In the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, Egypt’s triumph over Israeli forces shocked the world. Soviet-supplied Sagger missiles allowed the Egyptian infantry to outrange the Israeli tank units, securing an initial overwhelming victory. Many military officials saw these missiles as the direct counter to the tank, which appeared on the verge of obsolescence. The Israeli counterstrike, however, disproved these fears. In a combined arms action with infantry providing screening, Egyptian anti-tank weapons faltered.

On the modern battlefield, the U.S. Marine Corps currently possesses similar doubts about the effectiveness of its armored units. In the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Marine Commandant General David H. Berger suggests the future of his institution relies upon a light naval infantry force supported by precision artillery and air support.[1] General Berger wagers that future warfare nullifies the effectiveness of heavy armor support. On the contrary, the Marine Corps must adapt these assets into a force equipped with light tanks.

The results of the wargames that influenced General Berger’s rationale for eradicating Marine armor are classified. However, the 2030 Force Design provides detailed insight into the context behind this major decision, explaining:

We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capability, despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground armor capability will continue to be provided by the U.S. Army.[2]

The most important piece of evidence appears to be the Syrian Civil War. Turkish military operations targeting Syrian forces showed how long-range artillery and air support could annihilate armored formations without retaliation.[3] Furthermore, General Berger states in his guidance, “We cannot afford to build multiple forces optimized for a specific competency such as arctic warfare, urban operations, or desert warfare.”[4] He recommends this change in the face of a great power competition with China. However, during the competition of the Cold War, both powers pursued insurgencies, with conventional forces struggling to adapt to low-intensity conflict in countries such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. In addition, General Berger’s guidance lays out a more independent Marine Corps, arguing, “[Composite Warfare] empowers subordinates to execute decentralized tactical operations—independently or integrated into a larger Naval or Joint Force—through mission command and flexible supporting relationships.”[5] He also does not neglect the need for maintaining a doctrine of maneuver warfare, stating, “Our capability development focus has fixated on those capabilities with sufficient range and lethality to support infantry and ground maneuver.”[6] His detailed analysis of the future conflict awaiting Marines draws the focus away from a multi-mission mindset and onto a specific battlefield with a much lighter and more technical Marine Corps.

General Berger holds the doctrine of amphibious operations as the Marine Corps’ foremost mission. Notably, though, tanks have played a major contribution in ensuring amphibious victories. Tanks made their amphibious debut at the bloody Battle of Tarawa, where their capabilities prevented excessive casualties.  Invasion commanders overestimated the effectiveness of sustained bombardment on Japanese defenses, believing them to be totally eradicated. In reality, though, Japanese defenses could only be neutralized by direct fire support, creating a dire need for armored support.[7] The Sherman tanks acted as a mobile screen for the infantry, protecting them from pillboxes and mortars while destroying them with direct fire. While the tanks created a logistical strain, the burden of deploying the armor proved worthwhile, as they screened infantry advances inland.[8]

In the context of modern warfare, the concept of the amphibious landing has changed drastically, as shore-based anti-ship missiles prevent the sustained landings of past wars. As such, General Berger is compelling in his argument for a lighter infantry force able to avoid long range defenses. Yet heavily-fortified Chinese islands resemble Tarawa, thus requiring tanks. Air power in the Pacific also provides this fire support to the infantry, but light tanks are better suited to assaulting these islands. Tanks are able to establish clearer lines of communication with infantry, negating worries of friendly fire from danger close strikes. Furthermore, the cost-efficiency of replacing damaged tanks is greater than replacing jets, which are also susceptible to long-range air defenses on neighboring islands.

General Berger also neglects the possibility of prolonged ground campaigns against a nation-state, in which mobile armor plays a pivotal role. In the Korean War, the first direct conflict with China and a proxy, the Marine Corps executed a decisive landing at Inchon, followed by a lighting advance on Seoul. Marine landing forces resembled a mechanized division.[9] The presence of the tank battalion at Inchon provided the Marines with the fire support to counter the North Korean armor as they pushed inland. Furthermore, the inclusion of armor allowed the Marine Corps to immediately advance on Seoul, as they possessed the tanks necessary to provide support in the city. On the drive to Seoul, the Marine units encountered Korean People’s Army T-34s, which were destroyed by a combined force of Marine Corsairs and Pershing tanks. The presence of tanks during the drive on Seoul provided the Marines with an immediate counter to enemy armor, as air support experienced delays between re-arming and refueling.

The campaign in Korea highlights the importance of the Marine Corps possessing a suitable tank force required to support a mechanized inland assault, as air support does not have the physical staying power that ground units do. However, General Berger places the majority of his focus upon reaffirming the traditional notion that Marines are simply a sea-borne force. But conflicts such as Korea demonstrate that warfare will force the Marine Corps to provide armored support in conventional conflicts with nations that possess military parity.

And, more than ever, the possibility of urban combat dominating future warfare is high.[10] Notably, Marine tanks historically have played a crucial role in executing successful urban assaults. A textbook example of armor’s effectiveness in urban warfare is the Battle for Hue City during the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Death in the Imperial City describes how not all tanks thrive in urban warfare, explaining, “The moment a tank stuck its nose around the corner of a building, it looked like the Fourth of July. The enemy opened up with all the weapons in its arsenal.”[11] However, Marines at Hue praised the Ontos tank, stating how its smaller and lighter build made it more maneuverable through the streets while still defending against small arms and providing more accurate fire support due to its smaller guns.[12] The experiences of Marine armor in this urban setting show how the light tank provides a unique edge in city assaults. A tank provides the infantry with a mobile bunker to can screen troops from enemy fire while minimizing collateral damage with its ability to project direct fire support on a building. While air support has become extremely accurate through advanced targeting, the tank maintains the edge in urban combat due to less factors hindering its operation, such as fuel limitations, anti-air defenses, and poor weather conditions.

The Corps also cannot rely on the U.S. Army for heavy armor, because the Army struggles to provide crucial logistics. The nature of both services has changed in stride with technology, with each embracing the strategy of mobile and lighter units. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps possessed no heavy equipment transporters and therefore relied on the U.S. Army for transport.[13] The Marine Corps also faces shortages in funding for tanks, as the Abrams tanks are nearly 30 years old and thus require costly repairing and upgrading of their Cold-War era systems for 21st-century technology.[14] Due to these costs and shortages, the Cold War level of manpower and firepower is a memory, which inadvertently reduces the ability of cross-service support. This plan further decreases the likelihood of relying on the U.S. Army’s heavy armor. Because General Berger aims to shape the Marine Corps as an individual force operating under naval command, efforts must be made to equip the Marine Corps with sufficient light armor.

Additionally, the Marine Corps’ doctrine rests on maneuver warfare, which requires a substantial armored force to screen for vulnerable motorized units. General Berger, however, believes this doctrine should not be the foremost consideration of the Marine Corps in light of its transition back to the fleet. But, with a strong Chinese presence in Africa and its increased sales of heavy military equipment to several countries, the Marine Corps must maintain an armored force.[15] Similar to the Chinese influence over African countries, the Soviets supplied the Iraqi Army with export equipment. Thus, the example of mechanized Marine units during Operation Desert Storm is instructive. The Corps had to become ambidextrous to conduct a mechanized offensive while retaining a substantial amphibious force to prevent Iraqi redeployment towards the allied spearhead.[16] Furthermore, the Marine units were deployed in conjunction with British armored units, obligating the Corps to use mechanized forces to keep pace with its allies.

The flexibility demonstrated by the Marine Corps in maintaining both amphibious and mechanized forces in a single theater highlights the usefulness of diversifying the Marine Corps’ mission set. The threat of the Soviet Union persuaded leadership to adopt a focus on grand conventional battles, where sheer numbers and firepower reigned supreme. Because of this outlook, the U.S. military struggled to adapt to a campaign of counter-insurgency and limited warfare in Vietnam and the Middle East. By maintaining mechanized armored units, the Corps will retain its flexibility in a wide range of missions.

While General Berger proposes important changes, such as a focus on China and the need to revisit the Marine Corps’ amphibious strategy, the abandonment of the tank does little to benefit the infantry’s fighting power. The future of the Marine Corps rests in the adaptation of a cost-effective light tank that can bring suitable firepower to bear on islands, in cities, and in maneuver warfare. The M8 Armored Gun System fits this niche role, with an ability to carry a 105mm main gun. It also comes equipped with interchangeable armor packages. Furthermore, at 24 tons, the M8 is light enough to fit smaller landing craft, reducing the threat from shore-based anti-ship missiles targeting larger landing craft.[17] If Marine forces must downsize for a Pacific War, then they must adapt its armored assets to fit this likely vision of future warfare.

Jared Simonelli is a Midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy. The views expressed in this article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Marines with Bravo Company, 4th Tanks Battalion, prepare to fire a M1A1 Abrams tanks during a low-light live-fire exercise as part of Exercise Arrow 18 in Pohjankangas Training Area near Kankaanpaa, Finland, May 16. (SSG Marcin Platek/U.S. Marine Corps)

Notes:

[1] General David Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (Quantico: United States Marine Corps, 2019), 5.

[2] General David Berger, Force Design 2030 (Quantico: United States Marine Corps, 2020), 9.

[3] Shawn Snow, “The Marines Want to Get Rid of Their Tanks. Here’s Why,” Marine Corps Times, (2020).

[4] General David Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 5.

[5] Ibid., 10.

[6] Ibid., 13.

[7] Eric Hammel, “Heavier Metal,” World War II 27, no. 4 (2012): 55.

[8] Ibid., 56-58.

[9] Russell Stolfi, “A Critique of Pure Success,” 509-510.

[10] David Kilcullen, “Out of the Mountains. The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla”, Oxford University Press, 2013.

[11] Colonel Richard Camp, Death in the Imperial City: U.S. Marines in the Battle for Hue, 31 January to 2 March 1968 (Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2018), 38.  

[12] Colonel Richard Camp, Death in the Imperial City, 38.

[13] Anne Plummer, “Study: Army Struggled To Meet Marine Corps Requirements In War,” Inside the Army 16, no. 3 (2004): 5.

[14] Todd South, “Marines continue upgrading the M1A1 Abrams, but still lagging behind Army armor”, Marine Corps Times, (2019).

[15] George Allison, “China delivers tanks and artillery to Nigeria,” UK Defense Journal, (2020). 

[16] Major Charles Quitler, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), 14-15.

[17] Kyle Mizokami, “Here’s BAE Systems’ New Proposal for a New Light Army Tank,” Popular Mechanics, (2016).