The United States Air Force is in an arms race. Decades of dominance have allowed the force to slip into complacency, while near-peer adversaries have quietly developed capabilities to contest U.S. power across all domains. To re-assert America’s military primacy, the U.S. Air Force needs to transform vague buzzwords like lethality, agility, and innovation into a focused mission, using the department’s substantial resources to create an Air Force that can and will win. Converting rhetoric to action will require clear-eyed, decisive strategic leadership from the top. The recipe for innovation is not a secret—it comes from investing in disciplined processes driving towards solving critical operational problems. The Air Force can innovate its way to where it needs to be, but to do so it needs targets, it needs structure, and it needs investment.

A Strategic Imperative for Innovation

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, airmen have enjoyed dominant conventional overmatch. Three decades of asymmetric warfare have presented unique challenges for the force, but the low-intensity conflicts of the Global War on Terror were never predicated on an existential threat to the United States.[1]

The same cannot be said for the wars of tomorrow. The 2018 National Defense Strategy announced that “long-term strategic competition” has overtaken terrorism as the Department of Defense’s primary challenge.[2] Already, recent wargaming has shown that “when we fight Russia and China, [the U.S.] gets its ass handed to it.”[3]

The current status quo is unsustainable. The good news for the Air Force is that it can pull ahead of its competitors if it invests intelligently in forward-looking technology and ideas, using effective and efficient structures, towards well-framed and prioritized targets.[4]

The Moonshot Case Study

Air Force leaders are fond of referencing the 1960s space race as a case study in successful American innovation.[5] In this regard, they are in good company. Google subtitled their in-house innovation accelerator the Moonshot Factory. The Kennedy administration’s success is not just a nostalgic source of inspiration; the Moonshot case exemplifies the use of targets, structure, and investment to foster innovation. President Kennedy distilled complex operational problems into clearly articulated targets, like landing on the moon and building supersonic jets.[6] He demanded “a degree of dedication, organization and discipline which have not always characterized our research and development efforts.”[7] He outlined the “very heavy” investment needed to realize his vision.[8] President Kennedy’s lucid, decisive leadership transformed buzzwords into a mission, and the nation executed. It should be noted that while the Moonshot success provides a useful case study in government innovation, it does not imply that the President must lead Air Force innovation efforts. Air Force senior leaders must neither defer this responsibility down to their squadron-level subordinates, nor upwards to their civilian bosses.

Targets

It is exceptionally hard to drop bombs on target without targets on which to drop them. Air Force leaders know their force needs to get better at innovation—their bosses have told them so.[9] However, they have not communicated exactly what this looks like. Instead, these leaders have announced that the Air Force’s innovation problem is a culture problem.[10] The message is that the top and the bottom of the Air Force have the ability and desire to innovate, but are being thwarted by obstinate ne’er-do-wells—the frozen middle—who suffocate innovation in bureaucracy.[11] The solution? A vague directive to “foster a culture of innovation” by thawing the frozen middle, thus hypothetically unearthing the latent innovation skills of half a million airmen.[12]

However, America’s airmen do not have clear targets or outlines of the operational problems they are supposed to be solving. Innovation alone is not a goal; it is a problem-solving tool. If Air Force senior leaders truly want to drive innovation, they must set, prioritize, and communicate clear, actionable targets to their innovators.

Goal-setting should come naturally to Air Force leaders. They are trained throughout their careers on setting targets, using methods such as the S.M.A.R.T. goal framework (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Results-focused, Time-bound).[13] Innovation is not exempt from the basic strategies for mission success that the Air Force uses every day.

The Air Force’s current innovation directive obfuscates responsibility for its predicament and provides no real solutions.[14] The Chief of Staff has prioritized shifting decision-making from centralized command to “distributed control and decentralized execution,” but deferring strategic decisions to the tactical level of command is neither efficient nor effective.[15] Even brilliant tactics will not overcome derelict strategy. Air Force strategic leaders cannot rely on their squadron-level subordinates, nor their civilian supervisors, to translate their wicked problems into targets for their innovators—they need to do it themselves. An Air Force-funded longitudinal review of Air Force innovation highlighted this fact: “When Air Force leadership identified, framed, and prioritized concrete operational problems to be solved, the service has proven to be remarkably innovative,” and when senior leaders failed to do so, “[the Air Force] generally has not innovated.”[16]

Just as it did with strategic reconnaissance throughout the Cold War and precision strike capabilities in the 1990s, the force can innovate its way to victory, but the historical precedent is clear. The formula for innovative advancements starts with targets set, prioritized, and disseminated by senior leaders.[17]

Structure

For a force to pursue its objectives, it must build a disciplined, unified structure that can effectively capitalize on available resources to facilitate the creation, discovery, development, and implementation of innovative advancements.

Secretary Mattis ordered the services to “organize for innovation.”[18] The Air Force responded with AFWERX.[19] A central hub for the force’s innovation programs makes sense—AFWERX itself argues that taking “a systematic approach to innovation requires resources and discipline.”[20] McKinsey researchers agree, asserting that “role clarity and operational discipline…top-down innovation, capturing external ideas, and knowledge sharing” predict organizational agility.[21] AFWERX can facilitate an effective innovation environment if it centralizes its authority and communication pathways; building a clear, unified structure within which the force’s decentralized network of innovation cells can operate in concert.

Overbearing bureaucracy can strangle innovation, but so can chaos. AFWERX hosts a cumbersome portfolio of programs—Ideascale, Ideation, Idea, Spark, SparkX, Spark Tank, and Spark Collider—where decentralization manifests as chaos and redundancy. It is unclear how such programs relate to AFWERX or each other, or how airmen should best use them. The network of innovation cells across the Air Force have little or no contact with AFWERX, and certainly do not receive any guidance from it. If the Air Force Chief of Staff believes “victory goes not to the innovator, but to the rapid integrator of new ideas,” then the force needs to build a structure that can actually integrate new ideas, rather than letting them languish in a chaotic, disjointed infrastructure.[22]

The Air Force must better leverage its massive talent pool, integrating specialists into its innovation structure and improving connectivity across the force—putting the right people on the right projects. This kind of deliberate specialist integration was the foundation of the World War II-era push for an atomic bomb. Experts from organizations like Air Force Research Laboratories or academia can provide critical support in the development and implementation stage to maximize the potential of good ideas. Improved information-sharing across a network of innovators, both inside and outside the government, can also facilitate the discovery of unintended uses for ideas, as was the case for Apple’s Siri.[23]

Structure is not the enemy of creativity.[24] Sustained organizational innovation requires simple but disciplined structures that will actively direct, facilitate, and capitalize on its resources. The Air Force must unify and streamline its disparate programs and resources, both human and fiscal, creating a system that more effectively creates, discovers, develops, and implements good ideas.

Investment

Without investment, structured pursuit of clear objectives will fail. Increased investment is a painful necessity. Congress prioritizing the Air Force in its budget like it did in 1966 would help, but the Air Force’s innovation investment strategy should not rely on a quixotic financial windfall.[25] Instead, it should deliberately capitalize on resources, both proven and yet-untapped, channeled through strong structures, towards clear targets.

Air Force leaders are quick to tout the innovative potential of their airmen—arguing that if the force can mine the good ideas of multitudes of airmen, something useful should emerge.[26] However, crowdsourcing the next technological offset is a shaky bet on untapped potential, and even at its best, is not a substitute for strategic leadership from the top. Airmen often do not have sufficient time, skills, or opportunities to innovate. Senior leaders must prioritize innovation for airmen to get the time to work on projects.[27] Once it sets targets, the force must deduce from these what skills its airmen need, and then either recruit people who have those skills or train those who do not. If software is key, teach airmen to code; arm the airmen with the tools they need to operate effectively in the innovation environment.[28] Besides the organic capabilities this training would create, it would also help the force better manage outside contracts on technical projects.[29] The Air Force must capitalize on its organic resources. Internal laboratories like the Kessel Run software development shop are an excellent start, and the Secretary of the Air Force herself lauded their success, but they remain exceptions.[30] Admittedly, like any investment, none of this is free, but the return on investment is potentially paradigm-shifting, and these initiatives would be a bargain compared to the costs of conventional force investments like the projected $1.5 trillion F-35 program.[31]

Partnerships with external technology providers like academia, industry, and government entities also have tremendous potential.[32] New agile acquisitions programs like the Rapid Sustainment Office provide a limited venue for investment in technology from industry, but the Air Force can do more to capitalize on external entities. Academic institutions are full of people who want to work on wicked problems, and the Air Force has wicked problems to spare and substantial resources to support solving them.[33] Partnership seems natural, and has proved fruitful in the past, with notable outcomes including the Manhattan Project and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.[34] Intra-government collaboration has historically served as a powerful force multiplier. For instance, the Department of Energy has often worked closely with the Air Force on numerous nuclear weapons projects. Still, increased cooperation with other government entities will prove critical as the domains of warfare rapidly converge.[35] Just like any bureaucracy, Air Force research and development shops are susceptible to entropic growth, but increased collaboration can reduce redundancy, streamline innovation processes, and magnify existing resources.

America’s innovators are still capable of greatness if the U.S. invests in them.

Conclusion

The pursuit of innovation is an act of faith and vision. There are no guarantees of success, no assurances of victory. But the alternative—continued erosion of American military supremacy—is not an option. The last decade of American power saw the quiet metastasis of strategic insecurity in the form of near-peer competitors like Russia and China. The Air Force must ensure that this next decade is defined by the force’s rediscovery of its innovative capacity. The shift from low to high gear will not be easy, but it is both achievable and existentially necessary.

Innovation is not magic. In order to ignite its innovative fire, U.S. Air Force senior leaders must first translate the strategic threats facing their country into actionable, prioritized targets for their force to aim. Secondly, the Air Force must build a disciplined structure that can effectively facilitate the creation, discovery, development, and implementation of the innovative advancements that will propel the U.S. towards these targets, and thus ahead of its near-peer adversaries. Lastly, the force must replace buzzwords and bureaucracy with prioritized, substantive investment that better capitalize on its resources, both internal and external.

57 years ago, President Kennedy advocated for the self-assured pursuit of greatness—the moonshot—a mission that continues to inspire his nation today.

It is time for the U.S. Air Force to take ownership of the challenges it faces, and its capacity for innovative solutions.  It is time for the U.S. Air Force to do that which is hard, because it can no longer be postponed, and because the costs of failure are too high.

Jacob Lokshin is a United States Air Force officer. The views expressed herein are the authors alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Aircraft Silhouette Against the Moon (Pixabay)

Notes:

[1] Max Boot, “Why Air Power Alone Won’t Beat ISIS.” Wall Street Journal, Dec 8, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-air-power-alone-wont-beat-isis-1449618362.

[2] James M. Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” Department of Defense, 2018, 1. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

[3] Scott Boston, et al., “Assessing the Conventional Imbalance in Europe.” RAND Corporation, 2018, 1-16. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2402.html.; Elsa Kania, “China’s Threat to American Government and Private Sector Research and Innovation Leadership.” CNAS, July 19, 2019. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence.; J. Freedberg Jr., “US 'Gets Its Ass Handed to It' In Wargames: Here's A $24 Billion Fix.” Breaking Defense, March 7, 2019. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/us-gets-its-ass-handed-to-it-in-wargames-heres-a-24-billion-fix/.

[4] Adam R. Grissom, Caitlin Lee, and Karl P. Mueller, “Innovation in the United States Air Force: Evidence from Six Cases.” RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1207.html

[5] Valerie Insinna, “4 Questions about Innovation with the US Air Force’s Vice Chief of Staff.” Defense News, September 15, 2019.https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-force-association/2019/09/15/4-questions-about-innovation-with-the-us-air-forces-vice-chief-of-staff/

[6] John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at U.S. Air Force Academy.” Colorado Springs, CO, May 25, 1961. https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/044/JFKPOF-044-035

[7] John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs.” Washington, D.C., May 25, 1961. https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/034/JFKPOF-034-030

[8] John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs.” Washington, D.C., May 25, 1961. https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/034/JFKPOF-034-030

[9] James M. Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” Department of Defense, 2018, 1. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.; Donald J. Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” The White House, December 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[10] Stephen Losey, “Air Force Chief Wright: Innovation crucial to win the next war.” Air Force Times, 2018. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/02/22/air-force-chief-wright-innovation-crucial-to-win-the-next-war/

[11] David Goldfein, “Around the Air Force: The Frozen Middle/Servant Leadership.” Fort Meade, MD, March 21, 2019. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1791452/around-the-air-force-the-frozen-middle-servant-leadership/

[12] “Commander’s Call Topics.” Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs. March 16, 2018. https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/cct/2018/March/CCT-180312Innovation.pdf?ver=2018-03-09-142609-953&timestamp=1520623596116

[13] Arthur Baldonado, “Set S.M.A.R.T. goals for success,” Luke Air Force Base, 2015. https://www.luke.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/641498/set-smart-goals-for-success/

[14] Jason Trew, “Forget the Frozen Middle.” Over the Horizon, 2018. https://othjournal.com/2018/12/17/forget-the-frozen-middle-this-mysterious-layer-of-bureaucracy-is-not-an-insurmountable-obstacle-to-innovation-even-if-it-did-exist/

[15] Dan DeCook, “CSAF at Air Force Association Air Warfare Symposium.” Air Force News, 2018. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1449095/innovation-national-defense-strategy-the-future-csaf-at-air-force-association-a/

[16] Adam R. Grissom, Caitlin Lee, and Karl P. Mueller, “Innovation in the United States Air Force: Evidence from Six Cases.” RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1207.html

[17] Adam R. Grissom, Caitlin Lee, and Karl P. Mueller, “Innovation in the United States Air Force: Evidence from Six Cases.” RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1207.html

[18] James Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” 2018, p. 10. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

[19] AFWERX is not an acronym. Established in 2017 by the Secretary of the Air Force and reporting to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, AFWERX is a catalyst for agile Air Force engagement across industry, academia and non-traditional contributors to create transformative opportunities and foster an Air Force culture of innovation. The ultimate aim is to solve problems and enhance the effectiveness of the Air Force. https://www.afwerx.af.mil/

[20] AFWERX, “Innovation Handbook.” 2019. https://www.afwerx.af.mil/resources/Innovation%20Handbook.pdf

[21] Michael Rennie, et al. “McKinsey on Organization: Agility and Organization Design.” Organization Practice, 2016.https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Organization/Our%20Insights/McKinsey%20on%20Organization/McKinsey%20on%20Organization%20Agility%20and%20organization%20design.ashx; Marc de Jong, et al. “The eight essentials of innovation.” McKinsey Quarterly, 2015. https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-eight-essentials-of-innovation

[22] Dan DeCook, “CSAF at Air Force Association Air Warfare Symposium.” Air Force News, 2018. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1449095/innovation-national-defense-strategy-the-future-csaf-at-air-force-association-a/

[23] “Personal Assistant that Learns,” DARPA, 2019. https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/timeline/personalized-assistant-that-learns

[24] Donald Sull, “The simple rules of disciplined innovation.” McKinsey Quarterly, 2015. https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-simple-rules-of-disciplined-innovation

[25] Kevin N. Lewis, “The U.S. Air Force Budget and Posture Over Time.” RAND Corporation, 1990, p. 16. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a222458.pdf

[26] Heather Wilson, “AF to fund squadron innovation that improves mission effectiveness.” Air Force News, 2018.https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1448681/af-to-fund-squadron-innovation-that-improves-mission-effectiveness/

[27] Stephen Losey, “The drawdown blew a hole in the Air Force’s maintenance ranks.” Air Force Times, 2017. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2017/03/05/the-drawdown-blew-a-hole-in-the-air-forces-maintenance-ranks-how-it-s-digging-its-way-out/; Amaani Lyle, “Competing of the minds: Air Force Spark Tank 2020 open for submissions” Air Force Materiel Command, 2019. https://www.afmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1952440/competing-of-the-minds-air-force-spark-tank-2020-open-for-submissions/

[28] Emma Goldberg, “Personality Tests are the Astrology of the Office.” New York Times, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/style/personality-tests-office.html; Amy Schatz, “Obama: Everybody’s Got to Learn How to Code.” Vox, 2015. https://www.vox.com/2015/2/14/11559052/obama-everybodys-got-to-learn-how-to-code.

[29] Steve Kelman, “Why Kessel Run is Such a Big Deal.” FCW, 2019. https://fcw.com/blogs/lectern/2019/02/kelman-kessel-run-usaf-big-deal.aspx

[30] Michael McQuade, “Software is Never Done.” Defense Innovation Board, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/26/2002105909/-1/-1/0/SWAP.REPORT_MAIN.BODY.3.21.19.PDF; Rachel S. Cohen, “The Air Force Software Revolution.” Air Force Magazine, 2019. https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-air-force-software-revolution/

[31] Valerie Insinna, “Inside America’s Dysfunctional Trillion Dollar Fighter-Jet Program.” New York Times Magazine, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint-strike-fighter-program.html

[32] Brendan Orino, “Overlooking Innovation.” Brookings, 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/07/08/overlooking-innovation-the-need-to-include-silicon-valley-in-the-military-industrial-complex/

[33] Jan Tegler, “A Global Collaborative Network.” Defense Media Network, 2019. https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/a-global-collaborative-network-defense-research-development-army-research-academia-uarc-government-labs-academic-institutions-and-private-sector/

[34] “History.” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. https://www.llnl.gov/about/history

[35] U.S. Army, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 2018. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf