competitors will never need to resort to war, for they will accomplish their objectives in the gray zone without it.[24]

Shaped by theory, informed by history, and grounded in reality, these are pressing problems for the new National Security Strategy. The U.S. will need to formulate a unified, military-civilian approach to understand gray zone competition, make decisions, define success, and then execute in this conflict space. The hybrid threat demands no less attention than either the traditional forces or irregular actions of the preceding decades. Evolution in the competitive environment warrants evolution in American process, and these questions must guide the National Security Strategy.

Matthew Petersen is an officer in the United States Navy. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: USS Sampson works with USCG Ledet 2016 ( Petty Officer 2nd Class Bryan Jackson).

Notes:

[1] Lyle J. Morris et al. Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), pg 8.

[2] Frank G. Hoffman. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), pg 14.

[3] Valery Gerasimov. “The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” trans. Robert Coalson, Military-Industrial Kurier (2013).

[4] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

[5] David Kilcullen. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pg 150.

[6] Lendon, B. and Wakatsuki, Y. (29 July 2020). Japan’s air force faces a ‘relentless’ burden, imposed by China. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/28/asia/japan-china-fighter-jet-scrambles-intl-hnk-dst/index.html

[7] Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1). https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf?ver=2019-02-11-174350-967

[8] Ibid., pg 154.

[9] John R. Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict” (Slide presentation, Washington, DC, 1986), slides 5-8.

[10] Gen. David H. Berger et al. Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (2020).

[11] Milan Vego. “Mission Command and Zero Error Tolerance Cannot Coexist,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings: Vol. 144, No. 7 (2018).

[12] Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” slide 125.

[13] Ibid., slide 148.

[14] Ibid., slide 125.

[15] Morris et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone, pg xviii.

[16] Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, pg 73.

[17] Ibid., pg 81.

[18] Benjamin F. Armstrong. ““Things Done by Halves”—Observations from America’s First Great-Power Competition," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73: No. 4 (2020).

[19] Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside. “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War – Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2020).

[20] Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, pg 81.

[21] Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, pg 175.

[22] Sun Tzu. The Art of War in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, trans. Ralph Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pg 161.

[23] Hunter Stires. “Win Without Fighting,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings: Vol. 146, No. 6 (2020).

[24] Ibid.