On Friday, November 8th, audiences around the U.S. saw Midway, a dramatization of the climactic World War II battle at sea between the United States and Imperial Japan from June 4th through June 7th, 1942. One historical narrative suggests Midway was the decisive turning point of the Pacific Campaign.[1] A turning point in the context of historical military operations can be generally defined as a point at which the strategic initiative had shifted decidedly from one opposing combatant to another, where victory was a foregone conclusion for the latter.[2] In the context of the Battle of Midway, this assertion has been occasionally contested, however, the question of what battle or campaign, if any, was the decisive turning point of the Pacific Theater of World War II is well worth revisiting. With greater historical analysis, the Battle of Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands campaign from August 1942 through February 1943 is more deserving of recognition as the turning point in the Pacific due to grave strategic error committed by the Japanese military. This recognition as the turning point is particularly important; through thorough examination of the Battle of Guadalcanal, military strategists will also discover that this campaign by land, air, and sea serves as a notable case study in the strategic application of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force’s future operating concept of Multi-Domain Operations.

The narrative that claims the Battle of Midway served as the turning point in the Pacific Theater relies on the assertion that following the battle, the Japanese military shifted to the strategic defensive, ceding the initiative to the Allies in the Pacific Theater.[3] Although this may seem logical, given that Imperial Japan never experienced a battlefield victory of strategic proportion against the U.S. following Midway, one must carefully examine Imperial Japan’s battlefield actions to determine the validity of this assertion. Rather than shifting to the strategic defensive, Imperial Japan in fact continued their offensive drive by land, sea, and air through continuous assaults on Allied positions at Milne Bay, Port Moresby, Guadalcanal, and elsewhere throughout the South Pacific. Beginning on July 21st, 1942, just over a month after defeat at Midway, the Imperial Japanese Army executed an amphibious assault on Buna and Gona in Papua, New Guinea, and fought a vicious campaign in the Owen Stanley Mountains against the defending Australian Forces. A month later, on August 25th, Japanese Naval Infantry landed at Milne Bay at the far eastern tip of Papua, New Guinea, in an attempt to seize valuable sea and airports to isolate Australia. While these assaults were ultimately unsuccessful, they demonstrate that Imperial Japan was still very much committed to strategic offensive operations following defeat at Midway, diminishing the validity of the argument for Midway serving as the turning point for the Allies in the Pacific Theater.

Even the Solomon Islands campaign, from August 1942 to February 1943, while typically viewed as a U.S. offensive, displayed the undiminished determination of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army to attack U.S. forces in all domains. In fact, the entire campaign can be viewed as a continuous Japanese assault by land, air, and sea in which the U.S. successfully defended until the Japanese could no longer supply their own troops, forcing their eventual evacuation. Imperial Japan’s destruction of a U.S. naval fleet at Savo Island, massive and uncontested naval bombardment of U.S. troops ashore, daily air raids against Henderson Field, uncontested landing of a division of troops in plain American sight, and repeated offensive assaults against the American front lines make the assertion that U.S. victory at Midway was a decisive turning point, from which wartime victory seemed certain (from a historic lens), seem incorrect.[4]

Indeed, in October 1942, U.S. Marine Corps Major General Alexander Archer Vandergrift ordered his staff to develop a contingency plan to conduct a fighting retreat into the Guadalcanal jungle as the specter of defeat haunted him as an increasing possibility.[5] Victory for the U.S. at Midway was important in altering the balance in the Pacific, for it gave the Allies the space and time to plan the Solomon Islands Campaign.[6] This campaign would have likely been delayed had the Allies lost at Midway, however the defensive nature of U.S. operations at Guadalcanal, in addition to the Japanese attacks throughout Papua, New Guinea, suggest that Imperial Japan did not revert to the strategic defensive following defeat at Midway, further undermining the assertion the Battle of Midway was the turning point of the Pacific Theater as claimed in certain narratives of history.

Guadalcanal as the Turning Point

The defeat of Imperial Japan through grinding attrition at Guadalcanal is perhaps more deserving of the title as the turning point for the Allies in the Pacific Theater. It is important to note that even after defeat at Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy still retained a numerical advantage in aircraft carriers, battleships, destroyers, submarines, and deployable aircraft strength compared to the Allies in the Pacific.[7] Guadalcanal would forever reverse this disparity. During the 6 months at Guadalcanal, with the loss of over 1,200 experienced pilots and aircrew members, 683 aircraft, 38 naval vessels, and over 20,000 Army troops, Imperial Japan’s offensive capability in the South Pacific was left in ruins, and it’s industrial output, manpower, and training programs were not adequate to rebuild this capacity.[8] Indeed, as Admiral Yamamoto feared, the Guadalcanal campaign devolved into a military boxing match in which the industrial and economical might of the United States could easily replace a similar loss in aircraft and naval vessels, but Imperial Japan could not. During this campaign, U.S. industry produced 7 capital ships—including 2 aircraft carriers—62 destroyers, and 18 submarines, replacing more than double its losses in naval vessels and combat power.[9] Imperial Japan’s industry, however, could only produce 1 light cruiser, 7 destroyers, and 14 submarines during this campaign, a severe net negative in total naval combat power.[10] From victory at Guadalcanal, the Allies were able to launch the Central Pacific drive and subsequent offensive operations against which the Japanese could only defend with fewer and fewer naval, aerial, and army assets. Guadalcanal, not Midway, probably turned the tide irreversibly for the Allies in the Pacific.

Guadalcanal as a Case Study for Multi-Domain Operations

Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands campaign of August 1942 to February 1943 is worthy of extensive study, not only for serving as the turning point of the Pacific Theater, but also as a notable case study in the U.S. Army and Air Force’s Multi-Domain Operations future warfighting concept. As described by the U.S. Army in particular, the Multi-Domain Operations concept seeks to converge the capabilities of the joint force by providing near-simultaneous solutions through space, air, sea, land, and the electromagnetic spectrum to defeat anti-access area-denial weapons systems of strategic competitors such as Russia and China.[11] Convergence of solutions in Multi-Domain operations allows the U.S. military to project power across the globe in which the federated joint-warfighting solutions of legacy doctrine would prove inadequate for the modern era.[12] Key to Multi-Domain warfighting is using victory or advantages in one domain to exploit temporary windows of opportunity in another domain.[13] Guadalcanal demonstrated the utility of this key concept throughout the campaign by air, sea and land.

Japanese superiority at sea for much of the Solomon Islands campaign provided marked advantages on the ground. After sinking five U.S. cruisers at the Battle of Savo Island in August 8th 1942, the Japanese victory left U.S. cargo and transport ships critically vulnerable. Admiral Fletcher withdrew his transport ships after unloading an estimate of less than one-half of the on-board provisions necessary for the U.S. Marines to fight and survive on Guadalcanal.[14] On August 12th, in direct response to the supply shortage resulting from early withdrawal of U.S. cargo transports, Marine Major General Vandergrift ordered reduced-rations for his forces ashore who would henceforth subsist on one or two (often meager) meals per day.[15] This extended hunger resulted in significant loss in weight and capability for the Marines ashore for several weeks until the U.S. Navy re-established the line of supply by sea.[16]

Japanese superiority of the sea also demonstrated the utility of cross domain fires, with weapons designed primarily for effects in one domain critically influencing outcomes in another, a critical component to employment of Multi-Domain operations. The Japanese Navy adeptly used their superior training in nighttime operations to quickly sail within range, bombard Henderson Airfield and U.S. troops ashore, and depart before the U.S. Navy could ever respond effectively. On the night of October 13th-14th, Japanese warships fired over 1,000 14-inch naval shells in the span of 90 minutes, destroying half the U.S. aircraft at Henderson field, killing 41 men ashore and wounding many others through shrapnel and concussion.[17] Additionally, the bombardment destroyed critical airfield maintenance and fuel storage facilities, critically limiting the combat capability of the remaining aircraft. Through adept application of cross domain fires, the Japanese Navy achieved significant victories against U.S. airpower without risking aircraft of their own. In the modern era, strategists should pay careful attention to the vulnerability of high-tech aircraft which rely on a steady flow of sophisticated parts and digital systems, which may become the targets of adversarial cross-domain fires to attack U.S. airpower.

For the Allies at Guadalcanal, U.S. supremacy in the air, defended by Marine and Army ground forces, provided critical effects against the Japanese at sea and on the ground. U.S. airpower projected from Henderson airfield persistently raided Japanese naval warships, transport vessels, and ground-based supply depots. On December 8th, 1942, the Japanese command at Guadalcanal reported 4,200 out of approximately 30,000 troops (roughly 15% of the available forces) were healthy enough to fight.[18] The cumulative effects of persistent U.S. air raids against Japanese logistics nodes on land and sea produced crippling and decisive starvation for the Japanese troops ashore. On December 31st, the Japanese Navy recommended and received approval for the withdrawal of all troops ashore at Guadalcanal, which began in February of 1943.[19]

Conclusion

Guadalcanal and the campaign for the Solomon Islands remain important for study by the contemporary strategist. The Japanese military, while achieving notable tactical victories through skill and bravery, committed grave strategic error by engaging the U.S. in a lengthy campaign for which the Japanese industry, economy, and society would be gradually but decisively overwhelmed by that of the U.S., thus turning the tide of World War II in the Pacific Theater.

Guadalcanal is also an important case-study in certain applications of the modern concept of Multi-Domain Operations. Victories by the Japanese and U.S. in one domain, often using cross domain fires, gave advantages and opened windows of opportunity in other domains. It is also worth noting that the U.S. never committed to large scale offensive combat to force the Japanese army’s capitulation or sudden retreat, which may have been a costly endeavor in manpower. Rather, Marine and Army forces limited the scope of their operations largely to securing and defending Henderson Airfield, allowing the pilots and aircrew to achieve decisive effects on Japanese logistics on land and sea. No one arm of the Allied forces achieved victory alone, rather, the skillful maneuver of combat power by land, air, and sea achieved allied victory at Guadalcanal, the turning point of the Pacific and a notable case study of today’s concept of Multi-Domain Operations.

H. Brandon Morgan is a U.S. Army Officer and Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

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Header Image: U.S. Navy Douglas SBD-3 "Dauntless" dive bombers from scouting squadron VS-8 from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8) approaching the burning Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma to make the third set of attacks on her, during the Battle of Midway, 6 June 1942. (U.S. Navy Photo/Wikimedia)

Notes:

[1] Notable publications of this historical narrative include that of Paul K. Davis, 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); George W.  Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1996); John A. Adams If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

[2] While the term turning point in a military strategic context has no set definition and is thus open to interpretation, Carl von Clausewitz described how a major battlefield victory by a weaker contestant against a stronger opponent can lead to debilitating morale and general retreat by the latter, where the outcome of the war becomes clear, strongly correlating to what may be defined as a turning point. He notes that clarity of the reversed trajectory of war is not always easily seen by the combatants without the full host of available information on losses to enemy forces, and other factors often only available from a historical analysis. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 232-235.

[3] Andres J Aviles, "The Decisiveness of the Battle of Midway." Master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2015. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a623052.pdf.

[4] For the Japanese defeat of U.S. naval forces at the Battle of Savo Island, see John Prados, Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun, 62 (London: Penguin, 2013). For a description of the October 13-14 1942 uncontested Japanese naval bombardment of U.S. troops on Guadalcanal, see Ian W. Toll, The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944, 118 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015). For a description of Japanese air raids against U.S. forces at Henderson Airfield, see Robert Leckie, Challenge for the Pacific: Guadalcanal: The Turning Point of the War, 126 (New York: Bantam, 2010). For reference to the Japanese Army landing a division of troops uncontested at Guadalcanal, see Toll, The Conquering Tide, 174. For a reference to Japanese Army attacks against U.S. ground forces at Guadalcanal, see Leckie, Challenge For the Pacific, 213.

[5] Toll, The Conquering Tide, 142.

[6] Ibid., 10.

[7] Ibid., 9.

[8] Ibid, 186-7.

[9] Aviles, The Decisiveness of the Battle of Midway, 67.

[10] Ibid., 66.

[11] The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2018, Figure 1. Logic Map, V. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf.

[12] US Army General (Retired) David Perkins discusses the evolution of joint doctrine and the evolution of “federated” solutions from the separate services to “converged” solutions in the following podcast hosted by Mr. John Amble, Modern War Institute at West Point, December 6, 2017. https://mwi.usma.edu/mwi-podcast-future-multi-domain-battlespace-gen-david-perkins/

[13] The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, x.

[14] Toll, The Conquering Tide, 53.

[15] Ibid., 61.

[16] Ibid., 99.

[17] Although the Japanese battleships were originally designed for combat against enemy warships, the sailors aboard conducted several firing tests in Truk Lagoon to determine how to maximize their utility against parked aircraft and fortified positions akin to those of U.S. forces at Guadalcanal. An impact angle of 25 degrees, achieved by firing from 16,000 meters (well out of range of the U.S. artillery at Guadalcanal) achieved optimal destruction of the Japanese Navy’s intended targets. Additionally, the Japanese specifically developed naval shells with a thin casing filled with shrapnel and incendiary, instantaneously fused to maximize destruction of ground targets rather than the traditional target of armored enemy vessels; a profound example of the use of cross-domain fires. Ibid., 138.

[18] Matome Ugaki, Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Catherine Dillon. Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945 (University of Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Pr, 1991), 301.

[19] The Imperial Japanese Navy’s recommendation to Emperor Hirohito for the total withdrawal of troops at Guadalcanal followed previous intentions of the Japanese Army to divert the 6th and 51st Divisions from operations in mainland China to land at Guadalcanal for offensive operations against U.S. forces. The Japanese Navy’s primary objections centered on logistics; namely, if 30,000 Japanese troops on Guadalcanal could not be fed, landing, and then feeding another 50,000 was simply out of the question. Toll, The Conquering Tide, 179.