Deglobalization and International Security. Thomas X. Hammes. Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2019.

At the beginning of the last century, Theodore Roosevelt led the United States to great power status, leveled the playing field between business and labor, and called for the conservation of natural resources. He noted: "The one characteristic more essential than any other is foresight... It should be the growing nation with a future which takes the long look ahead."[1]

In Deglobalization and International Security, Hammes provides a current long-look ahead with respect to the unfolding fourth industrial revolution and the dramatic and ubiquitous changes it will bring. Published as part of the Cambria Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security series, this work clearly meets the editor’s goal of “providing policy makers, practitioners, analysts, and academics with in-depth analysis of fast-moving topics that require urgent yet informed debate.”[2] Moreover, Hammes brings together the fields of international political economy and security studies in a way that makes important contributions to both areas.

Drawing on anecdotal evidence and providing clear examples, Hammes walks the reader through recent technological advances—particularly in robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), 3-D printing, energy production, and weapons development—to show how the convergence of these technologies will lead to profound changes in global economic and security affairs. While both the economic and military arguments are clearly laid out in terms that are convincing and easy to follow, there seems to be a disconnect between the first half of the book devoted to the road ahead for the world economy and the second half of the book related to international security.

The first half of the book outlines how emerging technologies will assist, partner with, and ultimately replace human labor. These advances will result in a decline in world trade (deglobalization), increases in unemployment, and growing inequality both within and among states. For countries currently grappling with youth bulges, urbanization, and rising populist sentiment, this would seem to portend episodes of massive civil unrest, perhaps even resulting in intrastate conflict and increased threats of terrorism. Yet, the second half of the book, which describes emerging technologies in weapons development, focuses primarily on traditional great power war, a phenomenon that has become all but obsolete since the Second World War; and there is little in deglobalization to suggest its return. Thus, it would have been useful to include further analysis and perhaps recommendations related to the prognosis for asymmetric warfare in the foreseeable future.

Drawing on previous research by Klaus Schwab and others, Hammes shows the fourth industrial (or technological) revolution at the beginning of this century will be markedly different from the manufacturing and information revolutions of the past.[3] Instead of encouraging international trade and globalization, profit incentives will lead to a reshoring of production and sharp declines in trade. The combined use of robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3-D printing will fundamentally alter manufacturing processes to provide fully customized products on demand. The fourth revolution will eliminate the incentive for companies to relocate in search of cheap labor or raw resources; instead, they will want to move closer to markets to reduce delivery time and warehousing costs. Similarly, the advent of fracking and advances in renewable energy, such as solar and wind, will all but eliminate the international petroleum market, as power production becomes more regional, national, or local. Even the demand for international trade in agriculture will diminish as emerging technologies and the vertical farm industry make it possible to provide farm-to-table produce year-round in any location.[4] Hammes suggests the United States will likely fare well in this global environment, given its relative resource independence, well-educated labor force, and position as the world leader in innovation. Also, its geographic size and wealth per capita make it perhaps the most desirable consumer market.

On balance, Hammes, notes the downside of these advances is likely massive unemployment. He cites studies by Carl Frey and Michael Osborne and PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) to suggest that 38% to 42% of jobs could be lost to robots or computers in the next couple of decades.[5] The layoffs would not be limited to manufacturing, as many positions in services, including routine functions in the accounting, medical, legal, retail, and financial sectors are enhanced or replaced by artificial intelligence, and transportation jobs in trucking and shipping become automated. Looking at the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hammes acknowledges, although new jobs may be created in time, it is important “not to overlook the decades of declining health, wages, and security that urban laborers and their families experienced.”[6] Also to be remembered are the massive labor movements that led to socialist and repressive regimes during that period.

In the current political environment of rising nationalist and populist sentiment, massive losses in employment could result in demands for governments to increase public spending to provide education, health care, minimum standards of living, and jobs. The extent to which such pressures could lead to an expansion of civil service sectors and state-owned enterprises, a strengthening of regulatory environments, or the nationalization of industry and resources remains unknown.

In the absence of such measures, those who lose jobs through no fault of their own would likely experience relative deprivation compared with the winners of the revolution and could take to the streets. This probability would be greater in countries where political positions have become closely aligned with differences in ethnicity, race, religion, or sexuality or in societies suffering from a youth bulge.[7] Indeed, such possibilities are not limited to the developing world, as population aging in Europe, Japan, and North America could also result in a “clash of generations,” as pension schemes and healthcare plans place a drain on public coffers already stretched to the limit.[8] Thus, no country would be exempt from the potential for massive civil strife.

At the same time, Hammes describes advances in internet and surveillance technologies that have enabled governments like those in China, Iran, and Russia to collect the financial, personal, and social data of their citizens. These technologies also provide tools to track and isolate potential opponents. This observation calls for further study on whether these capabilities, combined with the recent militarization of police forces, might impact states’ ability and willingness to respond with more force to civil disturbances and insurgencies.

Despite Deglobalization’s theme related to emerging technologies of the future, the second part of the book focuses on current threats facing the United States: China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and transnational terrorism. The sudden move in Chapter 5 from the future back to the present created a chasm, because the economic arguments set forth in the first half of the book—especially on the demise of world oil markets—brought immediately to mind a question about Iran or Russia’s ability to keep up much less pose a significant threat in the coming years.

In the chapters devoted to international security, Hammes outlines the emerging technologies in missiles; aerial, maritime, and ground drones; warheads; and space that will make current military strategies and go-to weapons, like aircraft carriers and F-35s, all but obsolete as armaments become not only smaller, smarter, and cheaper, and more mobile. He then applies these advances to a careful analysis of current threats. This portion of the book could usefully have been expanded to cover all types of armed conflict: wars between states, wars within states, and terrorism. Thus far, wars between states generally have been based on disputes over territory, especially where natural resources, like oil or access to water, were at stake.[9] As global competition becomes less about access to geographic resources and more about access to markets and well-educated talent, is the motive for this type of armed conflict likely to disappear for good?  The interstate wars witnessed in this century have not been about great power competition; instead, the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli-Hezbollah War were cases of major powers invading smaller states. As Hammes notes, advances in weapons technology will give smaller states the means to fight back.

Given the wave of war within states that has occurred over the past 20 years—in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, for example—it would have been interesting to see more analysis on ways emerging technologies may affect asymmetric conflict between state governments and non-state actors. Clearly, these wars are bloodier when they become internationalized. As Hammes suggests, “Four factors will reinforce the decline in U.S. public support for overseas intervention—the employment changes being driven by the revolution, the reduced reliance on overseas trade, the increasing cost of intervention, and budgetary pressures which will force the United States to choose between funding domestic programs or defense/international programs.”[10] Will insurgents’ access to smaller, smarter, cheaper, and more mobile weapons strengthen the case for non-intervention, or will major powers engage in proxy battles to dominate markets?

Finally, the massive unemployment and growing inequality described in the first part of the book clearly calls for more attention to threats emanating from terrorist groups. The association between unemployment, poverty, and disillusioned youth and recruitment into social movements and terrorist organizations is by now well established.[11] Also, the wave of al-Qaeda-inspired attacks that have taken place across the globe since September 2001 bears witness to how group grievances in one country or region can affect the world at large.

In this work, Hammes leverages his extensive academic work and impressive military experience to present a thought-provoking glimpse into the long look ahead. In fact, it is so thought-provoking, it leaves the reader calling for more.

Sarah Tenney is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina.

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Header Image: Theodore Roosevelt (Biography.com)

Notes:

[1] Roosevelt, Theodore (2012). “In the Words of Theodore Roosevelt: Quotations from the Man in the Arena”, p.73, Cornell University Press

[2] Cambria. (2020). Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security (RCCS). Retrieved from Cambria: www.cambriapress.com/cambriaseries.cfm?template=91

[3] Schwab, Klaus (2016). The Fourth Industrial Revolution. New York: Crown Business.

[4] Halais, Flavie (2015). “Can Urban Agriculture Work on a Commercial Scale?” Landscapes/Paysages 17:2, 38-41.

[5] PwC. (2017) https://www.pwc.co.uk/economic-services/ukeo/pwc-uk-economic-outlook-full-report-march-2017-v2.pdf; Frey, Carl Benedikt and Michael A. Osborne (2013). “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerization?” Oxford Martin School, September 17.  http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is one of the largest professional networks in the world, offering consulting and accounting services in more than 157 countries. Carl Frey is the Oxford Martin Citi Fellow at the University of Oxford, and Michael Osborne is a Professor of Machine Learning at the University of Oxford.

[6] Hammes, T.X. (2019) Deglobalization and International Security. Amherst, New York: Cambria Press. p. 109.

[7] Blanton, Shannon and Charles Kegley (2020). World Politics: Trend and Transformation 17th ed. Cengage.

[8] Kotlikoff, Laurence and Scott Burns (2012). The Clash of Generations: Saving Ourselves, Our Kids, and Our Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

[9] Cashman, Greg. (2014). What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

[10] Hammes p. 228

[11] See Collier, Paul (2000). “Rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44:6, 839–853; and Mousseau, Michael (2011) “Urban poverty and support for Islamist terror: Survey results of Muslims in fourteen countries.” Journal of Peace Research 48:1, 35-47.