History does not repeat itself. With the exception of general platitudes about the permanence of international tension and the sporadic recurrence of violent conflict, statements about historical patterns and cycles of warfare can at best lead to historiographical confirmation bias and, at worst, can prejudice policymakers into taking counterproductive and unnecessary escalatory measures.[1] Diplomats, intelligence professionals, and politicians must tread with care when approaching history and any patterns that emerge from it, especially when trying to draw parallels with present-day events. History and policy are ultimately about particulars—particular interests, particular leaders, particular decisions, and particular crises. Specific policies matter and can go a long way towards avoiding war altogether or minimizing its impact should it occur.

History and policy are ultimately about particulars—particular interests, particular leaders, particular decisions, and particular crises.

Simplifications aside, a close study of history does have its merits. To borrow a phrase attributed to Mark Twain, history may not repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes. While the circumstances that cause state and sub-state groups to engage in open conflict are unique, the geographical, ethnic, and cultural conditions leading to tensions among these groups remain at least semi-permanent. The challenge before policymakers is to accurately assess present realities, many of which have historical precedents, and act within the small but undeniable window of choice these realities offer.

Recently, few issues have received as much attention as Sino-U.S. relations, and none have invited so many historical parallels. Phrases like “Senkaku Paradox” and “Thucydides Trap” are common parlance among young strategists and military leaders.[2] Comparisons with the pre-World War I Anglo-German rivalry or Athenian-Spartan relations before the Peloponnesian wars abound. These analogies fit into a specific version of the realist outlook on international affairs. According to these theories, sovereign states exist in perpetual latent conflict—a war of all against all—in an anarchic global environment. In the end, they must rely only upon themselves and the acquisition of power to achieve security. In this framework, status-quo hegemons find themselves in unavoidable conflict with hegemonic challengers. It violates the presumed axioms of realism for two hegemonic superpowers to coexist peacefully. Conflict—both cold and hot—is preordained.

Yet the preceding reflects only one particular strand of realist analysis. It is possible to adopt a more open-ended outlook on historical development while acknowledging the semi-structural elements that govern international issues. As states pursue their national interests—a fundamental principle of realism—opportunities arise not only for de-escalation of tension but even cooperation on particular matters. Indeed, if the international situation is suitable for it, cooperation between rivals can make the most strategic sense. The Helsinki Accords and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I/II) treaties at the highpoint of the Cold War, as well as the collaboration between U.S. and Iranian negotiators during the talks that eventually led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, demonstrate the potential for cooperation between apparently hostile countries.

Assessing bilateral relations between the U.S. and China today suggests areas where cooperation is possible.[3[A future Sino-U.S. war is far from inevitable, at least if leaders manage relations delicately and with sufficient mutual appreciation for each other’s unique history, culture, and strategic ambitions. Strategists cannot emphasize the point enough: China is not Sparta or Germany; the U.S. is not England or Athens. Each has a horizon for interpreting international relations that are unique to it, and American policymakers must make a genuine effort to understand the Chinese outlook. Beijing holds a number of nightmare scenarios coloring their strategic worldview, and U.S. policymakers should keep this in mind if they want to avoid rhetoric and actions that could inadvertently trigger Chinese fears of escalation.

Strategic Nightmare Scenario #1: Strategic Encirclement

In his influential assessment of China’s history, Henry Kissinger claims China’s greatest geopolitical fear is strategic encirclement—that a single hegemonic rival or an alliance of multiple weaker ones will surround its vast territory and work to destabilize its periphery.[4] This fear is strongly rooted in geography and history. In terms of security, geography has not been kind to China. Twelve different countries share its borders, and many of them have a history of aggressive action and outright cruelty toward the Middle Kingdom. What is more, several maritime powers lie within a few hundred miles of its coastline. Fate has positioned China precariously, explaining in no small measure the mistrust that has characterized its diplomacy. While China has often been regionally ascendant, it has always remained keenly aware that national tragedy or embarrassment are close-at-hand if these surrounding nations were to band together against it.

China’s two most significant geopolitical initiatives over the last decade confirm this lesson. For China, The Belt and Road Initiative serves primarily as a peaceful way to buy influence with many countries on its western periphery. For instance, many Central Asian countries have secured sizeable funding for infrastructure projects in the Belt and Road. Likewise, the maritime aspects of Belt and Road aim to construct a logistical basis for sea routes whose accessibility does not rely upon the goodwill of China’s island neighbors. Furthermore, China’s gradual militarization of the South and East China seas suggests an effort to secure its eastern and southern maritime flanks. Considering this element of China’s strategic horizon, the Belt and Road as well as the militarization of the South and East China Seas take on a new meaning. They are attempts to avoid the strategic disaster encirclement entails by creating a Eurasian sphere of influence less susceptible to maritime embargo or land-based intrusion.

For China, The Belt and Road Initiative serves primarily as a peaceful way to buy influence with many countries on its western periphery.

It is thus not surprising these initiatives are experiencing significant push-back from several rivals in China’s neighborhood who fear that their room for maneuver in the region will diminish. Among these encircling states, three stand out: Russia, Japan, and the United States.[5[ All have complicated economic relations with China today, with points of tension coexisting with cooperation on many fronts. All have engaged in military conflict with China at some point in its history, and Beijing holds them primarily responsible for orchestrating its “century of humiliation.”[6]

Although currently not a potent military superpower, Japan’s proximity perpetually stokes memories of its brutal occupation of Manchuria and illustrates the real and present dangers of domestic political instability and military weakness.[7] Shinzo Abe’s efforts to remilitarize the island nation of Japan have understandably provoked consternation on the continent.[8] These efforts may be one of the motivating forces behind the Belt and Road and the militarization of the South and East China Seas. The tit-for-tat steps of military buildup on both sides risk feeding into narratives that make de-escalation difficult.

Russia, on the other hand, currently enjoys relatively stable and cooperative ties with Beijing. But such was not always the case and may not be in the future. Talk of a budding alliance between the two powers ignores the severe headwinds around the corner.[9] Both view the Eurasian landmass as their backyard, and both seek to develop stronger economic and military ties with Central Asian nations. Russian initiatives tied to the Eurasian Economic Union, whose objectives include creating a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor, as well as promoting deeper integration of the post-Soviet space, collide with China’s own visions for the future of the Eurasian landmass.

In the short term, China and Russia are engaged in a high level of cooperation aiming to integrate the two projects.[10 However, the long-term prospects of cooperation are less bright. If either party begins to perceive any asymmetry in influence, an increasingly hostile and mutually suspicious attitude will inevitably emerge, especially if their common enemy, the United States, follows through with President Trump’s desire to withdraw entirely from the region.[11] A hostile Russia on China’s borders would create a situation reminiscent of the 1970s, when the U.S. was able to exploit the discord to its own advantage. Looking into the future, it seems localized great power competition between Russia and China, without the U.S. as a participant, could benefit the U.S. significantly more in an area that matters very little to American vital interests.

Currently, the chances of a complete U.S. withdrawal from the region appear slim. In fact, the American presence only seems to be growing, with Beijing perceiving the U.S. as the most likely contender to carry out this nightmare strategic scenario.[12] Therefore, the pervasiveness of America’s imprint along its entire periphery strikes an emotional chord with the Chinese leadership. American troops and strategic partnerships in South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Taiwan, Australia, India, and the Philippines, not to mention recent efforts to gain influence among the Central Asian countries critical to the Belt and Road, represent a textbook case of hegemonic strategic encirclement that understandably worries Beijing.

One area of controversy rarely mentioned in the American press is the war in Afghanistan. Despite America’s perception of the region as the heart of the so-called War on Terror, China’s perspective on this war differs considerably. Not only does Afghanistan share a border with China, but more importantly, strong cultural ties link Afghanistan to China’s most restive region, Xinjiang.[13] China initially supported the coalition effort to overthrow the Taliban—which has, Beijing believes, trained and provided refuge for Uighur separatists in Xinjiang—and promotes initiatives aimed at stabilizing the troubled country.[14] But a growing cohort in the Chinese leadership fears the conflict is morphing into a new arena for “Great Game” competition. The Chinese believe this transformed conflict risks leading to more instability on its periphery, not less.[15]

Because China believes instability in Afghanistan means instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese leadership could perceive this conflict in one of two ways. In the first, China views this instability as a headache inadvertently caused by the U.S. presence. China will have to dedicate substantial resources—both military and financial—to dealing with a problem that it sees as indirectly rooted in a U.S. military presence. In the second, China could suspect a deliberate U.S. hand in stoking instability in Xinjiang. As implausible as this suspicion may be, Washington cannot ignore Chinese perceptions of the nineteen-year conflict. The U.S. must come to terms with the reality that it may be inadvertently feeding Chinese fears of strategic encirclement.

Strategic Nightmare Scenario #2: Domestic Chaos

Understanding how Beijing behaves on the international stage also requires a deep appreciation of its complex domestic conditions. What often strikes western observers as an unnecessary violation of human rights represents, for the Chinese leadership, not only a matter of regime survival but also, more importantly, a matter of averting national catastrophe. Memories of the bloody civil war between 1927 and 1949—in which as many as 3 million people died—still haunt many Chinese. Illustrative of this lesson in more recent history are the 1989 Tiananmen Square anti-government protests.  Western observers believed these protests were a prelude to the full democratization of the Chinese mainland. So, the eventual government crackdown on the demonstrations—leading to the deaths of thousands and the arrests of even more—struck democratic societies as exceptionally cruel.[16] For many Westerners, Tiananmen symbolized the promise of China, what it could be if only the current communist regime decided to make necessary political and economic reforms.

As Kissinger astutely observes, understanding the political and historical context of Tiananmen shows that this event symbolizes something much darker for the Chinese leadership. In the lead-up to the unexpected death of Hu Yaobang, whose funeral was the trigger for the Tiananmen protests, Deng Xiaoping’s political reforms and economic restructuring were beginning to expose latent fissures within Chinese society. Gaps in wealth and education level were increasingly conspicuous as the protests spread.[17] Yet behind these wide societal differences also lay major areas of unity in opposition to the ruling regime. The protests eventually included students, manual laborers, military men, and government employees.[18] Deng and other members of the Chinese leadership feared—perhaps justifiably given their perception of foreign intervention in Beijing’s affairs—that foreign entities were primarily responsible for fanning the flames of discontent, and were helping to turn what otherwise would have been a minor incident into an existential crisis.[19]

On the economic side, attempts to make prices reflect real costs inevitably led to price increases, at least in the short term, which in turn led to a run to buy up goods before prices went even higher. This rush created a vicious cycle of hoarding and higher inflation. Also, to recast the command economy on the model of the European system, Deng Xiaoping dismantled many central institutions and streamlined the bureaucracy.[20] Reforms thus enraged many established interests. As Kissinger points out, “The relative success of economic reform produced constituencies at the core of the later discontent. And the government would face declining loyalty from the political cadres whose jobs the reforms threatened.”[21] The leadership in Beijing thus confronted opposition from both sides of the political spectrum. On the one hand, the Tiananmen protests showed that pro-western camps were not an insignificant factor in Chinese politics. On the other hand, because the foundation of Deng’s rule relied in many ways on the tenets of a communist economic system and the prior charismatic leadership of Mao Zedong—both of which Deng quietly repudiated in significant ways—any changes to these entrenched foundations would inevitably risk alienating those who had brought him to power.

Discontent among minority ethnic groups was, and still is today, another underappreciated factor influencing Beijing’s actions. At the same time the protests were raging, in the far west of the country, Tibetans and the Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang continued their decades-long agitation and opposition to the Chinese Communist Party’s policies.[22] This disorder added to Beijing’s panic. For the communist leadership and Deng Xiaoping in particular, the seemingly ubiquitous restlessness among the many strata of society stirred the historical Chinese fear of chaos. Regardless of the stated goals of the demonstrators, they recalled both the civil war and the bloody Cultural Revolution.[23] Deng carried out the eventual crackdown reluctantly. In his mind, it was a necessary measure to avoid national disaster.[24]

Presently, Beijing appears more confident domestically and internationally. Over the last two decades, China has enjoyed sustained growth rates well above those of Western democracies and has managed to weather the storms of an international financial crisis in 2008-2009 and a trade war with the U.S. with only a relatively minor effect on its overall growth. Standards of living continue to rise and poverty rates are the lowest they have ever been.[25] At the parade for the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 2019, this self-assurance was clearly on display, as enormous crowds gathered to admire the overwhelming might of a nation resurrected from the dustbin of history.

Nevertheless, as Matthew Goodman, Elizabeth Economy, and other commentators have suggested, all of this optimism masks a much bleaker reality for the Chinese leadership.[26] The regime’s legitimacy has come to rely almost entirely on its ability to continue to deliver high levels of economic growth, something that will become increasingly difficult as its population ages and the economy becomes more consumer-driven. Industrial production growth slowed to a 17-year low in August of 2019, and anecdotal evidence suggests that ordinary Chinese are starting to feel the effects of slower wage growth and higher prices.[27] Furthermore, many respected Chinese economists are calling attention to the fact that government efforts to spur growth in the face of these obstacles are less and less effective.[28] The marginal efficiency of capital, measured by the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR), is declining sharply since it takes more and more units of investment to generate one additional unit of growth.[29] All of this could potentially spell disaster for a financial system already racked with increasing debt and a forecasted growing disproportion between retirees and workers.

It will be necessary for Chinese leadership to cultivate other sources of legitimacy over the coming years if these economic trends continue. U.S. policymakers should be sensitive to these necessities and not overreact to any rhetoric that aims primarily at shifting the basis of legitimacy within China, even if it strikes an ostensibly anti-western or nationalistic tone outside of China. Xi Jinping’s position may require at least three levels of communication, one with other world leaders, one within the Communist Party, and another that serves primarily to protect domestic stability and the regime’s standing within China. Historical perspective shows that, in China, a weak regime means increasing domestic instability. It also shows this instability can take on a life of its own, leading to civil war, mass-murder, and vulnerability to foreign interference in its affairs. Beijing will do everything in its power to avoid this scenario, so leaders in Washington must be realistic about what it can expect from the Chinese leadership in the years ahead.

An Uncertain Future

Current Sino-U.S. relations are a complicated affair, and though strategists should never rely on history to provide an accurate picture of future developments, it can be a useful, albeit incomplete, guide to the particular concerns, interests, and strategic outlook of their Chinese counterparts. China’s two strategic nightmare scenarios outlined above are deeply rooted in its history, culture, and geography. They by no means explain all of its domestic and international behavior, but they can provide context for much of its rhetoric and many of its geostrategic initiatives. If the U.S. wants to elude the maelstrom of unavoidable war over relatively small strategic stakes, it would do well to avoid measures that feed China’s fears about these scenarios.

Although Washington should not be naïve in its dealings with Beijing, it should also make a deliberate effort to adjust its rhetoric to appease these legitimate concerns. Above all, it should demonstrate that its economic and military endeavors in China’s neighborhood intend, not to actualize some sort of strategic strangulation, but to serve Asia’s long-term interests by providing stability and prosperity to a region that, without a U.S. presence, would be much more dangerous for everyone. The U.S. should be more honest about the fact that its future prosperity depends largely upon China’s success. What is more, Washington should make clear that, while it does stand for human rights and the gradual reform of China’s political institutions, it understands that given China’s domestic conditions, these reforms cannot be made overnight.

Perhaps the most challenging consequence of a non-repetitive history is that the future is mostly undetermined, a mystery revealed only by the unfolding of particular events. This uncertainty puts the onus of decision and responsibility squarely on the shoulders of political, diplomatic, and military leadership, who must navigate this challenging terrain with incomplete knowledge of its features. A Sino-U.S. war is not preordained, nor is it an impossibility. If it ever does happen, it will be the result of the particular choices, words, and deeds of particular leaders, not a pattern embedded in the structure of history.

Michael Colebrook is a U.S. Army officer who holds a Ph.D. in Political Philosophy from the University of Dallas. The views in this essay are his own, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Notes

[1] I have in mind a recent article published in The Strategy Bridge. See Farley, Dylan. “Objects in Mirror Are Closer Than They Appear: The Oncoming Wave of Conflict.” The Strategy Bridge, October 15, 2019.

[2] See O’Hanlon, Michael. The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes. (Brookings Institution Press, 2019). Also, see Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?. (Mariner Books, 2018). It is worth mentioning that the positions outlined in these books are much more nuanced than their popular construal would suggest. Neither see a U.S.-China war as inevitable and, in fact, both provide very practical policy suggestions to help avoid war.

[3] For a summary of potential areas of cooperation, see Zakaria, Fareed. “The New China Scare: Why America Shouldn’t Panic About its Latest Challenger.” Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2020.

[4] Kissinger, Henry. On China. (New York: Penguin Books, 2012). This fear, almost completely neglected in English-language publications on Chinese Strategy, is very prevalent among the Chinese leadership today. Also see Lukin, Alexander. China and Russia: The New Rapprochement. (Medford: Polity Press, 2018).

[5] I am not forgetting India, the Philippines, and Vietnam, three other rivals in the region. However, for illustrating my point about strategic encirclement, the countries mentioned above will suffice.

[6] For a thorough analysis of China’s National Narratives and how they impact its security policy, see Kaufman, Alison. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China‟s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy.” March 10, 2011. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf; for a brief sketch of Sino-Russian border disputes and China’s perception of their impact on its “Century of Humiliation,” see Denison, Igor. “Aigun, Russia, and China’s Century of Humiliation.” Carnegie Institute Moscow Center, October 6, 2015. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/60357

[7] For a great overview of the history of Sino-Japanese relations, see McGregor, Richard. Asia’s Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of U.S. Power in the Pacific Century. (New York: Penguin Books, 2017).

[8] See Motoko, Rich. “Shinzo Abe Announces Plan to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution.” New York Times, May 3, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/asia/japan-constitution-shinzo-abe-military.html

[9] Aron, Leon. “Are China and Russia Really Forming a New Alliance?” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance

[10] Rolland, Nadège. “A China-Russia Condominium Over Asia.” International Institute for Strategic Studies, February-March, 2019.  https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2019/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-februarymarch-2019/611-02-rolland

[11] Aron, Leon. “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2019.

[12] Wong, Edward. “The U.S. Faces a Tough Great Game Against China in Central Asia and Beyond.” The New York Times, February 13th, 2020.

[13] See Huasheng, Zhao. “China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives.” Report published by The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2012. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120322_Zhao_ChinaAfghan_web.pdf ; Also compare Ma, Haiyun. “For Them Afghanistan Is Safer than China.” Foreign Policy, November 1, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/01/for-them-afghanistan-is-safer-than-china/

[14] Huasheng, Zhao. “China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives.” Report published by The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2012.

[15] Wong, Edward. “The U.S. Faces a Tough Great Game Against China in Central Asia and Beyond.” The New York Times, February 13th, 2020.

[16] Estimates differ as to the number of deaths in the Tiananmen protests. Some estimate casualties in the hundreds, some in the thousands. See Nathan, Andrew. “The New Tiananmen Papers.” Foreign Affairs, May 30, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-30/new-tiananmen-papers; for a higher estimate in the thousands, see Lusher, Adam. “At least 10,000 people died in the Tiananmen Square massacre, secret British cable from the time alleged.” Independent, December 23, 2016. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tiananmen-square-massacre-death-toll-secret-cable-british-ambassador-1989-alan-donald-a8126461.html

[17] For an account of past and present educational gaps between China’s rural and urban populations, see Gao, Helen. “China’s Education Gap.” New York Times, September 4, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/sunday/chinas-education-gap.html; for

[18] Kovalio, Jacob. “The 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident: Retrospective and Prospective Considerations.” Asian Perspective, Vol. 15 No. 1, p. 9.

[19] Nathan, Andrew. “The New Tiananmen Papers.” Foreign Affairs, May 30, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-30/new-tiananmen-papers

[20] Kissinger, Henry. On China. (New York: Penguin Books, 2012) pg. 406.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See Hastings, Justin. “Charting the Course of Uighur Unrest.” The China Quarterly. December, 2011.

[23] Kissinger, Henry. On China. (New York: Penguin Books, 2012) pg. 410.

[24] Nathan, Andrew. “The New Tiananmen Papers.” Foreign Affairs, May 30, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-30/new-tiananmen-papers

[25] https://www.adb.org/publications/poverty-profile-peoples-republic-china

[26] See Economy, Elizabeth. “The Problem with Xi’s China Model.” Foreign Affairs. March 6, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-03-06/problem-xis-china-model. See also Beckley, Michael. “Stop Obsessing About China.” Foreign Affairs. September 21, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-21/stop-obsessing-about-china

[27] Goodman, Matthew. “The Anxiety Behind Beijing’s Swagger.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/anxiety-behind-beijings-swagger

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.