Elizabeth Gooch, Eric Eckstrand, Chris Mayers, and Sebastian Ruiz

The international order is changing through political and economic shifts, and China is emerging as a forceful entity with bold plans. China’s President Xi Jinping has linked Chinese business interests with foreign policy through the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese companies are working on projects around the world, from natural gas pipelines in Pakistan and Bangladesh to deep-water ports in Sri Lanka and Djibouti. The engagement of Chinese-supported capital investments around the world embodies China’s new direction through economic statecraft.

Our analysis mobilizes the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) 2.0 which offers nearly 20 terabytes of information on news reports—1.3 billion articles since 2015—from around the globe and across 65 languages.[1] Big data is an increasingly important part of modern life and online media can be computationally analyzed to reveal patterns, trends, and associations.[2] Using this vast data set, we hope to gain insights into differences across perspectives on Chinese activities and relations abroad.

In this article, we assume a direct relationship between variation in media coverage from a country and that country’s national interests. For example, if the Chinese media reports positively about relations between China and another country, then the Chinese government is conveying its investment in cultivating a positive relationship with that country. Since Chinese media is either monitored or directly run by the state, then this link is particularly strong. The other country, however, likely has a freer press—the interests of its media may still be aligned with political affairs but in different ways such as approximating public opinion or even influencing opinion and policy.[3] However, many governments, particularly those cultivating relations with China, such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, control the local press.

Drawing our data from GDELT provides an additional layer of validity to the assumption we make about the relationship between media coverage and national interest. GDELT claims to collect all available online media since March 2015. Therefore, our speculation about national interest or public perception from the calculation of frequency of news coverage or the tone of the average article about a topic from the GDELT dataset means that we are using the full, actual news available and not a possibly unrepresentative sample.

Generally, the Chinese state-backed media views Chinese overseas ventures through rose-colored glasses. Western-based media outlets, however, tell a bleaker story about the Chinese projects and their impacts on the local citizens. Media coverage is a malleable form of soft power, altering foreign affairs through persuasion. The Chinese press is engaged in a ubiquitous persuasive endeavor—and GDELT allows us to measure the intensity of Xinhua’s position over the narrative of China’s activities and relations abroad.  China is currently working to upsell its brand, offering opportunities through strategic partnerships and access to the Chinese domestic market and funding for infrastructure development in target countries.

Through big data analysis, researchers can ask questions about the geographic scope and intensity of the Xinhua’s narrative. Additionally, comparison with the local news, specifically, can illuminate the soft power impacts within a country. However, depending on the freedom of the press in a country, the local press may be swayed by journalistic experience or by government intentions.

In this article, we compare and contrast reporting from Chinese and local press on China’s relations with Kenya, as well as, with the average perspective to vast global media front. First, we will provide a brief overview of one contested narrative case in which many interesting questions might be more generally gleaned from the GDELT dataset. Next, using the specific Kenyan case, we will highlight opportunities to examine variation in a narrative through both the aggregate of articles published as well as the frequency of tone and reception of these articles. Finally, we conclude by highlighting how the GDELT dataset provides narrative researchers an opportunity to further explore information as a powerful determinant of soft power.

A Contested Narrative in Kenya

Over the last few years in Kenya, Chinese companies have been involved in the construction of the first coal-fired power plant, a new railway, a digital television channel called StarTime which broadcasts Chinese content for an African audience, and other smaller projects and ventures.[4] Moreover, China is Kenya’s largest creditor.[5] Though not directly linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, an international initiative that ties together loosely associated infrastructure projects and that came into being in 2013, these ventures embody an acceleration in relations for the two countries.[6]

In the summer of 2019, though, Kenyan courts ordered construction to halt for a Chinese-built coal-fired power plant. During the subsequent 18 months, media outlets from the West and China engaged in a battle for the dominant position by publishing articles with starkly different perspectives.[7] Outlets like the Huffington Post and The New York Times first reported on the Chinese company’s plans, highlighting the country’s export of dirty energy.[8] These articles also highlighted the close proximity of the new coal plant to Kenya’s oldest living town and best-preserved Swahili settlement in East Africa. In the same period, China’s state-run Xinhua News countered that the plant would be the cleanest coal-fired power plant in Africa.[9]

In the case of the power plant, the Chinese press attempted to relieve doubts by influencing the narrative about the project.[10] The oppositional stance taken by the New York Times befits the United States position towards China. In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the United States identified China as a significant strategic competitor.[11] Specifically, the United States is concerned that new Chinese economic relations and Chinese-built infrastructure projects may represent a shift in partnerships away from the United States and a reallocation of control over resources.[12]

Opportunities in Future Media Research: Aggregate, Tone, and Reception

Does the Kenyan court’s rejection of the Chinese-backed power plant have any correlation with the negative press from abroad? Are the countries with which China is recently trying to cultivate relations through infrastructure projects, aid, and/or trade embracing the Chinese advance or not? Our analysis of the new, extensive global media data offers an opportunity to explore trends that cannot be gleaned from example events.

We approximate the Chinese media’s perspective through the articles published by Xinhua News Agency, China’s most prolific state-run media outlet. Beginning in 1937 and with a name meaning “New China,” Xinhua does the Chinese Communist Party’s bidding.[13] According to GDELT, Xinhua only comprises about a tenth of a percent of the global online media, despite this meager contribution the outlet still disseminates a lot of information at the behest of the Chinese state. In total, Xinhua publishes about twice as many articles as The New York Times.[14]

Kenya is one of the top 15 countries mentioned by Xinhua News over the last four years—totaling more than a thousand articles. Along with Kenya, however, better relations with many East African nations are of interest to China and are a geographic focus of the Belt and Road Initiative. In the region, for example, China has built a military support base and is in the midst of a legal battle for rights to port operations in Djibouti. A Chinese company signed a $1.8 billion deal with Ethiopia’s prime minister to construct new power and transport infrastructure.[15] These ventures establish deeper ties between the target countries and China. Some experts worry the scale of the ensuing debt will have long-run effects on the countries’ development.

The frequency of articles itself is a useful metric to describe news coverage pertaining to the case of Kenya. Kenya is the 15th most discussed country by the Xinhua News, while, after China itself, most reports are about the United States. For this analysis, however, GDELT offers more valuable information. Of particular interest is the emotional tone of each article, which is derived from the words used in the news story. The tone of an article ranges from very positive to mildly positive, to neutral to negative, or very negative and allows analysts to quantify whether the article was supportive or pessimistic about a topic. On this scale, the average Xinhua narrative in an article on China and Kenya is very positive. Returning to Chinese press coverage of the coal-fired power plant, the data analysis confirms the upbeat, anecdotal news reports exemplify a broader, very positive Chinese perspective.

Likewise, the take-away from big data analysis corroborates a pessimistic perspective from the non-Chinese press. The oft condemnatory perspective from The New York Times and Huffington Post on the Chinese coal-fired plant on the Kenyan coast epitomizes a general trend taken by non-Chinese press outlets. The average western press tone of articles about China and Kenya is very negative. Overall, regarding Chinese-Kenyan activities, the West and China are very much at odds.[16]

Additional measures available within the GDELT data set on the topical foci of articles provide opportunities for deeper analysis of Chinese-Kenyan activities for which the West and China are in conflict. GDELT categorizes an article’s focus using verbs and actors to typify a news article’s subject. For example, if the article mainly discusses a positive future commitment then the article is coded as an agree article.[17] One question of interest is whether or not Chinese positivism is driven by the topics of the articles—perhaps, they are reporting on positive events, while the other outlets are reporting on negative events, and the topic is driving the relatively pessimistic attitude.

Our analysis shows that the divergence between the tone taken about Kenyan-Chinese issues by the Chinese and non-Chinese press is sometimes even starker among articles with the same topical focus. For example, three common classifications praise and endorse, providing economic aid, and host a visit, each of which represents a positive interaction between China and Kenya, are reported on by the Western outlets very negatively. On these same types of events, the Chinese press is, as usual, very optimistic. The only type of event for which the non-Chinese media is mildly positive is to sign a formal agreement, which likely captures an agreement between a Kenyan entity and Chinese one.

When the Chinese and non-Chinese press present contrasting perspectives about a small nation like Kenya, we can ask the question: Does one narrative have more influence on the local press’ perspective on Chinese activities in their country? In the real-world example about the power plant used to motivate this essay, one may ask: Were Kenyan advocacy groups or the Kenyan media persuaded by the subtle call to halt construction on the power plant by articles from The New York Times or Huffington Post? Trends in the GDELT data suggest a more nuanced position within Kenya. On average, the Kenyan press rides a centerline—providing a neutral perspective—not even mildly negative. However, in the case of Kenya, it is not clear if ambiguous reporting reflects the public’s opinion or that of vacillating government stance because freedom of the press is relatively suppressed.

But even though the Kenyan reporters convey an unremarkable stance on their country’s relations with China, the plethora of news articles from the Chinese press may inundate the Kenyan public. By the number of articles about Chinese-Kenyan topics, China’s Xinhua News, China.org, and China Daily rank in the second through fourth most common reporters just behind Kenya’s Standard Media, one of Kenya’s largest newspapers. Though this article does not capture the percentage of the Kenyan population reading Xinhua, there is evidence that Chinese news outlets are reaching a large portion of the population, e.g. via StarTimes satellite TV.[18] The Chinese press out-reports Kenya’s Standard 3 to 2. The only top ten outlet for non-Chinese, non-Kenyan press, in terms of frequency of coverage, is Reuters.  It may be the case that the frequency of positive Chinese reporting increases the average reception of China within the view of Kenyan readers or it is possible that so few articles reach the Kenyan public that the Chinese press produces extra coverage.

Conclusion

States have wielded media as a tool for soft power competition throughout the 20th century. But now, as more people have access to online sources, the potential for influence through media is growing. Big data analysis, using datasets such as GDELT can help quantify the trends in the media—which can aid understanding of the changing global relations and influences. As China becomes a more involved player beyond its borders, many experts have relied on anecdotal data to draw conclusions on China’s influence. Big data analysis provides a bird’s eye view of the battle for the narrative and a unique and helpful perspective on relative soft power competition in this new era for world powers. China prizes soft power as a useful tool to advance its interests, and its endeavors through the Belt and Road Initiative are prime targets.[19] If Kenya is representative, then target countries are on the fence or, in other words, are noncommittal to Chinese influence.

However, the Kenyan press is relatively more positive about their own relations with China than the perspectives from abroad.  For example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative offers governments across Asia and Africa new opportunities for construction and financing.[20] GDELT offers both geographically and temporally precise information at changing attitudes expressed by the press. Further analysis of GDELT data may offer a way for nations wary of Chinese influence, like the United States and India, to monitor relations between their allies and neighbors with China and direct funding towards counterbalancing Chinese efforts to advance their soft power objectives.[21]

Elizabeth Gooch is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Naval Postgraduate School. She researches contemporary and 20th-century Chinese policy.

Eric Eckstrand is a prior U.S. Navy officer. Following his naval career, Eric worked in various machine-learning software engineering positions at start-up and mid-size companies, and now is a member of the Data Science and Analytics Group (DSAG) at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Chris Mayers is a senior at California State University, Monterey Bay pursuing a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science in preparation for a career in software engineering.

Sebastian Ruiz is a Computer Science major at California State University, Monterey Bay. He is a first-generation college student set to graduate in 2020.

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Header Image: The Xinhua News Agency (Columbia Journalism Review)

Notes:

[1] "GDELT 2.0 Our global world in realtime," GDELT, 19 February 2015. [Online]. Available: https://blog.gdeltproject.org/gdelt-2-0-our-global-world-in-realtime/. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[2] The results in this essay are from a preliminary analysis of the data and should only be taken as suggestive.

[3] F. Neresini and A. Lorenzet (2016). Can media monitoring be a proxy for public opinion about technoscientific controversies? The case of the Italian public debate on nuclear power. Public Understanding of Science, 26:2. J. Snyder and D. Stromberg (2010). Press coverage and political accountability.  Journal of Political Economy. 188:2, pp. 355-408. M. Schudson and D. Hass,“Feet to the fire: Does journalism keep government honest?” Columbia Journalism Review January/February 2020, [Online]. Available: https://archives.cjr.org/the_research_report/feet_to_the_fire.php [Accessed Jan. 17, 2020].

[4] J. Marsh, "How China is slowly expanding its power in Africa, one TV set at a time," CNN Business, 24 July 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/23/business/startimes-china-africa-kenya-intl/index.html. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[5] A. L. Dahir, "The “debt-trap” narrative around Chinese loans shows Africa’s weak economic diplomacy," Quartz Africa, 4 February 2019. [Online]. Available: https://qz.com/africa/1542644/china-debt-trap-talk-shows-africas-weak-economic-position/. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[6] J. T. Areddy and L. Wei, "The World Struggles to Adjust to China’s ‘New Normal’," Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-world-struggles-to-adjust-to-chinas-new-normal-1440552939. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[7] BBC, "Kenya halts Lamu coal power project at World Heritage Site," 26 June 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48771519. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[8] S. Sengupta, "Why Build Kenya’s First Coal Plant? Hint: Think China," New York Times, 27 February 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/climate/coal-kenya-china-power.html. [Accessed 1 October 2019]. D. Wesangula, "Kenya Gambles On Dirty Energy With Its First Coal Plant," Huffington Post, 15 March 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/lamu-kenya-coal-plant_n_5aa7a8d5e4b009b705d5f3ac. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[9] Xinhua News, "Kenya plans to build cleanest coal fired power plant in Africa: officials," 16 May 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/17/c_137184491.htm. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[10] E. Albert, "China's big bet on soft power," Council of Foreign Relations, 19 February 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[11] E. Colby, "Addressing China and Russia’s Emergence as Great Power Competitors and the Implementation of the National Defense Strategy: Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee," Center for New American Security, 29 January 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/addressing-china-and-russias-emergence-as-great-power-competitors-and-the-implementation-of-the-national-defense-strategy. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[12] M. A. Kuo, “China in Djibouti: Power of Ports: Insights from Basil M. Karatzas,” The Diplomat, 25 March 2019. [Online]. Available: https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-in-djibouti-the-power-of-ports/. [Accessed 16 November 2019].

[13] L. Lim and J. Bergin, "Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign," 7 December 2018. [Online]. Available: 2019. [Accessed 1 October 2019].

[14] P. Kennedy and A. Prat, "Where do people get their news?," Columbia Business School Research Paper, No. 17-65, 2018.

[15] M. Kirgua, “Deepening China-East Africa ties,” The Africa Report, 25 April 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.theafricareport.com/12301/deepening-china-east-africa-ties/. [Accessed 16 November 2019].

[16] N. Sonnad, "Can China Convince the World to Like It," Quartz, 30 August 2018. [Online]. Available: https://qz.com/1369639/can-china-convince-the-world-to-like-it/. [Accessed 30 September 2019].

[17] P. Schrodt, “CAMEO Conflict and Mediation Event Observation Event and Actor Code Book,” Event Data Project, March 2012 [Online}. Available: http://data.gdeltproject.org/documentation/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf. [Accessed 13 November 2019].

[18] Kaiman, Jonathan, “‘China has conquered Kenya’: Inside Beijing’s new strategy to win African hearts and minds,”  LA Times, 7 August 2017. [Online] . Available: https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-africa-kenya-20170807-htmlstory.html.

[19] Center for Strategic and International Studies, "China Power," 3 October 2019. [Online]. Available: https://chinapower.csis.org/is-chinas-soft-power-strategy-working/.

[20] Holmes, Frank, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Opens Up Unprecedented Opportunities,” Forbes, 4 September 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/09/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-opens-up-unprecedented-opportunities/#66c6be53e9aa.

[21] Sharma, Mala, “India’s Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative - Opportunities and Concerns,” The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 5(2), 2019. [Online]. Available: https://brill.com/view/journals/cjgg/5/2/article-p136_3.xml?language=en.