Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our fourth annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.

Now, we are pleased to present the second-place winner, from Michael N. Gonzalez, a student at the U.S> Army Command and General Staff College.

If 2020 has taught the citizens of the United States anything, it is that the security we take for granted is not assured. The COVID-19 global pandemic has shocked the world and created a tragedy across borders, ruining livelihoods and taking an incalculable number of lives—all during a time of relative peace. Yet, the world does not stop turning, and the adversaries of the United States will not stop seeking to undermine American interests. The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as the keystone document of America’s strategic posture. Considering how the world has changed since it was first published, and in response to how our adversaries have reacted to U.S. actions on the world stage, the next National Security Strategy must shift to meet evolving threats. The purpose of this essay is to pinpoint which assumptions from the 2017 National Security Strategy are no longer relevant, outline how the next National Security Strategy should change to reflect the new strategic environment, and to identify the implications of the proposed revisions for U.S. national security. The next National Security Strategy must remain grounded in principled realism, but also must pivot away from the insular tone that has isolated the U.S. from its friends and has needlessly provoked its enemies. America must engage with the world and shift from a policy maintaining peace through strength of arms to a posture of peace through strength of engagement.

Assumptions

There are three underlying assumptions in the 2017 National Security Strategy that policymakers must revisit when crafting the next. First, the 2017 National Security Strategy assumes competition is neither a part of nor a segue to conflict. The nature of the rivalry between the U.S. and a revanchist Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China suggests otherwise. The framework of a contest or competition implies both a common victory condition for each competitor and a common set of rules. China and Russia have separate definitions of victory in the current security environment, and they have shown that they will not abide by the norms of the current international order to achieve their ends. They are willing to engage in “all measures short of war” to destabilize the U.S. and prevent its freedom to act internationally. [1] This is not a simple competition—it is low-intensity conflict, and the government must treat it as such.

Second, the 2017 National Security Strategy promotes “historic investments in the United States military,” suggesting more defense spending will result in increased American strength.[2] This idea is flawed for two reasons. The first is that “aggressive defense spending is likely to be bad for the economy,” which in turn will “undermine state power” and weaken the image of the U.S. in the global arena.[3] Secondly, “Wealth is not a reliable indicator of military might.”[4] As prominent realist scholar John Mearsheimer points out, “States distill military power from wealth at varying levels of efficiency.”[5] Increasing the defense budget does not build military capability—a more discerning and strategic approach to defense spending is necessary to achieve that end. In the same vein, a leaner defense budget is not necessarily a sign of weakness or lack of commitment to strategic interests. 

Finally, the most dangerous overarching assumption of the 2017 National Security Strategy is the notion that the U.S. can both withdraw from the world stage and lead at the same time. The National Security Strategy promotes an “America First” stance that must be revisited.[6] In practice, this attitude has manifested as an “America Alone” approach to international engagement that has weakened our national security, diplomatically isolating the U.S. In the name of this policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from key pieces of legislation and international agreements, sundering traditional alliances, and creating rifts with allies. Paradoxically, at the same time the National Security Strategy advocates “advancing American influence.” [7] The U.S. cannot lead or influence while adhering to a strategy of retrenchment. According to Dr. Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution, “The United States must deepen its engagement with its allies” to credibly “convince revisionist powers that it has its allies’ back and will be steadfast in opposition to geopolitical challenges.”[8] The U.S. must engage with allies and partners meaningfully to project strength steadily over time. Influence requires engagement, just as leading requires those willing to follow. The U.S. can accomplish neither if it refuses to participate meaningfully in the international order.

Changes and Implications

With these assumptions in mind, the National Security Strategy must evolve in three key ways to reflect the current strategic environment. First, the U.S. needs to appreciate that current Chinese and Russian activity as part of a larger conflict rather than merely a competition. The 2017 National Security Strategy notes how “China and Russia [have begun] to reassert their influence regionally and globally” as “great power competition returned.”[9] While these actors are “operating below the threshold of open military conflict,” they have engaged in political and information warfare campaigns that have undeniably compromised the safety and security of the U.S.[10] While these were intentionally not overt military activities, they have just as effectively undermined U.S. interests. By reducing these activities to a mere competition, the U.S. has given its adversaries the maneuver space to continue using them to undermine the U.S. abroad. A new National Security Strategy must, ironically, be more realist in outlook. The authors should elevate the visibility of competition and measures short of war so that government decision makers take these measures as seriously as they should be taken.

This reorientation requires recategorizing diplomatic, economic, and information warfare campaigns as what they truly are—the new low-intensity conflict. Competition is too benign a term and downplays the threat that non-military conflict poses to U.S. interests. It also connotes a low-stakes environment, thus allowing Russia and China to successfully wage debilitating campaigns against U.S. interests while operating below the threshold of traditional conflict. Words are powerful, and recategorizing these threats as low-intensity conflicts would have two major implications. First, it allows the U.S. policymakers to place more urgency on international developments that undermine U.S. interests but are not traditional wars. Second, it would signal to Russia and China that the U.S. will no longer tolerate activities that negatively impact national security and compromise our interests. If left unchecked, Russia and China will continue to win the day-to-day battles in this new low-intensity conflict at the expense of the U.S. In this case, the result of losing a competition and a war could be the same: a revised world order unfavorable to American security and interests.

The second major change that the U.S. must adopt in its next National Security Strategy is to lessen the prominence of the military lever of national power. As currently written, the National Security Strategy promotes strength through military investment, which makes the military a foreign policy multi-tool the U.S. government turns to during crises. The National Security Strategy informs the government’s budgetary process, and the military therefore receives a disproportionately larger appropriation compared to the institutions forming the other instruments of national power. As a result of this funding glut, the defense enterprise has become inundated with projects and initiatives that have had a questionable impact. As John Mearsheimer notes, “Wealthy states sometimes do not build additional military forces...because they recognize that doing so would not give them a strategic advantage over their rivals.”[11] If the goal of the National Security Strategy is to provide a path for the U.S. to achieve its security aims, policymakers must ensure the investments we make will provide an undeniable competitive edge. Unfortunately, as seen with failed high-dollar projects like the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier the Gerald R. Ford, recent defense projects have not provided a strategic advantage commensurate with their cost.[12]

Continuing high-dollar commitments to exquisite defense projects at the expense of other potentially affordable and available levers of power does not promote strength; it only prevents the U.S. from utilizing more appropriate levers of power. Changing the prominence of the defense establishment in the National Security Strategy will result in two key impacts. First, more budgetary dollars will be available to better fund other government agencies and initiatives. Second, increased funding across government agencies will enable the U.S. to use other levers of power with more flexibility and lessen the burden on the military. As Kathleen Hicks noted in a recent Foreign Affairs article, bolstering non-military tools of foreign policy would allow the U.S. to build strength at home and abroad; it would spread responsibility for American security and prosperity across multiple lines of effort.[13] The result would be a more agile U.S., capable of leveraging multiple tools to achieve its security interests.

The final major change is inextricably linked to the second change detailed earlier. The U.S. must seek to preserve peace in the world not through armed strength, but rather through strength from diplomatic and economic engagement. The U.S. State Department must once again become the primary vehicle of American power in a world where its adversaries use carrots, with the implicit threat of a big stick, to accomplish their goals and undermine U.S. interests abroad. While many argue retrenchment is merely a correction to years of policy that “has distracted [the U.S.] with costly overseas commitments and interventions,” disengaging from the world is not the solution.[14] In fact, the U.S. has repeatedly turned to economic engagement as a means of strengthening alliances and providing security on the international stage. For example, George Kennan described the Marshall Plan as “restor[ing] the balance of power in Europe and Asia” and “substantially...deal[ing] with the underlying problems” associated with rebuilding a post-war world.[15] A new National Security Strategy focused on strengthening partnerships will reaffirm America’s existing commitments to allies and help it to build international political capital.

A revitalized State Department and a more engaged U.S. would have two key implications. First, a more active American diplomatic presence will limit adversary freedom to act against U.S. interests, because it acts as a forward deployment of diplomatic deterrent forces. As Bruce Jones from the Brookings Institution points out, an absence of American influence “make[s] the world safer for Russian adventurism and Chinese ambition.”[16] This diplomatic presence might not automatically gain America allies, but it could serve to deny China and Russia a power vacuum to fill. Second, a more engaged U.S. can better respond to non-traditional threats to its security and prosperity. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the dangers of American isolation. In an article for War on the Rocks, Joseph Nye, Jr., states that “the United States must use its soft power of attraction to develop networks and institutions that address these new threats.”[17] Nye further points out that transnational crises like coronavirus have made “power a positive sum game. It is not enough to think of American power over others. We must also think in terms of power to accomplish joint goals, which involves power with others.”[18] A future National Security Strategy should emphasize that America needs its allies and partners to utilize power in unison to achieve joint ends.[19]

The Next National Security Strategy

Regardless of the outcome of the 2020 presidential election, the next administration must recalibrate the next National Security Strategy to meet the realities of a dynamic world. Given the changes discussed above, an improved National Security Strategy must pivot from its current emphasis on the military lever of power. The peace through strength pillar should change to accommodate strength through engagement and influence as the United States seeks to regain lost prestige abroad. This can be accomplished in two ways. First, the next National Security Strategy must prioritize equipping and empowering American diplomatic corps with more careerists and fewer political appointees to improve engagement. Second, the National Security Strategy must reduce the military budget in favor of more balanced investments across the American foreign policy enterprise. This is not to say the future National Security Strategy should not focus on protecting our nation’s interests and ensuring the safety of her people—quite the opposite. It will focus on increasing resilience and depth of capability rather than relying on a singular massive hammer to crush problems that may or may not be nails.

The traditional view of a State Department that “suffer[s] from a lack of human and financial resources” must be mitigated if the United States wants to effectively and efficiently protect American security and prosperity.[20] Equipping and empowering the American diplomatic corps should become the cornerstone of the future National Security Strategy. To accomplish this, American leadership must intentionally cultivate a group of higher leaders who reflect the State Department’s “culture steeped in patriotism and service to the nation in a dangerous world.”[21] Stacking senior leadership positions with partisan political appointees—individuals with the right politics rather than the right credentials—has degraded the quality and reputation of America’s diplomatic arm. Unfortunately, the past three decades have shown the world an American diplomatic corps hemorrhaging its lifeblood of expertise and international respect, eroding the efficacy of the State Department, and weakening our nation.[22] Simply put, political favoritism has hamstrung the State Department and inhibited its personnel from serving and protecting our nation.

This dearth of expertise and competent leadership is exacerbated by a skeletal mid-career diplomatic corps, often understaffed “with lower-ranking career diplomats filling the positions temporarily in acting capacity.”[23] This is not a new trend. According to the American Academy of Diplomacy, successive administrations dating back to 1975 have left key positions at the State Department unfilled and allowed our nation’s diplomatic corps to fall into disrepair.[24] The future National Security Strategy should treat the State Department like it has traditionally approached the Department of Defense—the most experienced and qualified individuals, with proven track records of accomplishment, should ascend to leadership roles, regardless of their political affiliation. A better staffed and more experienced diplomatic corps will allow the United States to craft strategy and policy for the future, not just mitigate diplomatic crises of the present. Political heavyweights are not synonymous with diplomatic heavyweights; statesmen must become statesmen again.

The next National Security Strategy must also embrace methods that distribute the responsibility of accomplishing foreign policy goals more equitably to all government stakeholders. This will reduce the burden on the U.S. military and enhance the prestige of its sister governmental departments and agencies. Currently, the “disparity between civilian and military spending distorts policymaking because, as many have noted ‘money is policy.’”[25] Investment in non-military engagement will counter our adversaries’ efforts to undermine us while limiting the costly expenditures, in both lives and treasure, that have marred previous American endeavors. America cannot simply inflate the defense budget, turn away from our allies and partners, or discount the activities of our adversaries, and expect to maintain a unique position of power in the international system. America needs a National Security Strategy that plots a responsible course, renews world-wide engagement, and maximizes the power of our economy by promoting investment in multiple tools of state.

Most importantly, the next National Security Strategy must communicate to the American citizen why change is needed. In the last three decades, the U.S. has entangled itself in questionable foreign adventures that have weakened its stature and alienated its friends. Critics might argue that, in an era of great-power competition, the U.S. must maintain a robust military capacity that acts to deter our adversaries and, when necessary, compel their compliance. This argument has merit; however, military power must not be the only tool America uses to engage with the world. The military is stronger when it is complemented by a capable diplomatic apparatus, one that can coax as well as it can intimidate. A relative decline in military spending does not need to result in a less powerful military, but it should provide for a more capable foreign policy arm of the U.S. government to augment existing capabilities.

Conclusion

The current National Security Strategy offers an unbalanced and, ultimately, impractical path for the U.S. to achieve its security interests. It places too much emphasis on the use of force to meet American foreign policy objectives. This emphasis, intentional or not, has served to erode other forms of American outreach. Statesmen no longer enjoy the privileged status they once did as the face of American diplomacy. In their stead, modern-day combatant commanders, often acting as the chief ambassador of U.S. interests in their area of responsibility, communicate America’s will abroad. The U.S. must recapture its halcyon diplomatic days when it focused on “securing positive ties with second-tier states” that allowed it to lead a concert when dealing with global issues.[26]

The major assumptions in the 2017 National Security Strategy lead back to one main and flawed idea: that the U.S. can buy power and that, once bought, its value is permanent. Unfortunately, this is not true. Rather, the U.S. must continuously cultivate and responsibly maintain its power. This requires revamping the National Security Strategy and adjusting to today’s threats. To do so, America must understand that militant engagement with the world does more to increase insecurity. The next National Security Strategy must provide guidance on how to maintain peace and prosperity and, if necessary, win the wars of tomorrow. A more effective National Security Strategy reflects long-term plans to maximize the efficiency of our defense dollars, invests in our allies and partners to maintain influence overseas, and confronts our adversaries on our terms, not theirs.

Michael N. Gonzalez is a U.S. Army officer. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: State Department (Getty)

Notes:

[1] “All Measures Short of War” refers to FDR’s policy in the 1930’s and 1940’s to prevent American involvement in WWII. This term is also later utilized by George Kennan in a lecture delivered at the National War College in 1946. Most recently, Dr. Thomas J. Wright of the Brookings Institution published a book titled All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power, which also informed this essay.

[2] The President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, The White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed 1 May 2020), 1.

[3] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 78.

[4] Ibid, 81.

[5] Ibid, 82

[6] The President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, 1.

[7] Ibid, 37.

[8] Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 196-7.

[9] The President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, 27.

[10] Ibid, 3.

[11] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001),76.

[12] Ryan Pickrell, “The U.S. Navy fixed the propulsion problems on its $13 billion supercarrier, but the ship still has serious issues,” The Navy Times, August 13, 2019, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/08/14/the-us-navy-fixed-the-propulsion-problems-on-its-13-billion-supercarrier-but-the-ship-still-has-serious-issues/ (accessed 4 MAY 2020).

[13] Kathleen Hicks, “Getting to Less: The Truth About Defense Spending,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/getting-less (accessed 2 MAY 2020).

[14] Thomas Wright, “The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw from the World,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment (accessed 29 April 2020).

[15] John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 36.

[16] Bruce Jones, “China and the Return of Great Power Strategic Competition,” The Brookings Institute, February 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_china_power_competition _jones.pdf (accessed 7 May 2020).

[17] Joseph F. Nye, Jr., “COVID-19’s Painful Lesson About Strategy and Power,” War on the Rocks, March 26, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/covid-19s-painful-lesson-about-strategy-and-power/ (accessed 8 May 2020).

[18] Ibid. The italics are Nye’s.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Roger Z. George, et. al., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, 2nd Edition (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2017), 83.

[21] Ibid, 83.

[22] Tom Nichols argues that the U.S. is suffering through an age where expertise is no longer seen as something prized and valued. He notes that this loss in faith in expertise is negatively affecting our governmental institutions in an age when the world is so complex that expertise is required. For more on this idea see: Tom Nichols, “How America Lost Faith in Expertise: And Why That’s a Giant Problem,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2017, p.60-73.

[23] Robbie Gramer, “Diplomats Losing Out to Trump Picks for Top Spots,” Foreign Policy, August 15, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/15/former-officials-decry-diplomatic-disarmament-under-trump-state-department-political-appointees/ (accessed 13 May 2020).

[24] The American Academy of Diplomacy, American Diplomacy at Risk (Washington, D.C.: The American Academy of Diplomacy, 2015), 51.

[25] Roger Z. George, et. al., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, 2nd Edition, 84.

[26] Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 339.