Seven of the fourteen United Nations peacekeeping missions currently deployed throughout the world are in Africa.[1] Not only does the continent include half the countries in which the blue helmets operate, but it also accounts for around 80% of the total budget allocated to peacekeeping operations.[2] Nonetheless, peacekeepers seem to struggle with the implementation of their mandates. What should have been rare announcements of the loss of soldiers from the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) turned out to occur quite frequently.[3] The U.N Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), deployed to the country since 1999, hardly manages to protect the population against the many dangers threatening their lives. The peacekeepers face the same issues in South Sudan and are, on the whole, accused of contravening the principle of impartiality, a core value of peacekeeping alongside the consent of the parties and the non-use of force except in situations of self-defence.[4]

This article argues these failures undermine the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. It also demonstrates the struggles experienced by the blue-helmets are caused by both the context in which they operate and a long process of transition towards new forms of peacekeeping that contradict their core principles.

The confusion surrounding the core pillars of U.N. peacekeeping missions, in particular regarding the notion of impartiality, is a crucial factor explaining the decrease of the blue-helmets’ credibility in Africa. In 1958, Dag Hammarskjöld—second Secretary-General of the U.N.—declared impartiality in peacekeeping means peacekeepers should not “be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution.”[5] This concept was immediately associated with the idea of neutrality, as peacekeepers avoided any destabilisation of the balance of power in their region of deployment and therefore treated all the warring parties equally. Both impartiality and neutrality promoted a minimum—if not completely absent—use of force except in situations of self-defence, which entirely blurred the distinction between the two.[6] However, neutral peacekeeping is possible only in peacetime or when all belligerents in a given conflict commit to ending the fighting.[7]

While the U.N. tended to be successful in protecting civilians during the Cold War, the events of the 1990s forced scholars and the international community to rethink the concept of impartiality in peacekeeping. Indeed, the blue-helmets’ failure to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi threw into question what had, over the years, become a dogma. In an attempt to recover the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping missions, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that “impartiality does not—and must not—mean neutrality in the face of evil,” and he subsequently sponsored the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report.[8] This report first reiterated the attachment to the core values of peacekeeping, before adding that deployed peacekeepers “must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully,” even if it may compromise their principles.[9]

The scholar Hikaru Yamashita argues that since the Brahimi report impartiality has merged with the notion of loyalty to the mission mandate to allow peacekeepers to use force against any group or person that would pose a threat to the blue-helmets’ agenda.[10] This completes Dominick Donald’s definition of new impartiality, which suggests “an impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict…and is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking sides,'' as opposed to passive neutral entities which suffer from restrictions imposed by warring parties.[11] In the eyes of many, the distinction between the two notions remained hazy, as both impartiality and neutrality suggest no belligerent should be favoured or assisted by peacekeepers, with the Brahimi report simply allowing more permissiveness regarding the use of force.[12] In 2008, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations published its principles and guidelines on peacekeeping, seeking to clarify the situation once and for all:

“Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity...A Peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality...Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties.”[13]

Unfortunately, it seems U.N. officials did not consider the warnings of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and failed to understand the complexity of African political dynamics and their impact on the implementation of the blue-helmets’ missions on the continent. The mandates given to peacekeepers in Africa are not compatible with civil war situations and therefore affect their reputation as impartial forces. In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this problem stems from a misconception of the situation. The international community perceived the Congo to be a post-conflict case where violence was inherent to the region even in peacetime and underestimated the role of the Congolese government in the widespread chaos tearing the country apart.[14] For that reason, the first mandate of the U.N Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)—tasking peacekeepers with supporting the ongoing military operations in the country, protecting the Congolese population, and consolidating the state’s authority throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo—was destined to face paradoxes that would severely undermine its credibility.[15]

The mission is torn between the necessity of maintaining the consent of the Congolese government and the successful implementation of its mandate. Nevertheless, the regime of Joseph Kabila—President of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2001 to 2019—had been particularly brutal and represented a grave threat to Congolese civilians for nearly two decades. In 2016, the U.S. Department of State published a report stating Kinshasa was responsible for human rights abuses, including disappearances, arbitrary arrests, violence, and sexual assault—especially towards women and ethnic minorities.[16] The document also pointed out that authorities often refuse to prosecute or punish officials or soldiers who committed these violations, allowing human rights abuses to happen with near-total impunity within the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[17] Under these circumstances, how could the peacekeepers remain credible in the eyes of the population while supporting the Congolese state in its  so-called will to pacify the country? Worse, if the latter loses legitimacy—as it shows every sign of doing—so will the U.N. mission. This is illustrated by the 2012 crisis, when part of the Congolese armed forces undertook a mutiny that quickly degenerated into a rebellion. The rebels—regrouped under the banner of the M23 movement—inflicted crushing defeats on the rest of the Congolese army while spreading terror in North Kivu, contributing to the degradation of the security situation in the region.

In May 2013, a joint-report produced by the U.N. Joint Human Rights Office and the U.N Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) revealed Congolese soldiers retreating from the fighting and perpetrating acts of sexual violence against civilians. At least 97 women and 33 girls were raped, including some as young as six years old.[18] The M23 movement was eventually dismantled on November 5, 2013, following a raid conducted by a military formation called the U.N. Force Intervention Brigade.[19] The rebellion had disastrous repercussions on the peacekeepers’ reputation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as they became associated with the fiasco of the Congolese army in the eyes of the population.[20] It is hard to imagine how a population that suffered from such atrocities could understand that peacekeepers are deployed for reinstating state authority throughout the country when the state itself behaves as an enemy of its people.

Similarly, the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali became a party to the conflict by sharing intelligence with the French counterterrorism operation Barkhane deployed in the Sahel and the Malian armed forces. Consequently, Tuareg separatists—including those opposing Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—may be targeted by the Malian army because of the information given by the blue-helmets.[21] By openly siding with the states mentioned above, peacekeeping missions tasked with stabilisation mandates that include the protection of civilians breach the principle of impartiality, undermining their credibility.[22]

Alongside the difficulty of finding a balance between the consent of host states and the doctrine of impartiality, the evolution of the use of force also enters into contradiction with the central pillars of peacekeeping. Growing concern for the protection of civilians following the Rwandan genocide led to a new approach to peacekeeping missions, more robust and willing to undertake all necessary actions required to accomplish  U.N. objectives.[23] This robust doctrine was implemented for the first time on August 15, 2005 during Operation Iron Fist, in which blue-helmets of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti engaged Haitian criminal gangs, firing more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition and mortars in a few hours and eventually eliminating one of the most powerful mobsters operating in the country.[24] Iron Fist marked a shift towards stabilisation missions with an increasing level of robustness, embodied by the current mandates given to peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and the Central African Republic.[25] Although the U.N. Security Council continues to claim modern peacekeeping missions operate solely at a tactical level, this article agrees with John Karlsrud’s notion that blue-helmets also operate at a strategic level, thus getting closer to both U.N.-led counterterrorism and peace-enforcement missions.[26] Similarly, Mats Berdal argues the creation of the U.N. Force Intervention Brigade in the Congo during the M23 crisis represents a milestone in this evolution, as peacekeepers became officially allowed and, indeed, encouraged to take the initiative in the use of force.[27]

In March 2013, a new mandate for the U.N Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) tasked peacekeepers with preventing the expansion of all armed groups presenting a threat to state authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, if necessary, to neutralise the groups in question.[28] Furthermore, the foundation of the All Source Information Fusion Unit in Mali reinforces John Karlsrud’s argument on the transition towards more strategic peacekeeping interventions. Launched in March 2014, the All Source Information Fusion Unit seeks to produce intelligence destined for peacekeepers to enhance the decision-making process of civilian and military leadership with the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[29] By its very nature, this new structure demonstrates the growing military strategic perspective in U.N. peacekeeping. Finally, as the first peacekeeping operation mandated to work resolutely alongside counterterrorism operations, the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) marked another turning point for the use of force by the U.N. Its cooperation with Barkhane coupled with its robust mandate may represent the beginning of future U.N.-led counter-insurgency or counterterrorism operations, which would spell the end of the current format of peacekeeping interventions.[30]

Though the expanding robustness of peacekeeping operations affects the peacekeepers’ ability to remain impartial, it is the promotion by the U.N. of this more extensive use of force that has the greatest impact on its credibility, as peacekeepers suffer from political and structural limitations that diminish their ability to conduct their missions successfully.[31] In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on U.N. Peace Operations stated the latter “lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialised military preparation required, among other aspects” required to implement their mandate properly.[32] The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in particular, gives a clear illustration of the consequences of such structural weaknesses. The mission had to operate with only half of its mandated troops for over a year and consequently became the privileged target of the terrorist armed groups operating in the region.[33] Without accusing the U.N. of total negligence towards its blue-helmets, these unresolved issues have dramatic outcomes, as exemplified by 204 fatalities among its Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeepers as of August 31, 2019.[34] While such high losses should have accelerated the efforts for equipping the blue-helmets properly, the U.N. Security Council noted in June 2018 that peacekeepers in Mali still suffer from a shortage of helicopters and mine-protected vehicles.[35] These deficiencies also have repercussions on the lives of the civilians who are supposed to be protected by  U.N. peacekeeping missions. In August 2010, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) failed to prevent the mass rape of more than 300 inhabitants of North Kivu during a raid conducted by armed militias.[36] Likewise, despite its best efforts, the U.N. Mission in South Sudan could not prevent the slaughter of hundreds of civilians during the Juba clashes of 2016.[37] Interviewed on the growing promotion of the use of force by the U.N. and its perception in the eyes of the African populations, Dr. Aly Tounkara gives an answer that both reinforces and endorses the key arguments of the second part of this article:

In Africa, the gap between the expectations of the populations and what they actually see from peacekeepers keeps growing, especially in Mali. Civilians thought that the blue-helmets would defeat the jihadists proliferating on the Malian soil, but instead, MINUSMA tries its best to avoid any zone of conflict, and mainly stays in the city-centres. Moreover, how could peacekeepers be credible when it comes to the protection of the Malian people, while they are barely able to protect themselves?[38]

Overall, it seems U.N. peacekeeping missions have reached a deadlock. Peacekeepers—originally supposed to be deployed in environments where there is a peace to keep—are now sent into civil war alongside counterterrorism missions and are tasked with peace-enforcement missions incompatible with their core principles. Asked to support questionable regimes in the re-establishment of their authority over lost territories, the blue-helmets gradually lose all legitimacy as impartial forces in the eyes of both rebel groups and unarmed civilians. This paradox, coupled with the repeated failures to protect civilians in Africa and the inability to defeat the terrorist armed groups proliferating in the Sahel, inflicted critical blows to the credibility of the peacekeepers on the continent. This gradual deterioration of the U.N. peacekeeping missions will continue as long as the Security Council does not stop tasking the latter with infeasible mandates in non-permissive environments. Though the challenges faced by the various missions discussed here are likely to be part of a transition process towards new forms of peacekeeping, they could also spell the end of robust mandates, considering the high casualty rates among the blue-helmets throughout the African continent and the impact this has had on troop-contributing nations’ populations and governments.

Nicolas Salaün is a candidate for the MA in Conflict, Security & Development with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He also holds a Joint-Honours BA in War Studies & History from the same university.

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Header Image: A convoy with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA/United Nations)

Notes:

[1] United Nations Peacekeeping Website: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate

[2] Calculated from the data stated in the “Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019” produced by the United Nations General Assembly https://undocs.org/en/A/C.5/72/25 [Accessed April 10, 2019]

[3] As of August 31, 2019, 204 MINUSMA peacekeepers died within the context of the war in Mali. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities [Accessed October 8, 2019]

[4] Tomi Oladipo (2017), “The UN’s peacekeeping nightmare in Africa,” BBC NEWS, January 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38372614 [Accessed April 10, 2019]

[5] United Nations (1958), Document A/3943, para. 167.

[6] Hikaru Yamashita, “Impartial Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, (2008), p. 616.

[7] Dominick Donald, “Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping in the Beginning of the 21st Century,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, (2002), p. 23.

[8] United Nations (1999), Press Release SG/SM/6865, p. 4.

[9] United Nations (2000), Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, p. 10.

[10] Hikaru Yamashita, “Impartial Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, (2008), p. 617.

[11] Dominick Donald, “Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping in the Beginning of the 21st Century,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, (2002), p. 22.

[12] Dominick Donald, “Neutral is not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 3, (2003), p. 417.

[13] United Nations (2008), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, p. 33

[14] Séverine Autesserre, “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention,” International Organization, Vol. 63, (2009), p. 251.

[15] United Nations (2010), S/RES/1925, pp. 3-4.

[16] U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2016), p. 1.

[17] Ibid. p. 2.

[18] United Nations Joint Human Rights Office & United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2013), p. 9.

[19] Sabine Cessou (2013), “Congo dares to hope for peace after M23 rebels surrender,” The Guardian, November 6, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/06/congo-peace-m23-rebel-surrender-drc [Accessed April 9, 2019]

[20] Alan Doss, "MONUSCO,” In The Oxford Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 807.

[21] Michelangelo Freyrie, “The United Nations in Mali: A New Approach to Peacekeeping?," The Strategy Bridge, February 11, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/2/11/the-united-nations-in-mali-a-new-approach-to-peacekeeping  [Accessed March 22, 2019]

[22] Alex J. Bellamy, & Charles T. Hunt, “Twenty-First Century UN Peace Operations: Protection, Force and the Changing Security Environment,” International Affairs, Vol. 91, (2015), pp. 1281-1282.

[23] Mats Berdal, “What Are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?,” In United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, ed. Coning C., Peter M. (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019), p. 118.

[24] Colum Lynch (2005), “U.N. Peacekeeping More Assertive, Creating Risk for Civilians,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/08/15/un-peacekeeping-more-assertive-creating-risk-for-civilians/29749e76-0131-40fd-9fe2-195abecb4408/?resType=accessibility&utm_term=.a6c3b0961fbb [Accessed April 11, 2019]

[25] John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace- enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, (2015), p. 43.

[26] United Nations Peacekeeping Website: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping; John Karlsrud, “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace- enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, (2015), p. 48.

[27] Mats Berdal, “What Are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?,” In United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, ed. Coning C., Peter M. (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019), p. 118.

[28] United Nations (2013), S/RES/2098, p. 7.

[29] Sebastiaan Rietjens, & Erik de Waard, “UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 30, (2017), p. 533.

[30] John Karlsrud, “Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?,” Third World Quaterly, Vol. 38, No. 6, (2017), p. 1225.

[31] Robert Mood (2015), Force Commanders’ Advice to the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations.

[32] United Nations (2015), Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, p. 45.

[33] Walter Lotze, “MINUSMA,” In The Oxford Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 862.

[34] Data available on the United Nations Peacekeeping website: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities

[35] United Nations (2018), S/RES/2423, p. 4.

[36] Alan Doss, “MONUSCO,” In The Oxford Handbook on UN Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 806.

[37] UNMISS (2016), Press Release, July 10, 2016.

[38] Interview conducted by the author of this essay in Paris, on February 2, 2019, with Dr. Aly Tounkara, Professor and Researcher at the University of Bamako.