Great power competition is returning to the global stage. What can America’s past conflicts during great power competition teach us? Generally, warfare from 1945 to 1991 was politically limited by the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons coupled with a desire to limit third-party intervention among great power competitors—the strategic context. The Korean and Vietnam Wars can teach lessons about the relationship between the strategic context and balancing ends, ways, and means during great power competition.

Wars during great power competition are often fought for limited political objectives because of the threat of third-party intervention. Nations must understand the strategic context and balance the political objective to fit within it in order to have the greatest chance for an acceptable political outcome—as the means and ways applied are less likely to increase in wars for limited objectives. Given that political objectives are limited during great power competition between nuclear armed nations, this and the unwillingness to escalate the conflict create additional constraints upon the belligerents. As Donald Stoker writes, “All wars have constraints, but in wars for limited political aims, the constraints intrude more fiercely.”[1]

One critical aspect of the Korean and Vietnam Wars was that the United States was concerned with third-party intervention from the Soviet Union and China—the great powers opposed to the United States.[2] This is a crucial point in understanding the strategic context of the geopolitical environment as it pertained to nuclear deterrence, because it limited the political end state that nations pursued. As Clausewitz wrote, “Once the extreme is no longer feared or aimed at, it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made.”[3] The defining characteristic that made the Korean War successful for the United States was the appropriate balance between the means applied to prosecute the war, the appropriate ways to apply the means, and the political end states of all belligerents within the context of the strategic situation. Conversely, the Vietnam War demonstrated an instance where, within the strategic context, the means and ways required for victory were insufficient or incompatible with the political ends.

To set conditions for this article, defining terminology is appropriate. War is defined as the politically sanctioned use of military violence against another political entity in the pursuit of political objectives, or in the words of Clausewitz, “The political object is the goal, war is the means of achieving it.”[4] Warfare is defined as the methods or activities for waging war; warfare is correlated to the ways a war is waged as well as the means applied to wage the war. Success is defined as the attainment of acceptable political end states—in this case for the United States. Political end states are the set of conditions that define the achievement of the state’s political objectives.[5] Finally, the linkage between ends, ways, and means is defined in the following manner:

Ends answer ‘what’ is to be accomplished. Ways describe ‘how’ the ends are to be accomplished and they link the means to ends. Means, answer the question ‘with what?’, and are the resources which can be manipulated to support the ends.[6]

The introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation imposed political limitations on the means and ways applied during the Cold War. Theoretically, successful prosecution of warfare is predicated on which side can exert the most force for the longest period until the other side capitulates or is destroyed; what Clausewitz referred to as the “maximum exertion of force.”[7] While there have always been mitigating factors that limit a nation’s means or ways, the development of nuclear weapons and their subsequent proliferation has made those factors more pronounced. As Clausewitz wrote, “If one side uses force without compunction...while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war.”[8]

During the Cold War, as the destructive capacity of weapons increased to a level where all belligerents in the conflict, and potentially the entire world, could be destroyed, the military options available to nuclear-armed political bodies engaged in conflict with non-nuclear armed political bodies became limited by the possibility of third party intervention. As a result of this historical shift, the ability of leaders and decision makers to understand the political and strategic environment when waging war became even more paramount. The deterrent effects of nuclear weapons within the context of the Cold War were evident when then-Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall described the Korean War “…as a limited war which I hope will remain limited.”[9] The Korean War demonstrated a political understanding of the strategic and political situation brought about by nuclear weapons through the deliberate choice to avoid conditions that would cause the war’s escalation into a larger conflict with the Soviet Union or China.[10] This was the defining political end state that subsequently drove the means and ways of prosecuting the war.[11] Prior to the Chinese entrance into the Korean War, President Harry Truman changed the political objective from re-establishing the border with North Korea to unifying the Korean Peninsula under the South Korean government. Once the Chinese intervened, the political end state of the war reverted to a bifurcated Korea at the 38th Parallel.[12] Once it became clear the use of conventional United Nations forces on the Korean peninsula alone would not be sufficient to achieve the political end state of Korean reunification without third party (Chinese or Soviet) intervention, President Truman again changed the political objective due to the overarching desire to limit further escalation.

The strategic context and the political objectives of the war heavily influenced the ways of achieving the political end state. The United States and China both wished to confine the war to the Korean peninsula. The amphibious landing of American forces at Incheon was an example of the military options available when the political end state was reunification. When the political end state changed, the United States opted for a military strategy of attrition instead of operational maneuver to defeat the Chinese.[13] Rather than risk further escalation, the United States limited the ways applied to achieve its political objective. For instance, the United States could have targeted the Chinese war economy by blockading Chinese ports or conducting strategic bombing of the Chinese mainland, but political leaders wary of Soviet intervention prevented the military from employing these ways.[14] The ways used during this period focused on the use of air power to disrupt and destroy the Chinese and North Korean supply lines, thus limiting their offensive capability and making peace negotiations more likely.[15] Additionally, ground operations were limited to raids and small unit actions aimed at seizing and retaining key terrain along the 38th parallel to aid in negotiations.[16]

The Korean War shows the importance of understanding the strategic context: limiting the possibility for escalation with the Soviet Union and China. It also demonstrates the strategic imperative of balancing the political end state of retaining a South Korea free of communism without bringing the Soviet Union into the war and the appropriate ways and means. While the ways and means chosen were not tactically favorable to the military strengths of the United States, namely operational maneuver, they were enough to achieve the stated political end state. The Vietnam War, on the other hand, presents a case study in the unsuccessful balance of ends, ways, and means by a failure to adjust the political objective.

The Vietnam War demonstrates what can occur when the political end state requires ways and means that are incompatible due to a lack of understanding of the strategic context. As Harlan K. Ullman argued, “Policy must begin with identifying outcomes that can be realistically achieved and then proceed by linking means with ends and available resources.”[17] The policy that led to how the Vietnam War was conducted did not begin this way. The strategic context of the Vietnam War began in the mid-1950s when the United States sent advisors to South Vietnam to aid in the containment of communism.[18] A political objective, based on the Domino Theory, was being shaped: the containment of the spread of communism without major conflict with China or the Soviet Union. As President Kennedy stated, “We made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.”[19] President Kennedy faced a deteriorating situation in Vietnam and increased the number of advisors that were present in South Vietnam from just under 1,000 to over 16,000.[20] The increase in advisors demonstrated an increase in the means to achieve the political end state of a communist free South Vietnamese government.

However, President Kennedy, as well as subsequent U.S. presidents during the war, underestimated the will of the North Vietnamese people to unify their country.[21] These U.S. leaders and their advisors made a key strategic error by ignoring the prescient historic advice of Clausewitz who wrote, “If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”[22] In Vietnam, the means the U.S. applied to the conflict were sufficient. By 1968, Operation Rolling Thunder delivered more ordinance in three years than in all of Europe during World War II.[23] However, the ways applied to meet the political end state were incompatible. As one naval officer candidly explained to President Johnson in 1967, “Mr. President, we can get out or we can get in—that means taking the fight to the other side, blockading Haiphong and the other ports, and sending an amphibious force…cutting that country in half.”[24] The strategic context of the war, however, meant that applying more aggressive ways toward achieving the political end state, such as blockading the Soviet arms shipments into Haiphong harbor, was not politically acceptable due to the perceived risk of escalation with the Soviet Union or China.[25] Even before that, by 1965, the United States had no desire to negotiate with North Vietnam and wanted to extricate itself from the conflict without humiliation or losing world standing. Saving the South Vietnamese government was only a way to achieve that goal, not the goal itself.[26]

Given the incongruent trilemma political end state of no negotiations, no humiliation, and no escalation, the United States could not achieve its political objectives in South Vietnam. The ways and means were not only de-linked from the political end state, but many would counteract each other. For instance, to end the conflict without negotiation, the United States would have to defeat North Vietnam and unify the two countries, but that was not possible without escalating the war and potentially bringing the Soviet Union and China directly into the conflict. If the United States was willing to negotiate, that could potentially bring humiliation because the South Vietnamese government would likely collapse without significant support. One of the only ways left to the United States was then to conduct a war of attrition over time. However, time was not a resource the United States had in significant supply. In 1972, the Democratic party won a majority of seats in Congress and would ultimately de-fund the war, bringing an end to America’s involvement in Vietnam.[27] The un-willingness of the United States to alter one or more of its political end states or link the correct ways to the already ample means led to achieving only one of its three political objectives: not bringing the Soviet Union or China directly into the war.

Given the incongruent trilemma political end state of no negotiations, no humiliation, and no escalation, the United States could not achieve its political objectives in South Vietnam.

In conclusion, war is not limited nor is it total. War, and by extension, warfare, is situationally unique. Each instance is shaped through internal and external political factors, as it always has been. Understanding those factors and successfully balancing them with the appropriate means and ways to prosecute war is the defining characteristic of successful warfare. The Korean War is an example of successful warfare because the means and ways applied were balanced with the political end state within the context of the strategic situation. The Vietnam War is an example where those three factors were not balanced and the political objectives were not met. Understanding political objectives and their relationship to ends, ways, and means will have even more gravity as the world returns to great power competition between nuclear-armed nations, especially with the advent of increased technology and the potential for anonymous belligerents and non-state actors, further complicating an already strategically complex world.

Paul K. Wyatt Jr. is a U.S. Army officer. The views expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: U.S. soldiers near the Chongyang River in North Korea, 1951 (E.N. Johnson/AP)

Notes:

[1] Donald Stoker, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and U.S. Strategy from the Korean War to the Present (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 82.

[2] Ibid., 82.

[3] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989), 80.

[4] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 80.

[5] Chris Springer, U.S. Military Professionals’ Guide to Understanding Strategy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2019), 4.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 77.

[8] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 75–76.

[9] Stoker, Why America Loses Wars, 82.

[10] Ibid., 111.

[11] “Dean Acheson to Paul Nitze | Harry S. Truman,” 1, accessed February 3, 2020, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/dean-acheson-paul-nitze?documentid=NA&pagenumber=1.

[12] Stoker, Why America Loses Wars, 111.

[13] Spencer C. Tucker, “The Korean War, 1950-53: From Maneuver to Stalemate,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 22, no. 4 (December 2010): 429.

[14] Stoker, Why America Loses Wars, 111.

[15] Spencer C. Tucker, “The Korean War, 1950-53: From Maneuver to Stalemate,” 430.

[16] Ibid., 428.

[17] Harlan Ullman, Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every War It Starts (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 31.

[18] Ibid., 41.

[19] Ibid., 31.

[20] Ibid., 45.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, 77.

[23] “Rolling Thunder,” Air Force Magazine, accessed March 1, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0305thunder/.

[24] Ullman, Anatomy of Failure, 45–47.

[25] Ibid., 55.

[26] “Draft Memorandum from McNaughton to Robert McNamara, ‘Proposed Course of Action Re: Vietnam,’ (Draft) 24 March 1965,” 2, accessed February 1, 2020, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/doc253.htm.

[27] Stoker, Why America Loses Wars, 77.