Ivor Wiltenburg and Martijn van der Vorm

Introduction

Contemporary scholarly literature is critical on the perceived lack of strategic thinking in the latest iterations of Western interventions. For example, Anthony Cordesman laments the lack of strategic thinking in the American approach to its current wars, and finds the civilian contribution towards the overall effort wanting. In a similar vein, Sarah Sewell argues political leaders have failed to provide a compelling American strategy for the Iraq wars.[1] The broadsides on America’s strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan are persistent given the indubitable lack of progress in both theatres for almost two decades. As both wars continue, not only are global powers like the United States still involved, but many small states remain engaged. Each keeps contributing to, and participating in, these ongoing conflicts. While the criticism of the American strategic effort is sweeping, and may be considered justified, this critique spills over as collateral to the small allied states who continue to contribute to both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This article seeks to dissect the strategic considerations of the Netherlands pulling out as a case study about how small states think about and employ strategy in the contemporary environment.[2]

Strategy and its Functions

According to Colin Gray, the nature of strategy is an enduring aspect of the human condition. It is, and always has been, "about the attempted achievement of desired political ENDS, through the choice of suitable strategic WAYS, employing largely the military MEANS."[3] This logic transcends both time and culture. Although this view of strategy seems rather straightforward, it is very hard to implement successfully. First and foremost, all strategic endeavours must contend with an adversary who is actively seeking to undo your efforts while attempting to attain its own objectives.[4] Secondly, because strategy is a human function, the making and implementation of strategy is subject to the normal fallacies of human decision making such as irrationalities and biases. Of course, these impediments are exacerbated by the volatile and competitive nature of strategic means.[5] A third aspect complicating the formulation of a successful strategy is that the context to which it is applied is complex and subject to change.[6]

…how does a small Western state like the Netherlands seek to cope with the challenge of formulating strategy?

These above mentioned aspects make the formulation and application of strategy difficult. Despite careful and thoughtful deliberations, a state—or another entity— may not accomplish its objectives due to enemy actions, faulty assumptions about the situation at hand, or simply because the desired end cannot be achieved with the chosen or available ways and means. Naturally, these aspects plague global powers like the United States, as well as smaller states such as the Netherlands. The Netherlands does not possess independent national power instruments to the same extent as its great power ally, the United States. Instead it focuses on multilateral approaches towards security, which complicates foreign policy as it must be in accordance with American or European Union objectives. So how does a small Western state like the Netherlands seek to cope with the challenge of formulating strategy?

The Role of Strategy in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is a small state with large interests in the international community. These interests are reflected in its international security policy. In 2013, the main strategic interests were described as the defense of the territory of the Netherlands and its allied states, a well-functioning international order, and economic security. The Netherlands’ 2018 Defense White Paper reiterated these strategic interests, albeit in slightly different terms: to remain safe in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Europe, foster security in Europe’s neighbouring regions, and to secure connections to and from the Netherlands.

To meet these stated strategic interests, the Dutch contribute to many international missions. Over the last 15 years, the Dutch contributed to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, providing not only a military contingent but also adding global legitimacy to both wars by its substantial involvement. Recognizing the limits of the size of its armed forces, the default policy of the Netherlands is not to engage in military operations in isolation, but always in a coalition of states.

Contributing to international missions is important for the Netherlands for two main reasons. The first reason for participation is because the Dutch government greatly values international rule of law. The promotion of the international rule of law is one of the three constitutional reasons for the use of the armed forces; the other two reasons are territorial defense and domestic support. Using the armed forces for the promotion of international rule of law and other, mostly humanitarian, reasons is better accepted by the Dutch populace than more violent interventions.

Second, it fosters its relationship with the United States, the Netherland’s main ally since World War II. The Dutch consider NATO the cornerstone of their international security and, as such, have a great interest in the integrity of the alliance. Given that the United States is the main contributor to the alliance, this relationship is considered paramount. However, despite increasing accusations of free riding under the American security umbrella, both in frequency as well as severity over the last decade, the Dutch endeavour to regularly contribute to the NATO alliance whilst simultaneously avoiding increasing the defense budget beyond the public approval threshold. In spite of these attempts, American criticism is increasing since the Dutch fail to spend the agreed 2% of the gross national income on defense.

Moreover, recent Dutch policy on using the armed forces contains two important constraints. First, Dutch military deployments are capped in both time and size. Both the number of personnel allocated to a deployment, as well as the period during which they are to be deployed must be agreed on by the government and parliament. Although not bound by law, it has become a parliamentary custom to gauge every military deployment over a framework that includes the necessity of the mission, the size and scope, consequences for army readiness, and several other military and political factors. Usually, the period for deployments is set to two years or less, albeit with the possibility for extension.

The limited time and scope of these military missions leads to the second constraint in Dutch military strategy: while the results of interventions are stated relative to the outset of the deployment, the mission end state from recent interventions has not been reached within the allotted time frame. This leads to statements such as “the security in Afghanistan has been improved since the commencement of the mission,” which are used to justify continuing missions, but without adequately accomplishing the strategic objectives as Colin Gray noted above. The fact that only relative improvements can be adduced is forthcoming from the vague and relative grounds for participation as stated by the government; the results cannot be compared to the mission end state.

Furthermore, the Dutch government is careful to avoid ownership of the issue it seeks to resolve by intervening abroad, and instead focuses on themes such as “solidarity with the alliance,” “limit illegal immigration,” “prevent terrorism,” and “improve international cooperation.” Although this is understandable considering the size of the country, this limited approach has led in recent years to criticism from several high-profile scholars in the Netherlands. These critics have alleged the Dutch government of “strategic illiteracy,” “strategic vagueness,” and bemoaned the demise of military strategy in Dutch political discourse. This scholarly criticism was seconded by senior army officers. For instance, the Dutch commanding officer in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, noted in 2007 that the strategy for the Dutch part in the International Security Assistance Force mission in Uruzgan was in effect a grassroots process, and no strategy was present when the first Task Force arrived in Afghanistan in 2006.[7]

In a similar vein, the narrative for the recent Dutch deployments to Iraq indicated that the deployment was to “improve the international rule of law,” and to “contribute to de-escalating the regional situation.” Similar to the Afghanistan mission, the mission capped personnel and time, limiting the deployment to a year, six F-16 combat aircraft, and trainers for Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi troops.

Dutch military deployments are therefore not a product of sound military strategy, but rather an outcome of short-term partisan politics and international pressure.

Strategy is intended to link political ends to military ways. For the Dutch armed forces, it is impossible to produce the desired political output when that output is unstated, or, at best, relative to the situation at the beginning of the mission. And even so, measuring success would be very much in the eye of the beholder. Dutch military deployments are therefore not a product of sound military strategy, but rather an outcome of short-term partisan politics and international pressure. The policy goals on which the deployment is based are openly stated in formal parliamentary documents. These would include being a “reliable partner,” doing a “fair share” concerning military missions abroad, and showing “commitment.” To participate, bounded in time and resources, seems to be the prominent Dutch approach with regard to military interventions.

Participation alone, however, does not solve the strategic issues at hand for the Dutch government. This is reiterated by the current predicaments the Dutch government encounters in dealing with American requests for land and naval forces in Syria and the Strait of Hormuz respectively. As the Dutch criticized the American decision to leave Syria, their current refusal to deploy ground forces in Syria and their drawn-out decision-making process over whether or not to deploy a frigate to the Strait of Hormuz draw American ire.

This does not suggest the Dutch government is unaware or ignorant of current international affairs. The current Dutch Minister of Defense acknowledges the need for a strategic military intervention in Afghanistan, the threat from Russia and jihadists, and increasing geopolitical instability within the global order. However, it appears the Dutch government generally wants to avoid any form of lasting commitment to these issues. Rather, it restates the desire for international cooperation and comprehensive conflict resolution. The early, if not premature, withdrawal of the Dutch mission in the Afghan province of Uruzgan and the subsequent deployment to Kunduz province form a case in point.

The withdrawal from Uruzgan was a result of partisan politics within the coalition government rather than strategic considerations. After this alliance defection, the Netherlands desired to make amends to the international coalition for Afghanistan in order to repair some of the damage the sudden withdrawal from Uruzgan had caused to their reputation as a reliable ally. After much political handwringing, an "integrated police training mission" to Kunduz province was agreed upon. However, this mission was so densely packed with national caveats that the execution was thoroughly impeded, and is widely regarded as an expensive failure.

Conclusion

The Dutch have two challenges regarding strategy formulation. First, Dutch strategy lacks clear, attainable ends. Secondly, there is little thought on how to connect policy ends with military means, garnering criticism from both scholars as well as the military. Still, strategic objectives formulated in a succession of white papers reiterate the need to “participate” in interventions that suit the policy; to the Dutch policy makers it would seem such goals are met. However, Dutch strategy shuns ownership and limits participation in both time and resources allowing the government to reassess their military interventions periodically, which fits given its position as a small power. Dutch military strategy revolves around improving a failed or failing state, the security imperative of counterterrorism, and the desire to maintain or improve relations with the United States. In this sense, assessing the ways and military means necessary to achieve these ends is subservient to short term partisan politics and international pressure rather than strategy.

…it seems that as far as the Dutch are concerned, the strategic end of being a good ally might be all the strategic thinking they need.

Importantly, if the United States finds itself in a state of strategic disorientation, this reflects on small states looking to adapt both their international policy as well as the deployment of their armed forces based on the guidance provided by their hegemonic ally. However, by avoiding any commitment to tangible results, it seems that as far as the Dutch are concerned, the strategic end of being a good ally might be all the strategic thinking they need. It remains to be seen if this stance is tenable, as the United States continues to increase pressure on Europe to fend for itself with regard to its security.

Ivor Wiltenburg and Martijn van der Vorm are both Dutch Armed Forces officers and Ph.D. candidates at The Netherlands Defence Academy. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official position of The Netherlands Defence Academy, or the Dutch Armed Forces.

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Header Image: A Dutch company patrol in the Chora valley, Afghanistan. (AFP)

Notes:

[1] Department of the Army, Field Manual, 3-24: Counterinsurgency (University of Chicago Press Edition, Chicago, 2007) p. xxi-xliii (foreword by S. Sewell)

[2] The U.S. and the Netherlands share a long history, and the Dutch have been a strong supporter of the U.S., especially since WWII. The U.S. and the Dutch have strong cultural and economic ties, and the Dutch have joined forces with the U.S. in numerous armed conflicts. For further reading on U.S.-Dutch relations see: https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-netherlands/ and https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/nl-forrel-us.htm

[3] Colin S. Gray, The future of strategy, (Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2015) p. 10

[4] Edward Luttwak, Strategy: the logic of war and peace, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001). p. 15-17

[5] Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) p. 607-609

[6] Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996). p.1-4.

[7] Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell (eds.) Military adaptation in Afghanistan, (Stanford University Press, Redwood city, CA, 2013). p. 167