Dean Cheng and John Klein

China and the United States have fundamentally different approaches to strategy and deterrence, yet for the most part, U.S. space strategy does not acknowledge or address these differences. This mismatch must be addressed for the United States to successfully deter China.

The Biden-Harris administration has made addressing competition with China a priority.[1] Therefore, the new administration must create additional and more effective deterrence opportunities. Yet to do so, the fundamental question to be answered is how should the United States deter China through activities in space, and not simply deter Chinese activities in space? The answer is a new, comprehensive deterrence strategy that addresses competition with China in space by emphasizing deterrence by denial, fielding active debris removal capabilities, and developing a trusted method to attribute malicious action in space.

 China’s Unified View of Deterrence

In its most general form, the concept of deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and risks of a given course of action outweigh any benefits. The divergence between American and Chinese thinking about deterrence, however, begins at this fundamental, conceptual level. In 1966, Thomas Schelling defined deterrence as the threat intended to keep an adversary from doing something.[2] Schelling specifically differentiated deterrence from compellence, which he defined as the threat intended to make an adversary do something.[3] Within the United States, deterrence is most often viewed as the power to dissuade as opposed to the power to coerce or compel.

Also, U.S. strategies and doctrine often differentiate between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment emphasizes that the threat of credible and overwhelming retaliatory action against an adversary would be sufficient to deter most from conducting hostile actions.[4] In contrast, deterrence by denial refers to the capability to deny the other party any gains from the behavior that is to be deterred. Deterrence by denial, also called dissuasion, can seek two different, but related, outcomes: discouraging military competition in the first place; and conveying the futility of military activities because desired objectives cannot be achieved.[5]

At its essence, China’s concept of deterrence is not simply dissuasion, but also coercion.

The Chinese view of deterrence plays two basic roles: one is to dissuade the opponent from doing something through deterrence, the other is to persuade the opponent what ought to be done through deterrence, and both demand the opponent to submit to the deterrer’s volition.

The Chinese do not necessarily think of deterrence solely in terms of dissuasion, unlike the United States. Instead, the Chinese are thinking in terms of compellence. Whether an adversary agrees to do something they would prefer not to do, or avoids doing something they would prefer to do, both fit within the Chinese term for deterrence, or weishe. The Chinese view of deterrence plays two basic roles: one is to dissuade the opponent from doing something through deterrence, the other is to persuade the opponent what ought to be done through deterrence, and both demand the opponent to submit to the deterrer’s volition.

Because compellence and dissuasion are not considered separate concepts, China’s use of military action to compel an opponent may be construed as conflict escalation, even though that was not the action’s intent. There is no indication that China’s leadership has pre-established messaging methods to convey to an opponent when conflict escalation is intended or not.

Chinese deterrence, or compellence, strategies are also holistic with regards to the means. Strategic deterrence can incorporate all the components of comprehensive national power, which includes military forces, economic power, diplomatic influence, scientific and technological capabilities, and political and cultural unity.[6] Space capabilities are seen as both contributing to all of these aspects of comprehensive national power, as well as benefiting from them. Thus, China uses space-related investments to build ties to Latin America and Africa, and in turn benefits from those ties to gain greater access to infrastructure—both space and non-space—in those countries.

…it will prove difficult for China’s opponents to deter military action through single-domain deterrence efforts.

China’s military texts discuss “space deterrence” as the employment of space capabilities to achieve broad deterrence goals. China does not focus on preventing an opponent from acting specifically within the space domain or against space assets.[7] Instead, China’s political leadership exploits space-related systems to achieve certain political and military aims on Earth. The purpose of deterrence is to help achieve a particular goal—deterrence is not the goal itself. China’s strategists focus on “deterrence through space,” and an “all aspects unified” strategy, thereby viewing the land, sea, air, electromagnetic spectrum, and space in an all-domain fashion.[8]

Because China may readily shift military action from one domain to another, it will prove difficult for China’s opponents to deter military action through single-domain deterrence efforts. Conversely, China may well be willing to forego activities in a particular domain, such as space, if it will lead to the achievement of a central strategic goal such as the “liberation” of Taiwan.

Towards a Comprehensive U.S. Space Deterrence Strategy

The U.S. view of deterrence contributes to two shortcomings, especially in relation to China: defense planning often ignores the worldview and strategic experience of competitors, and deterrence efforts are thought to function outside of, and apart from, wartime operations.

First, U.S. policymakers and military planners often conduct cost imposition analysis as part of defense planning from a U.S. value perspective, and they seldom take into account the value differences caused by societal preferences and historical experience. During the Cold War, senior policymakers often mirror-imaged Soviet leaders’ decision-making. Soviet behavior was expected to follow familiar U.S. patterns, and deterrence was expected to play out in a predictable and stable manner—to function almost automatically.[9] It was understood years later that Americans and Russian had dissimilar sensitivities to loss of life due to differing histories, perceptions, goals, and strategic cultures. Consequently, nuclear deterrence was not, in actuality, as stable as originally thought.

Second, there is a mistaken belief that deterrence measures stop working after conflict starts. The recently published National Space Policy illustrates this view, stating the need “to deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, to defeat aggression.”[10] This and similar statements imply wrongfully that deterrence efforts are inconsequential after conflict begins. Deterrence is about affecting the decision calculus of potential opponents throughout the conflict continuum, which spans peace or war. By ignoring the significance of deterrence in times of war—or intra-war deterrence—this view fails to consider fully the impact of dissuasion, resulting in a lost opportunity for achieving U.S. strategic goals.

For the Biden-Harris administration to address current shortcomings in U.S. deterrence strategy, especially in relation to China, the following comprehensive approach is needed:

Update Deterrence Strategies and Doctrines. Because of the pitfalls involved in determining the associated costs and values of polities with different societal and historical experience—such as Chinese Communist Party leadership—a comprehensive approach to deterrence should include, in large part, dissuasion efforts. Dissuasion can help convey the ineffectiveness of offensive space systems and discourage military competition. For space professionals, the good news is that many of the key drivers in dissuasion are included within the concepts of space mission assurance and resilience. Also, dissuasion efforts are part of a hedging strategy should conflict occur, through inclusion of robust space capabilities and defensive measures. Consequently, U.S. policymakers and military planners should update space strategies and doctrines to reflect a comprehensive approach by emphasizing deterrence by denial of benefit, addressing intra-war deterrence, and utilizing all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, economic, and military means.

U.S. deterrence strategies need to incorporate the flexibility and adaptability to reckon with China’s strategic preferences and account for an unpredictable future.

Field Active Debris Removal Capability. A successful deterrence strategy addressing competition with China requires the credible military means to support deterrence by punishment and the requisite mission assurance to support deterrence by denial. This credibility, however, is being undermined by the growing orbital debris problem, which is becoming an indiscriminate impediment negatively affecting deterrence efforts and the freedom to operate in the space domain. It is estimated that there are over 500,000 pieces of human-made orbital debris a marble or larger in size, with about 70 percent in low Earth orbit.[11] Studies suggest that removing about five of the largest debris objects per year is necessary to stabilize the growth in orbital debris created by debris-on-debris collisions.[12] To address this problem in accordance with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, or any future alternative acquisition system, U.S. Space Command and acquisition professionals should define a capability need for active debris removal to support operational requirements. Doing so will help ensure the effectiveness of deterrence measures, while addressing long-term space sustainability concerns.

Develop a Credible and Trusted Space Attribution Framework. A credible and trusted space attribution process—or ability to trace the origin of an action against space architectures—underpins a successful space deterrence strategy, especially one incorporating deterrence by punishment.[13] Before one can respond to harmful interference or attack against space systems, it must be determined that an attack occurred, along with the source of the attack. A space attribution framework should be broad, inclusive, and trusted, to maximize the data and intelligence used to inform the attribution process. Towards that end, Joint Task Force-Self Defense and National Space Defense Center representatives should develop, rehearse, and refine a credible and trusted space attribution framework, which includes space domain awareness and forensics data capabilities of the intelligence community, allies, and commercial partners.

Final Thoughts

U.S. deterrence strategies need to incorporate the flexibility and adaptability to reckon with China’s strategic preferences and account for an unpredictable future. A comprehensive deterrence strategy will remain relevant throughout peace and war and maximizes the protection of national security interests in space and other domains. Moreover, there is unintended value from this approach. A strategy incorporating substantial dissuasion efforts provides additional space capabilities and services, encourages greater cooperation with allies and commercial partners, and enhances space sustainability. As a result, more of the global community can enjoy the benefits that space affords.

Dean Cheng is a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, specializing in China’s military strategy, space capabilities, and foreign policy, in particular its relationship with the rest of Asia and the United States. He is the author of Cyber Dragon: Inside China's Information Warfare and Cyber Operations (2016).
John J. Klein is a Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research, Inc., and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. He is the author of the books Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space and Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of The Heritage Foundation, Falcon Research, George Washington University, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Untitled, (NASA).

Notes:

[1] John Bowden, “Biden: There will be 'extreme competition' with China under my administration,” The Hill, February 2, 2021, https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/537713-biden-there-will-be-extreme-competition-with-china-under-my

[2] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 2, 31-34.

[3] Ibid., 69-72.

[4] Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence and Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4 no. 2 (June, 1960), 163.

[5] Andrew F. Krepinevich and Robert C. Martinage, “Dissuasion Strategy” (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), vii-viii.

[6] Dean Cheng, “America Needs a Comprehensive Strategy for Countering China’s Expanding Perimeter of National Interests,” Backgrounder No. 4397 (The Heritage Foundation, April 28, 2015), 3, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/america-needs-comprehensive-strategy-countering-chinas-expanding-perimeter-national

[7] Dean Cheng, “Evolving Chinese Thinking about Deterrence: What the United States Must Understand About China and Space,” Backgrounder No. 3298 (The Heritage Foundation, March 29, 2018), 2, http://report.heritage.org/bg3298

[8] Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2017), 161-162, 165.

[9] McGeorge Bundy, “Bishops and the Bomb,” New York Review of Books 30, no. 10 (June 16, 1983), 3-4; Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973), 412.

[10] The White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America (December 9, 2020), 30, https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/National%20Space%20Policy%209Dec20%20Fed%20Register.pdf

[11] NASA, “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft,” Mission Pages, September 26, 2013, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html

[12] J.-C. Liou and Nicholas L. Johnson, “A sensitivity study of the effectiveness of active debris removal in LEO,” Acta Astronautica, 64, Issues 2–3, 2009, 236-243, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094576508002634

[13] John Klein, “Op-ed: To deter attacks on satellites, U.S. needs a strategy to identify bad actors,” SpaceNews, June 5, 2020, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-to-deter-attacks-on-satellites-u-s-needs-a-strategy-to-identify-bad-actors/